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TULLY's Five Books *DE FINIBUS*;

OR,

Concerning the last Object

OF

Desire and *Aversion.*

Done into *English* by *S. P.* Gent.

Revis'd and Compar'd with the Original, with a Recommendatory Preface.

By *JEREMY COLLIER*, M. A.

TOGETHER,

With an *Apology* for the Philosophical Writings of *Cicero*, in a Letter to the *Translator.*

By Mr. *Henry Dodwell.*

LONDON,

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ADAMS 2212

TO

Mr. *CHERRY*,

Of *Shottesbrook* in *Berks.*

SIR,

THE *Design of* Dedications *has been so long abus'd, that* Modesty *obliges me not to make you a Tender of my Respects* in this way, *much more than Yourself not to admit of it. And yet if I should* spare *you, I could not excuse it to myself, when I consider* your Title *to the* present Argument, *and how good a* Judge *you are both of* That *and the* Translation.

I have concern'd myself with the greatest Oratour, *and* one of the greatest Philosophers *that ever appear'd. And therefore* Decency *forbids my Name at length in the* Title-Page. *But at the same time the World will be so Just* (*I hope*) *to the* Translatour, *as to compute upon the Sense he has of* Your Favours, *in proportion to the Eminence of his* Authour's Character.

Cicero, *as appears by his dedicating so great a Part of his Works to* Brutus, *found few of his* Fellow-Citizens *that deserv'd his* Address. *Had he liv'd in our Days* (*whatever some Peo-*

ple imagine) he must have been more at a Loss for Men of Merit. And you may be sensible that I flatter you as little as I wrong the rest of my Countrymen, when I tell you there are not very many among them, Worthy of Cicero's *Philosophy, and none Worthier than Yourself.*

And that you may live long as admir'd an Example, *as you have always liv'd, of* Religion, Piety, Goodness, Candour, *and* Prudence, *Happy in* Yourself *and* Yours, *Happy in the Success of your* Designs *and* Affairs, *Happy in the* Exercise *and* Use *of* your Learning, *Happy in the* Neighbourhood *and* Conversation *of* Mr. Dodwell, *(one of the greatest Felicities I can wish you in this world) Happy in the Acquisition and Enjoyment of whatever as a* Good Christian *and a* Wise Man *you have reason to think* Valuable *here, 'till you attain the* Completion *of* Human Happiness *in a* better State, *is the Prayer of,*

Honour'd Sir,

Your most oblig'd

And humble Servant,

S. P.

Samuel Parker.

Mr *Collier*'s Preface TO THE READER.

THE following *Treatise*, for the Importance of it, may well be call'd the *Grand Question*. The Enquiry is concerning the Seat of the *Soveraign Good*, the Complement of Human Happiness, and the farthest Object of Desire. And here all considerable Parties are allow'd to put in their Claim; to argue their Pretences at length, and make the most of their Cause. In the first place *Torquatus* stands up for *Epicurus*, and harangues it strongly in behalf of *Pleasure*: And by concealing the Defects, and heightening the Advantages of his *System*, makes the Argument entertaining enough. But then *Tully* appearing in Person on the other side, pulls-off *Torquatus*'s Paint, exposes the Fallacy of his Reasoning, and the Scandal of his *Hypothesis*; And in short, makes a perfect Conquest of *Epicurus* and all his *Clan*: And this is the Subject of the two first *Books*. In the *Third* the famous *Cato Uticensis* comes on in Defence of the *Stoicks*; calls *Virtue* and *Happiness* the same Thing, and courts nothing but what is strictly Honourable and Just: And thus by the Lustre of his *Object*,

by begging a Principle or two, arguing conſiſtently, and flouriſhing handſomly upon the Character of his *Wiſe Man*, he makes his Philoſophy look plauſible, ſolemn, and great. In the *Fourth Book*, *Tully* enters the Liſts again againſt *Cato*, takes his Plea in pieces, proves the *Stoical* Proviſion for Happineſs too narrow, ſhews the Vanity and Canting of that *Sect*, and that tho' their Terms were different, their Principles were much the ſame with thoſe of the *Peripateticks*, whoſe *Moral* Scheme in the *Fifth Book* is explain'd at large, and defended by *Piſo*. This *Argument* we ſee muſt have a great deal of Learning, and Curioſity in it; Inſomuch that the *Matter* and *Notional* Part wou'd be ſufficient to recommend it, tho' under an ordinary Management: How then muſt it ſhine in the Hands of ſo great a Maſter as *Tully*? So rich in his Invention, ſo exact in his Method, ſo cloſe in his Reaſoning, and ſo pompous in his Elocution? As for the *Tranſlation*, I have had the Satisfaction to compare it with the *Original*; and am of Opinion the *Criticks* will find the *Authours Senſe* well repreſented, which in ſo nice and uncommon a Subject, is no eaſie Performance: Beſides, the Phraſeology is *Engliſh*, and the Turn lively and agreable: And in ſome Places I ſhall venture to ſay, *Tully* is improv'd by Tranſplanting, and thrives better in our Soil, than in his own.

J. COLLIER

John Gerrish

THE

Translator's Preface.

'TIS *not the Formality of the thing which drawes a Preamble from me, but I would gladly give my Reader some necessary Hints, and obviate a brace of Prejudices, the one* against Translations *in* general, *the other* against Translations of those Authors which are call'd Inimitable.

To expostulate upon the former; What's the meaning of Ignorance *and* Conceitedness, *unless it be,* to understand nothing of other People's Knowledge, and preferr one's own before it? *Our unhappy Nation has more reason than any other to distrust itself; and, since 'twill ne'r be the better for its own, to try the* Cheaper Experience *of* Former Ages *and* Foreign Countries. *Besides; to make* Good Sense Inclosure *is a* Contempt *of* Providence, *which has design'd it of more general Benefit than the* Sun, *and as communicable thro' the Distances of Time as Place. For tho' 'tis inconsistent with the Order of Nature, an Universal Equality of Privileges and Conditions; Yet* Empty Heads *are to be furnished from* Full ones, *and not only Authoriz'd but Oblig'd to supply themselves* as they can. *If some People have thought more to the Purpose than we; why don't we allow the* Advantage, *and convert it to our own, as readily as the* Juice *of* French Grapes, *or the* Manufacture *of* Indian Artificers?

'Tis objected that Translations *make us* Idle, *and Forgetful of the* Originals. *Rather they should seem to*

putus in mind of them: And this is the least Good they can do. I confess they may be trifled with, and so may the Originals, *and a great many* Valuable Things *beside, and that is, by Those who will not give themselves the Trouble of making a right Use of them; for they are serviceable to those that understand the* Originals, *by* illustrating the Sense, *and to those that don't, by* imparting it; *while the latter have the Pleasure of* Novelty, *and the former, of* Variety *into the Bargain.*

Another Stratagem *is, either to alarm our* Modesty, *or dispute our* Prudence; *If the* Original's *good for something, 'twas* Arrogance *to render it; if good for nothing, we made a* Foolish Choice. *Here's a* Dilemma! *in obedience to which, no doubt, we are to let the Illiterate Part of the World lie uninform'd and destitute of those Instructions, which were intended them by the Learned! What if we can't reach the* Grandeur, Eloquence, Neatness, *and I know not what all, of an Authour's* Expression? *Must we lose his* Morality? *Shall we stifle the serious Principles and Solitary Precepts of a* Greek *or* Latin Philosopher, *in a complement to the Singular Graces of his Stile, and very often to the Fancy'd ones?* Reason *is not given for the sake of* Language, *but* Language *for the sake of* Reason; *And 'tis rightly observ'd by Men of Sense, that* our having a Relish, *as 'tis call'd, that is in plain* English, a greater regard to Words than Things, *may come in among the* Causes *of all our* Publick Indiscretions *and* Irregularities.

I am sensible Cicero *in the Title-Page is enough, with some People, to prevent the good Impressions of his own Discourses. But no matter, he'll take effect, in his* Dishabille, *upon the Understandings of Those that deserve to be the better for him. For here they will have his Argument laid out in the same equal Distribution and Method as* Brutus *himself receiv'd it, tho' not in the same Propriety and Easiness of Language, which the Matter will admit of as little as the Authour. If I have made those Terms Intelligible in* English, *which it cost him so much Pains to find* Latin *for, let the* Reader *be content.* Tully *deriv'd most of his Philosophical Notions from the* Greeks, *whose Thoughts were so refin'd*

and

and uncommon sometimes, that as rich as was their Language, they were oblig'd to explain themselves in Words provided o'purpose. Now Tully *endeavour'd to carry up these* Notions, *and set them out with a greater Variety of Expression; so that if our* Tongue *can be made to keep pace with him, 'tis not a little for its* Credit.

As to the Argument *of the following Treatise; 'tis, as the Authour takes Occasion more than once to observe, the* main Question *and* most Material Point *that* immediately *concerns us in* Philosophy, *the* Origin *as well as* Consummation *of it. For Men are as little Inclinable to act, unless for an End, as to desist 'till they compass it; and therefore if they mistake the worse for the better, 'tis a desperate Case.* Tully *has handled the Enquiry at large: In the first and third Book he reports the Resolutions of the* Epicureans *and* Stoicks *in their full Force and Validity, out of the Mouths of two very Remarkable and Popular Champions, each for his Cause. In the second he confutes, and, as became him, lashes the Pretensions of the first; and in the fourth discovers and rectifies the Errors of* Stoicism, *but with all the Deference due to so* Generous Over-sights. *In the fifth,* Piso *presents his* Chart *of the* Peripatetical *Principles, according to the best Intention and Tenour of them. And from first to last my Authour's Ingenuity is as observable for the Constructions he puts upon the Sense of his Adversaries, as his Reach of Judgment in the Detection of their Absurdities. His way of* Disproving *is Fair, Genteel, Entertaining and Politick; He first makes one Enemy conquer another for him, and then subdues them both for himself. Nor has he pinch'd the Controversy, but wrought it up with many Incidental Observations, Reflexions, and Authorities. He besprinkles it with* Poetical Citations *from the best* Wits, *and surprizing Instances of Vertue and Wisdom, Domestick and Foreign. In a word, so comprehensive has he form'd his* Essay, *that, beside the several Opinions of all the old* Philosophers, *as well Those whose Writings are perish'd as Others, about* Moral Ends, *it affords a Satisfactory Abridgment of all the* Ancient, Natural *and* Moral Philosophy *and* Logick; *with a faithful Account of them,*

and

and a handsom Judgment upon them too. But for this the Reader is recommended to Mr. Dodwell's *excellent Apology, which he has honour'd me with before my Translation.*

All this while it must be confess'd, that sometimes he strikes upon a Prejudice or an Error. As when, for Example, in the Second Book a Fit of Doubting *comes upon him, and he dares not averr This or That in relation to the* Moral Ends *there mention'd. In the same Book he speaks fair of the* Violences *of* Lucretia *and* L. Virginius; *so does* Piso *unreprov'd in the fifth, tho' he discountenanc'd the Practice of* Self-Murder *a little before. There is a Passage in the Fourth Book inclining to a Supposition of the Soul's Materiality; but then in the Fifth, where* Piso *asserts the Perpetuity of its Operation, our Authour, by not afterwards questioning or objecting against it, allows it, and declares vigorously for the Probability of it, in the First Book of his* Tuscular Questions *and* Scipio's Dream. *Elsewhere* Piso *ventures too far, and* Cicero *takes no Notice of it.* No Man, *says he,* could mistake his Chief Good, nor consequently his own Measures, did he but understand the full Significancy of his Nature assoon as he was born. *If these two Great Men had liv'd long enough to be acquainted with St.* Paul's *Doctrine, that* we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our Sufficiency is of God, *and the Reasons he gives for it, they had alter'd their Opinion. These are some of the most exceptionable Positions: I should have mentioned one more which leads up the Rear, but That the* Reader *will find consider'd at Length in the* Appendix.

To make some amends for these Illusions, *his allow'd Sentences are all Weighty, Consequential, Clear, and Apposite. He's a Stranger to the* Windings *of* Plato, *the Intricacies of* Aristotle, *and the Hastiness of* Seneca. *He has* Epictetus's Morals, *not without the* Rationale. *And had he not been by Birth a* Republican, *was qualify'd by Nature to have argu'd as Majestically and Compendiously as* Antonine *himself. However in one respect no Authour has been more Unhappy than* Cicero, *that the* Excellence *of his Performances has baulk'd*

the

the Use *of them, and begot such a superstitious Reverence in those that might have been his Interpreters, as to hinder the Distribution of that Influence which he design'd Universal. I know some Parts of his* Philosophy *have within these few Years appear'd in* English. *An Attempt (as it happens, an unkind one) has been made upon his* Tusculan Questions, *and his Books* of the Nature of the Deities. *The* British Cicero *alone has copy'd the* Roman *to the Life, in his admirable and envy'd* Translation of the Offices. *'Tis true,* these Three, *with that which follows, are the* Substance *of his* Ethicks; *but what other profitable Precepts and Suggestions are to be collected from the* Remainder, *I believe, might do some Service among us recommended in our own Tongue, especially in an Age when People rave after* Experiments, *and, like the Generality of* Madmen, *will not be brought to their Wits* but in their own Way; *When the Obligations of* Christianity *are Disown'd as well as Violated; and that which should make them Serious, is the Subject of their Mirth.* Nor can we wonder that they who have lost Religion, have lost themselves.

An

AN

APOLOGY

FOR THE

Philoſophical Writings

OF

CICERO.

Dear Sir,

(1.) *Many of* Cicero's *Accounts of* Philoſophy *are not of his* own *Senſe, but of* other *Philoſophers of a moſt flouriſhing* Age. *And are therefore to be valued according to* their *Reputation, rather than* his.

I See no Reaſon why you ſhould be diſcouraged in your Endeavours to recommend the Reading of the *Philoſophical Works* of *Cicero* to our *Nation* for any thing that has yet been objected againſt his excellency in *Philoſophy*. His *Philoſophical Works* might have been the *perfecteſt* of the *Kind*, though himſelf could not pretend to have been the *perfecteſt* of the *Philoſophers*. They who think otherwiſe are not ſufficiently aware that the *greateſt* Part of his *Philoſophical Works* is only a *Tranſlation* of the *Senſe* of *others*, (as yours is of the *Words* of *Cicero* himſelf) for the benefit of his own *Nation*. This he frequently owns and profeſſes. Here therefore it is not by his *own* Credit, but that of the *Original Authours*, by which we are to preſume of the accurateneſs of thoſe *Notions* which were *Theirs*, not *Cicero's*. Thoſe *Authours*, how *deſerving* they were, we cannot *immediately* judge, having loſt their *own Originals*. But that is ſo far from *derogating*, that it adds to the *Value* of what your Authour has preſerv'd of them. It makes his Accounts *Originals*, at leaſt to *Us*, whilſt we have no *certainer* Accounts, than *his*, by which we can pretend to examine how *faithfully* and *truly* he has *apprehended* and *expreſſed* the meaning of his *Authors*. This very conſideration alone is very valuable for to recommend the *Philoſophical Works*

of

of your most deservedly admir'd Authour, that we have no where else so accurate an Account of the *later* Sects of the *Philosophers*, and of their particular Improvements of what they found invented by their common Ancestors, as in him. We have lost all the Writings of the *Philosophers* from the time of *Theophrastus* to *Christ*, excepting some few *Fragments* at *second* hand, from Authors more remote from the time of his *Original Authors*, and therefore more liable to just *Exception* in reporting their Sense, than *Cicero*. We cannot have a mean Opinion of what he has preserved for us of this kind, if we have any Value for the *Philosophers* whose Doctrine he has so preserved. And those we have reason to believe to have been the most *Eminent* of their *Profession*. They came after *Pythagoras* and *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and had the great Advantage of *perfecting* what they found so happily *begun*, from so many admirable Intimations which they received from their sagacious *Predecessors*. This was the *time* wherein *Philosophy* was *improving*, and wherein we have reason to believe that it received its uttermost *Perfection*, as what was thought performable by *Men*. Accordingly we find the *Philosophers* after *Christ* (perhaps in Emulation of him) particularly laying themselves out in discovering *Divine* Authorities for what they had received, as if they believed it incapable of any farther Accession by *Human* Industry. Such were the *Oracles* of *Orpheus* and *Zoroastres* and *Hermes*, and other *Heathen Oracles*, out of which *Porphyry* collected a *Body* of *Philosophy*, which he thought *Divinely* inspired. Then it was that the *Adepti* pretended to *Theurgies* answering the *Christian Miracles*. Then they were stiled *Divine* : So *Pythagoras* : So his Disciple *Zamolxis*, if he was indeed his Disciple : So *Plato* among the *Ancients* : So (after Christ) *Apollonius*, *Apuleius*, *Plotinus*, *Porphyry* himself, and his Disciple *Jamblichus*. Why so, if they had thought their *Philosophy* capable of any further Cultivation by Inventions purely *Human* ? This therefore was the *perfectest Age* of *Philosophy*, when, besides the Patronage of the *Macedonian* Princes, they had withal the convenience of the publick *Libraries* of *Pergamus* and *Alexandria*, which they never had before. This enabled them to make the best of each *others* Inventions, and to lay out themselves on *new Discoveries*, when they could now so easily know what had *already* been thought of by their most accurate *Predecessors*. This therefore

was

was the happieſt *Age* of *Philoſophy*. And there is little doubt but *Cicero* pitch'd on the *beſt* Thoughts of the *ableſt* Perſons of that happy *Age*, as the fitteſt to be communicated to his own *Citizens*, and to receive the Ornaments of his own incomparable *Style*. This did not require any *Invention* of his own, but *Judgment* only concerning *other* Mens *Inventions*. All that was his *own* in Works of this Nature is his *expreſſing* their Thoughts to *Roman* Ears. And who can think this any *Diſparagement* to them? It muſt, on the contrary, be very acceptable to thoſe *Philoſophers* who valued *Oratory* as it really deſerved, that is, to the *Academicks* and the *Peripateticks*. If *Plato*'s own Stile was thought worthy *Jupiter*, if he would ſpeak *Greek*, where can they find a Stile more worthy a *Tranſlation* of him than that of *Cicero*, if *Jupiter* himſelf would have his Senſe rendred into *Latin*? Here certainly your *Criticks* can find nothing *unworthy* your Author, where every thing is *admirable* and *extraordinary*, as well the *Matter* as the *Stile*, as well what he has from *others*, as what is properly his *own*. What can even themſelves deſire more to make a work every way *worthy* of him?

(2.) *In this way he has preſerved Memoirs of the Sects which took moſt with the* Romans, *the* Platoniſts, *the* Stoicks *and the* Epicureans.

The *Sects* of the *Philoſophers* that took moſt with the *Romans* were the *Platoniſts*, the *Stoicks*, and the *Epicureans*. Theſe were encouraged by publick *Salaries*, as the *Peripatetick* was afterwards; but I do not know whether it was ſo frequented with *Roman* Proſelytes in the days of *Cicero*. And of all theſe he has given excellent Accounts on ſeveral very important Subjects. That which he owns himſelf is the School of the *Platoniſts*, or the *Academicks*, and of their ſeveral Subdiviſions and Innovations he has informed us as they came in his way. But principally of the *new Sects* of freſh Memory of the *Antiochians* and *Philonians*, concerning whom your *Criticks* cannot doubt but that his Teſtimony is very unexceptionable. Next the *Academicks* there was no *Hereſy* to which he was more favourable than to that of the *Stoicks*. To this he was endeared by the Intereſt of two of his greateſt and moſt admired Friends, *Cato* and *Brutus*, and of his Maſter *Antiochus*, who at laſt differ'd very little from them. This he ſeems to own as the principal Inducement to his Favour of it in his firſt Attempts of this kind. Yet when this *Recommendation* had made it *familiar* to him, he writes *himſelf* like a *Proſelyte* of it.

His

His Concern for the Disorders of the *Commonwealth* made him inclinable to believe those same Opinions, the belief of which had produced such *constancy* in Persons equally *concern'd* with himself, that he might *himself* enjoy the *Benefits* of those *Opinions* which he so much admired in *them*. It was very natural for so great a Genius to *rival* what he *admired*, where he had such Obligations of *Interest* readily to lay hold on all the *Expedients* of *Philosophy* that might support him under so afflictive Circumstances. Besides these the *Epicurean* Philosophy when it came to be known, proved very acceptable to the Genius of the *Romans* of that *Age*: I say, when it was *known*, because I am sensible with what *Indignation* and *Contempt* the first mention of it was received by *Fabricius* in the time of *Pyrrhus*. Yet that hindred not but that it was too contagious in the *next* Age of *Cicero*. Besides *Cicero*'s *Torquatus* and *Valleius* and *Plato*, we have *Lucretius*, a very elegant *Roman* Poet, a great admirer of that Philosophy in the same *Age* with your Author, though younger than him. *Cicero* and *Macrobius* also mention another *Roman*, *Amafanius* on the same Subject, probably as old as any of them. After them *Aufidius Bassus* the Historian, who continued *Livy*, is observed by *Seneca* to have been a Disciple of the same School. We have also no reason to doubt that *Seneca*'s *Lucilius* was the same way affected, and that it was in complement to him that *Seneca* takes so many occasions of commending *Epicurus* for Sentences more becoming his own Brethren the *Stoicks*, than the Disciple of *Epicurus* himself. And this I doubt to have been the Sense of the elder *Pliny*, so far I am from believing him guilty of the extream of *Credulity*, with which he is too *commonly*, and I think very *unjustly* aspersed. So far *Philosophy* in *general* is indebted to your Author for his Performances of this kind, as a *Translator* of the *Inventions* of his *Predecessors*.

Plutarch. Pyrrh.

(3.)

But he has also Writings of another Nature, wherein he takes upon him, like a Master *Sophist*, to give his *own* Sense on *Philosophical* Subjects proposed *ex tempore*. Here certainly he makes more use of his *Invention* than his *Memory*, and does not confine himself to the Sentiments of any one particular *Sect*, but freely delivers his *own* Thoughts without any regard whether any had thought on them *before*. And what can your Criticks

He has also given his own *Sense on* Philosophical *Subjects, which he studied with more* Application *than any thing else excepting* Oratory.

Criticks say why they think his Performances of this kind unworthy of him? Next his beloved *Oratory* I know no *one* Study on which he bestowed himself with more Application. It is the Subject of all the *rest* of his Works that do not treat designedly on his *own* Profession. And they, if they had been all preserved, would bear a very considerable proportion to those that are professedly Rhetorical. In the time of his retirement, on the Successes of *Cæsar* against the Party he espoused of the *Common-wealth*, it seems to have taken up his whole Thoughts, as appears by his many Writings on that Subject for so *little* a *time*. Nor was it then first that he began those Studies. That Age did not believe the Study of Philosophy it self so alien from the Study of *Oratory* as these Gentlemen seem to conceive. Most other parts of Learning were thought requisite to accomplish the Character of a *compleat Orator*. Yet hardly any more so than that of *Philosophy*. *Quintilian* (whose *Institutions* are one of the most perfect Works of that kind) is very full upon that Subject. And the first elaborate Writing concerning *Oratory* was written by *Aristotle*, a profess'd *Philosopher*, whom *Cicero* equals to any of the Ancients in that very particular also, excepting his own Master *Plato*. The *Peripateticks* pretended that it was that very Work of *Aristotle* which made *Demosthenes* himself an *Orator*, though, I think, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* has very well confuted that Opinion of theirs by *Chronological* Arguments. On this Account *Cicero* reckons his Writings on his own Faculty of *Oratory* among his *Philosophical* Writings *de Div.* II. *Theophrastus* the Successor of *Aristotle* in the same *Peripatetick* School, had that Name given him by his Master *Aristotle* on that same Account of his admirable *Stile*. Accordingly *Cicero* himself observes how the *Peripateticks* in general joyned the Study of Things and *Words* together, that the most improving *Arguments* might be recommended by the most winning *Style*. And it is certain, *Cicero* himself was of the same Opinion, that he could not attain his Ends as an *Orator* without a thorough insight into *Philosophy*. This he professedly asserts in his Books *de Oratore*, and ordered his initiatory Studies accordingly. When he was at *Athens*, he frequented the Schools not only of the *Orators*, but of the *Philosophers* also. There he heard *Antiochus*, the Author of the new Sect among the *Academicks*.

There

Jam se illis ferè æquarunt. *Off.* I.

Plura brevi tempore eversâ, quàm multis annis stante, Republicâ scripsimus. *Off.* III.

Quintil. *L.* XII. *Inst. Or. c.* 2.

Tuscul. Quæst. I.

Dionys. Halic. *Ep. ad Anim.*

There he heard *Phædrus* and *Zeno* Professors also in the School of *Epicurus*. *Phædrus*, whilst he was yet a *Boy*, that is, in his *Toga prætexta*. At *Rome* also he heard the famous *Philo* the Author of the *Academick* Sect of the *Philonians*, who was driven thither by the Troubles of *Mithridates*. That was in the Year 666 of the *Varronian* Epocha, in the XIXth Year of his Age. And it is observable with what eagerness he then also heard him. *Totum ei me tradidi*, says he, *admirabili quodam ad Philosophiam studio concitatus*. To the same Purpose elsewhere, he warns that, though he began to *write* on *Philosophical* Subjects in his declining Years, when the *Civil* Wars between *Cæsar* and *Pompey* obliged him to it, yet he had *studied Philosophy* from the very *beginning*. So he: *Nos autem nec subito cœpimus Philosophari: nec mediocrem à primo tempore ætatis in eo studio operam curamq; consumpsimus, & cum minimè videbamur, tum maximè philosophabamur.* He adds Proofs of it: *Quod & Orationes declarant, refertæ Philosophorum Sententiis, & doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit: Et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus*: So again, *ab initio versatus ætatis*, which he presently explains by *multum Adolescens*. Off. II. Again, *à primis temporibus ætatis* Tusc. V. He elsewhere mentions his having seen *Posidonius* in the Work, translated by you. His *Diligence* in these Studies appears by the *time* he spent in them. He heard *Antiochus* for 6 *Months* together that he staid at *Athens*. For *three Years* together himself professes it at another time: *Hoc tempore omni noctes & dies in omnium doctrinarum Meditatione versabar*. He was then under the Instructions of *Diodotus* the *Stoick*, who among other things that he read to him then, taught him *Logick* as well as *Moral Philosophy*. Which, by the way, shews how unlikely it is that he could be ignorant of what Monsieur *Petite* would suppose him ignorant, that of *Contradictories* one part must be always *true*. *Philosophers* were always in his *House*, and *familiar* with him. *Diodotus* particularly continued so till his *Death*, which fell out but a little before he wrote his *Brutus*. How therefore was it possible so great a *Genius* could be so mean a proficient in *Philosophy*, (as that learned Person would perswade us) having studied it so *long* and with such *Application*.

Ep. Fam. XIII. 1.

Brut.

de Nat. Deor. l. 1. init.

Tusc. Quæst. III.

Brut.

Petr. Petit. *Misc. Observ.* l. 4. c. 1.

I know not one of the *Ancients* that seconds him in that Paradox. St. *Augustine* does indeed, in his *Confessions*, com-

(4.)

St. Augustine's censure

of Cicero *relates to his* Practice, *not to his* Skill *in* Philosophy.

commend the *Tongue* of *Cicero* before his *Heart*. But he therein refers to his *Practice*, not to his *Skill* in *Philosophy*. For it is the *Practice* alone that could discover what his *Heart* was. His admirable *Understanding* would rather *aggravate* his Faultiness whilst it had no Influence on his *Affections*, than make him a *better Man*. And this is indeed the most *popular* Notion of a *Philosopher*, that it is not a sufficient Title to that Name to be a perfect Master of the *Skill* of it, no, nor to wear the *Habit*, and to *profess* and *teach* it, without owning it as a Rule of *Life* to him who professes it, and to suffer it to overrule all Liberties that are inconsistent with it. In this Sense I confess him guilty of some undisciplined Humours that were not so very becoming the *Gravity* and *Steadiness* of a *Philosopher*. Such was the extream *dejection* of Mind expressed in his *Exile*. Such his immoderate *Passion* for his Daughter *Tullia*, and his *Vanity* in treating her after her Death with *Divine* Honours. Such his *excessive* concern for preserving the Memory of the Glories of his *Consulship*, and his desiring *Luceius*, whose *Histories* he thought most likely to live, to gratify him with some flourishes *above* precise *Truth*. Such the *Consternation* he shewed when he was to plead for *Milo*, surrounded with the Guards of *Pompey*. Such his owning the *Successlessness* of these *Philosophical Writings* for his own aylings relating to the *Commonwealth*. These I take for the principal *Blemishes* of his *Life*, which notwithstanding were attoned for by many other indications of a generous Disposition truly worthy a *Philosopher*, which makes *Quinctilian* allow him for an *Orator* in his *Sense*, which makes his being an *Orator* inseparable from his being also a *Philosopher*, as a *Life* conformable to the Precepts of *Philosophy* is an *essential* ingredient in the Notion of a *Philosopher*. His behaviour at his *Death* was indeed *brave*, and worthy his Profession of being a *Philosopher*: Yet this *Concession* will not hinder but that his *Writings* may be as perfect Standards of *Philosophy* as they are acknowledged to be in *Oratory*. The *Reader's* concern is for the *Things* that are said, not for the *Person* that writes. If the *matter* be excellent, he may receive the same Benefit from a Work that were *Anonymous*, and therefore receive no *damage* by knowing that the Author did not *live* suitably to his own *Instructions*. If the *Reader* will *practice* better, he may be more *advantaged* by

Quinctil. XII. 1.

the

the ſame *Writings* than the Author himſelf who wrote them. According to *Quinctilian*'s Notion the Concern of *Cicero*'s *Perſon* will affect *both* ſorts of his *Writings* alike, thoſe of *Oratory* as well as thoſe of *Philoſophy*. And therefore if the imputations of his *Life* be no Prejudice to his Character as the *Prince* of *Orators*, neither can that *alone* be any hindrance why he may not, for all that, be alſo taken for the *Prince* of *Philoſophers*. The *Objections* proper for this Purpoſe, ſhould be, either to ſhew that he did not *underſtand* the *Philoſophers* with whom he dealt, or that his *own Notions* were ſo palpably *abſurd* as that they were not becoming the acumen of a *Philoſopher*. But his Cenſurers have not *produced*, nor *pretended*, one ſingle Inſtance of either kind. Either they *miſunderſtand* him, or *differ* from him in ſuch particulars as are only capable of *probable Evidence* on either ſide, wherein they may be as eaſily miſtaken as *he*. This will appear when I ſhall come to examine the Particulars.

But *Tully*'s own Teſtimony is produced againſt him, wherein he willingly yields the Glory of *Philoſophy* to *many others* above himſelf. His Words are, *Philoſophandi Scientiam concedens multis, quod eſt Oratoris proprium, aptè, diſtinctè, ornatèq; dicere, quoniam in eo ſtudio ætatem conſumpſi, ſi id mihi aſſumo, videor, id meo jure quodam modo vindicare.* So he in the beginning of his *Offices*. If the meaning of your Criticks be, only to ſhew that his Skill in *Oratory* was *greater* than in *Philoſophy*, that, I believe, is perfectly agreeable with his deſign in theſe Words, nor ſhall I much diſpute it with them. But what then? Will they therefore infer, that his Performances, even in *Philoſophy*, are *deſpicable*? Your Antagoniſt himſelf is too ingenuous and modeſt, and too skilfull too, to ſay any thing that may ſeem very *diſparaging* to his very *Philoſophical Writings*. His conſciouſneſs how little *Reaſon* he had to do ſo makes him ſo *various* and *inconſtant* in his *Cenſures*. Nor could he think ſo if he were of *Cicero*'s Mind in this Paſſage, and had not harder Thoughts of *him*, than *Cicero* had of *himſelf*. Not to take advantage of *Cicero*'s *Modeſty* in his own Caſe, his whole *deſign* ſeems to be no more than to acknowledge his *Skill* in *Philoſophy* inferior to what he pretended to in that which he *profeſſed*, and which he had made the principal Study of his *whole Life*. But it ſhould then have been conſider'd what *Degree* it was he challenged in his own *Profeſſion*. That will eaſily be underſtood

(5) *Cicero's conceſſion of the* precedence *to others does not imply any* mean *Opinion he had of his own, even* Philoſophical *Writings.*

by what he *grants* in this particular of *Philoſophy*, which he *would not* grant, and *implies*, he would not, in his own Profeſſion of *Oratory*. He ſays he would yield many a *Skill* in *Philoſophy* beyond *his*. He therefore implies that in *Oratory* he would *not* do ſo, at leaſt not to *many*. But what ſort of Perſons muſt thoſe many be, to whom he would grant a Superiority, even in *Philoſophy*? Plainly ſuch as *Cratippus* his Sons Tutor, with whom he deſign'd the *Compariſon* in his Book written for his *Sons* uſe while he was at his *Studies* under his *Tutorage*. And to *Cratippus* your Author aſcribes *Summam Doctoris Authoritatem*. He calls him *principem hujus ætatis Philoſophorum*. And again, *principem hujus memoriæ Philoſophorum*. Plainly therefore his Compariſon is with ſuch as held the *ſame* Reputation in *Philoſophy* as himſelf ſuppoſes himſelf to have held in *Oratory*, as the *Prince* of *Orators*, with ſuch as had, if *any*, yet but *few* Superiors in their own Faculty. This therefore hinders not but that *Cicero* himſelf, though he gave *place* to the *chief* of the *Philoſophers*, might notwithſtanding, at the ſame time challenge a *precedence* before all others, who were not of that *Supream* Rank, in that very Study of *Philoſophy*. The *many* therefore were ſuch as held the ſame Eſteem in their *own* Sects as *Cratippus* held in *his*, and as *Cicero* himſelf among all the *Roman Orators*. As there is no reaſon to urge his Words to a *further* Senſe than this, ſo really this ſeems moſt agreeable to his *Mind*. The *Reaſon* he inſiſts on why he did not pay the ſame deference to other *Orators* that he did to other *Philoſophers*, is not any diffidence in his own great *Genius*, but the *diſparity* of his *Application*. He had made *Oratory* the Study of his *Life*. He therefore did not think himſelf obliged to give the *preference* to any other *Orator*, though he had made it ſo too. This *Reaſoning* plainly ſuppoſes, that, in his own Opinion, he thought he had the Advantage of all who had *ſtudied*, even *Philoſophy*, with no greater *Application* than *himſelf*. He owns no more *unfitneſs* for *one* Study than the *other*. But next *Oratory* he owns an Application to *Philoſophy* more than to any Study *beſides*. In the time of his *Retirement* he followed it *more* cloſely than his *Oratory*, and wrote ſo many *Books* on that Subject *then*, in a *little time*, as that he owns them *almoſt equal* to what he had publiſhed in his whole *Life* in his own *Profeſſion*. Yet he denies that he then *began* that Study, though he then gave the firſt *publick* experiments of his

Off. L. I. init.

Offic. L. III in.

Offic. I.

pro-

proficiency in it. He profeſſes that he began it from his *younger Years*; that even *then* his Mind had been bent on it when he was thought *leaſt* of all to regard it; that he had given Evidences of his Inclinations that way by the uſe he had made of his *Philoſophical* Notions in his *Oratorial* Diſcourſes, (though not then commonly obſerv'd) and in the *delight* he took in the *converſation* with *Philoſophers*. To what end all this, but to put the World in greater *expectation*, than they had otherwiſe received, of his *Philoſophical* Writings? why ſo if he had not, at leaſt, in his own *Opinion*, done any thing in them that might anſwer ſo great an expectation?

But there is little need of inſiſting on the *Reaſoning* of *Cicero* for proving his *Opinion*. There is other Evidence of the *Fact* it ſelf independant on that *Reaſoning*, That neither *he*, nor his *contemporary Romans*, had ſo mean an Opinion of even his *Philoſophical* Performances as your *Criticks*. So he addreſſes himſelf to his Son in the end of his Offices: *Habes à Patre munus, Marce fili, meâ quidem ſententiâ, Magnum*, &c. Indeed, how could he think otherwiſe, conſidering that the greateſt part of what he delivers in that work, he profeſſes to have taken it from *Panætius* whom himſelf owns for the *Prince* of the *Stoicks*, and owns withal that *Panætius*'s Work, in which *himſelf* was concern'd, was the moſt celebrated of the kind. His Words are very expreſs: *Panætius igitur, qui ſine controverſiâ de Officiis accuratiſſimè diſputavit*, &c. yet even this moſt accurate *Writer* he ventures to correct and improve by his own Judgment. He profeſſes himſelf in this Work, not to follow the *Stoicks* as an *Interpreter*, *ſed, ut ſolemus* (ſays he) *è fontibus eorum judicio arbitrioq; noſtro, quantum, quoq; modo, videbitur, hauriemus*. This he owns for his uſual Courſe; which certainly he would not have done if he had ſuch a *diffidence* of his own *Philoſophical* Performances, as Monſieur *Petite* would fain perſwade us. He could not therefore have ſo mean an Opinion of this very Work from whence your Critick has produc'd his Teſtimony to the contrary. Yet this was not the only *Philoſophical* Work that pleaſed him. His *Deſign* was *great* in them all. His Opinion was, that the *Romans* had either better *Inventions* of their *own* than thoſe they had receiv'd from the *Greeks*, or better cultivated the *Greek Inventions* than the *Greeks themſelves* had done, *aut inveniſſe per ſe ſapientiùs quàm Græcos: aut accepta ab illis, feciſſe meliora*,

6. Tully's *Deſign was to excel the* Greeks *in their own* Philoſophy.

Academ. Queſt. L. IV. Panætius, Princeps propè, meo quidem judicio, Stoicorum.

Offic. I.

Tuſ. Queſt. I.

liora. He makes this Observation with a particular regard to the great *Design* he was then undertaking of translating the *Greek Philosophy* for the use of the *Romans*, with the liberty now mentioned, not only of an *Interpreter*, but a *Corrector* also and *Improver* of that *Philosophy*. Plainly his *Design* must therefore have been to make it *better* than he found it, by those very *Corrections*. He owns this very *Design* in these Words: *Quòd si nos non Interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quæ dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisq; nostrum judicium, & nostrum scribendi ordinem, adjungimus: Quid habent cur Græca anteponant iis, quæ & splendidè dicta sunt, neq; sint conversa de Græcis?* As he owns the design of *outdoing* the *Greeks* themselves in their own *Philosophy*, so he shews the *means* he used for attaining that Design. Accordingly he professes further, that his Translations were intended to communicate to his *Romans, quæ summis ingeniis, exquisitaq; doctrinâ Philosophi Græco sermone tractavissent.* This being so, in exceeding *them*, he must also necessarily go beyond the very *uttermost* of the *Greek* Inventions on those *Philosophical* Subjects. For where could those *Inventions* be expected but from their *choice Wits* and their *exquisitely learned Philosophers*? He therefore stirs up his Countrymen to assist him in this noble Emulation. But did he reach it? so he himself believed. His Words to this purpose are: *Qui diligenter hæc, quæ de Philosophia literis mandamus, legere assueverit, judicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora.* This perhaps will shew that what your *Critick* quotes out of the *Offices* can be no better than a Complement to *Cratippus*, when throughly considered. *Brutus* was the Man who *revived* the study of *Philosophy*, which your Author had before long *neglected*. And of him *Cicero* himself gives this Character: *Sic Philosophiam Latinis literis persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus à Græcis desideres.* In all likelyhood *Cicero* had the *same* Prospect in his *Philosophical* Writings that *Brutus* had, who put him upon them, and the same likelyhood of *Success*. And he had *reached* it if he had *finished* what he intended. So he tells us: *Magnificum illud etiam, Romanisq; hominibus glorioſum, ut Græcis de Philosophiâ literis non egeant. Quod assequar profectò, si instituta perfecero.* He could not say so if his *Greek Originals* had any *Advantage* that had been wanting in his *Translations*, which would have made it necessary for the Reader to have recourse to the *Greek* immediately. The difficulty of attain-

De Finib. I.

Ib.

Ib.

Academ. Quæst. I.

De Divin. II.

taining this is the reason he makes *Varro* give why he had written nothing professedly *Philosophical*, though he was so excellently skill'd in it. And it was the failing herein that frustrated the publick designs of those few *obscure* Persons who had attempted it before *Cicero* and *Brutus*. *Cicero* himself observes two particulars wherein they fail'd, and which made their noble Project unsuccesful, the want of *Learning* in the Subject, equal to that of the *Greek* Authors whom they were to *rival*; and the want of a more recommending *Stile*, at least to the native *Romans*. He was therefore sensible how requisite it was to his purpose to *exceed* his *Greek* Originals in both respects, if he would cut off all immediate *recourse* to them by satisfying the same designs *better* than the *Greeks* themselves had done. Hence therefore it plainly appears that he could neither hope for, nor have, the desir'd Success, without excelling the *Greeks* even in the *Skill* of their own *Philosophy*. Not certainly, if he had, in earnest, so many *superiors* in that *Skill*, as Monsieur *Petite* pretends to prove from the forementioned Passage in his *Offices*. Not certainly if, after all his Endeavours, he *still* had so. *Academ. Quæst. I.*

7. *He did believe himself to have that* Superiority *to the* Greeks *at which he* aimed.

Yet, even on these difficult Terms, he attain'd what he desir'd, if we may trust his *own* Accounts of the *Event*. And even his *own* Accounts, however *partial* otherwise, will be sufficient to prove his own *Opinion* of his own Performances better than any thing your *Critick* can pretend to the contrary. *Cotta* pleads for *Cicero*'s own Sect, the *Academick*. And therefore certainly in *Cicero*'s *Person*, and according to his own *Mind*. Yet *Velleius* gives him a great Character in both regards, of his *Skill* in the *things* as well as his *Stile*. His Words are very plain: *Næ ego incautus, qui cum Academico, & eodem Rhetore, congredi conatus sum. Nam neq; indisertum Academicum pertimuissem, nec sine istâ Philosophiâ Rhetorem, quamvis eloquentem*, &c. *Tu autem, Cotta, utraq; re valuisti.* He owns that his own *Writings* on this Subject were *read*, and read by *many*, and and put *others* also of the *Romans* on writing on the same Subject. No doubt, with the same Design of wresting the Glory of *Philosophy* from *languishing Greece*, as himself expresses it. It could be nothing but their *Opinion*, at least, of his *Success* in it, that could animate them to *imitate* him in so great an Undertaking. What can be clearer to this purpose than these Words of his own? *Equidem* *De Nat. Deor. II.* *Tusc. Quest. II.* *De Divin. II.*

dem etiam ex iis fructum capio laboris mei, qui jam ætate provecti in noſtris libris acquieſcunt, [that ſignifies their *Opinion*, at leaſt, that they had no *need* of any further recourſe to the *Greek* Originals] *Quorum ſtudio legendi meum ſcribendi ſtudium vehementiùs in his incitantur: quos quidem plureis, quàm rebar, eſſe cognovi.* Here we plainly ſee that his Endeavours of this kind proved *more* ſucceſsful than himſelf at firſt *expected* when he did not expect ſo many *Readers* as he found. Here is a plain Account of the *Modeſty* and Reſerve with which he wrote *before* he knew what the *Event* would be. Yet that ought to be no prejudice againſt the *real* worth of his *Philoſophical Writings* even *then*, much leſs againſt his Improvements *afterwards*. On the contrary, conſidering that his Writings prov'd *more* acceptable than he could promiſe *himſelf*, they would, when he *firſt* undertook them; we have reaſon thence to preſume that his Improvements *exceeded* his firſt *Hopes*, and therefore ought not to be *concluded* by them. However it ſhews the Judgment of his *own Age* concerning the *Succeſs* of his Labours of this kind, which is more to be regarded, in matters of this nature, of things relating to his *own Glory*, than the Judgment of his own *Modeſty*. And it was leſs *Invidious* in him *ſo* to inſinuate it.

8. *The Succeſs of Cicero in his Philoſophical Writings is owned alſo afterwards by Seneca and Quinctilian.*

Nor was this the Senſe only of his *own* Age. Grateful *Poſterity*, which had nothing to corrupt it in favour of your Author, paid the like Acknowledgments to the *memory* of your Author for his *Writings*, even in *Philoſophy*. *Seneca* plainly reckons him as the *greateſt* of the *Roman Writers* on that *Subject*. He excuſes *Fabianus Papirius* a *Philoſophical* Writer of his *own* time, for his leſs exquiſite *Stile*, by comparing him with the moſt famed *Philoſophical Writers* of the *Romans* then extant, among whom he reckons your Author in the *firſt* place: *Affer quem Fabiano poſſis præponere. Dic Ciceronem: cujus Libri ad Philoſophiam pertinentes, pene totidem ſunt, quot Fabiani. Cedam: ſed non ſtatim puſillum eſt, ſi quid Maximo minus eſt.* This *Papyrius Fabianus* was, as well an *Orator* as a *Philoſopher*. *Seneca* himſelf, the Father, reckons him among thoſe whom he had heard in his *Youth*, for cultivating his ſtudies of *Oratory*. That was the reaſon that put his Readers in expectation of an accurate *Stile*. On this account, it was very proper to compare him with thoſe *Philoſophers* who were alſo profeſſed *Orators*, among whom this

Senec. Ep. 101.

this younger *Seneca*, who *himself* also excelled in *both*, allows him the *first* place. Where can we expect a more competent *Judg* of *both* Faculties? Yet though *Papyrius Fabianus* laid himself out more on his *Philosophy* than *Cicero*, that is not the least allow'd for in this Comparison. *Seneca* allows your Author the *pre-eminence* in both respects, as well of *Philosophy* as *Oratory*, and accounts it no Disparagement to the most excellent for the Skill of *Philosophy* besides, to be *overcome* by him. *Quinctilian* lived in the same *Age*, but was *younger*. He also allows him the *same* place among the *Philosophers* that *Plato* had, the very first among the *Romans* who had written on *Philosophical* Subjects. His Words are: *Supersunt qui de Philosophiâ scripserunt, quo in genere pauciſſimos adhuc eloquentes literæ Romanæ tulerunt. Idem igitur M. Tullius, qui ubiq; etiam in hoc opere, Platonis æmulus extitit.* By the name of *Rival* he means, not only one who *endeavour'd* to equal *Plato*, but who was generally *thought* equal to him, and was therefore opposed to *Plato* by the *Romans*, when the *Greeks* boasted of him as a compleat *Philosophical* Writer, both for *Matter* and *Stile*. This *Emulation* between the *Greeks* and *Romans* gave *Plutarch* the occasion for writing his parallel *Lives*. This *Stile* for *Philosophical* Subjects was quite of a different Nature from that of the *Roman Forum*, and wherein no *Greek* Orator had exercised himself, as *Cicero* himself observes, except *Demetrius Phalareus*. This therefore was a *new* Glory of which *Cicero* was ambitious, to equal the *Greeks* in both sorts of *Stile*, which we see *Quinctilian* believes he *reached*, when he compares him with *Plato*, who was thought the most perfect *Master* among the *Greeks* of that *Stile* which was *Philosophical*. *Aristotle* was thought *next* to *Plato*, and only next to him, in the Opinion of *Cicero* himself. His Words are very plain to this purpose: *Aristoteles longe omnibus (Platonem semper excipio) præstans & ingenio & sapientiâ.* Of *Plato* therefore his Words are: *Deus ille noster Plato.* Again: *Princeps ingenii & doctrinæ Plato.* Elsewhere: *Unus instar omnium.* By which we see how true *Quinctilian*'s Observation is, that if *Cicero* would rival the *Stile* of any *Philosophical* Writer, *Plato* was the most likely *Person*, as being the most *perfect* of that kind, in his own *Opinion*. And if he reached him, there could then be no *Greek* Writer *superiour* to him, in this *Stile* also. Yet we see *Cicero* proposes him as a *Pattern* for his *Learning* as well as *Wit*.

Quintil. *Inst.* X. 1.

Offic. I.

Tusc. Quæst. I. *Ad Attic.* IV. Ep. 14. *Ad Quint. fr.* I. Ep. 1.

And

And therefore if he attain'd his Design, he must have equalled him in his *Skill* in *Philosophy* it self, as in the *Philosophical Stile.* He had not else made a recourse to *Plato* himself unnecessary. Certainly *Quinctilian* meant it so, when he allows *Cicero* the same *Pre-eminence* here, that he had *ubiq;*, including that which he had unquestionably in *Oratory*. *Quintilian* himself allowed the *Pre eminence* in this *Stile* to *Plato*. He cannot therefore deny it to *Cicero* when he allows him as an *equal* Rival to *Plato*.

Instit. 1. 12.

9. *And by* Plutarch.

Plutarch was also of the same *Age*, but a little *younger* than *Quinctilian*. And he also acquaints us with *Cicero*'s Opinion of his own Proficiency in *Philosophy*. His Words are: πολλάκις αυτὸς ἠξίου τοὺς φίλους μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον. Φιλοσοφίαν γὰρ, ὡς ἔργον, ἡρῆσθαι, ῥητορικῇ δ' ὀργάνῳ χρῆσθαι πολιτευόμενος ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας. So he in the Life of *Cicero*. He brings them in indeed unseasonably, as if these Words were used by *Cicero* in the time of his *Exile*, wherein he behaved himself *least* of all like a *Philosopher*. It is hence easy to observe the occasion *Dio* (and the *Sophist*, whoever he was that *Dio* makes use of) had for the *Dialogue* he relates at large between *Cicero* and *Philiseus* the *Philosopher* concerning *Exile*. It is of the same sort with the contrary *Orations* of *Cicero* and *Salust* by some *Latin* Rhetor before *Quinctilian*, and the like *Orations* of *Cicero* and *Calenus* in the same *Dio* mistaken by him for real *Facts*. But if *Cicero* had made that Profession even *then*, his Friends could not have been so *surprized* at his *Philosophical* Studies so long *afterwards*, in the time of his *Retirement*; nor would he have been so *concerned*, as he was *then*, to satisfy them, that those Studies were not then *first* undertaken by him, as it appears, they believed they were. For my part, I rather believe that the Words mentioned by *Plutarch* were not spoken by *Cicero* in his *Exile*, but in his *Retirement*. That, I think, appears by the Places to which I have already referred. Whenever they were spoken, they shew, at least, the Sense of *Cicero*, that he rather valued himself on his *Philosophical* Writings, than those which related to *Oratory*. This is quite contrary to the Inference Monsieur *Petite* gathers from the forementioned Words of *Cicero* himself in his *Offices*. I cannot, I confess, undertake, that *Cicero*'s Words, even on that occasion, were quite so *full* for this purpose, as *Plutarch* has represented them. Yet his *own* Words, (as far as I have already observed, from his still

ſtill extant Works) which gave *Plutarch* the moſt likely *occaſion* for *underſtanding* him ſo, do certainly imply that he *believed* his own *Philoſophical* Works, if not perfectly *equal*, yet very *near* ſo, in *value*, to thoſe he had written concerning *Oratory*. *Plutarch*, at leaſt, *himſelf ſaw* no reaſon (nor does he therefore pretend to *give* any) why *Cicero* might not *prefer* his own *Philoſophical* Works before thoſe concerning *Oratory*. This muſt needs ſuppoſe a very *near* Equality between them, when ſo great a *Judg* of *both* as he was, could not diſcern whether of them was to be preferred. The great *Learning* which *Plutarch* commends in *Cicero*, the παιδεία τοσαύτη which he mentions in his Life, relates particularly to the *Skill* he has diſcovered in his *Philoſophical* Writings, and therefore muſt be underſtood particularly of his *Skill*, even in *Philoſophy*. So himſelf explains it in his *Parallel* of the two *Orators*, where his Words are: Κικέρων δὲ ᾗ πολυμαθὴς, ᾗ ποικίλῳ τῇ περὶ τοὺς λόγους σπουδῇ χρώμενος, σωτάξεις μὲν ἰδίας φιλοσόφους ἀπολέλοιπεν ὀλίγας εἰς τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν τρόπον. These Words plainly relate to the two things which *Cicero* propos'd to himſelf for excelling the *Greek Philoſophers*, and which he had obſerv'd *deficient* in thoſe *Roman Philoſophical* Writers who had attempted the ſame *Deſign* before him, and to which he imputed their failing in the deſir'd *Succeſs*, their want of *Learning* in the *things*, and their *neglect* of the *Stile* wherein they delivered them. His Deſign therefore was for *Skill* in the *things*, and in that particular ſort of *Stile* which was proper for that ſort of *Philoſophical* Subjects. It was to *join* the *Philoſopher* and the *Rhetor* too, which was more than what had been performed by *Demoſthenes* himſelf, as *Cicero* himſelf had obſerved. So himſelf expreſſes this mixt Stile; *cum hoc genere Philoſophiæ, quod nos ſequimur, magnam habet Orator Societatem. Subtilitatem enim ab Academia mutuatur, & ei viciſſim reddit ubertatem Orationis, & ornamenta dicendi.* De Fat. Then follows: *Utriuſq; ſtudii noſtra poſſeſſio eſt.* This was the πολυμαθεία and the ποικιλία τῇ περὶ τοὺς λόγους σπουδῇ which *Cicero* aimed at with that very *deſign* of winning the Glory of *Philoſophical Matter*, and a *variety* of *Stiles*, which the *Greeks* themſelves failed in. And in *both* of them his Succeſs is owned by *Plutarch* himſelf, though his Bigottry for his own beloved *Greece* would not ſuffer him to own it with Application to the Caſe of *Demoſthenes*. This Conceſſion is all that *Cicero* deſir'd for attaining his own

end

end of *exceeding* all the *Greek Philoſophical* Writers. What better Teſtimony can your *Criticks* expect, what the next Ages to *Cicero* thought of his *Philoſophical* Writings?

10. *There is no reaſon to believe that Cicero thought that both parts of a Contradiction might be falſe, as Mr. Petite conceives.*

It is much more than needed with relation to your *Criticks*, who have not produced one of the *Antients* ſpeaking with the leaſt *diſreſpect* of his *Writings* of that *nature*, whatever they may ſay of his *Perſon*. Will they therefore pretend to that *Evidence* in their *proof* that may *countervail* all *Authorities* to the contrary? When they do ſo, I ſhall readily *wave* all Authorities againſt them. But, if we may judge what they *can* do by what they *have* done, I ſhould think the thing moſt clearly *proved*, by what has *hitherto* been produced, to be, how little *can* be ſaid againſt your Author in this very *cauſe*, when ſo able *Accuſers* have been ſo unſuccesful in making good their *Accuſation* againſt him. This will appear if we proceed to particulars. The Words of *Cicero* concerning the different *Opinions* of Men relating to *Providence*, are theſe: *Res nulla eſt de quâ tantopere non ſolum indocti, ſed etiam docti, diſſentiant. Quorum opiniones cum tam variæ ſint, tamq; inter ſe diſſentientes: alterum fieri profectò poteſt, ut earum nulla, alterum certè non poteſt, ut plus unâ vera ſit.* Here the thing Monſieur *Petite* excepts againſt, is, that *Cicero* ſhould own it *poſſible* that *all* the then receiv'd Opinions concerning the *Gods* might be falſe, though they *differed* among *themſelves*. And why does he think this ſo *ſtrange*, which is moſt certainly *true*, concerning the *moſt* of them? All that he pretends is that known Rule in *Logick*, that of *Contradictories* one *ſide* muſt neceſſarily be *true*, and the other as neceſſarily *falſe*. Does he therefore think *Cicero* ignorant of this Rule of the *Logicians*? He muſt then indeed think his time ill ſpent with *Diodotus*, at leaſt, in the ſtudy of *Logick*. But what need is there, from theſe Words to charge him with this Miſtake? He does not ſo much as mention the Word *Contradictories*. It was not poſſible for him to *mean* the *thing*. Had he done ſo, he could not have pretended ſo great a *multitude* of *Opinions*. If the different Opinions had been direct *Contradictions*, there could have been only *two* Opinions, one *Affirmative*, and the other *Negative*, of which one muſt indeed have been neceſſarily *true*, and the other as undoubtedly *falſe*. This *multitude* of *Opinions* could not poſſibly have been underſtood

De Nat. Deo. L. I.

Miſc. L. IV C. 1.

but

but of their *Affirmations*, which were alone capable of being so *numerous* as your Author makes them. And why should your *Critick* think it so difficult that their *Affirmative* Assertions concerning the same things might have been all *false*, though they were all mutually *inconsistent*, as *consequently* inferring the *contradiction* of each other. Himself has given an Instance in guessing at an unknown *number*. Twenty Persons may guess twenty *numbers*, of which *Cicero*'s Assertion is very *true*. It is very *possible* that *every* one of them may be *false*, but it is withal *impossible* that any *more* than *one* of them can be *true*, because of the *consequent contradiction* that any one determined *number* includes of all *other numbers* besides it self. This appears plainly to be the Case afterwards, where he *enumerates* the multitude of different *Opinions* both of the *Learned* and the *Unlearned* concerning the *Nature* of the *Gods*, all of them *Affirmative*, though mutually inferring the *contradiction* of each. Let *Affirmatives* be never so *numerous* concerning the same thing, your *Critick* will never be able to prove them *contradictory* as they are *Affirmatives*. Nor can he therefore give any solid Reason, why they may not, under *that* consideration, as they are *Affirmatives*, be all false, however they do by *consequence* infer the *contradiction* of each *other*. This Objection therefore is so far from being derogatory to your Author's *Skill* in *Logick*, as that it does not indeed prove *him*, but the *Objector*, guilty of the *Mistake* that is disputed between them. Your *Critick* does indeed instance in some Opinions which were really contradictory, as in the *granting* and *denying* of a *God*. Yet, even there, himself would not deny the *Falshood* of the Opinion that *denyed* it. Nor can he defend the *Truth* of *many* of those who *granted* the *Being* of a *God* in *general*, when they descended particularly to explain what they *meant* by the *God* they owned. This would bring them to *particulars*, the *Falshood* of which was very *consistent* with the *Truth* of their *owning* of a *God* in *general*, and which would affect *Practice* as much as if they had believed *no God* at all. Withal, your *Critick* forgets that if he would judge of *Cicero* as a *Philosopher*, he ought to do it, not by the Principles of the *Christian* Religion, but by the Principles of the *Academical* Sect of *Philosophy* which was *professed* by him. No other *Mistakes* will prove him a bad *Philosopher*, which were common to all *Philosophers* in *general*,

neral, or, at leaſt, to all of his own *Sect*. Now the *Academicks* deny'd all *Certainty*, and the moſt *moderate* of them only owned *Probability*. Thoſe might therefore *doubt* of that Rule of *Contradictions*, that *one* ſide muſt always be *true*, and the *other* ſide always *falſe*. That the antient *Academicks* did ſo, we have reaſon from *Ariſtotle* to believe, who found himſelf obliged to prove it profeſſedly againſt them. Whether this was *Cicero*'s Caſe, or not; yet there was another Doctrine of theirs which would *amount* to the ſame thing in the *Event*. They might grant, that *one* part of the *Contradiction* muſt always be *true*, and yet account *both* of them *poſſibly falſe* becauſe they could not *diſtinguiſh* whether of them was ſo. For whatever Argument proved *one* ſide *true*, muſt prove the *other* ſide conſequently *falſe*, and ſo on the *contrary*. *Both ſides* therefore may be *poſſibly falſe*, becauſe *neither ſide* was ſo *certainly*; and becauſe *both ſides* had *probable* Proofs of their own *Truth*, and of the *Falſhood* of their *Contradictories*, and becauſe *neither* ſide had *Evidence* more than *probable*. Yet this does not prove that *both ſides* might be *really falſe* at the ſame time, or that the *Academicks* were obliged to *think* them ſo. It only proves that *both ſides* might be *poſſibly falſe* as to their *Evidence* to *us*, becauſe *neither ſide* had *Evidence* ſufficient to ſecure *us* of either their *Truth* or their *Falſhood*. And this alone is ſufficient againſt *reckoning* on *either* ſide, as either *true* or *falſe* in *Practice*. This would again be a rational Ground, purſuant to Principles for the *Academick*, though not the *Pyrrhonian* Ἐποχή, the not *aſſenting* to *either* ſide with any *confidence*. And what can your *Critick* find here unbecoming the Judgment of an *exquiſitely* skilled *Academick*?

Metaph.

(11.) *Cicero's preferring an Active to a Contemplative Life can be no diſcredit to his* Philoſophy. *The beſt* Philoſophers *were of* his *Mind.*

His next Objection is a whole Common-place, wherein, it ſeems Monſieur *Petite* is of a different *Opinion* from your *Author*. He is offended at *Cicero* for preferring an *Active Life* before a *Contemplative*. So your Author in his *Offices*. But muſt it be a diſparagement to any ancient Authors *Skill* and *Judgement* if he be not perfectly of your excellent *Criticks* mind? At this rate, it will be very hard for any ancient Author to keep his eſtabliſhed *Reputation*, if it muſt depend on his being perfectly of every late *Criticks* mind in Matters of *diſputable Evidence*, in which it is equally poſſible for the *Critick* himſelf to be *miſtaken* as the *Author* that is cenſured by him. I do not intend to take this occaſion of launching into the

the *Dispute* it self, whether *Life* is the more to be preferred, the *Active* or the *Contemplative*, notwithstanding what your *Critick* has said upon it. It has been the Subject of many just Discourses, and too *large* to be handled *occasionally*. Nor does my *Cause* require it. It is *sufficient* for my purpose, to shew that *Cicero's* Opinion on that matter is, by no means inconsistent with his being *really* as great a *Philosopher* as he was an *Orator*. It was a Question *disputed* among the *Philosophers* themselves. And that with such *Equality*, that there were as *many* and as *great Philosophers* for *Cicero's* Doctrine on this Question, as they were *against* him. How can it then be a reproach to the *Philosophy* of *Cicero* to have been of the same Opinion with those who were *inferior* to *none* in that very same Study of *Philosophy*? Before *Cicero's* beloved *Plato*, *Pythagoras* had a Name inferior to *none* of these celebrated *Philosophers* of his Age: Perhaps *superior* to them all. For my part I think he deserved it, and had the greatest *Fruits* of his *Philosophy*. His design was wholly for the *Active Life*, and the good of *Communities*, and for contriving *Laws* to make those Comunities *happy*. *Magna Græcia* in *Italy* had the Effects of it. And so had *Thebes* of the retirement of *Lysis*, one of his Disciples, upon their *Banishment* from *Italy*. To *Lysis* they were beholden for *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas*. To the same *Lysis*, and his Education of *Philip* then a *Hostage* at *Thebes*, the *Macedons* were obliged for all the great Actions of *Philip* himself, and the Foundation laid by him, and the disciplined *Army* prepared by him, by which his Son *Alexander* conquered so great a part of the World. Indeed the whole *Discipline* of that *Sect* was to possess Men with a great value for their *Country*, and to qualify them with all Capacities of serving it, as *honest Statesmen* and *Souldiers* as well as *speculative Learning*, and an endearing *behaviour* in their *private* Stations. Him *Plato* himself followed in his *Timæus* and his *Politicks*, and in his Notion, that *Men* were born more for their *Countries*, than themselves, which naturally put *him* and as many as *believed* it, on designs rather of the *publick* than their own *private* Interests. The same thing *Seneca* owns as the Sense of the *Stoicks* and accordingly endeavours to *excuse*, rather than *commend* his own design of *Secession* by their Principles. These were the *Sects* that were most famed for *Religion* and *Enthusiasm* too. So were the *Pythagoreans* and the *Platonists*, who

De otio aut secessu Sapientis.

who yet knew nothing *inconsistent* between the nearest *Union* with *God*, this *Life* was capable of, and an *Active* Employment for the Benefit of *Mankind*. So *Pythagoras* himself pretended to more than *human Familiarities* with the *Gods*. Yet that did not hinder him from laying himself out on making *Laws*, and settling *Governments*. So the *Divine Plato*, whom *Cicero* professes to follow. Yet he also undertook the Journey to *Sicily* to serve his Friend *Dio*, as *Maximus Tyrius* observes in his excellent Discourse on this very Subject. Why should it therefore be thought strange in *Cicero*, who professes himself an Admirer of the *Philosophy* of that same *Plato*? So did *Lycurgus* and *Numa* and several others among the *Heathens*, whom *Diodorus* compares with *Moses* in this very particular, of being both *Law-makers* and pretending great *Intimacy* with their *Gods*. So *Scipio* and *Sertorius* got Reputation to their Designs in the *Active* Life by the *Opinion* commonly received of them of their being honoured with *Divine* Favours. So *Cicero* understands the *presence* of the *Gods* with *Homer's Heroes*, that even the *Martial Enthusiasm* (as Dr. *Casaubon* calls it) was from *Divine Inspiration*. Very agreeable to what our *Holy Writers* deliver concerning the *Spirit* of the *Lord* coming on *Saul* and the *Judges* when they set upon their *Military* Expeditions. So far an *Active* Life was thought then from *hindring* Divine *Inspirations*, that it was thought rather to *intitle* them to *many* which they could not *otherwise* have expected. Your *Author* is so far from being of your *Critick's* Mind, that he allows the Observation in *general*, that no *great Man* of what kind soever, could ever have been so without a *Divine Inspiration*. His Words are very express to this purpose: *Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* And he agrees herein with our *Christian Scriptures*, and the Doctrine of the *Catholick Church* against the *Pelagians*. Indeed *Law-makers* and *Governours* had the best Title to *Divine* Rewards by the Doctrine of *Plato*, as represented by *Cicero* in *Somn. Scipionis*, and expounded by *Macrob.* L. I. *c.* 8. 9. He does not therefore in this matter write otherwise than as became a *Platonist*. I need not mention the many professed *Philosophers* who proved as excellent as any in *Active* Employments. Such were *Milo* and *Melissus* among the *Pythagoreans*. Such *Dio* the Disciple of *Plato*. Such *Persæus* and the admirable Emperour *Marcus Antoninus* among the *Stoicks*. Such *Xenophon*,

Maxim. Tyr. *Diss.* V.

De Nat. Deor. L. II. fin.

nophon, *Polybius*, and the younger *Cato*. Your Author's Master *Plato* was so far from seeing any *Inconsistency* between them, that he was rather for *joining* them, and thought that the best Expedient for the good *Government* of *Human Societies*, if either their *Princes* would turn *Philosophers*, or *true Philosophers* were chosen *Princes*. And *Rome* perhaps was never happier, as to its *Government*, than under its *Antonines*, who did not think the Title of *Philosophers* dishonourable. These are the Authorities of *Philosophy*, much greater for your *Author* than for your *Critick*. *Plutarch* has two Discourses professedly in defence of your Author's Opinion. But of what Nature are the Authorities *against* him? That of *Epicurus* who denyed all *Providence*; or that of *Aristotle*, who deny'd any *below* the *Moon*. Can we *Christians* believe these *Authorities* considerable against the general *consent* of all those *Philosophical Sects* that had an honour for *Religion*? Must it be a *Disparagement* to the *Philosophy* of *Cicero*, as a *Heathen*, that he joined rather with the *Philosophers* that were *Friends*, than those who were *Enemies* of *Religion*?

12. *So also were the best* Christian Authorities.

It was from the Progress of *Monkery*, not from the *beginning* of *pure Christianity* that these Notions proceeded concerning the *preference* of a *Contemplative* to an *Active* Life, and the *Inconsistence* of the *one* with the *other*. *Solitude* and *Retirement* were indeed thought expedient for *disposing* Men for *Divine Conversation*. Thence the Stories of *Pythagoras*'s hiding himself for several Years, and his *Discipline* of a *quinquennial Silence*, which utterly disabled them for any *Conversation* while they were under that *Discipline*. But in those times such *Exercises* were not designed *perpetual* in Persons qualify'd for serving *Societies*. *Pythagoras* returned to his *former* freedom of *Conversation* when he judged himself to have attain'd the *End* of his *Retirement*, when he had qualify'd himself with those *Accomplishments* that might make him able to benefit *others* by his *own conversation*, and when he had *fortifi'd* himself against those *Weaknesses* that might expose him to the *danger* of receiving *damage* himself by the *conversation* of *others*. So also did his *Disciples*, as soon as the *Term* was elapsed for which that *Discipline* was prescribed. And the *prescribing* a *Term* at *first* was intended for this very purpose, that it might not be designed for a *perpetual* State of *Life*. This was perfectly consistent with your Author's

Notion, when the *contemplative* State was only design'd for a *time*, and only in order to the making them *more* useful in their *active* Life when they returned to it. And this seems really to have been the Case in the Age of the *Apostles*, before the rise of *Monkery*. There were many who *exercised* themselves by a *temporary Retirement*, who were far from the Opinion of making it the more *perfect* course of *Life*, to be designed *ultimately* by them who were *capable* of benefitting *others* by their *Conversation*. So *Philo* did, yet that did not hinder him from *returning* to Conversation, and serving his Nation in his *Embassy* to *Caius*. So *Josephus* did for three Years, yet afterwards was employed in the publick Affairs of the *State*, and of the *War*, without any the least Scruple for having been so. So in the *Apostles* times the *Essenes* were of both sorts, *Practical* as well as *Theoretical*, as appears in *Philo*, that *none* might be excused from being serviceable to the *Publick*, on pretence of the *Perfection* of their State if they were capable of being so. Among the *Christians* the *Active* Life was that on which they laid themselves out, whose *Examples* were most regarded. Whosoever then *addicted themselves* to *God*, were understood to do so, that they might be serviceable to the *Ministry*, the ὑπηρεσία τῦ λόγυ, for the benefit of *Souls*. If any did otherwise, they are never recommended as most *perfect* for doing so. We read of no *Sequestrations* for term of *Life*, no *Vows* for such *Sequestrations*, no *Commendations* of any for doing so, if they were capable of serving *others* in an *Active* Life. When *serviceable* Persons were thus engaged, that was the *time* that put Men on necessity of defending *Contemplation* before *Action*. But that was some considerable time after the *Apostles*. The Case of *Mary* and *Martha* are really nothing to this purpose. If they would prove *Contemplation* better, in general, than *Practice*, the *comparison* ought to be in the same *kind*. But *Martha*'s Practice related to *corporal* Service, *Mary*'s hearing, only to *Spiritual Contemplation*. Let the *comparison* be of the same *kind*, and then certainly *Mary*'s propagating the same Knowledg she was then *learning* from our Saviour for the Salvation of other *Souls*, had as much exceeded her own only *learning* it, as her *learning* a more *noble* sort of *Knowledg* than that which was concern'd in her *Sister*'s *Practice* did exceed the *Practice* it *self*. This way of *Comparison* gives the *preference* to *Mary*'s

Joseph. *vit.*

ry's *Contemplation* not as it was barely *Contemplation*, but as it was a Contemplation *productive* of a more excellent and noble *Practice*. And that I take to be the true Standard for judging of the Excellency of *Contemplation*. *Useless Knowledg* is so far from being *commendable*, that the *desiring* it is that Fault which we commonly understand by the name of *Curiosity*. It is therefore the *Use* that may be made of any Knowledg that does alone make it commendable. And according to the *degree* of its *Usefulness*, so it must also be judged, in the same *degree*, *commendable*. But the *Usefulness* of any *Knowledg* can only be judged by the Benefit we gain by the *Practice* of it. Thence it appears that *Knowledg* is only the *Means* by which we *attain* the *Benefit* accruing to us in the *Practice* of it. As therefore the *End* is more noble than the *Means*, so that *Practice* which helps us to the *End* must by the same Parity of *Reason*, be more *noble* than that *Contemplation* which only *teaches* us the *Means*. This is so certainly true, that even the *Knowledg* of *God* himself could not make us *happy* on that consideration alone as it is *Knowledg*. The *Devils* and the *Damned* also *know God*, and their *Punishment* of *Loss* is by so much *greater* as their *Knowledg* is so. The *Practice* therefore resulting from that *Knowledg* is that which can alone make us happy. It is the *Love* and *Delight* resulting from our being *possessed* of a *Good* which we know to be so *great*, that can alone make us *happy* in the *possession* of it. And what can we call that *Love* and *Delight* but the *Practice* of that *Knowledg* which we attain by the *Vision* of *God*, as far as that *Vision* may be judged practicable? This seems perfectly our *Saviour*'s Sense in those Words of his: *If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.* He would have said, *if ye know them*, in the *Apodosis* also, if *Knowledg* without *doing*, had been sufficient *alone* to make us *happy*. Thus it appears, that this *Opinion* of your Author is so far from being *bad Philosophy*, that it is indeed more *agreeable*, even to *Christian Divinity*, if that be judged of by immediate recourse to *Originals*, not by *prejudices* of later Ages, since the *Arabian Aristotelean Philosophy* has, by the *Romanists* been set up as a Rule of our *Christian Faith*, which is certainly very different from the Sense of our holy *Apostolical* Ancestors. In that way of judging, the doing good to *Souls* in *general* by an *Active* Life, is much more valuable, in *God*'s

eſteem than any *Contemplation* for the cultivation of our own *private* Souls, if we be otherwiſe qualified for the doing Service to the Intereſts of *Souls* in *general*. The Rewards that may be expected from God for promoting thoſe *publick* and *general* Ends of God may turn to more account as to the promotion of our own *private Spiritual Intereſts*, than the benefit that could have been expected if the ſame time had been in *Retirement* and *Contemplation*. The *Schoolmen* themſelves allow ſuch *publick* Endeavours, a Title to an *Aureola* of a *Doctor*, which themſelves take for an extraordinary Honour (more than could be expected from a *private* good work) for the encouragement of *publick* Services. It can therefore be no diſcredit to *Cicero's Philoſophy*, to maintain an Opinion that is otherwiſe ſo *ſeconded* by *Authorities* every way *more* conſiderable than thoſe which can be *oppoſed* againſt it. This I take to be ſufficient for my purpoſe *now*. I have purpoſely declined the *Arguments* your *Critick* has obſerved in Favour of your Author's *Opinion*, that I might not be obliged to *digreſs* ſo far as to conſider his *Anſwers*.

(13.) Cicero's *commending* Cato *for killing himſelf was not diſagreeable to the Principles of* Philoſophy.

Your *Critick's* next *Objection* is, that your *Author* commends *Cato* for his *killing himſelf*. This he obſerves him to have done in his *Offices*. He might have obſerved it more profeſſedly in the *Encomium* of *Cato*, againſt which *Cæſar* wrote his *Anticatones*. This your *Critick* calls a *Popular* way of *Philoſophizing*. Afterwards, his following the Opinion of the *Vulgar*. Had he meant it to have been a *generally received* Opinion, that ſuppoſition of ſo great *Authorities* on your *Author's* ſide, ſhould have made your *Critick* more *reſerved* in *cenſuring* a Fact ſeconded by the beſt *Authorities Cicero* knew of, who knew nothing of the *Divine Revelations* of the *Goſpel*. *Heathen Authorities* were they alone which could be allowed as Standards when the *Philoſophy* of *Cicero* was to be cenſured in Compariſon of the *other Philoſophers* of his own *Age*, who were *Heathens* as well as *he*. One would think that by the *Populacy* and the *Vulgar* your *Critick* meant the *inferior* Rank, in oppoſition to the moſt competent *Judges* of *Philoſophy*. Yet I hardly know how he *could mean* ſo, and *think* his own meaning *true*, by even his *own* Principles. Did any one *then* think *Cato* himſelf who is judged with this pretended *Unphiloſophical Fact*, a *Plebeian Judge* of *Philoſophy*? *Cicero* himſelf was perfectly of another Opinion. He took *Cato* for a perfect *Stoick*, and

Paradox. init.

and for a *Wiſeman*, in the Senſe of the *Philoſophers*, if *ever* there was one. And indeed who leſs affected *Popularity* than *Cato*? Who was more *affronted* by the *Vulgar*? Who leſs *regarded* them? Where is his incredible *Gravity*, which even your *Critick* cannot deny him? What Genius could be more averſe to the contrary *Levity* for which the *Vulgar* are ſo infamous? Whom can your *Critick* allow for a competent *Judge* of *Philoſophy*, if he denies *Cato* to have been ſo? Were *Horace*, *Seneca*, *Lucan*, *Valerius Maximus*, the younger *Pliny*, and *Tacitus*, *Plebeian Judges* alſo of *Philoſophy*, whom even your *Critick* has obſerved to have highly commended *Cato* for that *Fact*, as well as *Cicero*? Whom then will he allow for a *competent Judge* of *Philoſophy*, if theſe were not ſo? If all who allowed *Suicide* were *Popular Philoſophers*, and followed the *Opinions* of the *Vulgar*. I know not where we can have *Judges* by whom Monſieur *Petite* will be willing to be concluded. The *Legiſlators* allowed it, when it was not *turpi de Cauſâ*. Muſt they alſo be taken for followers of the *Vulgar*? Who then will be the *Guides* of the *Vulgar*, who are generally influenced by *Authorities*? Muſt the *Philoſophers*? So indeed Monſieur *Petite* pretends that *Cato*'s Fact was againſt the Senſe of the *beſt Philoſophers*, *contra Philoſophorum potiorum decreta*. But he is too ſparing in acquainting us who thoſe *beſt Philoſophers* were, who allowed *no* Caſe wherein it might be *lawful*, or even *commendable* to do as *Cato* did. He mentions only *Plato*, and quotes nothing from even *Plato* to this Purpoſe, but his *Phædon*. Yet it muſt be extreamly ſtrange if he can find any thing againſt *Suicide* in this very *Work* which *animated* ſo many to be guilty of it. So it did *Cleombrotus Ambraciota*, ſo it did our *Cato* himſelf who made it his principal Employment when he *deſigned* his own *Death*. This would make it very ſuſpicious, that if *Cleombrotus* and *Cato*, who lived ſo much nearer the *Age* of *Socrates* and *Plato*, and who could hardly chuſe but underſtand the true *Senſe* of this *Work* among the *Platoniſts* themſelves, did notwithſtanding ſo *underſtand* this *Work*, as that they thought it *encouraged* what Monſieur *Petite* pretends to have been cenſured by it; one of them muſt have extreamly *miſtaken* the *Senſe* of the Author. And certainly all the *Preſumptions* that can be deſired, lie rather in *Favour* of *Antiquity* and the received *Traditional* Senſe of the *Platoniſts*,

and againſt your *Critick*. Yet beſides this one *ſingle Work*, I know not one *ſingle Philoſopher* againſt it. All the *Philoſophers* who have written *ſince* the *Fact* of *Cato*, and have occaſion to *mention* it, however they *diſagree* in other things, they yet *agree* in mentioning it with the higheſt *Encomiums*. Among them *Seneca* and *Plutarch*, whom I believe your *Critick* would not have denied to have been as famous among the *Philoſophers* as any that lived after *Cato*. Your Author himſelf has obſerved that *Plotinus* wrote a Book Περὶ Διλόγε Ἐξαγωγῆς. So the Title is in *Porphyry*'s Life of that Philoſopher. And though the Word Διλόγε is wanting in the *Enneads*, yet the *Book* it ſelf ſhews that it was very *proper*. Will he ſay that *Plotinus* alſo did not underſtand *Plato's Phædon*, who was himſelf a profeſt *Platoniſt*? Will he ſay *Porphyry* alſo did not underſtand it, when he would have *ſtarved* himſelf in his *Lilybæan* retirement, if his Maſter *Plotinus* had not then diſſwaded him? And why ſhould we think this *Fact* ſo *Unphiloſophical* in *Cato* when *Opinions* and *Practices* too in *Favour* of it were ſo very common among the *Philoſophers* themſelves? *Apollonides* the *Stoick*, and *Demetrius* the *Peripatetick* were then with *Cato* when he ſignify'd his own Mind plainly enough what he intended to do. Did either of them *diſſwade* him from it? They did not *him*, though, at the ſame time they did at his *Deſire* diſſwade *Statilius* from imitating him, as not believing it, for the Intereſt of the *Commonwealth*, that *Cæſar* ſhould be freed from the Fear of ſuch an *Adverſary*, and ſuch a *Patron* of the *Commonwealth* againſt him. *Timon* perſwaded Men in *general* to *kill* themſelves, from whence he had the Name of Μισάνθρωπος. So *Apamantus* and *Miſo* in *Laertius*, *Hegeſias Cyrenaicus* in his Ἀποκαρτερῶν ſo encouraged them, that *Ptolemy* King of *Ægypt* thought himſelf obliged to *ſuppreſs* his *Book*. Many of thoſe *Philoſophers* took ſmall *Occaſions* to *practiſe it*. I will not mention the diſputed Caſe of *Ariſtotle* who is ſaid to have thrown himſelf into the *Euripus* becauſe he could not find out the *cauſe* of its *ebbings* and *flowings*. That I confeſs, *Philoſophers* themſelves might have judged to have been a *reaſon* unworthy a *Philoſopher*. But what ſhall we ſay of *Zeno* the Father of the *Stoicks*, the Sect that was profeſſed by *Cato*? He hurt his *Finger* by a *Fall* coming out of his School, and took that hurt for a *Summons* to his *Death*, which he anſwered accordingly. Who can deny but that *Cato* act-

Enn. I. I. IX.

Plutarch Anton. Lucian. Timon. Cicer. Tuſc. Q. I. 34.

Laert. VII. 28. Lucian. Macrob. Lactan. III. c. 18.

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ed consequently to the Principles and Practice of such a *Master*? Who can say but that *Cicero* commended *Cato* consequently for it, as an admirer of the *Stoicks* next his own *Academicks*? As a follower of *Antiochus* who taught a *Philosophy* consisting of a *Mixture* of both Schools, the *Stoick* as well as the *Academick*? *Diogenes* the *Cynick* is also generally reported to have made himself away, though the *manner* how he did it is not agreed on: So *Calanus*, *Euphrates* and *Pergamus*: So also *Empedocles* and *Cleanthes*. And why should he think this Doctrine strange among the *Heathens*, when even the *Jews*, God's own *People* knew no better? So it appears in the Instances of *Razis* and *Eleazar* in the *Maccabees*, and the Companions of *Josephus* in *Jotapata*, and of another *Eleazar* in *Massada*. Laert. VI.

The *Philosophers* were *generally* so favourable to this Opinion in such Cases wherein *Death* would be *honourable*, that we should have great Evidence to prove that *Plato's* Doctrine was *singular* in this particular. Let us see therefore whether his Doctrine be so *clear* in this *Case* as our *Critick* pretends it is. In his *Phædon* he makes *Socrates* say, μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι. This he makes also to have been the Sense of *Philolaus* the *Pythagorean* in *Thebes*. Again; οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι. And he gives an account of the *reason* of this from the *Mystical* Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*. So I understand him, not of the City *Mysteries*, which it had not been *safe* or him to have alluded to in a Writing intended for the *publick*. But *Plato* had gotten the Writings of *Philolaus* which had before been *confined* to the Sect of the *Pythagoreans*, and makes *use* of them as agreeable to his *own* Sense in Matters *Theological*, wherein he followed them. But in the Persons of *Cebes* and *Simmias* who might have heard *Philolaus* in *Thebes*. This then is the ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος, the *arcanæ de animæ reditu disputationes*, in *Macrobius*. That Men are in their Bodies, ὡς ἔν τινὶ φρουρᾷ, That we have *Gods* that take care of us whose *Possessions* we are, That they must needs take it *ill*, if any *escape* out of this *Prison* without the *leave* of those who have the *Custody* of them; that accordingly those *Guardians* are as much displeased if any *break* their *Prison*, and will be as desirous to inflict *Punishment* on them, who did so, as *Masters* did usually *then* on their *Fugitive Slaves*; That *good* Men ought to look on their Condition as *securer* in the disposition of these good *Guardians* than if they were at their

(14.) Plato's *Doctrine in his* Phædon *against* Suicide *well known to* Cicero.

Macrob. *in Somn Scip.* L. I. c. 13.

own disposal, and therefore should not *desire* to be *free* from them; That there were withal ill *Consequences* of *Violence* in this *Case*; that the violent *Passions* of *Fear* or *Hope* that occasioned their laying *violent Hands* on themselves, tyed them *faster* to *Matter* than before. This made them think that such *Souls hovered* over the Places of their *Bodies*, and that they were liable to *Evocation* by the *Psychagogi*, and of being consulted by the *Magicians* and *Necromancers*. They thought withal that these *new Passions* awakened by a *violent Death* put them in a *worse* Condition than the *same Passions* wou'd have done in their *animated Bodies*. They thought the *separated* Souls by such a *violent Death* to be as on a *Precipice*, more inclined to descend to *Hades* or *Tartarus*, and more *hardly revocable* to their superior Stations in *Heaven* than when their *Bodies* kept them in the *middle*. These *Passions* were the *corporeæ pestes* in *Virgil*, the κυμάς in the *Oracles*, the κῆρες in *Philo* and elsewhere, which *incapacitated* them for an *ascent* to *Heaven*. This was thought to be the case of the *Biothanatoi* (so they called them) which made it unagreeable to the Principles of *Philosophy* for any to imitate it. These Notions as they are alluded to in *Phædon*, so they are *supposed* in the *popular Mystical Traditions* of the *Poets* and the *Magicians*, and among the *Primitive Hereticks*. Was *Cicero* ignorant of them? No, he himself alluded to them in his *Somnium Scipionis* preserved by *Macrobius* out of his VIth. Book *de Republicâ*, and illustrated with a very learned *Commentary*. His words are very clear, when *Africanus* offered to kill himself, that he might immediately come to the enjoyment of his Friends in *Heaven*; He is warned to the contrary. *Quare & tibi Publi & Piis omnibus retinendus animus est in custodiâ corporis: nec injussu ejus à quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vitâ migrandum est; ne munus assignatum à Deo defugisse videamini.* Seeing therefore *Cicero* was aware of this, his *design* in *commending* *Cato* for *killing* himself ought to be interpreted, if possible, as that it might be *reconciled* with the Doctrine of his Master *Plato* in his *Phædon*.

Macrob. *Somn. Scip. L. I. c. 13.*

(15.) *Yet* Plato *himself allowed* Exceptions *wherein he thought it lawful.*

But this your *Critick* seems to believe impossibe. He need not have done so if he had endeavoured to *reconcile* even *Plato* with himself. *Plato* elsewhere is very plain in admitting *Limitations* of this Doctrine, though he *there* also admit the Truth of it in general. Speaking of Murther, he comes to this particular Instance of it in these

De Legib. IX.

Words:

Words: τὸν δὲ δὴ πάντων οἰκειότατον καὶ λεγόμενον φίλτατον, ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ, τί χρὴ πάσχειν; λέγω δὲ ὃς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ τῶν εἰμαρμένης βίᾳ ἀπεστερῶν μοῖραν, μήτε πόλεως τάξασης δίκην, μήτε περιδυνίῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσόντι τύχῃ ἀναγκασθείς, μήδε αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών, ἀρρίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρείας δεινῇ ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἄδικον ἐπθῇ. It is here very plain that *Plato* does not account every *Death* a *violent Death* which the *Perſon* inflicts on *himſelf*. He *allows* him to do ſo if his *Country* require it from him. This was a Caſe commonly practiſed among the *Romans* when the *Prince* was pleaſed to allow the *liberum mortis genus* as a *Favour*. Among the *Greeks* it was alſo a Cuſtom for the condemned Perſon to *drink* the *aconitum* prepared for him, which I am apt to believe to have been the Caſe to which *Plato* alludes in this place. This therefore did not, in the Opinion of *Plato*, make the Perſons who ſo contributed to their own Death, guilty of the *Piacular βία*, from whence they had the Name of *Biothanati*. But here perhaps the judgment of *Authority* which had undoubtedly the *Right* of *Life* and *Death* might be thought to *legitimate* that which had otherwiſe been *culpable*. Our Philoſophers other *Exceptions* are not capable of being ſo ſolved. In *them* the whole conſideration relates to the Perſon *concerned* in the *Fact*, an *incurable ayling*, or an *intolerable Shame* greater than can be recompenſed by the *Comforts* and *Advantages* of *Life*. Of theſe things therefore there could be no *Judge* but the *Perſon* himſelf of his *own* Caſe. Yet they could give him no more *Right* over his own *Life* than he had before. Here therefore it is to be enquired how the Perſon concerned comes to have that *Authority* over himſelf by *Plato*'s Principles, which your *Critick* thinks *inconſiſtent* with the *Doctrine* of that *Philoſopher* delivered in his *Phædon*. If *theſe* Exceptions alſo may be reconciled, your *beſt Philoſophers* Doctrine will be exactly the ſame with what your *Critick* calls *Popular*, and will allow the ſame Liberty of *dying* by ones *own* hand for any of thoſe Cauſes for which the *Roman* Civil *Law* allowed it, that is, for any of thoſe Cauſes which that *Law* did not call *turpes*, and for which it was ordinarily *practiſed* by the Men of *Honour* among the *Romans*.

But your *Critick* perhaps (if he had been aware of this) would rather have charged *Plato* with *Inconſiſtency* than have allowed this to be *reconcilable* with the *Doctrine* of his *Phædon*. Let us therefore try whether it be ſo. (16.) *Particularly he allowed that by the* leave *of his*

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own Genius, a Philosopher *might venture more easily on his* own Death *than any other.*

It is observable that, even in *Phædon*, where that *Philosopher* makes the *Piacularness* of a *violent Death* to consist in its being *without* the *consent* of the *Guardian Genius* whom he supposes to have the *Right* of disposing us he does, by *consequence*, allow that, when this *Genius* consents, then a *Death* inflicted by the Person *himself* will be *just* and *reconcilable* to the same *Principles* that had otherwise made it *impious* and *piacular*. For so he reasons Οὐκοῦν ἦδ' ὃς ᾧ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴτι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτιννύοι μὴ σημήναντός σε, ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ [τεθνάναι χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ; καὶ εἴ τινα τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν Πάνυ γ' ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν τοῦτον οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. He plainly allows that the *Genius* may signify his *consent*, so that the Party concern'd may be *satisfied* that what he does will *not* be displeasing to him. That is *σημαίνειν*. He owns withal, that the suffering the *Case*, the *ἀνάγκη* (that by this *Reasoning*, will *excuse* the Party concern'd in this Fact) to befal him, is so to be *understood* as if the *Guardian Genius* had sent it. That is, *ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ* He plainly supposes, that no *Event* can befal the Person against the *Will* of the *God* in whose *Custody* he is. Thence he gathers, that when the *Case* falls out it is *sent* and sent with a *Design* of *signifying* the *consent* of the *Genius* to leave the Person at his *liberty* to dispose of *himself* in such a particular *case*. Affirming withal, that this was then the Case of *Socrates* who was to drink his *Poyson* by the Sentence of his *Country*. The *Reasoning* may perhaps lie in this, That he may presume of the *Genius*'s *Consent* to act *himself*, when he is at his *own* disposal as he had been *used* to act by the *Suggestion* of his good *Genius*: And that therefore, when he *cannot* do so, the *Genius* will not be *displeased* at his removing himself from a State wherein he must for the future be *insignificant* or wherein he must incur a Shame from which his *Genius* had formerly always diswaded him. However besides the *leave* of the Guardian, *Plato* does in that same *Phædo* allow *Philosophers* a peculiar *advantage* for venturing on this Practice above other Men. That is, that *true Philosophy* is an *Exercise*, (to speak in the *sacred* Language of our Scriptures) of *dying daily*. His words are: Κινδυνεύ-ουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε

τε καὶ τεθνάναι. This, he tells us, takes off the *Fear* of *Death* from them, and filled them with *confidence* and well ominating *Hopes* in that *Uncertainty* they were *then* in without our *Divine Revelation.* *Socrates* Words there to this purpose are: *ὥς μοι φαίνεται, εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον, θαῤῥεῖ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα ὄισεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ.* All this he says very agreeably to the same *Principles* of this same Dialogue, from whence your *Critick* endeavours to infer a *condemnation* of *Suicide* in general. *Philosophy* was said to be an *Exercise* of *Death* as it mortified the *Flesh*, and the *Lusts* of it, that is, all *concupiscence*, to use the *sacred* Language in a *Philosophy* from whence so many *Forms* are borrowed in our *Holy Writings.* This *breaks* those *Fetters* of the *separated* Soul, which, by this Hypothesis, *kept* the *Soul* down in *matter* more than its *union* with the *Body.* A *Soul* so *purifyed* was supposed to have no *weight* to depress it. Therefore he elswhere allows a *Soul purged* by *Philosophy* capable of returning to its former State sooner than by any other way of *Purgation.* That is not all. The *Wings* of the *Soul* the *πτεροφύησις* in opposition to the *πτεροῤῥύησις*, was also thought to be very much advanc'd by *Philosophy.* So *Plato* expresly in his *Phædrus*: *διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη ἐπτερῶται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.* Accordingly he makes *Philosophy*, in his *Phædon* also, the best Expedient for access to the *Gods*, which is the reason why he had observed that *Philosophy* filled its Professors with such promising Hopes. To this purpose *Pythagoras* designed his *numbers*, and *Mathematicks*, as well as *Astronomy*, to familiarize Mens Thoughts to what they were to expect in *Heaven* by such *abstracted* Speculations. Thus it appears that, by the Doctrine of *Phædon*, *Philosophers* were thought to have a great *advantage* above others for avoiding the *Inconveniences* of *forced* Souls in the State of *Separation.* This would not indeed allow them the liberty of *breaking Prison*, though they had done it on a *prospect* of what they hoped for in *Heaven.* This *Cicero* represents as the sense of this *Philosophy* in the Case of *Africanus*, that he must not expect to come to *Heaven* if he did so. His Words are very plain. *Nisi Deus hic, cujus hoc templum est, omne quod conspicis, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest.* *Macrobius* gives the *reason* why even a Soul purify'd by *Philosophy* must not attempt it. *Hoc ipso quo sibi celerem finem spe fruendæ beati-*

tatis

tatis arceſſit, irretitur laqueo Paſſionis : quia ſpes, ſicut timor Paſſio eſt. That very *Hope* he ſays would be a *Paſſion* tha would hinder the *Aſcent* of the *Soul* by entangling it ir *matter.* Yet this hinders not why a *Philoſophical Sou* may not, by theſe Principles, be better *diſpoſed* to lay *hold* on the *Intimations,* I before obſerv'd, of the *Divine Pleaſure* to leave it to its *own* diſpoſal. He could with al bettter aſſure himſelf when it was not an *undiſciplined Hope* that put him upon it, when he had his *Hopes* as wel as his *Fears* under the Dominion of *Philoſophy.*

17. *This Doctrine ſo explain'd very applicable to the* Caſe *of* Cato.

On theſe Premiſals, it will now be eaſy to account how *Cato* might be *animated* to his *Death,* by reading this Book of *Phædon,* which your *Critick* conceives ſo clear *againſt* it. The third *limitation* propoſed out of *Plato*'s IXth Book of *Laws* was, μήδε αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου ἢ ἀβίου μεταλαχών. I doubt *Cicero* miſtakes the *Philoſopher*'s meaning when he tranſlates it thus : *neq; obrutus ulla pauperis miſeræq; vitæ ignominiâ.* As if *Poverty* had been one of the *caſes* wherein *Plato* thought *Suicide* lawful. This undoubtedly was not the Caſe of *Cato.* And it is manifeſt that he could not be concern'd in the *other* two Exceptions mentioned by *Plato.* So manifeſt it is that, if *Cato*'s Caſe could not be reduced to this *third* Exception, his Fact could not be juſtify'd by any *Principles* of that *Philoſopher.* But I cannot believe that *Interpretation* agreeable to the Mind of *Plato.* He could not favour that hard Opinion of *Poverty* below the *Magnanimity* of a *true Philoſopher.* Had *Poverty* been never ſo *pinching, Death* and *Pain* muſt be the utmoſt *extremity* of it, which are not acknowledged for *Reaſons* ſufficient to prevail with a *Philoſopher* to do any thing that he judges, on other accounts, *unreaſonable.* It muſt withall, by the *Principles* delivered in *Phædon,* be very hurtful for the *ſeparate* Soul to leave the *Body* with ſuch *violent Affections* for *corporeal* Enjoyments, and to make thoſe *Affections* more *violent* by yielding to them in this *laſt* Act of *violence* on her own *Body.* That would not be a *Philoſophical* αἰσχύνη, but a δυσωπία, againſt which *Plutarch* had ſaid ſo excellent things. The *Philoſophical* αἰσχύνη is only of *turpia,* and of thoſe not in the Judgment of the Vulgar, but of *Wiſemen* and *Philoſophers,* who never thought *Poverty* reproachable as a thing deſerving *Shame.* Ἄπορ& therefore here does not ſignifie *Poverty,* as oppoſed to πόρ& and ἔπορ& in an anſwerable Senſe, for *Revenues* and *Riches.*

It

It here signifies *unavoidable* and *inextricable*, what can neither be *avoided* nor *opposed*, out of which there is no πόρος by which we may escape. Thus this *Exception* will bear a Sense every way becoming the *Spirit* and *Case* of *Cato*. Ἀταχών will suit his *incredible Gravity* which *Cicero* mentions as the principal Cause that engaged him to the commission of this *Fact*. This made his *Behaviour* an *Authority* to all who pretended to *exact Behaviour*, and, by making it so, must possess him with a tender Sense of *Shame*, if he should fall short of the common *Expectation*, that is, if he should do any thing *not exemplary*, and which might not abide the severest tests of *tryal* by the most competent *Judges*. The *prospect* he had in his view was his *Behaviour* under *Cæsar* in the *Senate*. He had made it the business of his *Life* to oppose him from the first time he suspected him of any *Design* on the *publick Liberty*. He had voted the delivering him up to the *Germans* for invading their Country without any *Orders* from the *Senate*. He had provoked him so far that *Cæsar* had order'd him to Prison if the *Senate* had not interposed by shewing their great Concern for him. He still persisted to oppose him till *Cæsar* found the way of diverting him by *Clodius*, under pretence of an honourable Embassy to *Cyprus*, wherein none was so fit to be intrusted as *Cato* for his *Integrity* and exact *Justice*. Here therefore was the ἀπορία. Should he behave himself to *Cæsar* with his usual Freedom, that would be indeed to keep *true* to the same Person he had acted before. But he must expect *Cæsar* would always over-rule him. He must expect that by doing so constantly, even his *Authority* would fail him, and his *Endeavours* for the *Publick* must prove for ever unsuccesful. Should he, on the other side, use his Interest in the *good will* of *Cæsar* to win him to use his Power well by Art and Insinuation and Compliances, this might indeed be a likely means to gain his Point with *Cæsar*, but it would not look like acting the same Person he had acted before, having never laid down his *Hostility* against the *Enemies* of the *Commonwealth* till they had given him reason to believe that they also would act *otherwise* for the future than they had done: For him therefore to behave himself otherwise to *Cæsar*, when *possessed* of the Power of the Commonwealth, than he had done before when he was only forming *Designs* against

gainſt it, would make the World believe that the *change* was in him, whilſt they found him behave himſelf like a *Friend* when the *reaſon* of *hoſtility* continued the *ſame*. This *eaſy change* was inconſiſtent with his *incredible Gravity*. And the more ſo, conſidering the *falſe* Reaſons to which ſuch a Complaiſance would be *imputed* by the *Vulgar*, and thoſe who would be favourable to *diſcreditable* Interpretations. They would be apt to charge his change on Reaſons unworthy a *Philoſopher*, a *Fear* of *Cæſar*, or a *Flattery* of his *Succeſſes*, and a being unconcern'd in what he took to be a *publick Grievance*. Nor could he blame them for ſuch *Cenſures*, when no other reaſon *appeared* that might be judged worthy a *Philoſopher*. Beſides this, the *Generoſity* of *Cæſar* in eaſily forgetting paſt Provocations, muſt needs be burdenſom to *Cato*, who as he was *unwilling*, on the publick account, to *receive* Favours from one whom he judged an *Enemy* to the *Publick*, ſo would be more concerned to be outdone by him in *generoſity*. Yet he knew very well, that there was no returning the *good* Offices of *Cæſar* conſiſtent with his *Duty* to his *Country*. This alſo grated on his *αἰχωνη*, and made it *ἄπορον*, and put him out of all hopes of *extricating himſelf* if he had *lived*. Yet this *αἰχωνη* he thought *rational* and *conſiſtent* with the ſtricteſt *Rules* of *Vertue*. It had nothing to do with the Concernments of the *Body*, and therefore could not, in his Opinion, be reckoned among thoſe *Bodily Paſſions*, which that *Philoſophy*, by whoſe *Principles* he acted, thought ſo hurtful to the State of the *ſeparated* Soul. His own *Conſcience* was alone ſufficient to ſatisfie *himſelf* that what he did was on no *Bodily* Regards. The only *end* then that he could propoſe to himſelf in *living*, was if he could contribute any thing to the continuing the *War* againſt *Cæſar*, and to the *reſettling* the Commonwealth on its antient *Foundations*. And as to this he took all the Care poſſible for the preſervation of all thoſe who were likely to manage the *War* with any proſpect of *ſucceſs*. He would not ſuffer *Statilius* a brave *warlike* Genius to imitate himſelf, but ſet his *Philoſophers* on him to *diſſwade* him from it. He *invited* none to imitate him, no not his own *Son*. But he had too *great* an Opinion of *Cæſar's* Conduct to think *himſelf* an equal *match* for him. His great *Opinion* of it appeared by the *warning* he had given *Scipio* of it. And he had then no proſpect of *another*

other General. He might indeed have *lived*, and enjoyed his own Opinions to *himself* in *Exile*. And he was so far from believing this indecorous, that he had intended to have done so, if we may believe *Plutarch*, in Case *Scipio* had prevailed. But this was a βίος ἄβιος to him who believed himself to be born more for his *Country* than *himself*, to live a Life wherein he could only hope to enjoy *himself* without any *prospect* of being any more in a Capacity of serving his *Country*. Here also was place for a generous αἰχώνη, a *Shame* of living and enjoying what he was to enjoy alone, and could never hope that his *Country* could share with him in his Enjoyments. But the Truth is, his Charge of *Utica* would not permit him the liberty of going into *Banishment*, as it might have done if *Scipio* had been the *Conqueror*. Then another of his own *Party* had been ready to *receive* his charge from him by his General's *Order*. Now it was *unlawful* to *desert* the *Trust* committed to him by the *Commonwealth*. Now there was none but his Enemy, *Cæsar*, to *receive* it from him. And to him he could not deliver it without making himself his *Prisoner*. Yet there were no *Hopes* of defending it against him. The *Citizens* were better disposed to *Cæsar* than him. And there were no Thoughts of any thing but *Articling*. Here was therefore no prospect of *Living* to any Satisfaction to *himself*, if he could not endure to live under the Government of *Cæsar*.

18. *Preferring* Death *to* Slavery *was, by that Doctrine, thought* commendable *in Persons bred under a* Genius *of* Liberty, *especially in* Philosophers.

And indeed his *Averseness* to this may, I believe, be sufficient to answer all the *Phænomena* of his *Death*. It is very plain that what he did, though he thought it more *commendable*, yet he did not think it *obliging* to any that were under the same Circumstances with himself. And this was the Case of preferring Death before *Slavery* in the Opinion of that Age. They generally *commend* it as most *Heroical* to do so. Yet so as that they do not look on it as a *Reproach* to do otherwise, that is, if any chose rather to submit to the arbitrary disposal of the *Conqueror* than provoke him to take the uttermost *advantage* of his *Conquests*. The *preferring Death* to *Slavery* is the usual Subject of *Military Orations*, and *Historical Encomiums*. Not only where they chuse to fall by the *Enemies Sword*, but by their *own*, rather than they would submit to *dishonourable Terms*, or to the *Pleasure* even of *generous* and *merciful Conquerors*. The Instances of the *Num-*

mantines, the *Saguntines*, the *Thebans* under *Alexander* the *Great*, and of the *Jews* in *Massada*, are very commonly recommended in *Histories* as great *Examples* fit for the Readers *Imitation*. Nor are they less celebrated in the *Discourses* of *Philosophers* as often as they have occasion to treat of the Subject of *contempt* of *Death*. We are not therefore to take it only for a *popular* Opinion, as your *Critick* is willing to understand it, but as agreeable to the severest Notions of *Philosophy* then received. And this is actually owned by *Cato* as the reason of his own Fact in *Dio*. He there advises his *Son* to take the Advantage of *Cæsar*'s Mercy, and *allows* it in his *Years* to submit to that *Slavery* which he did not think it becoming *his* years to submit to. So his Words are represented by that Historian: Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔντε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ παῤῥησίᾳ τραφεὶς, οὐ δύναμαι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐπὶ γήρως μαθεῖν. σοὶ δ' ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει καὶ γενηθέντι καὶ τραφέντι, τὸν δαίμονα τὸν λαχόντα σὲ θεραπεύειν προσήκει. This is exactly agreeable to the *words* of your *Author* transcribed by your *Critick* concerning the *different* Case of *Cato* and *others* concerned with him in the same quarrel, why what he believes had been *blame-worthy* in them, might notwithstanding be highly *commendable* in him. *Forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent*, says *Cicero*. On the contrary, *Cato* in *Dio* makes it a *Duty* in his *Son* to *submit* to those Terms of living which he was resolved not to accept for himself. The Reason is taken from the nature of his Son's *Dæmon*, which was a *Dæmon* which allowed of *Slavery*, whose *Government* he ought not to decline. Οὐ προσήκει, is his Word. This shews he had throughly consider'd the Doctrine of *Plato*'s *Phædon* in this particular, concerning the *Duty* of being *concluded* by our *Genius*, and was not *conscious* of any *deviation* from it in his own Case. On the contrary, he argues in *defence* of his own *Designs* from the *Nature* of his *own Genius*, which was not, as his *Son's*, a *Genius* of *Slavery*, but of *Liberty*. This he proves from the *Tenor* of his *own Life*, which had been in *Liberty*. Divine Providence having brought him into a Scene wherein he had been inured to the owning no Power *superior* to the *Laws* of his *Country*. Thence he gathered the *Nature* of his *Genius* by which he had been conducted suitable to the *part* allotted him by that same *Providence*. It had always prompted him to Motions in *favour* of *Liberty*. And he had al-

always found great *Satisfaction* of mind in *complying* with such Motions, by which he had experienc'd how agreeable they were to the *Nature* of his *Guide*. As therefore *Balaam*, after having *twice* consulted God, thenceforward presumed on the Response without any more *repeating* the Ceremonies of *consulting* him; so *Cato* also *presumed* on the *Sense* of his own *Genius* by a much stronger Argument of the *Experience* of his *whole Life*, that Endeavours in favour of *Liberty* would not be *displeasing* to *him*. This way of *Reasoning* was agreeable to *Plato*'s Notions concerning *communication* with their *Genii*. *Socrates* did not pretend to know the *mind* of his *Genius* by positive and direct *Impulses*, but by *Omens* to the contrary if any thing were undertaken by him which *displeased* his *Genius*. Thence he concluded his *own Death* not displeasing to his *Genius* because he had no *Warnings* to the *contrary*; Presuming on the *Experience* of his *whole Life* where he had not *particular Evidence* to believe that a *particular Exception* was designed. The same way *Cato* might *Reason*, by the same *Principles*, for *presuming* on the *Sense* of his *own Genius* from past *Experience*, when the *Genius* it self did not think fit to interpose by particular *warnings* in a Case that was *against* the *general Rules* of his former Conduct. This therefore seems to be the meaning of *Plato* in his *Phædon* by his Words, μὴ σημήναντός σε. The σημεῖον might be given by the *Genius* by giving no *Omen* to the *contrary* in a Case wherein the *Sense* of the *Genius* in *general* was apparent by the *Station* of the Person concerned wherein *Providence* had placed him, and by the general *Conduct* of his *Life* fitted to that *Station*. Yet the Explication given in the same *Phædon*, πρὶν ἀναγκαίῳ τινὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ made it more easy for *Cato* to judg concerning his *own* Case by the *Principles* of this *Philosophy*. The *necessity* that put him on the commission of that Fact was the *Success* of *Cæsar*, and the unavoidable *consequence* that followed thereupon, of *losing* his *Liberty* if he would preserve his *Life*. God *suffering* this *event* to come to pass was, by these *Principles*, taken for a *Permission* of him to his *own liberty*, wherein it was *presumed* the *Genius* would not be *offended* if he managed himself suitably to the *conduct* of his former *Life* by the *Genius* it *self*, which had always been favourable to *Liberty*. And so it is that *Cato* himself *understood* it only as a *Permission*, when he urged it on *none* besides himself, who

had been *born* and *bred* under *Liberty* as well as he, though his *Reasoning* must needs hold, that *their Genii* were as favourable to *Liberty* as his *own*. What was it then that made his Case *singular*? His being a professed *Philosopher*, which probably none of the *Romans* that were with him were besides himself. The Doctrine of the same *Phædon* had taught him, τὸ τὲς φιλοσόφυς ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, because the Study of their *Life* was a *Mystical Death* to *Corporeal Affections* which were *they* alone which made the *Corporeal Death* formidable. This therefore taught him that he might lay *hold* on *less* Occasions than others were *obliged* to, for ridding himself from his *Body*. Herein therefore appeared the *Gravitas* as your Authour calls it, of *Cato*, ἰσχυρογνωμοσύνη as it is rendred by *Dio*, that he took occasion from this *Permission* of his *Genius*, to make his *Death* suitable to the *Conduct* of his whole foregoing *Life*, that he would not in that Sense go from the *Rules* observed by him formerly for this *Necessity*, which his *Genius* had suffered to befal him. So perfectly was his *Practice* agreeable to the *Doctrine* of *Plato* in his *Phædon*, as rightly understood according to the *Mind* of that *Philosopher*.

(19.) Cato's Gravity *consisted in an* Uniformity *of the last Act with his former* Life *on presumption of the* permission *of his* Genius, *by the best* Philosophy *then known. It is not probable that he* envied Cælar.

Let us therefore now see what your *Critick* has to *object* to the contrary. He tells us he does not take *Obstinacy* for *Gravity*. Nor does the Explication I have given of *Gravity* give him any occasion to understand it so. I have shewn it agreeable to the severest *Reasoning* on the *Principles* of *Plato*'s *Phædon*, to make his *Death* uniform to the rest of his *Life*, where the thing was otherwise thought *lawful*, and left to his *Liberty* by his *Genius*. And I have shewn the *Reasonings* consequent to that Philosophers *Sense* of things (which prevailed with him to commit the *Fact*) which might induce him to believe that this was really his *Case*, it was not ἰδιογνωμοσύνη, a preferring his own *private* Opinion before that of the *ablest Judges* of Matters of that *Nature*; but ἰσχυρογνωμοσύνη, a firm adherence to the same *Rules* of *living* whilst the *Observation* of them was *lawful*, though it were *lawful* also to *depart* from them, yet not necessary to do so. And what Fault can your *Critick* find in this? It rather *became* a Person who had been *used* to do so in the whole Course of his *Life*. And this is that which *Cicero* calls *Gravity*. Yet it was also *lawful* to behave himself *differently* in the like recurring *Circumstances*, if both of the dif-

different behaviours be *lawful*. Nor wou'd it *misbecome* a Perſon to do *differently* in the *ſame Circumſtances*, and to take his *Liberty* of *judging* and *chooſing* of the ſeveral lawful things, that which he takes to be moſt *expedient*. From *young* Men no other is to be expected, who are to *learn* by their *Experience* what is *expedient*. Nor is it a *diſparagement* to *others* who have *inured* themſelves to this *Liberty*. This is that which *Cicero* calls *Levity*, not by way of *Reproach*, but as *leſs commendable* in *old Men* who know the *uttermoſt* of their *Experience*, and who are to *lead* others by their *Example*. An *uniform* way of behaviour, and a ſteadineſs to the *Rules* they have preſcribed themſelves, by the beſt way of *judging* they are capable of, is natural to *old Men*, and is *expected* from them as moſt *becoming* their *Age*. But your *Critick* tells us that nothing can juſtifie *Suicide* but an expreſs *Divine Command*. Will not an expreſs *Divine Permiſſion* excuſe it alſo? I have ſhewn that both *Cato* and *Cicero* required that alſo, as well as their Maſter *Plato*. I have alſo ſhewn by what ways of *Reaſoning* they judged of that *Divine Permiſſion*. Nor do I think your *Critick* can ſhew better that they were capable of who knew nothing of any *written Revelation*. Our Queſtion is not how good *Divines* they were, but how good *Philoſophers*. And they muſt be allowed for the *beſt* of that kind, if they acted by the beſt *Rules* that were diſcoverable by *Philoſophy*. If therefore any one is concerned to defend your *Critick*, he ſhould ſhew ſome *better Rules* diſcoverable by the then known *Philoſophy*, than thoſe I have already deſcribed. Yet, even in *Divinity*, properly ſo called, I know none that even our *Chriſtian* Anceſtors have acknowledged to have come *nearer* to our *Divine Scriptures* than the *Divine Plato*. None, whoſe *Notions* and *Stile* too, are more frequently *alluded* to, not only in the *Writings* of the moſt celebrated *Fathers*, but of the *New Teſtament* it ſelf. St. *Paul* is not ſo ſevere as your learned *Monſieur*, in expecting that they who *ſinned without the Law* of God ſhould be *judged by it*. Your *Critick* inſiſts on the *Cenſure* of St. *Auguſtine*, that *Cato* killed himſelf in envy to *Cæſar*. But who was St. *Auguſtine*'s *Author* for it, being a thing beyond the *Knowledge* of St. *Auguſtine*? *Cæſar*, as appears from *Plutarch* alſo. That *Cæſar* who was the *Occaſion* of his *Death*. That *Cæſar* who, in vindication of himſelf was concerned to aſperſe the *Memory* of *Cato*, and wrote his *Anticatones* for that

St. Aug. de Civ. Dei. *L.* I. *c.* 23.

purpose. That *Cæsar* who was also *Cicero*'s *Adversary* in this very Cause, though otherwise a very generous one. Yet even *he*, not from any *Words* of *Cato*, importing such *Envy* in the *Judgment* of any *indifferent* Person, but by a sinister *Interpretation* of the *Fact* it self which was as capable of a *good* Interpretation as of the *bad* one, which *Cæsar* a professed *Adversary* to *Cato*'s *Person* was pleased to put upon it. *Cato* had indeed a *Soul* too *great* and *generous* for *Envy*. He knew it as contrary to his *Philosophy* as any of those other *Passions* to which he might have as great an *Inclination* in his *natural* Temper as he had to that, which notwithstanding he had so subdued to *Discipline* that no *Tokens* of them appeared *externally*. He knew it as hurtful to the Interests of his *separated* Soul by the *Principles* of that *Philosophy* on which he acted. And he had *then* a particular *warning* to take care of his Behaviour when he was in so near a prospect of *entring* on the State of *Separation*. He might indeed rival *Cæsar*'s *Generosity*: But I cannot easily believe so *beneficent* a Nature, so cultivated by *Philosophy*, would ever have *envied* him an *Opportunity* of *expressing* it.

(20.) Cato *might have lived* free *under* Cæsar. *But, by his* Principles *it was sufficient to* justify *his* Death, *that he was not* obliged *to do so.*

Your *Critick* tells us, that *Cato* might have kept his Liberty under *Cæsar* by the *Principles* of that *Stoical Philosophy* which he professed. He knew this very well, and would no *doubt*, have done so if he had come under *Cæsar*'s Power by any other Act than his *own*, if he had been *seized* and *delivered* up *bound* to him. But could your Adversary *believe* in earnest, that there was, indeed, no *difference* between these two Cases, of being *betrayed* to him, and *surrendring* voluntarily? No, not in point of ἀιχώη, which I have shewn was one of the *Exceptions* allowed by *Cato* from his own *general* Rule. He had no Reason to be ashamed of another Man's Act. But would even any *Philosphy* hinder him from being *ashamed* of the Consequences of his *own Act* which was perfectly in his *own Power*? So it had been for him, as Governour of *Utica*, to have given up his *Trust* received from the *Commonwealth*, the *City* and so many *Roman Citizens* in it; among the rest *himself* into the hands of *Cæsar*, *whom* he had himself for so many years opposed as an *Enemy* to the *Common-wealth*. It had been no *shame* to him to have been *spared* by *Cæsar*. But had it therefore been *none* to have *treated* and *articled* for his own *Life* with all the meannesses of a *Suppliant*? Had it been *now*, to have *failed* in it; or, upon Success,

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to seem to have been *exceeded* by *Cæsar* in point of *Generosity*? Had it been *none*, to seem to take *Death* for so *valuable* a consideration as to seem to have allowed the *Fear* of it sufficient to prevail with him to do any thing, that in his *own Opinion*, deserved *Shame*? This Sense of *Shame* may seem little and inconsiderable to mean *degenerous Souls*. But it did not so to *Cato*'s Brethren the *Stoicks*. It did not so to Souls truly *great* and *Heroical*, such as was that of *Cato*. All sorts of *Sins* with them were abhorred as *turpia*. And that which made them abominable on that account, was the consideration of their deserving *Shame*. This therefore was by them opposed to *all* those *Passions* of what kind soever, and therefore must, by their *Principles*, over-rule them *all*. This was indeed the *principal* Instance wherein *Cato*'s *Stoicks* differ'd from the *Cynicks*, that they could by no means endure their Doctrine of *Impudence*; but, on the contrary, were swayed by nothing more certainly than by considerations of *Shame*. Thence their so much insisting on the τὸ αἰδήμον in *Epictetus* and *Marcus Antoninus*. Thence the μάλις αἰσχύνεω σαυτὸν in the *Golden Verses* of the *Pythagoreans*, whose Doctrine was followed by the *Platonists* in Subjects of this Nature which were *Theological*. However, let us grant your *Critick*, that *Cato* might have enjoyed his own *Liberty* under *Cæsar*, though he had been *really* a *Tyrant* as well as an *Usurper*; and that though he had asserted it to the *uttermost*, he could at last have only suffered that from *Cæsar*, which he now inflicted on himself, as *Thraseus Pætus* and *Helvidius Priscus* did for their *Philosophical* Freedom from the *Tyrants* of their own Age. What then? All he can thence infer is only this, that *Cato* was not obliged to kill himself by the *Principles* of his own *Philosophy*. But how does it appear that he thought himself *obliged* to do so? It is rather as I have shewn, more probable that he did *not* think so. The *Reason* given by him concerning the *free* Nature of the *Genius* under which he had been educated, if it had *obliged him* would have *obliged all* of the same *Age* with himself. And he would not have *dissembled* his own Thoughts of their Case, if he had thought them under any *Obligation* to do as himself did. But so *far* he was from that, that he took all the *care* possible to *secure* all the *rest* that were concerned with him in the same *Cause*. But it will not thence follow that it was *unlawful* for him to *die*, because it was *lawful* for him to *live*, nor that his *dying* was the *less* commendable Case of the two. I have shewn the contrary from that *Philosophy* on which

Cato reaſoned, together with the *Reaſons* from that *Philoſophy* why he *thought* his own *Death* the *more* commendable. And this alone is abundantly ſufficient to *purge* both *him* and his *Encomiaſt* as *Philoſophers*.

(21.) *Neither Caſe of* Socrates *or* Pythagoras *like that of* Cato. *Monſieur* Petite *miſtaken when he thinks that* Cicero *reflected on* Cato.

The moſt conſiderable *Objection* inſiſted on by your *Critick*, is that of the Caſe of *Socrates*. His *Caſe* was, I confeſs, in ſeveral conſiderable things, *like* that of *Cato*. He alſo was an *old* Man when the XXX *Tyrants* were impoſed on his Country by the *Lacedæmonians*, and therefore *bred* under a *Genius* of *Liberty*. He was a *Philoſopher* alſo as well as *Cato*. The *Doctrine* of this whole *Hypotheſis* is alſo repreſented by *Plato* in the Perſon of *Socrates*. Very probably as knowing it agreeable to his *Senſe*. Withal the XXX *Tyrants* were *really* ſo, as well in regard of the *abuſe* of their Power, as of their *want* of a *Right* to it, which was ſo far from the Caſe of *Cæſar*, even in the Opinion of *Cato* himſelf when he allowed his *Son* to do what he did not think *fit*, to do *himſelf*. Why then ſo *different* a *Practice* in ſo great an *Agreement* of their *Caſe*, between two ſo great *Philoſophers*, acting on the ſame *Principles*? Yet there were *differences* in their *Circumſtances* ſufficient to ſhew their *Caſes* really more different than they may be thought when conſider'd *ſuperficially*. And thoſe of ſuch *Importance* to this Cauſe, as may ſhew *Socrates* not *obliged* to act like *Cato*. *Socrates* had no *truſt* of the *Commonwealth* in his Hands that *obliged* him to ſo particular *Tranſactions* with the *Oppreſſors* of the common *Liberty*. He was in a *private* Station, and had no more concernment with them than the *meaneſt* of his fellow *Citizens*. He had not particularly diſobliged the *Tyrants* in their *private* Converſation; had no *old* Grudges and Reſentments againſt his own *Perſon*; was neither *then*, nor formerly *had* been, in *Arms* and *Hoſtilities* againſt them; had no particular Cauſe to *fear* their *Cruelty*, or to *exerciſe* their *Generoſity*; had no particular Cauſe of *Shame*, if he had appeared before them, nor any *Concern* to appear *before* them at all, unleſs he pleaſed *himſelf*. In ſo many Inſtances with regard to the time *paſt*, his *Caſe* was *different* from the *Caſe* of *Cato*; Nor was it like it with relation to the time to *come*. *Cato* was a *Senator*, and, on that account *obliged* to attend the *Seſſions* of the *Senate*, and, *puniſhable* by the *Laws* of his *Country*, if he did *not*. That was the *Aſſembly* of *conſtant*

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uſe wherein all things of the *greateſt* Conſequence were tranſacted. He could not therefore *avoid* diſpleaſing *Cæſar*, and that very frequently, if he gave his Opinion with the ſame *Freedom* he had been always uſed to. Beſides, his *Authority* in that *great* Aſſembly influenced a great *Number*, and among them many of *higher* Station in it than *himſelf*. This made it *odious* and *invidious* for *Cæſar* to *differ* from him, as he had experienced before in his *lower* Station, when he endeavoured to *impriſon* him. *Socrates*'s Poverty excluded him out of the σύγκλητον βουλὴν, wherein the XXX *Tyrants* exerciſed the *greateſt* and moſt *frequent* Acts of their Authority. They avoided, as much as they were able, any ordinary recourſe to the ἐκκλησίαν, wherein alone it was that *Socrates* had a *Vote* among the 6000. Yet neither had he the *Authority* *Cato* had, and *he deſerved*, of influencing *others*, which might put it in his Power to *hinder* the deſigns of *Tyrants*. But your *Critick* fancies he might, at leaſt, have kept his *Liberty*, as *Pythagoras* the *Philoſopher* did, by going into a voluntary *Exile*. But even that he could not do till he was diſcharged of his *truſt* of *Utica*. And that was a matter of *Shame* to *Cato*, upon *any* terms to deliver up the *truſt* of the *Commonwealth* into the Hands of *Cæſar*, whom he took for the greateſt Enemy to that ſame *Commonwealth* which had *committed* that *truſt* to him. But the ſtrangeſt fancy of your *Critick* is, that *Cicero* ſhould *reflect* upon *Cato* for the very ſame thing for which he cannot deny but he has taken ſo *many* occaſions of *commending* him. Your Author's words produced for this Purpoſe are, *neq; ita geſſi, quaſi homini aut temporibus iratus*. The Words are in his *own* Perſon, not in the Perſon of any *other*, much leſs of *Cato*. The Words *before* and *after* do not ſo much as *fit* the *Perſon* of *Cato*. He did not *hide*, nor *forſake*, nor *afflict* himſelf. Nor was he ever an *Admirer* of the *Fortune* of *Cæſar*, ſo as to be *ſorry* for his *own*. And theſe very Words, as they are in the *Perſon* of *Cicero*, ſo are they ſo exactly *fitted* to his *own* Caſe that there is not the leſs *Neceſſity* of underſtanding them of any deſign upon any *other*, but purely as a juſt *Apology* for *himſelf* for ſpending the *time* of *Cæſar* in *retirement* and *Philoſophy*, rather than in the Employments of his own *Function* as an *Orator*, or in the Affairs of the *Commonwealth* as a *Roman Senator*. This is that which was naturally apt to be *interpreted* as a being

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ing *angry* at *Cæsar* and the *times*; and very probably was *so* interpreted by those who were *not* satisfied with his being so *employed*. It is certain that many did *censure* him for it, as appears by the many *Apologies* he makes for it in *other* Passages of his Works. So *little* occasion there is for this suggestion, as if they had related to the *Case* of *Cato*.

(22.) *This* Doctrine *of* Plato's Phædon *and* Cato *will not* excuse *our modern* Suicides.

I think I have rightly accounted for the *true* Cause why *Cato* killed *himself* from that very *Philosophy* which gave *Cato* the *occasion* for it, and *Cicero* the *occasion* of *commending Cato* for the *Practice* of it. My present design against your *Critick* does not *oblige* me to *defend* that *Doctrine* of that *Philosophy*, nor to give my *own* Thoughts of it. But though it *could* be defended, I doubt whether it would excuse *any* of the *Suicides* of our *present* Age. Ours are generally for some *Passion* of the *lower* Soul relating to the *Body*; For *Love*, for *Fear*, for *worldly Disappointments*, for *Impatience* of the *Calamities* sent upon them by *Providence*. These are all sinful by the Principles of *Phædon*. The killing *themselves* for any Causes of *this kind* is a *breaking* their *Prison* without his *leave* to whose *Custody* they had been committed by the *supream Being*, and makes them, who are *guilty* of it, liable to the *Displeasure* of their *Genius*, and of the *Supream Being* also, who had committed them to the *Custody* of their *Genius*; and to all the *Punishment* they should either of them think fit to *inflict* on their *fugitive Servants*. That is not all. It *fixes* those *Passions* in them which gave them *occasion* for their *violent Death*, and, by doing so, does *more* indispose them for mounting to *Heaven* than when they were in the *Body*, and inclines them more to descend to *Tartarus* than to keep their *middle Station* wherein they were *before*. Withal it brings them under a *Piacular* guilt for the *Violence* offered ro *themselves*. This *Plato* owns expressly in the forementioned place of his *Laws*. Accordingly he advises their surviving Relations to make *Attonements* and *Expiations* for them, that they might thereby avoid the contagion of *Punishment* following from the Nature of a *Piacular Crime*. The supposing this ranks them among the ἀμέθαρτα πνεύματα, and makes them fit for the Conversation of none but *Apostate Spirits*. Accordingly they were ranked among *Devils*, and many of the *Effects* of *Devils* are also ascribed to these *Piacular Human* Souls. All the Conversation of *Necromancers* and *Psychagogi* was at the *Monuments*

ments of their *Bodies*, and therefore proper for those *Spirits* which had been *formerly* in *Bodies*. For it is to the *Love* of those *Bodies* that *Plato* ascribes their hovering over their own *Monuments*, and being there *consulted*, and returning *Oracular Responses* to Questions proposed to them. These Reasons do not concern *Spirits* which had never been *embodied*, but only *Piacular Human* Souls. So that these will indeed prove the only *Devils* concerned in these Cases, unless perhaps they supposed such *Souls* under the *Management* of *Evil Spirits* from the time they had cast off their *Subjection* to the *Good Spirits*, to whom they had been allotted, by committing this *Piacular* Crime. This might be the Reason why the *Magicians* and *Necromancers* made their Addresses to their *Evil Genius* rather than to the *Souls* themselves which were not supposed to be at their *own* disposal. And it is agreeable enough to the *Platonical Hypothesis* of which I am now discoursing. This really appears to have been the Notion of the *Jews*, and consequently of the *primitive Christians* who *received* their Sentiments of this kind from the *Jews*, as the *Jews* did from the *Platonists* in things not *contradicted* by the *Divine Revelations* of the New Testament. *Human unclean* Souls are reckoned among the *Devils* in the Fragments we have of the ancient Book of *Enoch*: So the Words are: Καὶ νῦν οἱ Γίγαντες, οἱ γενηθέντες ἀπὸ πνευμάτων καὶ σαρκὸς πνεύματα πονηρὰ ἔσονται, τὰ πνεύματα ἔσονται τὰ πνεύματα ἐξελεύσεται ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῶν, διότι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγένοντο, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων τῶν ἐγρηγόρων ἡ ἀρχὴ κτίσεως αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀρχὴ θεμελίου. πνεύματα πονηρὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσονται, &c. St. *Justin Martyr* is perfectly of the same Mind. So he in his 1 *Apology*, which was really his *last*: Οἱ δ' ἄγγελοι, παραβάντες τοῦτο τὸ τάξιν, γυναιξὶν μίξεσιν ἡττήθησαν, καὶ παῖδας ἐτέκνωσαν, οἱ εἰσιν οἱ λεγόμενοι δαίμονες. Apol. I. p. 44. B. Accordingly he accounts them *Dæmoniacks* who were possessed by the *Souls* of the *Dead*, οἱ Ψυχαῖς ἀποθανόντων λαμβανόμενοι καὶ ῥιπιζόμενοι ἄνθρωποι, οὓς δαιμονιολήπτους καὶ μαινομένους καλοῦσι πάντες. Apolog. II. p. 65. Very agreeably to the Doctrine of his former Master *Plato*, who made those *separated Souls* who retained their *Sensual Affections* to have therefore a great *Inclination* to take all Opportunities of *returning* into *Human Bodies*. Thence he takes all the Commerce of *Necromancers* and *Magicians* for Proofs of the *Immortality* of *Human Souls*, which he could not do unless they were

were *Human Souls* with whom that Superſtitious *Commerce* was maintained. Accordingly in his *Dialogue* alſo with *Trypho*, he grants it to have been the *true Soul* of *Samuel* which was *moleſted* by the Witch of *Endor*. Wherein he followed the old *Helleniſtical Siracides*. That ſhews how *agreeable* his *Doctrine* was, in that particular with the *Traditions* received by our firſt *Chriſtian* Anceſtors from the *Jews*. That is not all. He makes this *moleſting* Power over *ſeperated Souls* the ground of the moſt ancient *Prayers* of the *Church* for their deceaſed Chriſtian *Brethren*. Which ſhews that *they* who then uſed thoſe *Prayers* were of the ſame *Mind* with *him*, and that he was not herein guilty of any ſuſpicious *ſingularity*. Not that *ill Dæmons* had the *ſame* Power over ſuch *pure Souls* as *Samuel's*, as they might, by the *Doctrine* of *Plato*, be ſuppoſed to have over thoſe who had brought themſelves under the *Dominion* of *ill Spirits* by *deſerting* their *good* Tutelars, and by their *Piacular Crimes*. The *Dæmons* of ὕλη were ſuppoſed to have a Power through the whole ὕλη, which, by the *Platonical Hypotheſis*, was from the *Moon* downwards. All this was reckon'd under the *darkneſs* of this *World*, as oppoſed to the *Cæleſtial Light* which was the proper *Habitation* of *pure Spirit*. But in this Region of *Darkneſs*, they made two Partitions, one of the σκότος ἐσώτερον, from the *Moon* to the *Earth*, the other of the σκότος ἐξώτερον, from the *Earth* to *Tartarus*. But from the *Moon* to the *Earth* it was requiſite that *good* and *evil Spirits* ſhould *both* of them freely correſpond with *Mankind*, the *free Agent*, which, according to his *behaviour*, was to be tranſlated to *Heaven* or *Tartarus*, the *habitations* of thoſe *Spirits* with whom he was concerned. If he followed the *good Spirits*, they were to fit him for, and conduct him to *Heaven*, the Region of *pure Light*, and the habitation of the *Bleſſed*. If he followed the *evil* Spirits ſo as to ſuffer *them* to have *dominion* over him, they were ſuppoſed to draw him to *Tartarus* or *Erebus*, the place *deſigned* by *God* for the *Puniſhment* of thoſe *accurſed Spirits*. This *middle* Station therefore, though comprehended under the *Darkneſs* in oppoſition to the *pure Light*, yet was indeed thought to be a *mixture* of both. As the *Angels* of *Light* maintained an Intercourſe with *Man* in it, ſo it partook of their *Illuminations*; and yet was *Darkneſs* as it admitted the Commerce of the *Spirits* of *Darkneſs*. Yet ſo as that *neither* of the *Spirits* were to converſe with each *other*, as acting contrary *hoſtile* deſigns. The *ill Spirits* therefore

Dialog. cum Tryph *p.* 333.

Eccl. XLVI. 20.

ore were perfectly *excluded* from any access to *Heaven* ne habitation of the *Blessed*, as the *good* ones were from *artarus*, the place appointed for the *Punishment* of the *ccursed*, that there might be no κοινωνία between *Light* nd *Darkness*. That I take to be the *great Gulph fixed* or hindring any Intercourse between the *Blessed* in *Hea-en* and the *Damned* in *Hell*, which therefore took in all he *intermediate* Space between *Heaven* properly so cal-ed, and *Tartarus*. However being *both* of them design-d for the tryal of *Mankind*, they were *both* of them per-nitted to converse with *Men*, and therefore were allow-d the liberty of this *middle* space. This is a clear Ac-ount why the State of *Souls* in this *middle* Station, which vas generally believed by the *Primitive Church*, is de-cribed so differently by the *Antients*, sometimes as a tate of *Light* and *visitation* of *good Angels*, sometimes s a State of *Molestation* by *evil* ones, from whom they vere to be delivered by the *Prayers* of their *Christian* Friends. This therefore was all the Power *ill* Spirits vere supposed to have, over even *good Souls*, in the im-erfect State of *separation*. But Possession by them was power of a higher nature, not only to *perswade* the Men they had to deal with by external or internal *Sug-estions*, but to move them in many things *against* their *Wills*. That was the Case of *Dæmoniacks*, and of Persons guilty of *piacular* Crimes, whilst they were in their *Bo-dies*. They were frightned by *Furies* into Fits of *di-straction*, and many *involuntary* Motions. That is said to have been the Case of *Hercules*, and *Alcmæon*, and *Orestes*, and was also the Case of the Christian *Excommunicats*. For the *Furies* were supposed to have the same Office in the *Heathen Theology* that the *Devils* had in the *Christian*, of being *malignant Spirits* employed by God for the *Punishment* of *Mankind*. Whilst therefore any *piacular* Person was thus under the *dominion* of an *ill Spirit*, as the *Spirits* who *possessed* them were supposed to be *un-clean*, so were *themselves* also on that very *account* of their being so *possessed*. Accordingly they were (for that time) excluded from *Prayers* and *Sacrifices*, and all sorts of *Re-ligious* Offices of *Worship* with *good Spirits*. Not only so, but they were also forbidden all familiar *Conversation* with *Religious* Persons, who would themselves, by such *Con-versation*, be involved in the *contagion* and *guilt* of their *piacular* Crime. To what purpose all this but to signify

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how *unacceptable* they were to those *good Spirits* themselves, who would endure no *Conversation* with them in those who were admitted to *partake* in their *holy Offices*! This being the Case of the *Living*, it must, by the same Principles, be supposed to be worse with the *Dead*. They must be *more* in the *dominion* of the *Evil Spirit* in whose Power they are by the *violence* of that *Passion* which was the *cause* of the *violence* offered to themselves, and by the Nature of a *separated Soul* with a *violent Passion*, according to the Doctrine of the *Platonists* more inclined to go *downwards* to the Mansions of *Evil Spirits* than *upwards* to the Mansions of the *Good*. They are then supposed as *unfit* for any Converse with *good Spirits* which might *rescue* them from the power of the Tyrants in *possession* of them as they were *unfit*, when *living*, to join in any holy *Offices* wherein any *good* and *holy Spirits* were concerned. The desire of *Heaven* by a *violent Death* might seem as *commendable* a *Passion* as any. Yet even that I have shewn not to have been thought sufficient to attone for the *Piaculum* contracted by such a *Death*, by the same Principles of *Plato* approved by *Cicero* in the Case of *Africanus*. Even in that Case he makes *God* concerned to keep them *out* of that very *Heaven* which they had sought irregularly without the *consent* of their *Genius*. This will utterly condemn all *Suicides* on pretence of *Religion*.

(23.) Martyrs *generally contributed to their* own Death, *and are* commended *for doing so.*

If *any* Cases of it be justifiable by our *Christian Religion*, I know of none that can so fairly pretend to it as that of *Martyrdom*, and that of securing *Chastity* by it. As to the *former* Case, I know of no Example of *offering Violence* to *themselves* with their own *hands*. But there were very many who did *not* use the utmost *liberty* of *securing* themselves by Expedients otherwise *lawful*; many who offered themselves before the Dangers *reached* them; many who provoked the *Instruments* of their own *destruction*, and who were highly *commended* by the *Church* for doing so in the *Ages* of the *greatest* and most *unquestionable Authority*. The *Apostolical Ignatius* uses the word προσβιάσωμαι concerning the *Beasts* that were to devour him, that, if they should, by *Miracle*, be *restrained* from exercising the *Fierceness* of their *Nature* upon him, he would *force* them to it as far as *Provocation* might do so. I know the Adversaries of these admirable Epistles *Blondell* and *Dallee* have taken advantage against them from this very

Ignat. ad Rom.

Word.

Word. But how little agreeably they have done so to the *Sense* of the *Age* of *Ignatius*, has been shewn by our excellent Bishop *Pearson*. He has produced another Example of the same *word* in a like Case of *Germanicus* from the unquestionable Epistle of the Church of *Smyrna* preserv'd by *Eusebius*. Of the *thing* he has produced many more Passages of those Ages in that very elaborate Work shewing the great Opinion they then had of it. Besides several others I have seen in the Margin of his own printed Book which occurred to him after the *Edition* of it. But the word προσβιάσομαι is particularly remarkable because *Plato* himself uses the simple Word βιάζεσθαι, and *condemns* it in this very Case. But our Blessed Saviour uses the very same *word* as *Plato* himself did, and yet *allows* it. His Words are: ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν βιάζεται, καὶ βιασταὶ ἁρπάζουσιν αὐτήν. He seems to design it in opposition to *Plato* who, as I have shewn took this βία for a certain *hindrance* of being admitted into *Heaven*. In St. *Luke* xvi. 16. the Expression is, ἀπὸ τότε ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ εὐαγγελίζεται, καὶ πᾶς εἰς αὐτὴν βιάζεται. This Sense fits the *Coherence* conveniently enough. Our Blessed Lord had before been commending the *Austerities* of St. *John* the *Baptist*, as to his *Diet* and *Habit*. Yet so that he prefers the *meanest* of his *own* Disciples before him. *Him* he allows for those singular Austerities to have been the *greatest* of those who were born of *Women*. But his *own Disciples* in their *Baptismal Regeneration* were to partake of a *Diviner Birth* than that of *Women*; *not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of Man, but of God.* St. *John* i. 13. Being *born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God which liveth and abideth for ever.* I St. Pet. i. 23. This relates to the *Baptism* of the *Spirit* which accompanied our *Saviour's Baptism*, but did not so in the *Baptism* of St. *John*, nor of any *other* that *Baptized* before our *Saviour*. This made our Saviour's *Disciples* entitled to a *Birth* of the *Spirit* as well as of *Water*. St. *John* iii. 5. which the other *Baptisms* could not pretend to. Wherein therefore did the *meanest* of the *Disciples* of our *Saviour* excel St. *John* the *Baptist* but in that very point of his celebrated *Austerities*? That whereas the *Austerities* of St. *John* were *short* of *Death* (I mean those *alluded* to on this occasion) all our Blessed *Saviour's Disciples* should, in their very *Baptism*, profess themselves *ready*, not only

Pearson Vind. Part II. *c.* 9.

S. Cypr. *Ep.* XXVI, Dionys. Alex. *ap.* Euf. *H. E.* VI. 41 Prudent. *Hymn.* XII.

S. Matth. XI. 12.

to

to endure *Corporal Auſterities* for him, but to give their *Lives* for him whenever his *Cauſe* required it, or whenever the *preſerving* their *Lives* ſhould prove inconſiſtent with their *Duty*, whenever their *God* ſhould ſend the ἀνάγκη that ſhould make it requiſite, to ſpeak in the Language of *Plato*'s *Phædon*. This is implied in the *Baptiſmal Stipulation*, inaſmuch as the *Signs* there uſed are *ſtipulatory*, and *ſtipulatory* on our *part*, as well as *God*'s. Our going *under the water* ſignifies our *dying* and being *crucify'd* with our *Lord*, and are therefore ſo to be underſtood, as *covenanting* on our part that we will be *ready* to give up our *ſelves* to all *ſufferings*, even *Capital*, that may be ſubſervient to the Advancement of his Cauſe. This is plainly ſuppoſed in the *New Teſtament Reaſonings* from our *Baptiſmal Stipulations*. Therefore it is that our Saviour tells us that if we *hate* not *our Lives* for his *ſake* we *cannot be his Diſciples*. St. *Luke* xiv. 26. That he that *hateth* his *life in this world*, ſhould *keep it unto life eternal*. St. *John* xii. 25. The leaſt that can be implyed by this *hating life* muſt be the *readily* laying hold on *ſmall* occaſions of *loſing life* in this glorious *Cauſe*, as Men uſe to do in *loſing* things which they *hate* really. And this requiring it from *all* his *Diſciples* in *general*, ſhews really how much the *meaneſt* of our *Lord's* true *Diſciples* exceeded the *Auſterities* that were then ſo much admired in St. *John* the *Baptiſt*. I mention not the many other places wherein our Saviour encourages us to *loſe* our *lives* for *his ſake*, and the *Advantages* we ſhould gain by doing ſo. From all, it abundantly appears how *natural* this Explication is to the *Circumſtances* of this place, and how *peculiar* this Glory was to the *Goſpel*, that no *Inſtitution* whatſoever made ſo many *Martyrs*, or made Men ſo *willing* to part with their *lives* as this did. Thus it appears that *Chriſtians* were as readily diſpoſed to *part* with their own *lives* as *Philoſophers* were by the Doctrine of *Plato*'s *Phædon*. And that on the ſame account, that *their Diſcipline* alſo *exerciſed* them in *dying daily* as well as that of *Philoſophy*. Accordingly they are uſually cenſured by their Adverſaries, in the *Martyrologies*, as *Biothanati*, as Men *weary* of their *Lives*, on account of their *forwardneſs* to *loſe* them. That was ſo great that it *amazed* their *Adverſaries*, and invited them to ſerious Thoughts conerning their *Cauſe* it ſelf, and the *reaſons* of their *Conſtancy*. St. *Juſtin* and *Tatian* own the Influence it had

Baron. *Ann.* 138. 4, 5. Du Freſn. Biothanat.

that

that way upon themselves. They were withal then supposed *full* of the *Holy Ghost* by which they were so animated *beyond* their *natural* Powers and their own *Expectations*. All therefore that they then did, that looked *great* and *generous*, and *worthy* of *him*, was *ascribed* to *him*, especially that ardent and more than natural *Zeal* for *Martyrdom*. This therefore being the *Motion* of the *Holy Ghost* himself must needs be more *satisfactory* to *them*, that their *Death* was not a flying *from* the *God* within them spoken of by *Plato* in his *Phædon*, nor *displeasing* to *him*, than could be expected in the way of *Philosophy*, by *ominous* Intimations, or by no *Intimations* to the *contrary*. But that which most of all *animated* them was the Notion of *Martyrdom's* being equivalent to a *second Baptism*. This so effectually secured them from the *Fear* of that *Passion* of *Hope*, which by the *Doctrine* of *Phædon* as explained by *Cicero* and *Macrobius*, depressed them to *Matter*, and *hindred* their *Ascent*; that, on the *contrary*, it *purged* them from *material Fæculencies* more *effectually* than the *Philosophers* themselves *believed* performable by *Philosophy*. The *Philosophers* indeed believed *Philosophy* the best *Purgative* they knew of. But they believed it *gradual* and *slow* suitable to the *Impurities* that were to be *expiated* by it. The *Christian* Opinion of their *Baptism* as *applicatory* of the *Blood* of our *Redeemer* in a *fœderal* way, was incomparably *greater*. They thought it alone sufficient in a *Moment* to *attone* for the *greatest Impurities* the Soul was *capable* of, whether *Original*, or *Actual* or *Habitual*, without any remaining Satisfaction to be given to *God* or *Men*. And I have elsewhere shewn how *solid* their *Reasoning* was by which the *Primitive Church* was perswaded that this *Priviledge* was indeed allowed to *Baptism* by our *Blessed Saviour*. *Dis.* Cyprian *XIII.*

(24.)

The *other* Case wherein the *Primitive Christians* allowed of *Suicide* was in the defence of *Chastity*. Not for the *Shame* of a past *Violation* of it (which was the Case of *Lucretia*) but for the *preventing* one for the *Future*. In this Case they did not only *offer* themselves, not only *provoke* the *Adversary* to *kill* them; but were Instruments of their *own Death*, and are highly *commended* for it by the Writers who lived in the *nearest* Memory of their times. *Eusebius* mentions some who *threw* themselves from a *Battlement*, τὸν θάνατον ἀρπαγμὰ ἡγεμενοι τῆς τῶν δυσσεβῶν μοχθηρίας. The *Case* and *Circumstances* do so very well

So those also are commended *who chose rather to be* Instruments *of their* own Death, *than to* suffer *Corporal* defilement. Euf. *Hist. Eccl. VIII.* 12.

well fit S. *Pelagia*, that *Baronius*, I think does very well apply it to *her*, though *Eusebius* has not expreſs'd the Perſon's *Name*. Whoſoever the *Perſon* was, *Eusebius* mentions it as a *Commendation*. And ſo indeed *Pelagia* is highly celebrated for it by thoſe who take notice of her *Name*. Her fellow Citizen St. *Chryſoſtom* has done it profeſſedly in a *Homily* on that occaſion. So does St. *Ambroſe*, and the Author of the Acts of *Lucian* the *Martyr*. St. *Ambroſe* makes her *defend* her *Fact* by theſe expreſs Words, *Deus remedio non offenditur, & facinus fides ablevat*. Could *he* have made *her* ſpeak ſo if *himſelf* had blamed her for it? So far he, or an other of that Age, were from *cenſuring* her, that *ſhe* was then received into the number of *allowed Martyrs*, and the accuſtomed *Honours* were paid to her *Memory* that were then believed proper for Perſons who had ſo obliged the Publick. That ſhews that the *Church* of that *Age* had *honourable* Thoughts of the Caſe wherein ſhe was concerned. Beſides her, *Euſebius* mentions, in the ſame place, a *Mother* and two *Daughters* who *drowned* themſelves for *Preſervation* of their *Chaſtity*. They alſo were of *Antioch*, and ſuppoſed, not improbably, to have been the *Mother* and *Siſters* of the ſame *Pelagia*. Theſe St. *Auguſtine* objects to himſelf where he diſputes profeſſedly againſt all *Suicide*, that of *Cato* as well as that of *Lucretia*. And he owns the Senſe of the *Church* in *favour* of them. He has therefore no other way of defending his *univerſal Cenſure* of *all* Facts of this kind, but by preſuming a ſecret *Inſpiration* to their *Perſons*, requiring that which had otherwiſe been *unwarrantable*, ſuch as is conceived to have been in the Caſe of *Sampſon*; and withal that the *Church* had ſome *extraordinary Evidence* for *knowing* their ſecret *Thoughts* which are *impoſſible* to be known by that *Evidence* that is only *ordinary*. But this *Reaſoning* depends on *Conceſſions* too *precarious* to juſtify a Caſe that would *otherwiſe* be *commendable* if no *Evidence* could be expected but what is *ordinary*, unleſs ſomething more *appear* that would bring the Obſervation home to the Queſtion *here* diſputed. *Sampſon*'s Caſe is *preſumed* to have been from *Divine Inſpiration* becauſe the *Reaſonings* of the *New Teſtament* ſuppoſe the *Facts* of the *Old Teſtament* to have been ſo generally, becauſe they alſo were *deſigned* for the *Holy Ghoſt* as *Prophetick Symbols* of ſomething *anſwerable* to them under the *New Peculium*, which could not have been if they had been

De Virgin. & Comm. *in Pſalm* 104.

De Civ. Dei *L. c.* 26.

been determined only by the *Free Wills* of the *Persons* concerned in them, who knew *nothing* of what was to *answer* them under the new Dispensation of the *Gospel*. The same *Opinion* the *Church* had of the *Acts* of *Martyrs* in their *last Agonies*, that they were *wholly* under the Conduct of that *Divine Spirit* who animated and encouraged them to their *Martyrdoms*. But then this Concession could be urged no further but in Cases which had not *greater Evidences* of their *Unlawfulness* than the *Church* had of such *Martyrs Inspiration*. This must therefore shew that the *Church*, who took these Persons for *Martyrs*, knew nothing whereby *Suicide* in such a *Case* as *this* is could be proved *Unlawful* in *general*. The *Spirit* of the *Martyrs*, according to St. *Cyprian*, is to be tryed by the *Gospel* which *makes* them *Martyrs*. It could not therefore have *Authorized Suicide* in a particular Case, if it had in *general*, been *condemned* by the Doctrine of the *Gospel*. A like Example the same *Eusebius* has, in the same Persecution, of a *Roman Matron* who thus secured her self from the Embraces of the Tyrant *Maxentius*, by *stabbing* her self. Yet he is so far from *blaming* her for it, that he insists on her Example as a *Glory* to her *Christian Religion*. For that is his Observation on her. Ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἀπάσης φωνῆς γεγωνοτέροις, ὅτι μόνον χρημάτων ἀηττητόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἡ παρὰ χριστιανοῖς ἀρετὴ πέφυκεν, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς τε νῦν ὄντας καὶ τοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένους ἐξέφηνε. *Valesius* on this place produces a *Scholion* out of two of his MSS. of a *Modern Greek* blaming *Eusebius* for his good Character of *Suicides*. But who sees not that *Eusebius*'s own *Testimony* is much *more* to be regarded for the Sense of *Antiquity* than that of his *Anonymous Scholiast*? Withal the Doctrine of our *Christian Religion* contains some Notions peculiarly *favourable* to this Case. Especially if so understood as they were likely in those Ages, to understand it from the Impressions of their former *Education*. That made it a peculiar Aggravation of *Corporal Unchastity*, that it was a *defiling* of the *Temple* of the *Holy Ghost*, and a taking the *Members* of *Christ* and making them the *Members* of an *Harlot*. Withal the *Pollutions*, to which they were condemned, were with *Heathens*, either the *Executioners* themselves, or the common *frequenters* of the publick *prostibula*, which *Christians* were not *allowed* to do by their own

Euſ. *Hiſt. Eccl. L. VIII. c.* 14.

Principles. This added a further Aggravation, that it would then be the turning of the *Temple* of the *Holy Ghoſt* into a *Temple* of his moſt odious Rival the *Devil*, and a taking the *Members* of *Chriſt* and making them *Members* of the *Devil*, as much as it lay in their *Power* to do ſo. This made the very ſuffering it, though they were purely *paſſive* in it, very abominable. Therefore it is that *Tertullian* tells us, that the *Chriſtian Women* dreaded the *Lenones* more than the *Leones*. Nor is it true what S. *Auguſtine* urges, that the *purity* of their *Minds* was ſufficient to ſecure them againſt all *Concern* for the *involuntary Pollution* of their *Bodies*. It is very plain that *Pollutions* of this kind muſt have been thought *Piacular*, and of the *higheſt degree* of that *higheſt kind* of *Guilt*. And it is withal as plain that *Piacular Crimes* were believed to have *many* of their *Effects* on Perſons not guilty of the leaſt *Conſent* to them. They involved the *Body* they belonged to in a contagion of *Puniſhment*, though they were ſo far from *conſenting*, that they *knew* nothing of it. That was the Caſe of the *Iſraelites* in relation to the *Sacriledge* of *Achan*. Some *thouſands* of them were *deſtroyed* by their Enemies for it *before* they *knew* it. The ſame was the Caſe of the ſame *Iſraelites* in relation to *David*'s numbring them. They were, as he calls them, *Sheep* for their *Innocence* of it. They neither *knew* of it, nor, when they did, could they *hinder* it; yet many *thouſands* of them *periſhed* for it. It was the Caſe of the *Poſterity* of *Saul*. The *Guilt* of his *bloody* Deſigns in breaking the *publick Faith* given to the *Gibeonites*, fell on *ſeven* of his *innocent Poſterity* of the *next Generation*, who could not *hinder* him from thoſe *bloody* Deſigns. Nor did the unavoidable *Ignorance* of the Perſon *himſelf* who *incurred* the *Piaculum* exempt him wholly from the conſequent *Calamity* of it. *Jonathan* had *ſuffered* for his *Father's Imprecation*, of which he was perfectly *ignorant*, if the People had not reſcued him. And he was *diſcovered* by *God* himſelf in the then uſed way of *Divination* by *Lots*. By which we underſtand that his ſuffering for it had been perfectly agreeable to the *Divine Juſtice*. This was allowed of as to *temporal* Inflictions, to which many were thought *liable* who were not any way *acceſſary* to the *Crimes* for which they were inflicted. Therefore it is that *Oedipus* is repreſented by the *Tragedians* as *unhappy*, ra-

rather than *impious* in being involved in his *Piacular* Guilts. His Endeavours to *avoid* them, when *foretold* by the *Oracles*, are ſaid to have been the true *occaſions* of committing them. The Inſtance of *Adraſtus* in *Herodotus* is not unlike, who *killed* himſelf for *Shame* of a *Piacular* Guilt he could not poſſibly avoid. Here was the *ἀιχωίη* mentioned in *Plato*. This ſhews that the *Heathen* Notions in this particular are perfectly agreeable with thoſe of our *Inſpired Writers*, and therefore that theſe are of the *Law* of *Nations*, which all acknowledge univerſally obligatory on *Mankind* in *general*. *Purity* therefore of their *Minds* could not be ſatisfactory to good *Chriſtians* if it were in their Power to have *prevented* the *Pollution* of their own *Bodies* by any *lawful Means* in their own *Power*. And what Reaſon had they to believe this way of *preventing* their *Pollution* by their *Death unlawful*? They very well knew that this abhorrence of *carnal Pollutions* was no unreaſonable *Paſſion* of their own, but perfectly *agreeable* to the *Mind* of *Chriſt* whoſe *Members* they were, and of the *Holy Ghoſt* who poſſeſſed them as a *Temple*. They very well knew that *themſelves* could not *abhor* ſuch *Pollutions* more than *Chriſt* did and his *Holy Spirit*. Here therefore was no danger of *deſpleaſing Chriſt* and his *Spirit* in *abhorring* the ſame things as they did. They knew further that *corporal Death* was, to themſelves, a leſs *Evil* than *Corporal Pollution*. And had they any reaſon to ſuſpect that *Chriſt* and his *Holy Spirit* might be of *another Mind*? If they had none, they had reaſon to prefer the *leſs evil* for avoiding the *greater*, where both were *unavoidable* if we may ſuppoſe them left to their *own* diſpoſal. They could not doubt of the *Conſequence* if the *Premiſes* were perfectly agreeable to the Senſe of *Chriſt* and his *Holy Spirit*. How could they then think that *Chriſt* and his *Heavenly Spirit* could be diſpleaſed with a juſt *Conſequence* from *Premiſſes* allowed by *themſelves*? There being no Expreſſion of the *Goſpel* to the *contrary*, this *Reaſoning* is ſufficient to ſhew that here is no *particular Reaſon* why this Caſe in *particular* ſhou'd have been thought *diſpleaſing* to them. That is enough according to the forementioned *Reaſoning* of the *Platoniſts*, to preſume a *Permiſſion* when nothing appears to the *contrary*. And the *permitting* this *ἀνάγκη* to befal them, is by the *Platoniſts* ſo expounded as to *ſignify* a *Permiſſion*. And this was the

only way they had *then* of judging in things of this *Nature*, not otherwise determined by the *Revelations* of the *Gospel*. Thus then it would appear that this way of *Death* could have nothing *Piacular* in it. That Notion was adapted to *Suicide* as it was influenced by evil *unclean Spirits*, which were supposed to be Authors of *Distraction*, and of all the disorders of *irregular Passions*; or, which came to the same Purpose, as it might be taken for a *flight* from the *Conduct* of the *good Spirit* to whom *Providence* had committed them. For this was looked as a necessary *Consequence* of the *desertion* of the Conduct of *good Spirits*, that they would, by the just Judgment of the same *Providence*, be given over to the Conduct of *evil ones*. Here therefore, by these Principles, there would be no *Piaculum* against a *Piaculum*, but a truly *Piacular* Act avoided by an *Act* that contained *nothing* in it *Sinful* or *Piacular*. These *Cases* I take to have been the *uttermost* that were thought *allowable* by the Principles of *Primitive Christianity*. The common Practice of the *Heathens* of avoiding *incurable Aylings* of *Life* by *Death*, had not, that I can find, the least Countenance from *our Religion*, though the *Ayling* had been such made Men *unserviceable* to the *Publick*.

(25.) Cicero *defended in his preferring the* Laws *of the* XII Tables *before the* Libraries *of the* Philosophers.

I now return to your *Critick*, whose last *Objection* against your Author is from his Words in his first Book *de Oratore*. He there prefers the *Laws of the* XII *Tables before the Libraries of all the Philosophers*. This is indeed no more than a just *Consequence* of his forementioned Doctrine for preferring the *Active* before the *Contemplative* Life, wherein I have already shewn how agreeable his Thoughts were to those of the *best Philosophers*. So far this is from being a solid *Objection* against his *Philosophical Writings*. His design in this Comparison is no disparagement to *Philosophy* in *general*, but only to shew that the making such excellent *Laws* is the noblest *end* of the best and noblest part of *Philosophy*, and therefore as far to be *preferred* before any *Philosophy* as the *End* is to be preferred before the *Means*. And what is there that your *Critick* can deny in this whole way of *Reasoning*? Can he deny but that Philosophy is most excellent which perfects *Man* the most *excellent Creature* in his most *excellent part*, his *superior Soul*? Can he deny but that his *Morals* are, as of the greatest *Importance* to

him

him, ſo the moſt *valuable* to *him* as thoſe which moſt *nearly* concern his *laſt End* of all, his *Happineſs*? This being ſo, can he deny but that of all *Parts* of *Philoſophy*, the *Moral* is moſt *excellent*? Can he deny further, but that of all *Moral Philoſophy*, that *part* again muſt be moſt *excellent* which is moſt *diffuſive*, which does good to whole *Societies*, and is not confined to *ſingle Perſons*? Can he deny that of that *part* which relates to *Societies*, that *ſtill* again is moſt *excellent* which benefits the *moſt* and the *greateſt Societies*, not being again confined to *ſingle Families*, or even to *ſingle Provinces*? Or can he deny that *good Laws* have the greateſt influence for *forming* or *amending* the *Morals* of *great Societies*? Or that the *Laws* of the XII *Tables* were moſt eminently excellent in their *kind* as *Laws*? I ſee not how he can deny any part of this *Reaſoning*; nor, if he grants it all, how he can maintain the Severity of his own *Cenſures*. But he ſtrangely forgets himſelf when he imputes this Compariſon of your Author to his *Vanity* for his own *Nation*, or his *partiality* againſt the *Greeks*. What *Envy* could it be to the *Greeks* to give ſo great an *Encomium* to *Laws* confeſſedly received from *them*? Or what *Glory* to his own *Romans* to commend *them* for *Laws* that were not originally their *own*, but *received* from *others*, from thoſe very envied *Greeks* whom your *Critick* would perſuade us that your Author *rivalled* in ſo commending them? What is *Modeſty* if this be *Roman Arrogance*, to commend what they had *received* from the *Greeks*? Your *Critick* pretends ſome Things in the *Roman Laws* of leſs *Importance* than others; and that your Author believes it, and has given Inſtances. Who *doubts* it? Yet that hinders not but thoſe ſame Inſtances may be of *extraordinary* Excellence when compared with Matters of another *Nature*, of leſs Importance to the *Happineſs* of *Mankind* in *general* than *Publick Laws*. He adds withal the excellent *Diſcoveries* of the *Philoſophers* concerning *God*, the *Original* of the *World*, the *Laws* of *Nature*, the *Nature* of *Man*, concerning *Providence*, concerning *Virtue*, *Vice*, and the *chief Good*. As if theſe Diſcoveries, ſo far as they conduc'd to better *Human Morals*, had been *unknown* to the ancient *Law-makers*, who made *good Laws* before the *Name* of a *Philoſopher* was heard of. As if the *Philoſophers* themſelves, who were *Friends* of *Religion*, had not *received* all their *Doctrines* of this *Nature* from immemorial *Traditions* older than *Philoſophy* or *Let-*

ters. *Plato*, I am sure, *Cicero*'s Author, does ingenuously own this *Original* of what himself knew from the παλαιοὶ λόγοι. As if this were not the *surest* way of deriving those *Laws* which depended on the *Positive Institution* of *God*, of which kind there are many among the *Laws* of *Nature* and *Nations*, no less obliging all other *Nations* than the true *Peculium*, because it was the *Pleasure* of the Divine *Lawmaker* that they should do so. Such are those of *Incestuous Marriages* and of *Piacular Crimes*, the Punishment of which, even in *this Life*, God has reserved to *himself*, to be inflicted on the *whole Bodies* in Case the *ordinary Magistrate* neglects them. Such also those *others* by which *God* was pleased to *form* all *other Nations*, as well as the *Peculium*, into *Societies* for their better *Government* and *Preservation*, and to teach them their *Duties* relating to their several *Stations* in those *Societies*, for keeping their due *Subordinations*, and for making such *Societies manageable* for the good of their respective *Members* when already *formed*. Such *Laws* as these the very *first Philosophers* found already established, long before the Use of *Letters*, and therefore could not pretend to be the *Inventors* of them. It was indeed impossible for them to discover by naked *Reasoning*, what depended on the *Divine arbitrary Pleasure*, and what *might* have been constituted *otherwise* as *Reasonably*, if God himself had *pleased*. These were so far from being the *Inventions* of *Philosophers*, as your *Critick* fancies, that they were not the Fruits of any barely *Human Reasonings*, but of *Divine Inspiration* in those happy *early* times when *God* was pleased to converse more *familiarly* with Mankind than he has done *since* the *Invention* of *Letters*. These therefore the *first Philosophers* could not know *otherwise* than by immemorial *Traditions* derived from the ἀπόγονοι of the *Gods*, who were supposed immediately to succeed the Gods *themselves* in the first *Golden Age* of *Familiarity* with *Mankind*. So *Plato*. These Laws therefore could not have been the Contrivance of *Philosophers*, which yet had a great *Share* among those of the XII *Tables* mentioned by *Cicero*. Here therefore the *Philosophers* only enquir'd into *Fact*, and kept the *Laws* already received with as little *variation* as the change of *Circumstances* would allow of. *Change* it self they very well knew to be *nuisance* to any *setled* Constitution, if it were made without *necessity*. Here therefore

ore it is no *disparagement* to the *Philosophers*, to believe hey were *excelled* by those *Laws* which were the Products of a more than *Human Wisdom*. The rest of the *Laws* of he XII *Tables* which were not of this kind, were made by the *Athenian Lawmakers* who lived before the *Roman Decemviri*. Those were *Draco*, *Solon*, and *Clisthenes*, none of them *Philosophers* properly so called. *Solon* had the name of a *Sophos*, but *Pythagoras* was the first that called himself a *Philosophus*. *Lycurgus* also and his *Thales*, or rather *Thaletas* the *Musitian*, are both of them *elder* than he Age of *Philosophy*. The same is *Herodotus*'s Opinion concerning *Zamolxis* the *Scythian Lawmaker*, that he was *elder* than the *Pythagorean*. I do not now mention what he learned Dr. *Bently* has said for disproving the common Opinion, that the *Locrian Laws* were made by *Zaleucus*, the *Thurian* by *Charondas*, both of them *Disciples* of *Pythagoras*. If what that excellent Person has suggested prove *true*, there will be very *few Laws* that can pretend o have been made by *Pythagoras*. The old *Ægyptian Lawmakers* mentioned by *Diodorus*, and compared with *Moses*, were none of them *Philosophers*. No more were the *Cretans*, who were notwithstanding *famous* for their *Laws*. There will then remain very *few Philosophers* of whom he *Fact* will be true, that they were *Legislators*. I mean, that they practised that *Power* any further than in their *Writings*. Yet even they who were so, had they been such *Philosophers* as your *Critick* would have your *Author* to have been, that is, if they had preferred the *Contemplative* before the *Active* Life, had not been fit for it. Such *Philosophers* could never have known the *Aylings* of *Societies*, which were to be *prevented* or *remedied* by *good Laws*. These were impossible to be known but by *Experience* in human *Conversation*. Nor were they the *Contemplative* but the *Active Philosophers* who did so much as pretend to it. Such were the *Pythagoreans* and the *Platonists*. They made none more capable of the greatest and most perfective Vertues, than Men of *Business*. So your Author seems to understand them in these Words of his Dream of *Scipio*: *Sed, quò sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam Rempublicam sic habeto: Omnibus qui patriam conservârint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in Cælo definitum locum, ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruantur. Nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris*

Diss. on Phalaris. *p.* 334. *&c. in Answer to Mr.* Boyl.

Ap. Macrob. *Somn. Scip. L. I. c.* 8. 9.

terris fiat acceptius, quàm consilia cætusq; hominum juresoci ti, quæ Civitates appellantur. Earum rectores & servato hinc profecti huc revertuntur. Accordingly the first of th sort of *Gods* were *Founders* of *Cities* and *Lawmakers*. Th sort therefore of *Active Philosophers* were indeed fitted f making *By-laws*, and for adjusting the Reasons of tl *Divine Laws*, on which they were to superstruct, to tl change of *Circumstances*; and to make *new Laws* for *n Circumstances* for which no *Traditional Divine Laws* we known to have made peculiar Provision. Thus it appea that the *best* and *highest* parts of *Philosophy* fitted Men fc the *lowest* and *less noble* part of the *Laws* which were *Human Institution*. Which abundantly confirms the trut of your Author's *general Assertion*, That the Body of th XII *Tables* was justly to be preferred before all the *Libra ries* of *Philosophers*. It was indeed an Employment wo thy the *Philosophers*, to enquire into the *Reasons* of th *Laws* of their *Countries*. And the Discovery of those *Re sons* were really very useful to make those, who *kne* them, *pleased* with their *Laws*, and willingly obedient t them. But this *Obedience* to the *Laws* for their *Reasonabl ness* was a thing that the *smallest* part of the *Subjects* wer capable of, even where the *Reasons*, being known, wer *cogent* and *undeniable*. Even here they could only satisfi the *Guides* on whose Conduct the *Multitude* were oblig' to depend. But the *greatest* part of our *Positive Laws* de pend only on such probable Reasons as may indeed sa tisfie *Governours*, but cannot be presumed sufficient to ob lige all others, who *know* them, of their *Governours Mina* Yet it is very often the Interest of the *Publick*, tha those true *Reasons* should *not* be *known* to the *Subjects*, i order to the attaining the *End* designed by them. It i only therefore the *Sanction* that can make the whole *Bod* of the *Subjects* unanimous in their Observation, withou which *Unanimity*, *Laws* can signifie very little for pro moting the *publick Good*. The *Philosophers Reasonings* alone could not *secure* it, without that further Principle, tha the *Reasonings* of the *Subjects* are to be concluded by the *Reasonings* of their *Governours* in things *unsinful*, and which are uncapable of any more than *probable Evidence*. But that the *unknown Reasons* also may oblige the *Subjects* to the same *Unanimity*, so as to act *confidently*, and without *hesitation*. It is further more convenient for the *Publick*

(not

ɔt only for avoiding *Prolixity*) that the *true Reaſons* ıich prevail with *Legiſlators* ſhould not be expreſſed in : Laws as it is requiſite they ſhould be in *Diſcourſes* of *iloſophers* profeſſedly on ſuch Subjects. Such *Reaſonings* ɔuld produce ſuch a *timorous* and *diffident* Aſſent, in Ca- ; where the Intereſt of the Publick would require *gour* and *Confidence*, as would be *hurtful* to the *Common- alth*. Thus it appears that the *Authoritative* way of *en- ning* the ſame *things* by *Lawmakers* does really more od to *Mankind* than the *precarious* way of recommend- g them ſo far only as their *Reaſons* may contribute to e recommending them, which is the only way that can uſed by *Philoſophers*. Yet this is no *Diſcommendation Philoſophy* for benefitting the *manners* of the *Publick*, ıt the *Sanction* of *Authority* does more *effectually* pro- ɔte that ſame *End*. No *Lawmaker* ought to impoſe any ing on the *Publick* but what himſelf, at leaſt, believes ıſonable. And the *judging* of this with the greateſt *Ex- neſs* cannot be expected without the Aſſiſtance of *Phi- ɔphy*. Your *Critick* had forgotten that *Socrates* is ob- ved to have been the firſt *Athenian Philoſopher* who ıde uſe of his *Philoſophy* for the cultivation of *Human ınners*. But he was too little regarded in *Athens* to ve any Influence on the Amendment of their *Laws*. e was too *young* to have any *Authority* at all when the *cemviri* derived their *Laws* from *Athens*. How then uld *Philoſophy* have any hand in thoſe *particular Laws* which your Author diſcourſes, of the XII *Tables*? is very true what your Author ſuggeſts, that it is bet- r to make Men *good*, than to puniſh them for being o- erwiſe. Will he therefore ſay there never were any *od Men* before there were *Philoſophers*? *Education* cer- inly, and *good Cuſtoms*, and *good Examples*, with *right No- ɔns* received from the *Original*, contribute more to pro- ıgate good *Manners* univerſally than any *Reaſonings* of *hiloſophers*. But theſe are all the *Effects* of *good Laws* in ell conſtituted Governments, and are above the Power *private Reaſoners*. Withal your Author again forgets ıat good Laws *reward* as well as *puniſh*; and that ma- y more are prevail'd on to do their Duty on Conſi- eration of the *Reward* than would be on any other In- ıcement whatſoever, if *unrewarded*. He therefore for- ets that *good Laws* are as well the *Cauſes* of *Moral Health*

from

from the *beginning*, as the *Cure* of *Moral Aylings* when ther is occasion for it.

(26.) *The* Conclusion.

I have now gone through all that Monsieur *Peter Petite* has objected against your Author's *Philosophical Writings* in his *first Chapters* of his IVth *Book* of *Miscellany Observations*. You have rightly observed the Inconsistenc of his VIth *Chapter* with all he had said before. Ther he believes him *Divinely inspired* whom he would no before own to have been skilled in that *Human Philosophy* which he might very well have attained withou any the least *Pretence* to *Divine Inspiration*. I did no think to have been so *large* upon it, *designing* witha studiously to avoid all occasions of *unnecessary* Enlarge ment. Nor did the *moment* of his *Objections* require it if I had not thence taken occasions to explain some thing relating to the *Philosophy* followed by your *Author*, bu not rightly *understood* by your *Monsieur* nor others tha I had observed. If what I have done may answer you Design, I shall be heartily glad of it. Not only as i gives me an Opportunity of signifying my *respect* to th memory of your great *Father*, but as it may any wa *encourage* the many generous *Designs* of your *early* Year Others, who have perhaps no better Opinion of ther than I have, would here commend the good *Talent* both *natural* and *acquired*, wherewith God has endowe you. I rather chuse to *congratulate* what, by your willin and ready *seconding* the *Divine preventing Grace*, is mor properly your *own*, your *owning good Principles*, and sted fast *adhering* to them, in an Age *degenerous* and full o *bad Examples*. Early *Piety*, as it *needs*, so it *has* the mo encouraging *Hopes* of *Acceptation* with the *Rewarder* o it. To renounce the World in an Age of most *sensua relish* of it, to *deny* its *Hopes* under the *largest Prospect* o *enjoying* them, to prefer the *Authority* of the *few serious Self-denyers* before the multitude of *Self-pleasers*, whos *Conversation* is more *delightful* to a *Youthful Gusto*; a they are less *grateful* to *Flesh* and *Blood*, so must they for that very reason, make a more *grateful Oblation* t him for whom *alone* you expect your *Reward*. The *Difficulty* and *Rarity* of things recommend them to the *Esteem* of *Men*. Much more they will do so to the *Infallible* Judgment of your great *Creator*. These will affor the most pleasing Reflections on a *Death-bed*, when yo

Dr. Samuel Parker *the late Bishop of* Oxford.

ca

n *assure* your *self* that you have for *his* ſake quitted hat was otherwiſe *deareſt* to *you*, when you have done at for your *Redeemer*'s ſake for which you could have no *ſpect* of any *Reward* from any *other* beſides *himſelf*. ay you ſee that *happy Hour*, which all who did ſo, have dged an abundant *Recompence* for all their *Sufferings* in is *Life!* May you enjoy that *Peace at the laſt* which ade wicked *Balaam* rival the *Death* of the *Righteous!* heſe are things which the *irreſiſtible Powers* of the *World* ve nothing to do with. They can neither *give* them, r *take* them *away*. That you may have the *Comfort* of em when all *Worldly Comforts* ſhall fail you, is the arty and earneſt Prayer of

The moſt unworthy of your Fellow-ſufferers.

Shottesbrook, Feb. XI.
$170\frac{1}{2}$. HENRY DODWELL.

TUL-

TULLY
OF
Moral Ends.

BOOK I.

WHEN I first attempted to naturalize the Notions and Arguments, which the *Grecian* Philosophers have, with such a force of Wit and Judgment, and such an Exuberancy of curious Learning, deliver'd in their *Mother-Tongue*, I easily foresaw, my Friend *Brutus*, that in spite of Fate, and my best Endeavours, I should bring the Criticks about my Ears in a plentiful manner: One sort of Men (there are Scholars of the Party too) cannot digest so much as the business of Philosophy in ge-

neral; while others are willing to dispense with you for a little smattering; but for a constant and entire Application to't, they can upon no Terms approve of it. A third Party are our *Helleniz'd* Countrymen, topful of *Greek*, and too learned for the Pedantry of *Latin*; and these know not how to excuse it to their own Consciences, if they look into any but *Greek* Authors. Others, of a fourth kind, I expect to meet with, directing me to the pursuit of more significant Studies: They grant Philosophical Exercises are very Polite and Gentile, but then they don't suit the Dignity of my Character and Condition. To each of these I shall return a satisfactory Answer: And first, as for the profess'd Enemies of all Philosophy, I refer them to a certain Book of mine, (they know which I mean) where upon occasion of *Hortensius*'s Invectives, I have drawn up its defence, and vindicated its Merit; a Work, which your self, and some other discerning Persons, have been pleas'd to favour with such encouraging Commendations, that I cannot forbear entring upon new Essays, and should be sorry, if after I have once carry'd my Point as to Men's Opinions, the World should have cause to believe 'tis more than I can do to keep it. As for the second sort, who condescend to gratifie us with a small Allowance

ance, 'tis an impracticable Leſſon they teach us, when they talk of our abridging our ſelves in the uſe of that which when we once come to meddle with, we looſe the Command of our own Inclinations; and in earneſt I had rather ſhake hands with your thorough-pac'd *Abjurers* of Philoſophy, than your People that would cramp us in a Study which is almoſt infinite in its Nature, and pretend to warn us againſt Exceſſes, where Temperance were a Fault. For either a finiſh'd Wiſdom is attainable; and then 'tis pity but when we have made Prize of it, we ſhould have time to enjoy the Fruits of our Expedition; or the Difficulty is ſeemingly as great as if it were not ſo; but then, firſt of all, the Search of Truth ought to ſtop no where till there's no more to find; and ſecondly, 'twere an Eternal Blemiſh upon us to flag in the Chace when the Game's ineſtimable. Agen; Is there a real Satisfaction in writing upon Philoſophical Arguments? Then certainly, nothing but Envy and Peeviſhneſs will interrupt us. Or is it a very laborious Toil? 'Tis hard indeed, if a Man may not have the liberty of being as induſtrious as he pleaſes. Old *Chremes* in the Play, perhaps, thought 'twas good Nature, when it diſturb'd him ſo much, that his new Neighbour *ſhould dig and plough, and gaul his Shoulders*—— not that

he would balk his buſtling, but only wiſh'd him to work upon matter more ſuitable to his Quality: And juſt as obliging are thoſe ſollicitous Gentlemen, whoſe Bowels yearn over us for that Intention of Thought which is properly a Recreation to the Thinkers. But it is not ſo eaſy to give our wholeſale *Greeks* content; as ſurprizing an Abſurdity as, I conceive, it is, that they will not reconcile themſelves to ſerious Points diſcuſs'd in the Language of their own Country, and yet find themſelves Entertainment in the verbal Tranſlations of the *Greek* Mythologies. For where is the Man ſo inveterately bent againſt the Credit of his Country, as to undervalue and throw aſide *Ennius*'s *Medea*, or *Pacuvius*'s *Antiopa*? To admire 'em as they ſtand in *Euripides*, and nauſeate 'em as made ours? And yet the Cry runs, *Menander* in the Original for my Money; *Cæcilius*'s *Synephebi*, and *Terence*'s *Andria* are Traſh to it. It may be ſo, but ſtill, as good an Author as we have of *Sophocles*, I had rather read *Attilius*'s bald Tranſlation of *Sophocles*'s *Electra* than the Original it ſelf. And tho' *Licinius* indeed would make *Attilius* a rough and a crabbed Authour, perhaps not without Reaſon, yet he may and ought to be read; and not only *Attilius*, but all the reſt of our Poets, the Neglect of them proceeding either from

a lethargick Lazineſs, or a foppiſh Delicacy. Beſides, (or I'm miſtaken) he ſcarce deſerves the Name of a Learned Man that is not competently vers'd in the Productions of the *Latins*. Now with Tags of Metre tranſlated from the *Greek*, ſuch as *Utinam nè in Nemore*, &c. we can diſpenſe well enough; Where's the Harm then, ſhould we render what *Plato* has diſcours'd upon the Subject of a good and happy Life into *Latin*? Or, waving the Project of a Tranſlation, what if I engage to make good what ſuch Authors of Character have aſſerted, and annex my own Opinion of Things in my own Method and Stile? Will there yet remain room for Prejudice in favour of the *Greeks*, provided we write as handſomly as the beſt of 'em, without being beholden to any of 'em? 'Twill not ſuffice to tell us, the *Greeks* have been canvaſſing all theſe Queſtions beforehand. By the ſame Argument the Objectors are debarr'd their poring upon half of the *Greeks* themſelves that are extant. What has *Chryſippus* omitted that concerns the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*? and yet nothing will ſerve but we muſt read *Diogenes*, *Antipater*, *Mneſarchus*, *Panætius*, my Friend *Poſidonius*, (that ſhould have been mention'd in the firſt place) and an Hundred beſides. Do we not conceive a mighty Satisfaction when

we peruſe *Theophraſtus* upon the very ſame Heads which *Ariſtotle* had treated of before him? And ſo for the *Epicureans*; Do they ever ſcruple to come over again with the ſame Suggeſtions that *Epicurus* and their Predeceſſors had ſet a foot formerly? Well then, if the *Greeks* think it worth their while to read one another, tho' many proceed upon the ſame Matter, becauſe they handle it different ways; 'tis a very hard caſe, if our People will not do the ſame Juſtice to the Labours of their Countrymen. I confeſs, were I reſolv'd upon as formal a Tranſlation of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, as our Poets have made of the *Grecian* Fables, I ſhould be far from deſerving the Thanks of my Fellow-Citizens for the Importation of thoſe mighty *Genii*; but I have not yet made the Attempt, tho' I know of no Impediment or Prohibition to ſtop me; and when it comes in my way, I ſhall uſe my own Diſcretion in citing Paſſages, eſpecialy from the Authors aforeſaid, as *Ennius* has quoted from *Homer*, and *Afranius* from *Menander*. At the ſame time I will not do as *Lucilius* did, challenge and empannel my Readers. No, I'll wiſh for a *Perſius*, and call out for a *Scipio* and a *Rutilius*, whoſe Depth of Judgment was ſuch a Bug-bear, it ſeems, to the Poet, that upon the Apprehenſion he preſently addreſſes himſelf to the

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Tarentines, *Consentines*, and *Sicilians*. This was one of that Bard's many merry Conceits, and in the Days when Criticks had as little of Politeness and Learning in them, as his Works, of Solidity; for, 'tis certain, they discover more of Humour and the Gentleman than Scholarship. But as to my own Concern, I need not stand in awe of any Reader whatsoever, having presum'd to dedicate these Notes to a Person, who so fairly makes his Party good, upon the Comparison, with the best of the *Grecian* Sages; tho' 'twas your self that laid an Obligation upon me to do so, by the Present you were pleas'd to make me of your Book about *Virtue*. That which has begot so strange an Abhorrency in some People to the Compositions of the *Latins*, is, I believe, the Misfortune of meeting with Uncouth Translations from wretched *Greek* Originals, deliciously improv'd in the Brewing. Nor will I blame those that have had no better luck, for their Antipathy, upon condition they'll cashier the *Greeks* too that harangue 'em to the same effect in the same Strain. But who would refuse any valuable Hints, whatsoever, or whencesoever, drest up in Expressions elegant and proper? Certainly no Body, unless 'twere the same Person's Ambition to be thought a Native of *Greece*, as *Albucius* had his Mock-Title,

the *Athenian Prætor*, given him by *Scævola*. Our *Lucilius*'s Account of it is very comical and satyrical in those Lines which he puts into *Scævola*'s Mouth, *Græcum te, Albuci*, &c.

'Tis well, Albucius, *you shall be no more*
A Roman, *as we counted you before*;
No, nor the Sabine, *who so loudly boasts*
Of Patrons, Pensions, Honourable Posts.
When'er we meet, my brave Athenian *Lord*
I kiss your Hand, and χαῖρε *be the Word.*
Your Troopers, Lictors, all the Tribe of State,
With χαῖρε *shall alarm the People's Hate.*

The Reflections were just: Nor is any thing more unaccountable than this prevailing Aversion to our own *Manufacture*. But that the Disquisition is for another place, I am sensible I could prove, and have often insisted upon't, that the *Latin* Tongue is so far from the Barrenness which 'tis generally charg'd with, as to be more copious even than the *Greek*. When or where have any of our First or Second-Rate Orators or Poets betray'd any Deficiency, either as to *Richness* or *Elegance* of Expression, when once provided with a Pattern to follow? The Commonwealth of *Rome* has thought me worthy to be made an Instrument of serving her Interest, and, I hope,

what

what with the Fateagues of the Bar, and a thousand Drudgeries and Dangers, I have in that respect acquitted my self as I ought; yet one Duty more is, I think, incumbent upon me, and that is the Propagation of Learning among my Countrymen, whatever Pains or Perplexities it may cost me. Furthermore, I promise all such as are dispos'd rather to read the *Greeks*, they shall never be discourag'd by me, if they will realy study 'em, and put no Tricks upon us; and as for those who trade in both Languages, or are inclinable to prefer their own to any other so far as 'twill serve their purpose, I'll do them what service I can. To proceed, they who would have me lay out my Talent another way, are somewhat severe, seeing no body of *Roman* Extraction has wrote more than I have done already; not that I am yet without a Reserve, if I live long enough to make it publick, tho' among all my Productions there are none preferable to the ensuing Philosophical Treatise, as every one that well digests it will allow. For how can we better exercise our Thoughts and our Curiosity than upon Philosophical *Queres*, and particularly the present; namely, What is ultimately the Scope and End to which all our Resolutions of living honestly and virtuously are pointed: What Nature bids us pursue

as the choiceſt of Eligible things, and what to avoid as the greateſt of Evils: A Queſtion about which there has ever depended a mighty Controverſy among the Men of Letters; and therefore I conceive, I ſhall not ſeem to depart from the Dignity of my Character, by ſetting my ſelf to learn wherein conſiſts the Solidity and Perfection of whatever occurs in the Concerns of Life. Shall two ſuch Patriots as *Publius Scævola* and *Marcus Manilius* maintain a Diſpute whether a Maſter's Title be good to the Child of his Slave? And ſhall *Marcus Brutus* diſlike an Argument of ſuch an admirable kind and ſo general a uſe as mine? I have heretofore with pleaſure gone through that *Caſe* beſide many others of the ſame Stamp, and deſign to go over them agen; but muſt we therefore never look after thoſe *Reſolves* which ſettle the main and only Buſineſs of Life? The firſt, perhaps, may ſell beſt; but the laſt, I'm ſure, will ſerve beſt; as I need not inform thoſe who will but apply themſelves to read 'em. Let me add, that I have diſſected and ſifted the whole Queſtion about the Ends of Good and Evil, for I have not only dwelt upon ſuch Notions as I my ſelf could approve, but ſtated the ſeveral Hypotheſes which Philoſophers of all ſorts have advanc'd. To begin with the plaineſt, let *Epicurus*'s

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Model, being the most generally known, lead the Van; and you'll see my Account of it is as accurate as you can meet with any where among the *Epicureans* themselves, it being not my Design to make *Proselytes*, but to clear up Truth. Once upon a time, you must know, I heard *Epicurus*'s Cause pleaded as to his Opinion about Pleasure, by that compleat Scholar *Lucius Torquatus*. *Caius Triarius*, a well instructed, serious young Gentleman was present. And I answer'd what we had from *Torquatus*. They were pleas'd to make me a Visit at my Seat in the Country; and so after a short Conference about Learned Matters, to which my two Guests were much addicted; once in our Lives, says *Torquatus*, we have caught you at leisure; Now then I must know your Reason why you refuse your Vote for my Friend *Epicurus*, for you are not so bad as the rest, that not satisfied with dissenting from him, bear him a mortal Hatred. I take him to be the only Man of 'em all that had Truth before his Eyes, and was able to rescue the Mind from the grossest Errours, and find out a compleat Method to make us good and happy. But I suppose yours and *Triarius*'s Objection is one and the same, that he wants all the Elegancies of *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and *Theophrastus*. For as to the Truth and Stanchness

of

of his Aſſertions I cannot ſuppoſe you'll pretend to diſpute it. Never, *Torquatus*, reply'd I, were you wider of the Mark. I'm not at all diſpleas'd with the Stile of your Philoſopher; 'tis expreſſive and clear: And tho' I would not turn my back upon a Philoſopher's Eloquence if it came in my way; yet at the ſame time I wou'd ne'er fall out with him for having none to ſhew. No, 'tis his Matter which I cannot reliſh, at leaſt as to a great many Inſtances that might be produced. But ſo many Men ſo many Minds, and none Infallible. To this *Torquatus*; And what, I beſeech you, may be your Exceptions? For I'm well ſatisfied of your Candour, and therefore conclude you have ſome way or other miſtook the Philoſopher's meaning. If I have ſaid I, my Inſtructors *Phædrus* and *Zeno* muſt anſwer for it, who with all the Knowledge they communicated of the *Epicurean* Principles, could never reconcile me to any but the Proofs they gave of their own Diligence. *Atticus* and I were two of their moſt conſtant Auditors; for *Atticus* had an Eſteem for them both, and was a paſſionate Admirer of *Phædrus*; nor did we let a Day paſs without interchanging our Notions upon what had been dictated by our Tutors. *Then* it never us'd to be any part

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of our Debate whether I underſtood, but only which way I held the Queſtion. If you pleaſe, anſwer'd *Torquatus*, let's hear what it is that you cannot digeſt. In the firſt place ſaid I, as much as he values himſelf upon his Natural Philoſophy, never any Man's abounded more with Blunders and Abſurdities. He attempts improving upon *Democritus*, but in my Opinion ſo very unfortunately, that whatever he mends he makes ten times worſe than 'twas before. *Democritus* had ſuppos'd an infinite ſpace, uncircumſcrib'd by Dimenſions or Extremities, and therein a Multitude of Atoms or Indiviſible Bodies, and theſe to friſk about hither and thither till they danc'd themſelves into a Conſiſtency and Continuity, ſo as to make up the Material World; and that theſe Atoms deriv'd not their Agitation from the Impulſe of any *Efficient Cauſe*, but that they had been in Motion from all Eternity. Now ſo long as *Epicurus* keeps touch with *Democritus*, for the moſt part he makes a pretty good ſhift, tho' both advance a great many Suppoſitions to which I can never ſubſcribe, as particularly and eſpecialy, when there are two Fundamental Principles at leaſt which every Naturaliſt is oblig'd to conſider, the Efficient and the Material Cauſe, they have excluded the for-

former, and wholly concerned themſelves with the latter. In this Nonſenſe they are equally intereſted; but the next Monſter of Imagination is *Epicurus*'s own; for when he has given the Word of Command to his little indiviſible *Solids*, that they ſhould all deſcend by the force of their own Weight in a direct Line, according to the Natural Tendency forſooth! of all Bodies, the ſubtle *Virtuoſo* at laſt bethought himſelf that if every Atom fell from its place in a ſtreight Line, they might fall long enough before any two of 'em encounter'd. Hereupon he caſts about for an Expedient; and what d' you think 'twas? Why truly his Atoms had unaccountably got a trick of *Reeling*, and ſo met and ſhook hands, and combin'd themſelves into a World. Now this is a meer School-Boy's Invention; and yet it will not bring him off at laſt: For this Motion of Inclination is all precarious and arbitrary, and no more Cauſe aſſign'd for't, than for his depriving his Atoms of that direct Motion which is natural to Gravitation. What a ſtrange Creature is a natural Philoſopher, erecting Hypotheſes without a Phyſical Cauſe? And that impertinently to his own Deſign in doing ſo? For if all his Atoms muſt deſcend *Sideling*, they'll never join one another; or, if ſome are to fall *aſlant*, and ſome right down,

down, juſt according as he lays his Commands upon 'em; this is teaching 'em to lead up *Courants* and *Minuets*. And then this tumultuary Conflux of Atoms to the Diſappointment of *Democritus* as well as *Epicurus*, could never, after all, have produc'd ſuch a beautiful and regular Univerſe. Indeed the very ſuppoſing of an Indiviſible Body proves him ſufficiently defective and ignorant in his own way, as himſelf might have underſtood, if inſtead of unteaching his Friend *Polyænus Geometry*, he had ſubmitted to learn a little of it from him. *Democritus*, who was a Man of Learning and a compleat *Geometrician*, allows the Sun to be a very large Body, while t'other's contented with two Foot, or thereabouts for its Diameter, making its Real bigneſs the ſame, or much the ſame as its Apparent. Thus whatever he changes, he ſpoils; and whatever he takes without altering belongs to *Democritus*; as his *Atoms*, his *Space*, his *Repreſentations* or *Species*, which obtruding themſelves upon us, are the Cauſe as well of Thought as of Sight; his *Apiriá*, or *Infinity*; his *Innumerable Worlds*, and his *Daily Originations* of *Some* and *Diſſolutions* of *Others*. Theſe *Chimæras* I know not what to make of; but yet, methinks, 'tis pity *Democritus*, after the Applauſe which others have beſtowed upon him, ſhould

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loſe all his Reputation thro' the Default of one of his moſt devoted and ſervile Followers. Then as for that other part of Philoſophy which contains the Myſtery of Diſputation, and is termed *Logick*, your *Oracle* is abſolutely unfurniſh'd and defenceleſs: for he has nothing to ſay, not he, to *Definitions*, *Diviſions* and *Partitions*; neither will he put us in a way to form a Concluſion, unravel a Fallacy, or diſtinguiſh *Equivocals*: He appropriates all Diſcrimination to the external Senſes; and affirms that if ever they ſhould entertain a Falſhood for a Truth, we are deſtitute of any further means of diſcerning one from t'other. And as for his *Ethicks*, the third part of his Philoſophy, when he brings into the Light his Moral End, 'tis a diſhonourable and a ſordid one. The grand Proof which he urges for his Poſition is fetch'd from this natural Principle, that we ſhould purſue Pleaſure and avoid Trouble; and therefore his Diviſion of Things is into *Delectables* and *Deteſtables*. This is all *Ariſtippiciſm* reviv'd, only the *Cyrenaicks* manag'd their Cauſe more artfully and ingenuouſly. Now Human Nature could not receive a greater Affront than this implies. Our being with its Furniture and Diſtinction was certainly deſign'd to much nobler Purpoſes: And I cannot believe (tho' I know my ſelf li-

liable to Error) that the *Original Torquatus* took the Enemies Gold Chain from him, in order to the Perception of any Bodily Pleasure; or that in the time of his third Consulship he engag'd the *Latins* in the Battle of *Veseris*, for the sake of any sensual Gratification. So when he gave his Child the fatal Blow with his own Hand, preferring the Rights and Authority of the Publick Establishment to the Natural Tenderness and Duty of a Parent, I suppose, the Satisfaction of this Discipline, if he had any, was severely imbitter'd by the Relation. So agen, when *Lucius Torquatus*, that was Fellow Consul with *Cneius Octavius*, treated his Son, that had been adopted by *Silanus* with such Severity, upon Articles exhibited against him by the *Macedonian* Delegates, for Acts of Extortion, while he was *Prætor* in that Province, strictly commanding him to come to his Tryal, then after an hearing of both Parties, declaring that his behaviour in his Government had been unworthy of the Family from which he was descended, and banishing him for ever from his Presence: Will you say that the Father when he did all this had any Raptures and Transports in his Eye? Not to enumerate the Dangers, the Toils, the Calamities, which are welcome to every true Patriot and Protector of his

Dependents, in such a Rational Defiance to all outward Enjoyments as to embrace Extremities rather than forgoe a Duty; not to reckon up these, I say, let's descend to more familiar Instances, tho' not weaker Evidences. I appeal to your selves, Gentlemen, Where's the *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* you taste in the several Authors you converse with, Historians, Philosophers, Poets, and the many Verses you have imprinted upon your Memory? 'Twill not serve the Turn to tell me they are entertaining and diverting. No doubt the *Torquatuses* found a Pleasure too in what they did. But *Epicurus* is wiser than to put his Cause upon that Issue; and so are your selves, and every Body that understands the Merits of it. If here, as o' course, 'tis demanded, how the *Epicureans* then come to be so numerous, among other Causes, a principal one is this, that *Epicurus* is vulgarly conceiv'd to maintain, that Vertue and Probity are essentially and intrinsically delightful; and whether any regard be had to Corporeal Satisfactions or not, Vertue and Wisdom would be desireable irrespectively, and for themselves, Which he can by no means away with. And therefore I can as little approve of *Epicurus*'s Opinion. But it is as good as could be expected from that illiterate Man (for I presume, even *Torquatus* himself

ſelf muſt acknowledge him to have been but a very ſuperficial Scholar.) However, he had no reaſon to ſeduce other People from following their Studies: Tho', it ſeems, he could not influence you in that reſpect. This was what I offer'd, not ſo much to explain my ſelf, as to alarm *Torquatus*. In earneſt (ſaid *Triarius* with a ſmile) you have effectually ſtript *Epicurus* of all his Philoſophy, and left him no Pretenſion to chear up his Spirits, but only this; that as extravagantly as he talks, you underſtand his Drift. His Natural Philoſophy is borrow'd Ware, and all of it in your Opinion Bad; but none of it ſo bad as his own Alterations and Amendments. He knew not one Tittle of *Logick*. His placing the *Sovereign Good* in Pleaſure, is a Conceit that's none of his own; and the very *Choice* diſcovers the ſhallowneſs of his Judgment: For *Ariſtippus* had defended it before, and with a much better Grace too. And when you have thus diveſted the Man of Common Senſe, 'tis no wonder you ſhould make him a *Dunce* into the Bargain. If I am to declare my ſelf oblig'd, Sir, (ſaid I) to diſſent from any Man, would you have me do it without informing you what it is I diſlike in him? If I could receive all that *Epicurus* has taught, what ſhould keep me from going over to him? eſpecially when I conſider, that to learn his Philoſophy is no

more than to learn a Game. 'Tis true, I think it beneath the Dignity of a Philoſopher to blemiſh a Diſpute with contumelious and ſpiteful Suggeſtions, paſſionate Excurſions, or a poſitive, peremptory Obſtinacy. But why Diſputants may not find *Flaws* as faſt as they can, I do not apprehend. Moſt freely (ſays *Torquatus*) I agree with you there; for 'tis as impoſſible to diſpute at all without the Liberty of Carping, as to diſpute without Impartiality and Temper to any purpoſe. But for other Matters, you ſhall have my Anſwer immediately, if you'll give your ſelf the trouble to hear it. What (ſaid I) d'you think I have been promiſing my ſelf all this while? Then the Queſtion was, whether he ſhould take in all the Parts of the *Epicurean* Inſtitution, or confine himſelf to the Topick of Pleaſure, the Point in Controverſie: And when I had left him to his Choice, Why then (ſaid he) I'll at preſent ſpeak to the main Queſtion only, deferring the Vindication of his *Phyſicks* for a more ſeaſonable Opportunity. And I do not queſtion but to ſatisfie your Scruples, and remove your Prejudices about the Deviatory Motion of the Atoms, the Bigneſs of the Sun, and the reaſonableneſs of the Improvements made by *Epicurus* upon *Democritus*. For this time I ſhall only explain my ſelf upon the Subject of Pleaſure, neither advancing new

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Notions, nor any other that I think you will have reaſon to reject. For my part (ſaid I) an Unconvincible Humour is my Averſion; and aſſure your ſelf, if you can fairly prove your Point, you make me your Convert. Then I do not deſpair (ſaid he) provided you'll be as good as your Word; but to prevent the Interruptions of *Queres* and *Replies*, I crave leave to carry on my Diſcourſe in a continued Series. And when for that I had left him to his own Diſcretion, thus he addreſs'd the Company: I will begin in that Method which my Maſter obſerv'd before me, and define the Subject of the Queſtion; not that I ſuppoſe you want any ſuch Inſtruction, but that we may proceed more regularly. 'Tis therefore demanded what is our Chief and Ultimate Good, into which, as 'tis agreed among all Philoſophers whatſoever, the reſt are univerſally reſolv'd, and it ſelf into none. *Epicurus* will have this to be *Pleaſure*; as on the contrary, *Pain* to be the greateſt of Evils; and he thus propoſes to prove it. Every Animal, ſays he, is no ſooner born, but it begins the Chace after Pleaſure, and indulges it ſelf in that, as the only Expedient for its Well-being; while to the utmoſt of its Power it avoids and reſcues it ſelf from Pain; and this in an unprejudic'd and an undeprav'd State of Nature. And therefore he denies any Neceſ-

ty of expoſtulating for a Reaſon why we ſhould affect Pleaſure and abhorr Pain. Theſe he accounts the immediate Reſults of Senſation, as we perceive that *Fire* makes us warm, that *Snow* is white, and *Honey* ſweet; of all which Particulars, we need no other Demonſtration to convince us, than that of Impreſſions from without, the Difference being wide between Syllogiſtical Deductions, and the ſimple Perceptions of Senſe: The one unlocks Doubts and Obſcurities, and lets you into Truth; t'other is a *Thorough-fare*, and lets in Truth upon you. Now in regard a Man without any Senſes is no better than a Carcaſe; from hence it follows, that Nature is the beſt Judge of her own Deſires and Averſions: And that Pleaſure is the immediate Object of the firſt, and Pain of the other. For is there any thing which a Man is capable of perceiving and diſtinguiſhing in order to purſue or ſhun it, beſides Pleaſure or Pain? Others there are of *Epicurus*'s Diſciples, that carry the thing further; and not enduring that the diſtinctions of Good and Evil ſhould be ingroſs'd by the Senſes, underſtand it as a Dictate of the Judgment, and a Rule of Right Reaſon, that Pleaſure is in its own Nature Deſirable, and Pain Odious. And ſay that the Conſequence, which is, that we ſhould purſue the firſt,

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and avoid the laſt, is an *Innate Principle*. But another Party, to which I properly belong, obſerving how ſtrangely the Diſpute concerning the Excellency of Pleaſure and the Evil of Pain has been bandy'd about, are of Opinion, that we ought not to manage our Cauſe with Pertneſs and Bigotry, but lay our Reaſonings carefully together, and confer *at large* upon the Nature of Pleaſure and Pain. Wherefore for the eaſier Detection and Diſproof of their Error that declaim againſt Pleaſure, and ſpeak favourably of Pain, I will ſet the whole Matter in a true Light, and give you the Senſe of what I find ſuggeſted to our purpoſe by our great *Alchymiſt of Truth* and *Projector of Humane Felicity*. No Body conceives an Averſion to Pleaſure; but becauſe, if we take imprudent Meaſures to attain it, we ſuffer for't in the Conſequences. As on t'other hand, no Body can be a Friend to *Pain*, as *Pain*; but yet it may meet with a favourable Reception, becauſe it frequently happens, that Pain and Labour prove a neceſſary Means towards the procurement of Exquiſite Pleaſures. To propoſe a trivial Inſtance; Which of us Three would fatigue himſelf with our bodily Exerciſes, if he did not find his Account in't? At the ſame time ſhall I blame a Man for preferring that Pleaſure which he can purchaſe without any manner of Trou-

ble, or for excuſing himſelf from that Pain which is not productive of Pleaſure? Notwithſtanding, when the Blandiſhments of any preſent Delights prevail ſo far, as to intoxicate and incapacitate us for judging what Difficulties and Inconveniences *we had better* embrace, we are highly to be blam'd, and deſerve to have no Favour ſhew'd us; as do alſo thoſe People, whoſe Effeminacy, and Lightneſs, and Antipathy to Pain and Labour betray them into diſhonourable Courſes. But here the right Diſtinction is very obvious. As thus; when we are free from all conditional Barrs and Limitations, and warranted to make directly after that which pleaſes us beſt, then we muſt reſign up our ſelves entirely to the Pleaſure, and admit no Treaty with the Pain. But when, as it falls out ſometimes, either our Duty or our Circumſtances oblige us to give up our Pleaſures, and wade into Vexations, there's this Choice yet reſerv'd for every Wiſe Man, either to ſecure to himſelf Greater Pleaſures at the Price of Leſſer, or to eſcape ſeverer Vexations by accepting Lighter. This is my Notion of the Buſineſs; and I would gladly underſtand why the Inſtances of our Family will not agree with it——— ſeeing you were pleaſed, upon recollection, out of reſpect and kindneſs to faſten there. A notable Stratagem (if 'twould take) to

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ſtroak your Adverſary into a peaceable Indifference! But I beſeech you, what account will you give us of their acting as they did? Can you believe when the Enemy was charg'd ſo briskly, and their own Fleſh and Blood handled ſo roughly, that no Ends or Intereſts were to be ſerv'd? The very Beaſts of Prey are wiſer than to expoſe and diſorder themſelves for Nothing: And can you fancy that Perſons of ſuch a Character would have acted ſo ſingularly, they knew not why? Hereafter we ſhall ſee what Grounds they went upon. At preſent it is enough to be aſſur'd, that if they did what became 'em, they acted upon ſome other Motive than that of ſimple and abſtracted Vertue. One of them carry'd off his Enemy's Chain; and when he had done ſo, made Armour on't *for his own Security.* Well, but there was a dangerous Obſtacle that fac'd him, call'd *an Army.* And what could be the Temptation then? Why a Proſpect of raiſing his Reputation, and fortifying his Intereſt with Applauſe and Popularity. The ſame Perſon knock'd his Child o'the Head; but had he been ſo Raſh and Inhumane as to do ſuch a thing without a Reaſon, I ſhould bluſh to own my ſelf his *Relation.* Now, if 'twas his intent rather to deſtroy his own Quiet, than ſuffer the *Military Diſcipline* to be infring'd, or his Orders and Authority neg-

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lected among the Soldiers, when the Danger was imminent; he made a wise Provision for the safety of his Countrymen, well-knowing that his own was comprehended therein. The same Observations are applicable to a vast variety of Instances. And as industriously as Both of you, especially my Antogonist, who thrashes at the Study of Antiquity, exercise your Lungs upon the Characters of Gallant and Extraordinary Men, and magnifie their Actions, as not resulting from any Mercenary Considerations, but purely from a Principle of Vertue and Honour, you are ty'd to retract, provided, as in the Premisses, it be made a Rule of Option, that lesser Satisfactions are to be quitted for the obtaining of greater, and lesser Inconveniences borne with to divert worse. And thus much may suffice in relation to your Instances of Glorious and Heroick Actions, it being by this time proper to come forward and observe how directly all Vertue tends to Pleasure. And here I shall explain what it is I mean by Pleasure, that so the Common Misconstructions may be prevented, and the Seriousness and even Austerity of that Philosophy, which passes for such a luscious, effeminate System, may be set forth. For indeed that sort of Pleasure which strikes the Senses, and affects the Oeconomy of our Bodies with an obliging

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Influence, we do not purſue excluſively of the other incomparable Pleaſure, which conſiſts in *Indolency*, or an Exemption from Pain: For ſince Pleaſure is nothing elſe but the Agreableneſs, nor Pain but the Diſagreableneſs of Things to the Percipient; and ſince the very Removal and Intermiſſion of Pain is a thing ſo very agreable to us, no wonder if we pronounce the Abſence of Pain to be a Pleaſure. Thus for the purpoſe, the Conſequence of taking off Hunger, and extinguiſhing Thirſt is an actual Satisfaction: And ſo, as to all other Particulars, a Ceſſation of Diſturbance is the very Birth of Pleaſure. Hence it was that *Epicurus* deny'd a *Medium* between *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, becauſe that *Medium*, as underſtood by thoſe who talk of it, implies freedom from Pain; which he will have to be not a Pleaſure barely, but the *Queen* of all Pleaſures; it being impoſſible but that every Man who feels at any time within himſelf after what manner he's affected, ſhould be ſenſible either of ſome Pleaſure or ſome Moleſtation: Whereas 'tis *Epicurus*'s Maxim, that the ſublimeſt Pleaſure terminates in an entire Diſcharge from Pain; and that altho' it further admits of Specifications and Variety, yet it is capable of no higher Improvements. Upon this Occaſion, I remember, my Father has told me,

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when he has been in the Humour of rallying *Stoicism*, that at *Athens*, in one of the *Ceramici*, there's a Statue of *Chrysippus* sitting, and holding out his Hand, as if he would propose his Favourite *Quere*, *D'you find any Cravings in your Hand in the present Crisis of its Affairs*? None, I dare say, which yet it would not but have, if *Pleasure* were a real Good; and therefore it cannot be such. My Father was positive, the Statue it self, if able to speak, would talk more *à propos*. 'Tis true, the Argument holds handsomly against the *Cyrenaicks*; but *Epicurus* is by no means concern'd in it. If there were no Pleasure but that which exhilarates and captivates the Senses, the meer absence of Pain, without the force of a little lively Pleasure, could never have given his Hand *Content*: But if *Epicurus*'s Indolence be the highest of all Pleasures, we may grant *Chrysippus* the first Supposition, that his Hand, while he held it out, felt no want of any thing: But for the next, that if *Pleasure* were a real *Good*, his Hand would be grasping at it, we must beg his Pardon; for it could not possibly feel the want of any thing, because that which is free from Pain is in a State of Pleasure. Further, to make it plain that Pleasure is our Utmost *Good*, let us represent to our selves the Condition of a Man perpetually regal'd with all the variety con-

conceivable of the moſt raviſhing Pleaſures incident either to the Mind or Body, without the leaſt Alloy of Pain, either preſent or approaching: Can any Condition of Life be more advantageous, or more deſireable than this, eſpecially ſince it muſt include ſuch a firmneſs of Soul, as renders it proof againſt the Fears of Death or Pain; Death being a loſs of all Senſation, and Pain either long and moderate, or acute and ſhort; ſo that which ever it proves, there's room for Comfort: Tho' to finiſh the Felicity of it, neceſſary it is that the Dread of a Deity be forgotten, and the ſweetneſs of paſt Pleaſures very frequently recollected. Agen, let us imagine a Man afflicted with the ſaddeſt Agonies and Tortures of Mind and Body, utterly deſpairing of any Relief or Relaxation, and wholly loſt as well to the remembrance of paſt, and the expectation of future, as the fruition of any preſent Pleaſure; what could we call him but the very Accompliſhment and *Idea* of *Miſery* it ſelf? If therefore a Life of Torment is the moſt deteſtable, undoubtedly 'tis the greateſt Evil, and conſequently a Life of Pleaſure muſt be the greateſt Good, on this ſide whereof the Mind of Man finds nothing for it *finally* to fix upon; as there is nothing beſides Pain, as that comprehends all ſorts of Terrours and

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Moleſtations, which ſimply and from it ſelf can either diſturb or ſhatter us. In ſhort, Pleaſure and Pain are the firſt Occaſions and Springs of all Affection, Averſion and Action; whence 'tis evident, that all the Concerns of Wiſdom and Vertue are to be reckon'd into the Account of a Life of Pleaſure. And thus while we convince our ſelves, that when we have ſaid all, a Life of Jollity and Pleaſure is the *Summum Bonum*, the laſt and compleateſt Good, into which all others muſt be reſolv'd, and in ſelf into none; there are ſome People abroad that widely miſtaking the Intendment and Scope of Nature, affirm, that Vertue and Glory claim that Denomination an Abſurdity, from which *Epicurus*, if they'd lend him an Ear, wou'd eaſily free them: For what becomes of the Dignity and Value of all your fine charming Vertues in caſe they are no longer effective of Pleaſure? But for the ſake of Health, we ſhould look upon the Science of *Medicine* as an idle Piece of Curioſity; and a Pilot is eſteem'd not for his Theory of Navigation, but the benefit of his Conduct: Accordingly Wiſdom or *the Science of Living*, were it no more than a barren Amuſement, would be undeſerving of our Application, whereas it claims our Attention, becauſe we are by it put in a way to come at Pleaſure. What Pleaſure I mean

I hope you know so well by this time, that I need not fear the *Odium* of the Word will stand in the way of my Argument. The Thing which I drive at is this. All the unhappiness of our Lives is notoriously imputable to the false Estimates we pass upon the Nature of Things, and these Misapprehensions frequently forfeit us our choicest Pleasures, and lay us open to the most Melancholy Discomposures; against which, VViſdom is our Antidote, as being that which subdues our Fears and our Desires, corrects our vain Opinions and Prejudices, and certainly brings us to the Possession of true Pleasure. 'Tis this alone that quells our Sollicitude, and all our Pannick Fears, that slakes the Vehemence of our Appetites, and teaches us the Art of living happily, our Appetites being so insatiable as to bring Destruction upon our selves and our Neighbours, upon entire Families, nay upon whole Common-Wealths. These are the Fountains of Emulation, Ruptures, Faction and War. And yet as wildly and impetuously as they run a tilt against other People, the Tempests and Tumults they raise in our own Breasts are such, that the Comforts of Life are totally lost in them; and till a Man has the Discretion to prune away his Levity, and his Mistakes, and contain himself within

in the Reſtrictions of Nature, 'tis not in his Power to live without Diſturbance and Terrour. To this purpoſe is that moſt uſeful and edifying Diviſion, which *Epicurus* has introduc'd of our Deſires into *thoſe that are both Natural and Neceſſary*; *thoſe that are Natural but not Neceſſary*; *and thoſe that are neither Natural nor Neceſſary.* The Firſt may be ſatisfy'd eaſily and cheaply: The Second will alſo come to very reaſonable Terms, requiring no more than a moderate Competency of what Proviſions offer themſelves: But the Third will not be reſtrained or ſtinted at all. Now then, as ſure as Ignorance and falſe Reaſonings over-caſt the Serenity of Human Life, and nothing but Wiſdom reſcues us from the Tyranny of our Inclinations and Terrors, and makes us a Match for the Malice of Fortune, and Maſters of our own Eaſe and Quiet: So ſurely 'tis Pleaſure we propoſe to our ſelves, when we labour to be Wiſe, and Fear of Infelicity that keeps us from Courſes of Indiſcretion. Thus ought we to be ambitious of having a Command over our ſelves, not for the ſake of the Vertue, but the inward Satisfaction, Complacency and Harmony ariſing out of it. For this Virtue is that which governs us in all our Purſuits and Averſions, inaſmuch as 'tis not enough

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for us to distinguish between what Methods are fit or unfit to be taken, but our Determinations must be follow'd with suitable Resolutions and Practices; whereas usually when we come to know what we have to trust to, some one Phantom or other of Pleasure enchants us; we yield our selves Prisoners to our own Desires, and lose all Apprehensions of the Consequences; and so for the Love perhaps of a poor insignificant Satisfaction, that might have been obtain'd some other way; (or if not, it had been never the worse for us) we run our selves into Diseases, Distresses, and Disgraces; nay frequently upon the very Weapons of Publick Justice: While they who contrive and and regulate their Pleasures in such a manner that no subsequent Inconveniences attend them, and deal so ingenuously by themselves as not to do, for any Sollicitations of Pleasure, what they are satisfi'd ought not to be done, receive always double Interest for any Pleasure they quit; and to put by a greater Evil they surrender themselves to a less. Whence we infer, that as Moderation and Temperance are not desireable Qualities, as they retrench our Pleasures, but only as they commute them to our Advantage, so Extravagances and Intemperance are not purely upon their own account detestable. The same is to be said

of *Fortitude.* 'Tis not for the Bleſſedneſs either of taking or enduring Pains that we give Proofs of our Patience, our Vigilance, nay our Induſtry, and even our Bravery it ſelf: But theſe, we know, are the beſt Phyſick toward a Cure of the Sollicitudes and Diſcouragements of Human Life, and a Philoſophical *Guard du' Corps* againſt our Daily Diſaſters. The Fear of Death murders the Repoſe of Life, and when Affliction once overpowers and unmans us, we muſt be miſerable: thus Multitudes have become diſpirited and deſperate, and done Violence to their Parents, their Friends, their Country, and Themſelves. But a Man of a ſturdy, brave ſpirit is beyond the Reach of Care and Diſquietude: He is unconcern'd at the Thoughts of Death, as remanding him into the ſame Condition he was in before he was begot, and fortified againſt Pain by recollecting, that if violent, Death ſtops it; if gentle, it has Intermiſſions; if between both, we have it under Command; and ſo as long as 'tis ſupportable, may endure, and when we can no longer endure it, may be as glad to leave Life, as the Diverſion of an *Opera* when we are tir'd. All this effectually proves that Cowardize and Lazineſs are not eſſentially ſuch Ill Qualities, nor Fortitude and Tolerance, ſuch good ones as they are made to be, but only for that the Ef-

Effects of the First are so pernicious, and those of the Latter so pleasant and beneficial. *Justice* only remains of the Four Cardinal Vertues to be consider'd, and this will take the same Application as the former, it having been shewn, that the Union between Pleasure, Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude is indissoluble; and it holds as well between *Pleasure* and *Justice*, which is not only Inoffensive, but fills the Soul either with Satisfactions arising immediately from it self, or from an assurance of all those Felicities which are incompatible with a Corrupted Conscience, just as Precipitancy, Impetuosity and Impotency teaze and torment the Mind; for the consciousness of Justice is a Charm against all Discomposure, whereas your Knave's lying close and undetected for some time, can by no means make him secure that his Practises shall never be discovered. For Foul Play creates Suspicions, which ripen into Rumours, and then come the Informers and the Judges, unless the very Parties betray themselves, as they did under your Consulship; Or if some People of Wealth and Interest, fancy themselves sufficiently fenced against Prosecution and Disturbance from Men, yet there's the Dread of a Deity which they cannot elude; and those dismal Apprehensions which haunt and macerate 'em Night and Day,

paſs into a certain Earneſt, and a convincing Proof of the Divine Vengeance. How great alaſs! are the odds between the Advantages propos'd in doing an Ill Thing, and the Mortifications we ſuffer for it from our own Conſciences, from publick Juſtice, and publick *Caium*. And yet ſome People's Avarice, Pride, Ambition, Luſt, Luxury, and Vices in general are ſo inſatiable, that the more they extend their Conqueſts, the more they are encourag'd and animated, and will not be reclaim'd, and therefore muſt be reſtrain'd. Upon the whole, we ſee Right Reaſon binds us to the Duties of Juſtice, Equity, and Honeſty. Man is but a poor helpleſs Infant, and fair-dealing is his Intereſt, and the beſt means to compaſs his Ends. By right, our Generoſity ſhould be the Steward of our Fortunes, and Abilities, which, if impower'd, will procure us the main Ingredients of a comfortable Life, that is, the Benevolence and Favour of others; and that without croſſing upon any plauſible Temptation, for the wants of Nature are eaſily ſupply'd without our betaking our ſelves to Injurious Methods, and of all other Wants we are to take no Notice, for the Matter of them is unworthy the leaſt Regard, and the Booty cannot prove ſo valuable as the Injury prejudicial. Wherefore we dare not affirm even

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of *Justice* that it is Eligible and Valuable for its self, but because of the Satisfactions which attend it, for there's a mighty Consolation in being esteem'd and belov'd, in as much as the Interests of Life are thereby confirm'd, and so the Pleasures of it doubled. And therefore Villany and Disingenuity ought to scare us not so much by the Calamities which they bring upon Ill Men, as because they banish Repose and Chearfulness from the Mind that entertains 'em. Now then if all the glorious Pretensions of Vertue it self which your other Philosophers have spent their Harangues upon, dwindle into nothing, unless consummated by Pleasure; and Pleasure is the only thing which by its own Force invites and attracts us to it self, 'tis apparent that Pleasure must be our main and ultimate Good, and a Happy Life, only another Name for a Life of Pleasure. My principal Assertion being thus made out, I shall now briefly dispatch some remaining Observations. Whether Pleasure and Pain are the true Moral Ends, is not question'd by any of our Sect: But the Error of Some among us lies in their Ignorance of the true Origins of Pleasure and Pain. It cannot be deny'd that the Pleasures and Pains of the Mind spring from the Pleasures and Pains of the Body: And I must own, whatever *Epicureans*

think otherwiſe, as I know there are a great many ſuperficial Ones that do, muſt not, as you obſerve, hope to carry their Point. The Pleaſures, 'tis true, and Diſturbances of the Mind affect us with Joy and Sorrow; but then both of 'em begin at the Body, and becauſe of the intimate Relation that is between them, it comes to paſs that the Pleaſure and Grief which the Mind perceives, exceeds the Pleaſures and Pains of the Body; for the Body is ſenſible of none but the Objects preſent; whereas the Mind moreover employs it ſelf upon Precedent and Future. And if when the Body is in pain, the Mind is proportionably afflicted, any Expectations of Eternal and Infinite Evils, muſt add very conſiderably to the Weight of our Troubles, as on t'other hand, to be free from ſuch Apprehenſions muſt mightily encreaſe our Pleaſures. In ſhort, it's paſt Diſpute that the richeſt Satisfactions, and the blackeſt Anxieties of the Mind conduce more either to the Happineſs or Unhappineſs of our Lives, than either of them, if their Duration be meaſur'd only by the continuance of the Pleaſures and Pains of the Body. Further, 'tis to be intimated that Diſſatisfaction does not immediately ſucceed upon Intermiſſion of Pleaſure, unleſs a Poſitive Sorrow ſupplies the Place of a departed Pleaſure; altho' Intermiſſion of Pain is it ſelf a very ſenſible Refreſh-

freſhment, whether accompany'd by any Bodily Pleaſures or not. And this Hint ſufficiently illuſtrates the Choiceneſs of the Pleaſure of Indolency. Agen, as the Proſpect of a Future Good is a wonderful Support and Encouragement, ſo is the Remembrance and Recapitulation of Satisfactions paſt and gone. Men of Senſe will entertain and amuſe themſelves with reviving the Images and Ideas of the Sweets they have formerly taſted, and none but a Fool troubles his Head with recollecting the Miſeries he has undergone. 'Tis in our own Power as well to bury paſt Perplexities in Oblivion, as to retrieve and chew upon the very Phantom of what has heretofore delighted us. And thoſe Recollections, if enforc'd with Earneſtneſs and Attention, will as the Matter of them appears either hurtful or beneficial in its Nature, accordingly diſturb or compoſe. Behold then how plain, direct and admirable a Method I recommend to make you Happy! for ſince we cannot wiſh our ſelves a greater Happineſs than to be abſolutely free from Pain and Diſquietude, and to enjoy the compleateſt Pleaſures imaginable both of Mind and Body, what is there away that can further contribute toward our attaining that chief and ultimate Good which we ſeek for? *Out upon that Voluptuary* Epi-

curus, is continually in your Mouths, and yet he proclaims it an Impoſſibility for him that would not keep up to the Rules of Wiſdom, Juſtice and Ingenuity to live happily, and as impoſſible for him that does to live unhappily: For if there can be no Peace as long as there is Faction and Rebellion in a Body Politick, nor in a Family where the leading Members of it are divided; for the ſame Reaſon the Mind that's at variance with it ſelf is not in a Condition to reliſh any thing that may be call'd a ſavory and a genuine Pleaſure. Where inconſiſtent Purpoſes and Reſolutions take place, Eaſe and Tranquillity have no Concerns. If any harſher Bodily Diſtempers create ſuch lamentable Perturbations, how much more muſt the Diſeaſes of our Minds impair our Happineſs? By the Diſeaſes of the Mind, I mean all our exceſſive and fantaſtical Deſires after Riches, Glory, Dominion, Senſual Pleaſures. Add to Theſe Diſcontent, Diſappointment, and Vexation, which diſtract and conſume us while we will not underſtand that our Minds ought to take no Impreſſions but of Bodily Pain either Preſent or in Reverſion. And becauſe every Unwiſe Man labours under one or other of theſe Diſeaſes, therefore we meet with no Body that's properly Happy. Beſides, Death like a Stone, ſuppoſe, over

Tantalus, is perpetually dangling above our Heads; and then there's another Thing call'd *Superstition*, that certainly if indulg'd destroys our Quiet. Nor is it in the Power of any Unwise Man to enjoy any present Comforts, or the remembrance of any past, but barely the hopes of Future; The uncertainty of which fills him with Fear and Anguish, and when in the upshot he finds that the gay Promises he had made himself of Wealth, Empire, Greatness and Glory come to nothing, he loses all Patience: For indeed, let him act as vigorously as he will; 'tis impossible for such a Man to find Fuel enough for the Flame of his own Passions and Appetites. There are also your Puny, Abject, Disconsolate, Malicious, Envious, Peevish, Unconversable, Exceptious, Unaccountable Sorts of Souls, not forgetting the Amorous, Impertinent, Impudent, Lewd, Intemperate, Idle, Insignificant, Inconstant: And these poor Wretches ne'er know what means a moment's Relaxation from Misery. So that Happiness cannot be the Portion of Fools, nor Unhappiness of Understanding Men. And this we prove from Principles which are farr more just and rational than those of the *Stoicks*, who will have nothing to be properly good, but an empty *Chimæra* of their own which they have dignify'd with the Title of *Honestum*,

neſtum, affirming that Vertue lodg'd in this *Honeſtum* or *Principle of Honour and Honeſty*, alone and excluſively of all Pleaſure, ſuffices to render us compleatly Happy. Not but this is a real Truth too in one Senſe, (and inſtead of oppoſing it ſo underſtood, we'll ſtand by it) for 'tis conſtantly *Epicurus*'s Character of a Wiſe Man, that he governs his Appetites, that he deſpiſes Death, that he's not afraid to make his own Concluſions when he's thinking of the God's, nor unwilling to leave the World when 'tis convenient. So ſoon as he's thus diſpos'd he cannot help being Happy; at leaſt the Pleaſures of his Life, tho' blended with a few Diſturbances, will be Predominant. He freely indulges himſelf in his Meditations upon Delights that are fled, and makes the moſt of Objects and Opportunities that lie before him, expecting, without depending upon Things to come, and ever ſecuring the preſent. He ſteers aloof from all the ill Habits mention'd before, and upon comparing the Life of a Fool with his own, is chear'd and ſatisfy'd. If any Uneaſineſs attacks him, 'tis never of that Force, but that ſtill he's Maſter of a Superiour Proportion of Happineſs. What can be nobler Theorems than thoſe of *Epicurus*, that Fortune has very little Power over a Wiſe Man, and that

hat he governs the World by the Force nd Authority of his Underſtanding, and hat a State of Mortality fills up the Mea- ure of his Happineſs as effectually as Im- nortality it ſelf cou'd. Your Logick *Epi- urus* neglected, as affording no helps ei- her in the Buſineſs of *Morality* or *Argumen- ation* : And yet his Natural Philoſophy bounds with Inſtances and Exemplifica- ions of the Force both of that Art and *Rhetorick* in their ſeveral Branches. But t is the Knowledge of Nature's *Phænome- a* that diſſipates thoſe Terrors which elſe iad impos'd upon us, that cures our Su- erſtition, and hardens us againſt the Fear f Death; and what's more, 'till we have horoughly examin'd what are the Seve- als which the Order and Oeconomy of he Univerſe require, we have not done ll that lies in our Power toward finiſh- ng our Behaviour and Manners. But then, rovided we keep cloſe to our general Cri- erion, or Determining Rule, as a Divine rradiation of Truth from Heaven, and once come to form and fix rightly our Notions of Things, twill not be in the Power of Wit or Words to drive us from our Hold. Neither yet ſo long as we are ignorant of the Natures and Properties of Beings, can we prove the verity of ſenſible Repreſen- tations and Suggeſtions. All Ideas of the

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Mind are deriv'd from the Senſes; if theſe therefore are all faithful, as *Epicurus* tells us, we are capacitated in ſome ſort both to Apprehend and Comprehend. But if theſe are to be caſhier'd, and there can be no ſuch Thing as a right Perception, the Reaſons of either Poſition muſt be ſuch as demonſtrate Both to be precarious; over and above the fruſtration of all our Entercourſes and Enterpriſes which ſuch a Scepticiſm implies. Upon the whole, our Natural Philoſophy is our *Orvitan* againſt the Fears of Death, or the Horrors of a Religious Melancholy. It diſcovers the ſecret Dependances of Natural Cauſes, and makes us eaſy and ſecure. It ſhews us what and how various our Appetites are, and whence we may beſt form our Meaſures to regulate them. And laſtly it ſerves for a Rule of Judgment and Science to ſtate our Diſtinctions by, between Truths and Untruths. I muſt not make an End 'till I have explain'd my ſelf upon one Head more, and that is the Subject of Friendſhip, which you tell us is never to be contracted, if Pleaſure be the *Greateſt Good*, tho' *Epicurus* declares it his Opinion, that Wiſdom among all the Ingredients of Happineſs has not a nobler, a richer, or a more delicious one than Friendſhip. And this he did not only aſſert in his Writings, but gave a practical Proof of it

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in his Life and Converſation. How ſingular a Commendation this is, appears from the rare Inſtances of Friendſhip, which the Mythology of the Ancients, as Voluminous and as full of Variety as it is, contains, at moſt amounting but to Three Couples, when we have trac'd them from *Theſeus* to *Oreſtes*. But O! what a numerous, what an Harmonious Company of Friends did *Epicurus* crowd into his own little Habitation! And the *Epicureans* have ever follow'd the Example. But to return; the Diſputants of our Sect have manag'd the Queſtion of Friendſhip upon Three Different Bottoms. One Party of 'em that confeſs the Communicative Satisfactions which paſs from Friend to Friend, are not ſo deſirable upon their own account as every Individual's proper Pleaſure, (a Confeſſion very prejudicial, as ſome People conceive, to the Intereſt of Friendſhip) yet vigorouſly maintain their Point, and (to do them Juſtice) with very good Succeſs, it appearing to them an Abſurdity, that the Vertues before ſpecify'd ſhould be inſeparable from Pleaſure, and Friendſhip not ſo. Even common Senſe prompts us to friendly Aſſociations and Alliances upon the view of the many and mighty Dangers and Frights that go along with Unconverſableneſs and Solitude. For theſe Alliances make us Bold and Sprightly,

Sprightly, and are the certain Fore-runners of an advancing Happineſs. For if Malice, Envy, and Diſregard are the Bane of Tranquillity, the Conſequence will be, that Friendlineſs, I will not ſay promotes, but compleats our Satisfactions, as well Common as Perſonal. And as faſt as it furniſhes out the preſent, it heightens them on with Promiſes of future. Seeing therefore the Comforts of Life muſt be very uncertain and volatil, unleſs fixt by Friendſhip; and Friendſhip is no way to be cultivated but by loving our Friends no leſs than our ſelves: Pleaſure is as neceſſarily the Concomitant, as mutual Affections are the Indentures of Friendſhip; and hence it is that Friends equaly ſhare one another's Content or Diſcontent, and every Wiſe Man has as quick a Senſe of the Circumſtances of his Friend as of his own, and will buſtle as briskly to gratifie his Friend as to gratifie himſelf. So that whatever has been urg'd to prove that Vertue and Pleaſure cannot be alienated from each other, may as well be apply'd to prove that neither can Friendſhip and Pleaſure be divorc'd; according to what *Epicurus* has excellently remark'd, that the ſame Philoſophy which has baffled the damping Suppoſition of an eternal or Permanent State of Miſery, has pronounc'd Friendſhip the beſt Security of Human Life. A ſecond

ſort

ſort of *Epicureans*, and a very ſhrew'd one too, apprehending more Danger than thoſe of the firſt *Hypotheſis* from your ill-natur'd Objections, and doubting whether the Cauſe of *Friendly Offices* will not be loſt, if we make Pleaſure the Scope and End of them, anſwer you, that the firſt Motive and Occaſion of ſtriking an Acquaintance and Confederating, is the Pleaſure of compaſſing an amicable Union, which being wrought up into Familiarity, the Endearments prevail ſo farr at laſt, that, all Conſiderations of Profit thrown aſide, one Friend loves another for t'others proper ſake. Thus we commonly entertain a Partiality for particular Places, as Cloiſters, Towns, Schools, Fields, Dogs, Horſes, Games, becauſe they have been the Stages or Inſtruments of our Exerciſes or Diverſions: How much more natural is it then for Converſation to breed and heighten Friendſhip? A third ſort alledge Aticles of a tacit Compact, wherein all Wiſe Men are Parties, and whereby they are oblig'd to love their Friends full as well as themſelves. This we all know is practicable, and the Method holds true in Fact. I need not add how ſubſervient it is to our Happineſs, this mingling of Intereſts. And now we have laid together an account of the whole Matter; by which it appears, that the Doctrine of Pleaſure's being the *Summum Bonum*, is ſo far from

from weakening the Foundations of Friend ſhip, that without it there can be no ſuc Thing. And if the Reaſonableneſs of wha has been inſiſted upon is, as it is, as brigh and radiant as the Sun in the Meridian ; Nature her ſelf ſeals it all with her ow Teſtimony, if that Teſtimony be furthe corroborated by the full and unbyaſs'd E vidence of our own Senſes ; nay, if Chil dren, Infants, and even the dumb Animal themſelves, antecedently to any Degenera cies and Prepoſſeſſions, upon the bare d ſtate and inſtinct of their Natures, give u to underſtand, that nothing is grateful t our Being but Pleaſure, nothing diſagreabl but Pain : What Veneration and Acknow ledgments are due to the Man, that ha ving firſt ſoberly and rightly digeſted th Leſſons which Nature taught him, has pu us all in a way, if we have but our Wit about us, to make our own Lives Eaſie Quiet, and Pleaſant? If he was nothing c a Scholar, 'twas becauſe he would not ſeem upon any Terms to extend the Province c Learning beyond the Study of Huma Happineſs. You, I warrant, would hav advis'd him to do, as I and *Triarius* her have done by your Advice, play the Foo and waſte his time in conning over th Poets ; or elſe to follow *Plato's* Exam ple, and lay out himſelf upon Muſick Geometry

Geometry, Arithmetick, and Aſtronomy All of 'em Amuſements that proceed upon Principles notoriouſly falſe; and which, tho' they were never ſo ſolid, ſignifie not a Ruſh towards the improving of our Lives, that is, of our Pleaſures. What? would you have had him employ'd his Hours upon the Sciences aforeſaid, and to have ſpar'd all his laborious, beneficial Enquiries about the Conduct and Regulation of Life! No, no; the Men that want better Teaching, are they who require of a Philoſopher, when he is beyond his *Climacteric*, to make the *Elements* of his Education his Buſineſs: They, and not *Epicurus*. Then he concluded in theſe Words; You have now, Sir, what I had to propoſe, and I expect you'll vouchſafe me your Sentiments upon it; and then I ſhall have my Ends of you, which, for want of a fair Opportunity, I could never have before.

TULLY

OF

Moral Ends.

BOOK II.

IMmediately they Both turn'd their Eyes upon me; and when I obſerv'd 'em expecting, I told 'em in the firſt place I would not be guilty of that which I had condemn'd in the Philoſophers; of Reading a Lecture upon a Queſtion. Did ever *Socrates*, that great Maſter in the Faculty, take ſuch a Courſe? 'Twas an Abuſe brought in by the *Sophiſts*, as they were call'd. *Leontinus Gorgias*, one of that Tribe, was the firſt Man that preſum'd to frequent the publick Exerciſes and *challenge Queſtion*; I mean, demand a Subject to be

diſputed upon *off-hand.* This was Bold, rather Impudent; if our Philoſophers, th afterwards trod in *Gorgias*'s Steps, can fo give the Term. Tho', as we learn fro *Plato*, *Socrates* routed the *Sophiſts* as l pleaſed, and particularly the Challenger foreſaid. His way was to put Queſtio and receive Anſwers, and to make the Pe ſon he conferr'd with explain his own Op nions, and then he ſpoke again to tho Anſwers, as he ſaw convenient. This ma ner of Diſputing in proceſs of time gre quite out of Uſe, till it was reviv'd by *A ceſilas*, who made his Auditors open the Minds to Him inſtead of inquiring wh was *his*, and afterwards he came in wi his Animadverſions upon their Propoſitio which nevertheleſs they were permitted defend as long as they were able. The g neral and ordinary Procedure was, and ſtill, among the *Academicks*, to have t Queſtion propos'd, and then the Propoſe keep ſilence. As thus; *Pleaſure*, ſay yo *is according to my Senſe of Things, the Su mum Bonum:* Whereupon immediately fo lows the Diſproof at large, in a fair a full Diſſertation; the Aſſigner of the Queſ on being not conceiv'd to hold it as he h been pleas'd to ſtate it, but to call for ſu Reaſons as any Body elſe can object. It ha pens our Affair is in a great forwardneſs, *T*

quat

quatus having already not only inform'd us *how* he holds the Queſtion, but *why* he holds it ſo. And notwithſtanding, Sir, your Diſcourſe, as you continu'd it in one Thread, was extreamly taking, yet perhaps it had been more adviſeable, as Particulars came to be urg'd in Order, and when what One ſide or T'other granted or deny'd was well underſtood, then to have deduc'd your Particular Concluſions from the Premiſſes agreed upon, 'till you had gone thro' all Parts of the Diſpute. For a *Running Oration* is like a *Rapid Stream:* It carries All before it, but with ſuch Violence and Precipitation, that there's no laying hold upon, or making Prize of any thing. In all methodical and rational Enquiries the Law-Form of *Ea res agatur, Pray keep to that,* muſt be allow'd for a leading Direction; for if we will diſpute, we muſt be firſt agreed upon the Matter we diſpute about: So ſays *Plato* in his *Phædrus*; and *Epicurus* himſelf has approv'd of it, and paſs'd it into a *ſtanding Law*; not obſerving the notorious Inconſiſtency of this Rule with another of his, prohibiting *Definitions*, without the help of which 'tis very often impoſſible for the Parties in Suſpenſe to agree upon the meaning of the Matter in Debate; as particularly in the Caſe before us. We are looking out for the *Ultimate Good.* And af-

ter a Thouſand Arguings about it *Pro* and *Con*, How much the Wiſer, think you, are like to be 'till we have ſetled and pair'd our Notions, as of *Good* in general, ſo of an *Ultimate Good* in particular. And theſe Illuſtrations and Characterizings of the Forms and Eſſences of Things are call'd *Definitions*. You your ſelf ſtumbled upon them ſometimes ——— for want of due Caution! Elſe you had omitted your Excellent Account of the *Laſt* or *Final Good*, that it is that Good which is the Scope aud End of all our commendable Actions, and which is never purſu'd for the ſake of any Thing elſe. I ſuppoſe, had you thought it of Conſequence, you would not have ſcrupled to give us alſo a Definition of *Bonum*, *Good in general*, as that it is *the Object of our natural Deſires*, or that it is *every thing that is really Beneficial*, or *advances our Welfare*, or *creates us a Pleaſure*. It ſhou'd ſeem then, you can reconcile your ſelf as often as you ſee fit to the Buſineſs of Defining; and if ſo, give me leave to put you to the trouble of defining *Pleaſure*, the Subject of our preſent Diſquiſition. Is it ſuppoſeable, ſaid he, that any Body can be ignorant of the Nature of *Pleaſure*, or demand a Definition to give him a light into't? But that for my own part I know, ſaid I, how true and adequate an Idea of Pleaſure I have, I could find i'my

Heart

Heart to confeſs my ſelf an Exception to your *Is it ſuppoſeable:* But let it ſuffice that a certain Philoſopher, who goes by the Name of *Epicurus*, as carefully as he inculcates the Expediency of learning the Significations of Words, not only heſitates and varies in the importance of the Word *Pleaſure*, but utterly miſtakes it. I profeſs, a glorious Paradox! (reply'd he ſmiling) that the Man who aſſerts Pleaſure with all his Force to be our *Utmoſt Good*, the Perfection and Complement of all our Felicity, ſhou'd not conceive what *Pleaſure* is? In earneſt, either *Epicurus* did not underſtand the Nature of Pleaſure; or if he did, no Mortal beſide himſelf ever underſtood it. I was ask'd how that appear'd. I reply'd, that every Body meant by Pleaſure, no more than the Satisfactions and Gratifications of Senſe. Well! ſaid *Torquatus*, and does *Epicurus* take no Cognizance at all of ſuch a ſort of Pleaſure? Oftener (ſaid I) than makes for his Credit; as when he frankly declares if there be any other *Good* beſides good Eating, good Drinking, good Muſick, and ſomething elſe not fit to be nam'd, he neither apprehends where, or what it is. I appeal to your ſelf; have I miſrepreſented him? And what if he has affirm'd thus much? (ſaid *Torquatus*) Where's the Harm, if you will put that favourable Conſtruction upon the

Words which they will very well bear, and I'll undertake to vindicate. O, no queſtion! ſaid I, and pray be proud withal of your being liſted under *the Pink of Penitration*, the only baſhful poor Creature that ever ſeiz'd upon the Title of *Wiſe!* for *Metrodorus* did not write *Himſelf* ſo, but *Epicurus* very graciouſly conferr'd that Honour upon him. As the *Seven Sages* had the ſame Epithet adjudg'd them by the general Conſent and Suffrage of the World: But no Matter for that; As long as 'tis plain *Epicurus* in the Paſſage before quoted means by *Pleaſure* the ſame Thing that other People do, a certain delightful *Tremor* in the Senſes, call'd in *Greek* ἡδονὴ, in *Latin Voluptas*. 'Twas demanded then, What I took offence at. I'll tell you, Sir, ſaid I, and really not ſo much with a deſign to reprimand either your ſelf or *Epicurus*, as for our better Information. As much of that, ſaid he, as you pleaſe, and as little Correction. D' you know, ſaid I, what *Hieronymus Rhodius* has allotted for the *Summum Bonum*? I know, ſaid *Torquatus*, he reſolves it into *Nihil dolere*, *Meer Indolence*. And what's his Opinion as to *Pleaſure*? That it is not a Thing to be deſir'd for its own ſake. It ſeems then, ſaid I, he puts a diſtinction between *Pleaſure* and *Indolence*! He does ſo, ſaid he, and againſt all Reaſon, as is clear from what I formerly obſerv'd to you, that the Removal of all Uneaſi-

neſs

neſs, is the Conſummation of all Pleaſure. As for the Effect of Indolence I ſhall examine (ſaid I) what it is in the Sequel. Mean time, I aſſure my ſelf you cannot be ſo perverſe as to deny there's a Difference in the Reſult between *actual Pleaſure* and *bare Indolence.* I aſſure you, ſay'd he, I muſt be ſo perverſe, and am confident my Cauſe is good. Is it a Pleaſure to drink when we are Thirſty? No doubt on't. Is it the ſame Pleaſure that follows when our Thirſt is quench'd? Not the ſame *Species* of Pleaſure. The latter is a *Still* or *Stable Pleaſure*; the former an *Active* or *Operative one.* But if, ſay'd I, they ſo little reſemble one another, why do you confound them? Have I, ſaid he, ſo lately told you to ſo little Purpoſe, that Pleaſure ariſing from the Abſence of Pain admits of Variety, tho' not of Intenſion? I have not forgot it, ſay'd I, and you ſpoke *good Latin* when you told me ſo, but not *clear Senſe. Varietas* is a *Latin* Word properly ſignifying a *Diverſity of Colours*, tho' taking it in a larger Acceptation, we adapt it to a *Diverſity* or *Multiplicity* of *Peculiarities* in any thing elſe. Thus we ſay a *Poem full of Variety*, *an Oration full of Variety*, and *Variety in a Man's Manners or Fortune*; and *Variety of Pleaſure* too, that is, as there happens to be *a Variety of Objects* and *Motives* that occaſion Different Plea-

Pleaſures. Had you ſpoke of ſuch a Variety as this, I had underſtood you with a little help as I underſtand my own Meaning; but when you are pleas'd to teach us, Firſt, that a State of *Indolency* is the very ut'moſt Perfection of *Pleaſure*; Secondly, that the Approximation of Things operating agreably upon our Senſes is an *active* or *fermenting Pleaſure* begetting *a Variety of Pleaſures*; and yet that *your Pleaſure of Indolence* admits of no *Intenſion* or *Emprovement*, I am as much at a loſs for a Notion of what you mean by your *Variety*, as for a Reaſon, why *Indolence* muſt have the Name of *Pleaſure*. Can you imagine a greater Bleſſing, ſay'd he, than to be free from all manner of Pain or Trouble? For the preſent, ſuppoſe it, ſay'd I; Will it follow that *Pleaſure* and *Indolence* are one and the ſame Thing? Certainly *Indolence* is not only a Pleaſure (ſay'd he) but an Unparalell'd one too. If you are reſolv'd, ſay'd I, that it ſhall be the *Summum Bonum your Uuparalell'd Pleaſure*, why will you not ſtick by it ſincerely, ſtoutly, and faithfully? And why will nothing ſatisfie you, unleſs *Pleaſure* be receiv'd into the *College* of *Vertues*, that is, a *Common Proſtitute* into a familiarity with *Ladies of Reputation and Honour*? The Reaſon's plain, becauſe when ſhe's by her ſelf ſhe's loathſome and ſcandalous;

lous; and all the Apologie you can make for her, is to cry, You don't apprehend *Epicurus*'s Meaning when he mentions her! I have my ſelf been frequently admoniſh'd thus. But I muſt own, ſuch is the Affront, that as little apt as I am to grow warm in a Diſpute, I cannot forbear ſometimes expreſſing my Reſentments when I am told ſo. Hard luck indeed! the *Dunce* is to be taught what ἡδονὴ ſignifies in *Greek*, and *Valuptas* in *Latin!* Which of the Tongues is it that I am a perfect Stranger to? Or why cannot I underſtand what the Word *Pleaſure* imports, as well as every Body that forſooth! will commence *Epicurean?* Eſpecially in regard it is a celebrated Maxim of your Profeſſors, that *Philoſophy* requires not *a Foundation of Learning*. Accordingly as the old *Romans* took *Cincinnatus* from the Plough and made him *Dictator*, Juſt ſo you travel to *Greece* for your Worthies, and let 'em be but Honeſt Fellows, you care not how little they are Taught or Poliſh'd. Dull *Cicero!* not to comprehend *Epicurus*'s Dictates half ſo well as They; Tho' I'm very ſure and poſitive that the Words ἡδονὴ and *Voluptas* (*Pleaſure*) ſtand for the ſame *Idea*. We are ever and anon at a loſs for want of a *Latin* Word that will exactly anſwer in ſingnification to a *Greek* one; But for the preſent

preſent Occaſion, there's not a VVord in all our Language more expreſſive of the Propriety of its *Greek* than the word *Voluptas*; nor a *Roman* that's tolerably acquainted with his Mother-Tongue, but knows that *Voluptas* implies two Things, *a Serenity* or *Satisfaction in the Mind*, and the *Activity of any Gay Senſations in the Body*. Therefore *Trabeas* we ſee, makes uſe of the Word *Lætitia* where he is ſpeaking of the ſame Exceſs of Pleaſure that *Cæcilianus* repreſents by *Omnibus lætitiis lætum eſſe*, *Tumbling in an Ocean of Delight*. Note by the way, that the *Stoicks* take the Word always in an Ill Senſe, aſcribing a Viciouſneſs even to Pleaſure of the Mind, and thus defining it, *Pleaſure of Mind is a Fantaſtical Elevation grounded upon a Dream of the preſence of a Subſtantial Good*. When the Word has a Reference to the Body, 'tis not properly the ſame as *Lætitia* or *Gaudium* (*Joy*,) but *primarily*, and in the ſtrictneſs of the *Latin Idiom* it ſtands for the *Influence and Impreſſions of any Delight upon our Senſes*. Tho' 'tis true the Word *Jucunditas* (*a Delicious Perception*) may be made *Metephorically* and *Improperly* to reſpect the Mind, *Jucundum* being deriv'd from *Juvare*, a Term equally ſignificative, whether accommodated to the Concerns of the Mind or of the Body. Tho' not ſo improperly nei-

neither, Sir, as that we must explode a *Medium* between *all Joy* and *all Grief*; between

Tanta lætitia auctus sum, &c.
O! 'tis a dangerous Joy, my Soul gives way!

And,

Nunc demum mihi Animus ardet,
A Conflagration warrs about my Heart.

For what think you of (to the Tune of neither the First nor the Last)

Quanquam hæc inter nos, &c.
It matters not how long or how lately we have been acquainted, Neighbour, ———

There's a middle Condition between an Affluence of Pleasure and an Extremity of Pain, and that is, when we are affected by Neither. What say you now? Can you dispense yet with my returning to my *School-Dame*, and my *School-Master*? If not, do me the Justice to examine whether 'tis for want of a competent Knowledge of the *Greek*, that I don't understand *Epicurus*, or for want of Perspicuity in *Epicurus*, that his Meaning is absolutely Unintelligible. A Fault which was never excus'd but in Two Cases; Either when it was design'd, as *Heraclitus* affected Intricacies in his *Natural*

tural Philoſophy, and ſo got himſelf the Surname of *Obſcure*; or elſe when our Subject-Matter is abſtruſe, tho' not our manner of Explication, as in the Inſtance of *Plato*'s *Timæus*. Now *Epicurus*, unleſs I much miſtake him, is neither unwilling to ſignifie his Meaning clearly, nor argues about any *Phyſical Riddle* or *Mathematical Subtilty*, but a familiar maneageable *Common-place*. You your ſelves do not ſuppoſe us ignorant of the Nature of Pleaſure; No, but of *Epicurus*'s Notion of it: And that Suppoſition will juſtify the Inference, that altho' we are throughly inſtructed in the Signification of the Word *Pleaſure*, he would not uſe it in that Senſe, but affix to it a new and ſingular one of his own. If he's agreed with *Hieronymus*, and places the *Summum Bonum* in an *Eaſy*, *Unmoleſted State of Life*, why will he not ſpeak out as plain as t'other, abrogate the Name of Pleaſure, and adhere to *Vacuitas Doloris*, *Freedom from Diſturbance*? Or if he will have Pleaſure for his *Summum Bonum*, I mean his Pleaſure of *Indolence* or *Unactive Pleaſure*, let him not leave the other in the Lurch, his dear Enchantreſs which bears the Name of *Operative Pleaſure*, or *Pleaſure in motu*. Why is he ſo concern'd to perſuade every Mortal Man out of the Conſciouſneſs of his own

own Nature, and to convince him in ſpight of his Senſes that *Indolence* and *Pleaſure*, are the very ſame thing? 'Tis hard, let me tell you, *Torquatus*, that all our Faculties muſt be *ſtorm'd* at this rate, and our Apprehenſions rifled of the Plaineſt and the moſt Univerſal Meanings. Is it not obvious and uncontrovertible that we are all ſubject to a Threefold Variety of Circumſtances, either *actual Pleaſure*, or *actual Pain*, or *meer Compoſedneſs*, which is the Company's Condition? One Man receives Refreſhment upon Eating, another a Violence of Torment upon the Rack, but no Body much, I think, of one or t'other in ſitting ſtill. Do you not, as we converſe, take notice how many Thouſands of Living Arguments of a State of *Indifference* move this way and that way about us? But for all that, ſay'd *Torquatus*, I muſt bide by it, that it is not only a Pleaſure, but the very *Quinteſſence* of Pleaſure not to be in Pain. So that, anſwer'd I, my *Skinker* perceives himſelf as agreably affected in filling me out a Glaſs when he has no Inclination to drink, as I can do, for my Life, when I am taking it off to quench my Droughth. Let me pray you, ſay'd he, no more of your Interrogatories and Expoſtulations. I thought I had provided againſt your *Socratical* Snares in a *Preliminary Ar-*

Article. Are you then, say'd I, rather fo
a *Rhetorical* than any *Logical* Methods o
Disputation? For Both, say'd he, unle
you'll affirm that the *Philosophers* have nc
so good a Claim as the *Orators* to th
Process of *Discoursing at length*. *Aristotl*
say'd I, and after him *Zeno* the *Stoic*
distributed the *Energies of Speech* into Tw
kinds, the *Rhetorical* and the *Logical*. Th
first are compar'd by *Zeno* to the Hand o
a Man, expanded, because an *Orator*
Business is to amplifie and expatiate; Th
latter to the *Hand Clench'd*, because a *Ph*
losopher's Business is to say as much in as fe
Words as he can. But in compliance wit
your Desire, I'll try to philosophize in th
Vein of a *Rhetorician*, that is of a *Philosoph*
zing for as for our *Forensick Oratory*, 'twill o
necessity be Flat and Jejune, because it obli
ges to suit our Measures to vulgar Under
standings. Not that by thus complying
wou'd countenance *Epicurus*'s Contempt o
Logick, a Science that brings home the ful
Benefit of all our simple Conceptions, an
disposes aright as well the Discursive Facul
ty as the Judgment, and by means where
of *Epicurus* might have kept himself upon
his Legs, had he but condescended to the
dull Discipline of Distinguishing; at least
in the Particular before us. Pleasure, you
assert, is the *Summum Bonum*; the next thing

to

to be look'd into, is, What is *Pleaſure*, and this is the ready way to ſet clear the full Senſe of the *Queſtion*. Had *Epicurus* troubled himſelf to explain what Pleaſure is, he had never been ſo bewilder'd. For either he muſt have ſtuck to *Ariſtippus*'s Pleaſure, Senſual, Soft, and Effeminate, that which our Cattel, if they could ſpeak, wou'd call *Pleaſure*; or if he wou'd have oppos'd his own Proprieties to the Senſe and Language of all *Greece* beſide, *the brave Achæan, Argive, Attick Youths, Omnes Danai*, &c. (as the *Anapæſtick* has it,) then he muſt have rejected *Ariſtippus*, and appropriated the Name of Pleaſure to *Indolence*. Or if he intended, as he did, to patronize Both, he would have given us them together in the Terms of *Indolence join'd with actual Pleaſure* for the *Two Ultimate Goods*. And for this he might have pleaded ſeveral renown'd Precedents among the *Philoſophers*, as *Ariſtotle* for one, who conſtitutes his *Summum Bonum* of Two Parts, *a Vertuous Life with an entire Proſperity*. For the ſame purpoſe *Callipho* couples *Honeſty*, and *Pleaſure*; *Diodorus*, *Honeſty* and *Indolence*; And *Epicurus* had no more to do than to yoak together that which is the Modern Opinion of *Hieronymus* with the ancient Opinion of *Ariſtippus*, tho' their Diſtinct *Hypotheſes* naturaly carry'd them to the choice of

Distinct *Moral Ends.* I may venture to say they understood *Greek* full as well as *Epicurus*; and yet *Aristippus* never sprinkles his *Summum Bonum* of Pleasure with *Indolence.* Neither does *Hieronymus* at any time miscall his *Summum Bonum* of *Indolence* by the Name of Pleasure, as even denying that Things of a Desireable Nature are effective of Pleasure. Do not mistake your self; *To be without Pain and to be under the Sense of Pleasure*, are not only Two distinct Modes of Expression, but Two distinct Things. And yet, as if it were not enough to make these two distinct Modes convertible, which is Venial in comparison of t'other, you must be straining at Impossibilities and *Identifying* the distant Natures of the Things themselves. If *Epicurus* thought good to pitch upon both *Pleasure* and *Indolence*, he shou'd (as he does, but still so as to jumble them into one by confounding the Names) have retain'd both alike for a *Summum Bonum.* There are many Passages in him I cou'd cite where he extolls *Pleasure*, properly so call'd, and very modestly professes in a place where he's handling the Subject of *Summum Bonum*, that he cannot imagine What can pass for *Good*, beside the *Aristippick* Species of Pleasure. In another Book (Judge your self, *Torquatus*, whether I translate his Words un-

unfairly, for I'm going to quote one of his weighty, demonſtrative Periods, his *Oracles of Wiſdom*, as they are call'd, the κυρίαι δόξαι, the conſtant *Pole-Starrs*, which Your ſelf and the reſt of your Fraternity conſult and ſail by in purſuit of Happineſs) the ſame Authour thus declares himſelf. I ſhould have nothing at all to object againſt *Luxury*, if the Pleaſures of it cou'd diſengage the Mind of Man from all Dread of the Gods, of Death, and of Pain, and imply'd the proper Scope and End of our Appetites, for thus refin'd they would make up the Total of Human Happineſs, and become a *Charm* againſt the Evils of *Pain* or *Sorrow*. But does *Epicurus* realy talk at this rate? Say'd *Triarius* to *Torquatus*, for he cou'd no longer contain himſelf, and tho' he knew well enough how the Caſe realy ſtood, had a Mind to bring *Torquatus* to Confeſſion. But *Torquatus* took him up with a ready Aſſurance, own'd the Charge, and told us we did not reliſh the Senſe of *Epicurus*'s Words rightly. And 'tis impoſſible I ſhou'd, ſay'd I, ſo long as he ſays one Thing and means another. However, here I fully comprehend the Drift of what he aſſerts, and the Abſurdity too. A Luxurious Fellow not deſerve to be diſcommended, provided he be but a Wiſe Man! 'Tis pity, he did not tell us

that neither wou'd a Parricide deſerve a Reproof, if 'twere not for his own Avarice and his Dread of the Gods, of Death, and of Pain! To what Purpoſe does our great Philoſopher compound with his Gluttons, or offer at ſuch a wild Suppoſition as the Exiſtence of a luxurious Perſon that's a Stranger to thoſe other Miſtakes and Vices, which if he had not entertain'd, he might have been diſpens'd with for his Luxury? Wou'd not himſelf have rebuk'd a Luxurious Man for ſuch a blind Purſuit of confus'd Pleaſures, if 'twere but in behalf of the *Sovereign Pleaſure of meer Indolence?* Beſides too, there are *Sots* in the World that make no Conſcience of ſcrambling for the Sacrifices upon the Altars, and brave Death every Day with a

Mihi ſex menſes, &c.

Let me but lead a Jolly Life *mean while,*
And lay me ſeven Months hence upon the
fatal Pile.

It may be, againſt Pain *Epicurus* has furniſh'd their *Snuff-Boxes* with his *Noſtrum, Si gravis, brevis: ſi longus, levis; If exquiſite, ſhort, and moderate, if long.* Be it ſo: Yet am I puzled how to conceive ſuch a thing as a Mortal abandon'd to Luxury, and yet abridging

ing

ing his Appetites! Why then ſhou'd *Epicurus* give himſelf the trouble of informing us, that truly he has no Exceptions againſt a Luxurious Man, provided he lays a Limitation upon his Appetites? which is as much as to ſay in other Words, *I have no Exceptions againſt a Sot, but that he's a Sot; nor, in general, againſt a Vicious Man, if he were but Vertuous.* Obſerve the Sage's Auſterity! He has no Quarrel, not he, againſt Luxury conſider'd in it ſelf! And in good Truth, *Torquatus*, if Pleaſure be the *Summum Bonum*, the Man's in the Right. Never hope to bring him off with your *Imagery* of a Club of Wretches vomiting over the Punch-Bowl, and afterwards carry'd to Bed by the *Drawers* in order to be capacitated for renewing the Debauch upon a Foundation of *Crudities* the next Morning. No Body ſuppoſes *the Brutes of this Predicament*, who, perhaps, never got ſober enough to know, as they ſay, *when 'tis Day or Night*, 'till after a Revolution of ſome Years, they have conſum'd the very means of Subſiſtence; no Body ſuppoſes theſe *Prodigies* have much Enjoyment of their Lives. Your Men of Delicacy, that employ all the noted Cooks, Bakers, Fiſhmongers, and Poulterers they can hear of, to furniſh their Table with Curioſities as agreable as may be pro-

cur'd to Stomach and Palate; *Whose Wines* (as *Lucilius* has it)

Caskading from a mighty Goblet flow,
Without or Skinny Tang, or Dash of Snow:
Their Business Assignations, Balls, &c.—

——not to forget the Womanish *Valets* that wait upon them, and, conformable to all the rest, their Cloaths, their Plate, and the Statelineſs of their *Halls* and *Parlours*. Defile these off the Account, cries *Epicurus*, and a Fig for any other *Good* whatsoever; And yet, say I, the Sensualist with all these Appurtenances, tho' according to one meaning he *lives well*, yet in no Sense can live *Happily*. Nor think that *Pleasure*, because 'tis not the *Summum Bonum*, is not *Pleasure*. 'Twas not an Insensibility, but a Contempt of the Sweetneſs of *Pleasure* that got *Lælius* (Pupil in his Youth to *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, afterwards to *Panætius*) the Character of a *Wise Man*. He had the *Sense* of *Tasting* as well as other People; but then he had the *Sense* of a *Philosopher* too. Remember *O lapathe, ut jactêre*, &c.

Be proud, ye Dock-Leaves, *be for ever proud;*
When Lælius *had you on his Plate, aloud*

Læ-

Lælius *the Great, the Wiſe, Impartial*
Rage
Diſcharg'd upon the Gluttons o'the Age,
Gallonius, Publius, *poor Unhappy Men,*
That e'ry Day devour as much as Ten,
And mortgage Farms to treat a Fool with
Fiſh,
Yet ne'r cou'd get a Dinner worth a Wiſh!

The *Declaimer*, who made no Account of *Pleaſure*, has not the Confidence to deny *Gallonius* was pleas'd with his Meals; but yet he is poſitive, you ſee, that *Gallonius*, or any other Slave to Pleaſure, never *din'd well.* Here we have the ſeparate Intereſts of *Pleaſure* and *Bonum* very gravely and judiciouſly inſiſted on, and may learn from the Diſtinction, that altho' *whoſoever dines well, dines to his own Satisfaction*, yet it will not hold convertibly, *that he that dines to his own Satisfaction, dines well.* As for Example; *Lælius* us'd to dine well, that is, as *Lucilius* explains it, *Cocto, condito, upon ordinary Fare.* His principal Diſh was *Sermo bonus, Profitable Diſcourſe.* And thus he made up a Dinner, *ſi queri libenter, much to his own Satisfaction.* He knew no other End in Eating, but ſoberly to ſatisfie the Cravings of Nature. He had good Reaſon therefore to affirm, as he did, that notwithſtanding *Gallonius* might like his Victuals

ctuals well enough, yet the poor Man, with all the Pains and Expences he was at, had never the good Fortune once in his Life to *eat well*, that is, to be plain, that he never eat *frugaly, temperately, and as he ought to have eaten*, but *brutiſhly, indulgingly*, and in all Reſpects as he ought not to have eaten. 'Twas the Luſcíouſneſs of the Satisfaction that *Lælius* loath'd: Upon any other Conſideration he had ſcarce admir'd his *Dock-Leaves* above a *Gallonian Fiſh-Dinner*. For why? 'Tis not to be ſuffer'd, thought he, that *Pleaſure* ſhall uſurp the Title of *Summum Bonum*. And indeed to give it that Title is no better than *High-Treaſon* as well in *Word* as in *Fact* againſt Vertue and Common Honeſty. To be ſhort, if 'tis not our *Summum Bonum* at *Dinner*, 'tis ſtrange how it comes to be the *Summum Bonum* of our *Lives*. In the next place, how untowardly has your Philoſopher diſtributed our Inclinations and Deſires into *Three Sorts*, *Such as are both Natural and Neceſſary; Such as are Natural, but not Neceſſary, and ſuch as are neither Natural nor Neceſſary*? What can be leſs Artificial than this Diviſion? Which, whereas it ſhould have no more than Two, is branch'd into Three Members. This is *drawing and quartering of Comprehenſive Terms* inſtead of *dividing them*.

'Tis

Tis a lamentable Overſight in ſettling a *Diviſion* to clap *Inferiour* and *Superiour Kinds* ogether. Had he firſt divided our *Deſires* nto *Natural* and *Unreaſonable*; And the *Natural* agen into *Neceſſary* and *Unneceſſary*, ie had gone the right way to work. How-ver, if he will but reaſon as he ſhou'd do, ve'll not fall out with him for the Confu-ednes of his Method, becauſe he profeſſes nd vindicates *Unaccuracy* and *Negligence*. Accordingly, for once I'll do Violence to ny Judgment, and give a Philoſopher leave o read Mankind a Lecture about limiting heir Deſires. What? Reſtrain our Deſires? *I mean our Irregular ones according to the roper Signification of the Word* Cupiditates) No: Totaly ſuppreſs and exterminate them, nleſs you'll ſhew me a Man of a Covetous Temper, juſt as Covetous as he ought to e, or a ſort of Adulterers and Gluttons hat keep within Bounds. As if 'twere ity to treat our Depravities in ſo cruel a nanner, but we muſt deſcend forſooth! o Terms of Accommodation with our Vi-es! Incomparable Philoſophy this! Not ut that I am as well pleas'd with the Sub-tance and Import of the Diviſion, as I m offended at the Form and Dreſs he has iven it. 'Twere adviſeable to couch he *Deſideria Naturæ, the common Sollicitati-ns of our Conſtitution* under a more reputa-

ble

ble Word than *Cupiditas*, which ſhou'd hav
been reſerv'd to his *Titles* of Avarice, In
temperance, and the like enormous Ha
bits, and among them receiv'd its Con
demnation. But alaſs! Theſe are Libertie
which he makes a common Practice c
taking. Neither will I cenſure him upo
that Score, becauſe had he been modeſt i
obtruding his Doctrines upon us, his *Ph*
loſophick Majeſty muſt have leſſen'd his ow
Prerogative, which rather than he will dc
after he has once taken *Voluptas* (*Senſu*
Pleaſure) into his eſpecial Favour and Prc
tection, in the Senſe which all Mankind ha
impos'd upon that Word: Whatever Diff
culties hamper him, he will not deſert Her
Nay, altho' he muſt utterly overthrow th
Regalia of *Conſcience*, and the Throne bein
declar'd vacant, place in it *Voluptas* to pla
her own Arbitrary Game. But becauſe h
found his *Rational*, and wou'd ever and ano
be ſallying out in Bluſhes upon his *Anim*
Part, he had always that other Propoſition t
retire to in his Confuſion, *that no Additio*
can be made to the Pleaſure of Indolence. Bu
what if *Indolence* be not a Term equivale
to *Voluptas*? Why the Philoſopher is nc
concern'd about the preciſe Significatio
of the Terms. But what if the Things diff
widely from one another? And ſuppo
(for altho' the *Epicureans* are very Nic
an

Untractable, yet there are Millions of
n that may be won with Eaſe to yield
noſt an Aſſent to any Thing) ſuppoſe
ou'd frame an Argument to this Effect,
Indolence be the greateſt of Pleaſures, then
the Abſence of Pleaſure the greateſt of
ins ? Will it not hold ? No, becauſe we
y not oppoſe the *Abſence of Pleaſure*,
a Privation of Pain to *Pain*. However
is not Obvious, and the Darkneſs of
Diſtinction expoſes the Abſurdity of
retaining that other Pleaſure, which if
y'd him, he declares he knows not what
erves to be deem'd *our Good*. And it is
Pleaſure, for which we are beholden
our Palates and our Ears (not to men-
n in regard to good Manners and Mode-
ſome other Organs of it) that is the
ing Favourite, the ſingular and ſole *Good*,
ich our demure and rigorous Philoſopher
d ever any Notion of, and yet while he
cates that Pleaſure under the Raptures of
dolence, he has moſt unadviſedly contra-
cted himſelf, and made that *Sole Good of*
to be not ſo much as a Thing Valuable
Deſireable. And in all theſe Repugnan-
es has he tangl'd himſelf, purely becauſe
thought it beneath him to meddle with
efinitions, Diviſions, Logick, Grammar
Language. By this time you may be
nſible how Wiſe he was in his Contri-
vances.

vances. He assumes the Supposition
Two Pleasures, one his *Voluptas in m*
his Excited Pleasure, the other a new P
sure which no Body ever heard of befo
and he melts down Both at last into
and the same. The first of these, his del
ous *double-refin'd* Pleasure you shall have h
sometimes decrying at the rate of *Man*
Curius himself; And celebrating it at ot
times as his Individual *Bonum* or *Good*
Position to which rather the publick C
for's than any private Philosopher's Anim
versions are Due, as being not half so l
a *Solecism* in point of *Grammar*, as in pc
of *Morality*. Only Excesses and Soll
tudes must not go along with Luxury;
else he has no manner of Complaint agai
it. I confess this is one way to strengtl
his Party, when whoever will be a thorou
pac'd Voluptuary is to commence firs
Philosopher of the *Epicurean* Stamp. N
withstanding all this we have receiv'd
Directions to look for the Origin of *S*
mum Bonum in the Nests and Nurseries
Animals, for that the Notices they sugg
about *Good* and *Evil* before their Natu
Powers have taken a wrong Byas, m
best determine us; and These are no soo
born, but they pursue and espouse Pleasu
as a *Good*, and on the other hand esch
Pain as an *Evil*. This is one of your P
sitio

tions, and this the exact Senſe of it as you ave worded it. But tho' the Poſition is one, ie faults of it are many. For I beſeech you, r, whether is it of the Two Pleaſures, the *ill and Stable*, or *the Active and Operative* n the Stile made ſacred by *Epicurus*) by hich an Infant amidſt his Moans is to diſtin- uiſh for us between *Good* and *Evil*? If by the *ill* and *Stable*, we are as ready to grant as ou can wiſh, that Nature conſults for and nforces her own Preſervation. If by the *ctive and Operative*, as you conceive, this rinciple will recommend to Mankind the ankeſt and the moſt Diſhoneſt Pleaſures. eſides that your New-born Animal does ot enter upon Life with ſo much as your *anſcendent Pleaſure of Indolence.* Neither oes *Epicurus* himſelf appeal to his Brats and is Brutes, as much as he takes 'em for the *irrors* and *Dictionaries* of *Nature*, to prove iat according to Nature we are incited to urſue the *Pleaſure of Indolence*, the Influ- ice whereof has not force enough to owze and irritate the Appetite. And the me Objection will equaly affect *Hieronymus*. For 'tis the Pleaſure which ſooths nd ſolaces the Senſe, that actuates and ex- tes. And this is the Reaſon why *Epicurus* advances the Inſtance aforeſaid to ſhew iat we are prompted by Nature to purſue, ot the *dormant Pleaſure* of *Indolence*, but

that

that *Cogent* and *Active* One that gives Li
to all the Motions of *Little Children* a
Irrational Animals. And what now c
ſavour of Abſurdity more than that, aft
he has admoniſh'd us of Nature's early I
pulſes to one ſort of Pleaſure, he ſhou
conſtitute another for the *Summum Bonu*
Then as for the Suffrage of Brutes, I l
no ſtreſs upon it, for altho' their Authori
be not incompetent upon the Score of *D*
pravities, yet it is certainly ſo upon t
Score of *Imperfections.* They are not c
pable of entertaining any *Wrong* Perſwa
ons, and therefore uncapable of intimati
any *Right.* 'Tis one thing to bend a Sti
'till you make it ſtand Awry; and anoth
thing when it grows Crooked. Agen; yo
Infant is not inſtigated by the Force of a
Innate Principle to a purſuit of Pleaſure, b
to a Love of its own Being, and a Ca
of its own Preſervation; It being Natur
for every Living Creature to wiſh well to
ſelf, and every Part of it ſelf. It is *prim*
rily fond of the Body and Soul which mak
up the whole of it, and *proportionably* of t
Powers and Parts of each. For there a
certain Privileges and Advantages of prim
Account which appertain both to the B
dy and the Mind. And when we hav
paſs'd a Judgment upon theſe, we come t
obſerve that it is conſonant to the Me
ſur

ures of Nature to further thoſe Intereſts which herſelf has principaly regarded, and o proteſt againſt the contrary. Whether Plea- ure be one of theſe *Prima Naturalia* or not, s much diſputed. But that it is the only One, ſcarce any Body, I ſhou'd think, ou'd have the hardineſs to maintain, that ad not loſt the uſe of his Limbs, Five Sen- es, and Underſtanding, and never knew hat it is to have a Sound Body and a Hale Conſtitution. Take notice withal, that the reſent Article is the grand *Hinge* upon hich the whole *Rationale* of the Diſquiſition bout the Nature of *Good* and *Evil* turns. he Old *Academicks* and *Peripateticks* have ronounc'd it the *Summum Bonum*, *Secun- am naturam vivere*, *a Life unſully'd with any hing that is diſagreable to our Nature*; or in ther Words, *a Life of Vertue, not deſtitute f the* Prima Naturalia. *Callipho* requir'd o Additions to Vertue but Pleaſure; *Dio- orus* none but Indolence. After theſe came ariſtippus's *Simplex Voluptas*, *Pleaſure by it elf*; and the *Stoicks Conſentire naturæ*, *En- ire Submiſſion and Conformity to the Eſta- liſhments of Nature*, which they reſolve in- o living *Vertuouſly*, or *as a Man of Honour nd Honeſty is bound to live*, and which they xplain by a Life, the Perfection whereof is o be throughly acquainted with the Con- lition and Circumſtances of thoſe things which

which occur in Nature, to make choice
the Measures which she prescribes, and n
to venture upon the contrary for the Worl
So then, as there are three *Hypotheses*
Moral Ends, excluding *Honestas*, *Honest*
and Vertue, That of *Aristippus* and *Epicur*
That of *Hieronymus*, and That of *Carneades*
so there are Three *Hypotheses* which lin
Honestas and something Accessional toge
ther, as those of *Polemo*, *Callipho*, and *Di*
dorus; besides which there is that of *Ze*
no in favour of *pure* and *abstracted Honest*
or *Moral Decorum*; not to mention the ob
solete, abandon'd Schemes of *Pyrrho*, *Ari*
sto, and *Herillus*. Among these *Aristippus*
Hieronymus, *Carneades*, &c. had the Di
cretion to contrive, every Man for himself
that his own System should be all of a Piece
whether it were *Aristippus*'s Pleasure, *Hie*
ronymus's Indolence, *Carneades*'s *Frui prin*
cipiis Naturalibus, that we should make the mo
we can of all Principles in Nature whatsoever
or whether it were any one of them beside
But *unfortunate Epicurus*, when he had en
gag'd himself at first in behalf of *Pleasure*
must be understood either to mean *Aristip*
pus's Pleasure, and then he ought to have
been true to *Aristippus*'s *Summum Bonum*; o
else *Hieronymus*'s; But how can that be
when 'tis plain his first Essay was in Recom-
mendation of the *Aristippean Pleasure*. As

un-

unadvisedly has he empower'd his Senses to determine him about the *Goodness* of *Pleasure*, and the *Evil* of *Pain*. This is giving them a larger Commission than the Law vouchsafes to any Man in the Company. We are allow'd to judge or arbitrate in a private Capacity; but may not assume to our selves the Determination of any Matters which lie beyond our proper Cognizance. As it would be trifling and ridiculous for a Judge upon the Bench, when he has pronounc'd the Sentence, to conclude with a *Si quid mei judicii est*, *If my Judgment avails any thing*. And in case *Epicurus*'s Senses were not, and cou'd not be sufficiently authoriz'd, such a *Proviso* stands them in as little stead; for 'twill not render the Decision, I hope, e'er the more valid, if his Senses have sometime or other been pleas'd to adjudge that which was *Sweet* to be *Bitter*, that which was *Smooth* to be *Rough*, that which was *Nigh* to be *Afar-off*, that which *Stood still* to be *in Motion*, and that which was *Four-square* to be *Round*. Let *Right Reason* therefore interpose her Authority in the Decision, and how will she proceed? With a nice regard, no doubt, to the Counsels of *Wisdom*, as that is truely defin'd *a Knowledge extending to Things as well Divine as Human*; and with as precise a Deference to *Vertues* of all Denominations, which notwithstand-

ing you treat as no better than ſo many Pimps and Prentices to your *Pleaſures*, Right Reaſon proclaims them ſo many Empreſſes and Heroines; and, as their Herald, has notifi'd aloud in defiance to *Pleaſure*, that inſtead of its having any Title to the Character of the *Summum Bonum*, after which we are enquiring, it is altogether unworthy to be the *Collegue* of *Honeſty* and *Vertue*. Neither is poor *Indolence* in a better Taking nor yet the Hypotheſis of *Carneades*, no thoſe which take in *Pleaſure* or *Indolenc* into the Subſtance of *Summum Bonum*, o ſhut *Honeſty* or *Vertue* out of it. So tha there are now no more than Two behind, an theſe to be diſcuſs'd and weigh'd with a imaginable Diligence and Advertency; fo it muſt either be concluded that *Bonum* an *Malum*, *Good* and *Evil*, are neither more nc leſs than *Honeſtum* and *Turpe*, *What's Honeſt*, and *What's not*; and as for any *Collateral* or *Supernumerary* Advantages, that the are not at all to be minded; or however Things barely *Eligible* or *Unacceptable*; nc as Things truly and ſimply *Deſireable* c *Deteſtable*: Or elſe *Right Reaſon* will aſſig the Pre-eminence to that Account of *Sum mum Bonum* which comprehends all the E cellencies and Ornaments of Honeſty an Vertue, and all the Perfections of a Li regulated and refin'd according to the M

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del and Scheme of Nature. And toward this Determination Right Reason will make the happier Advances, if she satisfies her self in the first place whether the Controversie relating to these Conclusions be *Real* or only *Verbal*. Pursuant therefore to the Admonishments of so good a Directress, I design to take that Course, resolving to contract the Dispute into as narrow a Compass as I can, and to deny a Place in the Province of *Philosophy* to all those *Uncomplex Ideas* of *Summum Bonum*, which don't include Vertue. And first, it was a gross and foggy Dulness of Apprehension in *Aristippus* and the *Cyrenaicks*, when they had the Impudence to carve themselves a *Summum Bonum*, not out of so despicable a *Nullity* as *Indolence*, but out of those *busie Pleasures* which dally with our *Senses*; to miss of what *Aristotle* has remark'd, That Man is a kind of Mortal Deity, and that the Ends whereunto he is born, are *Observation* and *Action*, as a *Horse to Racing*, an *Ox* to *Ploughing*, a *Finder* to *Beating*; nay, contrariwise to maintain so wild and unaccountable a Doctrine, as that Man with all his natural Dignities and Eminences receiv'd his Existence for the same Ignoble Ends as *Baboons* and *Swines* receiv'd theirs, to indulge themselves in the fulsome Satisfactions of *Eating*, *Drinking*, and *Venery*. This *Bill* I am oblig'd to *file*

against *Aristippus*, tho', to do him justice, he has dealt more ingenuously by us than You, and owns he means the same that the rest of Mankind mean by the *Voluptas* or *Pleasure* which he has entit'led *Sovereign and Sole.* Not that this palliates the Offensiveness of his Error, the very Structure of our Bodies, as well as the Excellence and Majesty of our Rational Faculties demonstrating that the Enjoyment of *Pleasures* cannot possibly be the genuin End of our Existence. *Hieronymus*'s *Summum Bonum* o *Indolence* (and yours too upon Occasion or rather without Occasion) deserves a little to be regarded. For 'tis no Consequence, that because Pain is an Evil, therefore we cannot but be sufficiently happy when the Evil of Pain is away. That *A pophthegm* of *Ennius* we'll allow in him *as a Poet*, *Nimium boni est cui, nihil e mali :*

———'Tis an Excess
Of Pleasure not to feel Uneasiness.

But we, as *Philosophers*, must measure ou Felicity, not by the *Absence of Evil*, bu by the *Acquisition of Real Good*, and ma expect to compass it, not upon the foot ting of *Aristippus*'s Oscitancy and Volup tuousness, nor of *Hieronymus*'s *Negative* c

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Indolence, but by a *Studious* Vigilance, and an *Induſtrious* Application. The *Summum Bonum* of *Carneades* falls under the Stroak of the ſame Cenſure and Diſproof. Indeed it was not from the Opinion which he had of it himſelf that he was mov'd to propoſe it, but merely that he might mortifie the *Stoicks*, againſt whom he was Implacable. This however muſt be ſaid for it, that in Conſort and Conjunction with *Vertue*, it might appear plauſibly enough to take in the entire Latitude of Human Happineſs, and reach up to the Tenor of the preſent Queſtion. Nor may we ſhew half the ſame Tenderneſs and Favour toward any of the other *Complex Summum-Bonums*, as *Vertue* coupled with *Pleaſure*, her greateſt Nuiſance, or with *Indolence*, which has in it ſo little of *Summum Bonum*, that it is only the *bare Negation* of an Evil. I cannot imagin what ſome Philſophers intend by thus leſſening and derogating from the Character of *Vertue*. They will not ſtop at the Demand of Something *to boot* with her, but the *Allotments* requir'd muſt be the moſt Unbeſeeming too, and thoſe only of a few ſcanty Particulars, inſtead of the whole *Sett* of the *Prima Naturalia*; as *Ariſto* and *Pyrrho*, for their part, ſet ſo little by the *Prima Naturalia*, that they wou'd by all means make us believe, there's not an Ace to choſe between a State

of *perfect Health*, and a most *uncomfortable Habit of Body*. And therefore no Body has, for a long time, thought it worth while to wrangle with 'em. Rather than *Vertue* shou'd not be the most compleat and comprehensive *Good*, they took away the Liberty of *Comparison* and *Option*, and consequently the *Seminal* Principle out of which it shou'd emerge, and the *Aliment* by which it shou'd sustain it self. *Herillus* was for shutting up every other Good in the *Good of Science*. But as this, 'tis evident, is not our *Greatest Good*, so neither does it inferr a Regularity in our Practices and Manners. Upon this account *Herillus* has long since shar'd the same Fate with the Two Former; for no Body has took him to task after *Chrysippus*. The *Academicks*, you know, will averr nothing *Categoricaly*, but as in despair of ever grasping any absolute Certainty, take up with whatever looks the most probable; and therefore we can form no Judgment in relation to them. *Epicurus* makes his Entrance in the Rear, and creates us the more trouble, first, because he's brought a'bed of more than one kind of *Pleasure*; and, secondly, because both himself and his Philosophy had the good Fortune to make Themselves at first a great many Friends, and to live in as numerous a Succession of Vindicators; nay, however

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it comes about, the general Applauſe of the Multitude, which is a very ſuſpicious Sign of the Contrary's being deſerv'd, ſome of theſe People (whom it is our Duty to confute, as we tender the Intereſts of Vertue, Honour, and Merit) pretend to convert into a Demonſtrative Argument. Thus I have drove the Pretences of all the other Philſophers out of the Field, and the Two Combatants that remain, are, it ſhou'd ſeem, not I and *Torquatus*, but *Vertue* and *Pleaſure*. *Chryſippus*, a Man of a mighty Reach, and an Aſſiduity proportionable, has led the way, and caſt the whole Diſpute about the Nature of *Summum Bonum*, upon the Compariſon that lies between thoſe Two. And I am ſo farr of his Mind, that I conceive I have cut the Throat of *Epicurus*'s Cauſe ſo ſoon as I can make out any one *Honeſtum* (or Principle of Vertue) to be a Thing deſireable for its own ſake, and by Vertue of its own Influence. Having therefore firſt defin'd and ſtated the true Notion and the proper Grounds of this *Honeſtum* with a *Seaſonable Brevity*, I ſhall proceed, Sir, to unravel all that you have offer'd, and hope, as you ſee cauſe, you will make good the Omiſſions of a defective Memory. *Honeſtum* (or every Honourable, Ingenuous, Commendable Principle) *is That which challenges our Eſteem and beſt Affections upon*

the Merit of its own intrinsick Worth and Excellence, exclusively of any Prospect of Profit or Compensation. Here, I conceive, we have the *Rough-Draft* and *Out-Lines* of *Honestum*; but he that's dispos'd to contemplate the Natural Symmetry and Features of it, must look into *Conscience*, and survey the Original presenting it self in the Intentions, Purposes, and Practices of such Worthy Persons, as overlooking all the Invitations of Advantage and Interest are devoted to the accomplishing of great and glorious Enterprizes purely upon the Evidence of their Suitableness to Rational Faculties and a Generous Disposition. For among many other Properties wherein a Man differs from a Brute, the most conspicuous one is this, that he's endow'd with *Rational Abilities*, has a large Capacity of Soul, a quick and lively Apprehension, and such a Force of Sagacity and Thought as to collect and observe Diversity of *Ideas* at one Act, and in one View, by the Force of which Powers he finds out Causes and Consequences, and the Relative Disagreements and Correspondences of Things with Things. We anticipate Futurities and connect them with the *present Juncture*, and predetermine our selves about the general Circumstances and Events of Life. The further Effect of all this is a kind of In-

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clination in one Man to another, and a mutual Communication of Deſires, Notions, and Intereſts, and according to the Order of Nature, theſe Alliances firſt obtain among the ſeveral Relations of the ſame Family; Next among the Members of the ſame Civil Community; And laſtly among the ſeveral Parties of the Univerſal Society of Mankind. Hence *Plato* in one of his Epiſtles takes occaſion to admoniſh *Architas*, *That the End of his coming into the World was to be ſerviceable to his Country, and his Friends, for that he was intit'led to a very ſmall Portion of Himſelf and his own Actions.* And in regard we are born with a very vehement Propenſity to acquire the Knowledge of Truth, as is evident from that eagerneſs of Attention, with which ſometimes when we have nothing elſe to do, we look up to the Heavenly Bodies, and gaze at the Places and the Motions of 'em; This Principle by degrees kindles in the Mind a Veneration and Fondneſs for all Truths in general, eſpecialy all Fundamental, Stanch, and Solid Truths, and as great an Averſion to Illuſions, Falſities, and Fallacies, as particularly to Frauds, Perjuries, Malice and Injuſtice. But there is yet a higher Proficiency of Human Reaſon, and that is, an Auguſt and Awful Reſoluteneſs, that fixes us in an abſolute Command of Our ſelves,

and

and as if 'twere not enough to render Disappointments and Misfortunes Tolerable, makes them scarce perceivable; That erects and exalts the Soul, ensures it against all the Power of Fear, or any other Impressions whatsoever. By this time we have a Threefold Division of *Honestum*: The Fourth and Last to be superinduc'd upon the Three former *Species*, and no less amiable and engaging, respects Order and a Regulation of our Behaviour; for the very Shape and Lineaments of our Bodies are as Monitors to mind us of the Dignity of our Nature, and caution us against licentious Indecencies in Word or Action. And these Intimations, at least those Motives concurring which arise out of the Three precedent kinds of *Honestum*, restrain us from doing any Thing rash and extravagant, and make us beware of Uttering or Attempting whatever may give Offence, occasion Mischief, or argue a Littleness and Poverty of Spirit. Behold the full Dimensions and Proportions of our *Honestas* (*our Principle of Honour, Honesty and Vertue!*) and how they comprize the Four Vertues which your self, Sir, so mainly insisted on. Be it so: Yet *Epicurus* protests he cannot conceive what some People wou'd have him understand by their confining the *Summum Bonum* to this *Honestas*. 'Tis Gibberish and Jargon (he tells us) to talk of resigning up

All

l to this *Honeſtas*, unleſs you will ſuppoſe high-ſeaſon'd with Pleaſure; Neither uld it ever enter into his Head after all e mighty Buſtle about the Word *Hone-s*, what is the proper Senſe of it. In the ulgar Acceptation the Word *Honeſtum*, he underſtands, goes for every thing that's y'd up and applauded in the World. And ho' (continues he) that which is thus lebrated may by chance now and then ſur-ſs the ſweetneſs of ſome ſorts of Pleaſure, t it is the Pleaſure it affords which inveſts with its Value and Significancy. Take otice now how widely the Opinion of ur Matchleſs Philoſopher that has extend-his Conqueſts over *Greece*, *Italy*, and all e barbarous Nations, differs from Mine. ne Term *Honeſtum* he'll maintain is Un-elligible, unleſs either you make it ſtand *Voluptas*, (*Pleaſure*) or intend it ſhall de-te any thing that has the Acclamations the Multitude to magnifie it: Whereas m fully ſatisfy'd they as often beſtow eir Encomiums upon Things, which carry them a *Moral Turpitude*, and tho' ſome-nes it happens otherwiſe, and they place eir Commendations right, yet nothing n owe its Goodneſs to their Commenda-ons. Whatever upon the Score of its own xcellency and Rectitude becomes the Sub-ct of Praiſe, lays no Claim to the Word

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Honeſtum by Vertue of any *Certificat* fro
a Multitude, but becauſe, altho' no Mort
had known any thing of it, or ſpoke an
thing concerning it, in its own Nature
would be Lovely and Laudable. Acco
dingly, finding himſelf unable to hold o
againſt his own Convictions, *Epicurus* elſ
where changes his Note, and ſays as yo
do, that there's no living a Life of Pleaſu
but for him that lives up to the Rules
Ingenuity and Vertue. *And what's livi
up to the Rules of Ingenuity and Vertue*? Wh
the ſame thing as *living a Life of Pleaſu*
Very good! That's as much as to ſay
ving up to the Rules of Ingenuity and Vertue
all one with *living up to the Rules of Ing
nuity and Vertue*; as *the Rules of Ingenuity a
Vertue* are all one with *the Voice* of a *Mult
tude*. Why? No Life of Pleaſure witho
their *Good Likeing*? For ſhame! Shall a Wi
Man ſpread the Sails of Life to the Breath
Ideots? Well then! What are we to unde
ſtand in this Paſſage by *Honeſtum*? Tha
and only That, for certain, which is tr
ly and in its own Nature Valuable. For
it were Valuable becauſe of the Conſequen
Pleaſure, ſo is every good Joint of Me
that hangs in the Shambles. One wou
therefore imagine *Epicurus* not to be th
Man, that having ſet ſo high a Price upo

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Honeſtas as to declare it impoſſible for us o live a Life of Pleaſure without it, makes he People's Applauſe the very Eſſence of his *Honeſtas*, and a moſt neceſſary Conlition of Pleaſure too: As who wou'd not vonder that he ſhou'd ſuppoſe any ſuch hing as *Honeſtum*, that is not Rationaly nd in a Moral Conſtruction ſuch, and that loes not recommend it ſelf by the Luſtre of its own Excellency? Wherefore, *Torquatus*, I cou'd not forbear obſerving with vhat Oſtentation and Emphaſis you brought out that Expreſs Aſſertion of *Epicurus*, that here's no coming at the Pleaſures of Life, but upon the Terms of Honour, Honeſty, Regularity, and Prudence. The Dignity nd Eminence of the Qualities anſwering o thoſe Words had you under ſuch an nfluence that you ſprung upward in the Pronouncing, kept your Body rais'd, and ixt your Eyes upon us the better to rivet your Apology for *Epicurus*, *that there are Paſſages to be found in him, where he attributes their due Praiſes to Honour and Juſtice.* And undoubtedly you did well and wiſely to make your Uſe and Advantage of thoſe Words, which are of that peculiar Importance, that did they not ſtand adopted into *Philoſophick* Terms, we cou'd not ſo much as know what occaſion we have for Phi-

Philoſophy! Thoſe very Sounds, *Prudence*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*, *Temperance*, a Languag almoſt unknown to *Epicurus*, are, and hav ever been, ſo many Philtres upon the Soul of the greateſt Men to engage them i Philoſophical Studies. The moſt acute Sen is the Senſe of Sight (ſays *Plato)* yet nc ſo acute as to compaſs a View of all thoſ Charms and Graces of *Wiſdom*, whic might we but once behold, O! how entirel wou'd they captivate our Affections an Faculties! For no reaſon in the World, t be ſure, but becauſe *Wiſdom* has a read hand at catering and preparing our Pleaſures 'Tis this that *Juſtice* is only good for! An that Antiquated Proverb has nothing in't *Quicum in tenebris*, (which is as much as t ſay, that we are to take no Advantages a gainſt any Man upon an Improbability c being Diſcover'd)! This Adage may ſerv for a general Inſtruction, not to conſide ſo much who ſees our Actions as what ou Actions are. So that when you ſuggeſte how miſerably the Minds of Profligate Peo ple are tortur'd, as well by their own Act of Reflexion upon themſelves, as by th Terrours and Gaſtlineſs of Puniſhment either Preſent or Expected, pardon me i I think you trifled: For 'tis not neceſſar only to make an Inſtance of your Fearful Faultring Sinners, with ſo much Grace lef

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bout them as to execute the rigour of the aw upon themſelves, and ſo little Cou- age as to ſtart at their own Shadow. No, o: We are ready to produce you your Po- tick, Ingenious Raskals that make a *Science* f Villany as well as a *Trade*, and are ſafe nough if they can but practice out of all anger of an *Information.* At preſent e have nothing to ſay to *Lucius Tu- ulus* the *Prætor*, that was ſo notoriouſly orrupted in a Cauſe of Homicide, as, up- n a Motion made the Year after to the eople by their *Tribune Publius Scævola*, Whether he ſhou'd be call'd to Account or't, and upon a Reſolution of the People hat he ſhou'd ſtand his Tryal, to be ar- aign'd before *Cneius Cæpio* the Conſul, ppointed Judge by an Order of Senate: And when the Sentence of Baniſhment vas after a ſhort hearing paſs'd upon him, he Fact had been ſo clearly prov'd that he lid not ſo much as open his Mouth in his wn Defence. Our Buſineſs is with your loſe, Intreaguing Offenders, (ſuch was *Quintus Pompeius* when he deny'd the *Nu- nantian* League) and with your Men of oldneſs and Braſs, that have bound Con- cience (perhaps without much Difficulty) o its good Behaviour, and are become ſuch rtiſts at keeping their own Counſel, ſuch iniſh'd Proficients in Diſſimulation and Gri-

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mace as to bemoan the Iniquity of the Ag
when they hear of other People's Crime
Theſe are your *Seaſon'd Waggs*. For Exampl
Publius Sextilus Rufus, I remember, mad
Oath how that *Quintus Fadius Gallus* had le
him his Heir, and in the Body of the Te
ſtator's Will it was found that he had di
rected *Sextilius* to write his Daughter *Fa*
dia ſole *Inheritreſs*. But *Sextilius* averr'd h
knew nothing of it. And ſo he might ſe
curely, for there was none of us who a
Friends of the Deceas'd were concern'd i
the Arbitration that cou'd diſprove him
tho' 'twas abundantly more reaſonable t
believe that *Sextilius* had forſworn him
ſelf to come by the Eſtate than that *Fadiu*
cou'd have ſo little Natural Affection a
not realy to have given thoſe Direction
which were mention'd in his Will. *Sextili*
us urg'd moreover that he had been ſwor
to the obſervance of the *Voconian* Law
and might not act againſt the Tenor of it
unleſs we the Friends of the Deceas'd wou'
bear him harmleſs. To be ſhort, it wa
the Opinion not only of us Young Men
but of all the Judicious and Eminent Sage
upon the Spot, that the Daughter cou'
inherit no more than what ſhe might claim
by the *Voconian* Law. So *Sextilius* ru
away with a large Eſtate, which had ne
ver fallen into his Clutches, had he beer
ſuch

ſuch a Fool of a Philoſopher as to preferr Honeſty and Fair-dealing to his own Lucre and Advantage. O! but I warrant you he never enjoy'd himſelf afterwards! Yes, and his Eſtate too, and the more for getting it ſo dextrouſly. The Morſel was the richer and the ſweeter, becauſe even the Letter of the Law conſpir'd to bring it him; tho' rather than Wantonneſs and Pleaſure ſhou'd go without ſo plentifnl a ſund, he ought, at leaſt if he was a true *Epicurean*, to have run hazards for it: Seeng if every Man who affirms that Honour nd Probity are Things for themſelves deireable is oblig'd to encounter any Daners in their Service, then on t'other Hand ught every Body that conſecrates All hings elſe to his Idol of Pleaſure, when is way towards his *Pleaſures* lies thro' angers, to venture on. Either *Epicurus* uſt not think it worth his while to preſs ie purſuit of his own *Summum Bonum*, or he does, whenever he has it in his Pow- to make Prize of a tempting Inheritance, hich will be a means of improving and ultiplying his Pleaſures, he muſt enterize as daringly as if a *Scipio* in Thirſt of lory were to drive a *Hannibal* back into s own Country. *Scipio*, let me tell you, in an ugly Riſque, and that conſulting not s *Pleaſure* but his *Honour*. And therefore

your Philoſopher cannot for Shame, but when an Intereſt may be ſerv'd, face all Oppoſition rather than not gain his Point; as provided none of his Enormities takes Air, he furniſhes himſelf with Diverſion out of them, or if he come to be diſcover'd he is wiſer than to let the formidable face of *Puniſhment* affect him, having been train'd up to a contempt of Death, of Baniſhment, or Pain! which (by the way) tho' tolerable to a Wiſe Man, becauſe forſooth! his ſhare of *Good* muſt ſurpaſs his ſhare of *Evil* o'courſe yet, as you manage the Matter, is to a wicked Man an inſupportable Grievance. Further, let us ſuppoſe a Knave that with his good Parts has Power and Authority, a Man of as wide a Command as was *Marcus Craſſus*: Not that *Craſſus* abus'd thoſe Advantages: Or ſuch as *Pompey* at this time of Day, who fairly deſerves the Thanks of his Country-Men for dealing ſo handſomly by them, when if he pleas'd, he might do them a Thouſand Ill Turns, and not ſmart for't. The baſe Tricks are innumerable that a Man might play, without ſo much as forfeiting his Reputation or incurring any Cenſure. Shou'd your Friend upon his Death-bed leave his Inſtructions with you by Word of Mouth for his Daughter to ſucceed as ſole *Inheritrix* to the Eſtate, without any Body By to attel

teſt it; and not commit them to wri-ing as *Fadius* did, I make no queſtion but you'd punctualy fulfil thoſe Inſtructi-ons, and ſo perhaps *Epicurus* too wou'd have done. Thus *Sextus Peducæus*, Son o *Sextus*, that Miracle of Worth and In-egrity, a Gentleman of Letters too, and bleſt, as we ſee, with a Son as Upright and Ingenuous in all his Dealings as his Father, when *Caius Plotius* of *Nurſia*, a Noble *Roman* Knight had notify'd his Will o him only by Word of Mouth, and be-ore no Witneſſes, went directly to his Relict, who was altogether ignorant of he Matter, acquainted the Lady how her Husband had diſpoſed of the Eſtate, and aw her ſettl'd in the full and free Poſſeſſi-n of it. I am confident *Torquatus* wou'd have acquitted himſelf as Honeſtly. But hen at the ſame time he muſt have ad-anc'd a manifeſt Proof againſt his own Doctrine; for that how much ſoever he pre-ends to ſubject all Things beſides to Pleaſure and Self-Ends, yet in his Practice and Con-uct he wou'd give *Pleaſure* the *go-by*, and tick to his *Duty*; Which makes it a clear Caſe that a right Diſpoſition and Temper f Mind has and muſt have the Aſcen-ant over all the Sinifter Cajoling Perſwa-ons of a perverted Judgment. Suppoſe as the Caſuiſtry of *Carneades* ſuppoſes)

a Perſon whoſe Death wou'd turn to your Advantage were preparing without any Suſpicion to ſeat himſelf over the Neſt of an Adder, and you knew of an Adder's being there; tho' the Law takes no hold of you, and no Body can make appear that you knew it, you are ne'ertheleſs a Murderer unleſs you gave him a timely Caution. But I have dwelt already too long upon this Head, eſpecially conſidering I have handled it at large under the Perſon of *Lælius* in my Diſcourſes *concerning a Common-Wealth*, and that it is indeed a Propoſition which carries its own Evidence in its Bowels, that there can be no ſuch Thing as a good Man unleſs it be taken for granted that Nature her ſelf ties upon us all the Duties of Juſtice and Fair-dealing, and that theſe Duties are not to be reſolv'd into Pretence of *Utility*. Let this be further apply'd to thoſe Two Vertues which conſiſt in bringing the Brutal Part of Us under Obedience to the Scepter of Reaſon, the Vertues of *Modeſty* and *Temperance*. Does not *Chaſtity* ſuffer if Beſtialities be committed, tho' all paſſes in Privacy and Darkneſs? Or ſuppoſe you no Crime can be Flagitious if it eſcape the Brand of Publick Infamy. Agen, Is it the way of *Heroes* to make a Eſtimate and Computation of the Pleaſure

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they are to carry off with 'em, before they break in upon the Enemy's Ranks, and ſacrifice their Lives to the Intereſt of their Country? Or is it a Noble Vehemence and *Exploſion* of the Soul that drives 'em forward? Tell me freely, *Torquatus*, were that Illuſtrious Anceſtor of yours now preſent at the Conferences we are holding, Whether of the Conſtructions we have paſs'd upon his Behaviour wou'd he take to himſelf, Yours or Mine? Wou'd he rather have it aſſeverated by Me that he had no other Aims than to be an Inſtrument of Good to his Country, or by Your ſelf, that he only deſign'd to *make his own Pennyworths* and *Advantages*? At leaſt if you had unfolded your Meaning in plain Terms, and told him to his Face he never did a brave Thing in his Life, but *ſtill* there was an Expectation of *Pleaſure* at the Bottom, how had he taken it at your hands, d'you think? No matter, becauſe you will have it ſo, tho' I can never conſent that ſuch a Gallant Captain as *Torquatus* ſhall be ſaid to have ſerv'd under the Banner of *Pleaſure*, yet for once let him take his Place among the *Mercenary Rout*. But then muſt his poor *Collegue*, *Publius Decius*, the Firſt *Conſul* of the Family, have had the *Scab* of *Pleaſure* upon him too, when the *Knight-Errant* ſo ſolemnly vow'd himſelf a Victim

for his Country, and gallop'd full-ſpeed into the main Body of the *Latin* Army? It tickled his Fancy undoubtedly, to think of being hack'd to pieces within a Quarter of an Hour! Nothing leſs than the Charms of that Aſſurance cou'd have ſpurr'd him on to Deſtruction, and with a keener Appetite too than if he had been riding in as much haſte after *Epicurus*'s Pleaſure as *Epicurus* himſelf cou'd have wiſh'd. What's more, I cannot perſuade my ſelf his Son, had the Father acted upon any other than a Principle of Bravery and Honour, wou'd have copy'd after him as he did in the time of his Fourth Conſulſhip; nor that his *Grandſon*, the Third in a direct line that loſt his Life for the Publick (and he a *Conſul* too when he fell) wou'd have fought and dy'd ſo deſperately in the Warr with *Pyrrhus*. After theſe I cou'd produce you Inſtances of *Greeks*, but that, in Compariſon of our own, they are neither Eminent nor Many as thoſe of *Leonidas*, *Epaminondas*, and Three or Four beſides; Whereas were I to reckon up all the bright Ornaments of this kind with which our own Country has bloſſom'd; your Principle of Pleaſure muſt immediately proſtrate it ſelf a Captive before our Principle of *Vertue*; Nor wou'd the Remainder of the Day be long enough for ſuch an Enumeration. Beſide, I may

fair

fairly ſay as *Aulus Varius*, that old teſty, ſevere Judge, us'd to ſay to the Perſon that ſat next him in the Court, when a good many Witneſſes had given in their Depoſitions, and new Ones were call'd, *O me! O me! if we han't had enough of Evidences yet, we ſhall never have enough of 'em, take my Word for't.* Nay, to come nearer home and appeal to a Gentleman of ſuch renown'd Anceſtours as Your ſelf; Was *Pleaſure* the Inducement in your younger Years when you open'd a Charge before that Magnanimous Patriot, as the Common-Wealth knew him to be at all times, but eſpecialy during his Couſulſhip, and afterwards, I mean your own Father? Under whoſe Conduct, and by whoſe Suggeſtion I too was ſo happy as to give ſome Proofs how much more I thought my ſelf oblig'd to be concern'd for the good of the Community than for any private Intereſts of my own. It made me ſmile when I heard you ſtating the Oppoſition between the Circumſtances of a Mortal beſet with the greateſt Variety imaginable of the moſt exquiſite Pleaſures, and not ſo much as under the Pain of a *Scratch*, or obnoxious to any Future; And the Circumſtances of a poor Creature torn with inexpreſſible Torments in all Parts of his Body, without ſo much as the leaſt hopes of a Relaxation;

And then putting the Queſtion, whether any Thing cou'd exceed the Happineſs of the Former, or the Miſery of the Latter; And ſo making your Concluſion, that *Pain* muſt be the greateſt of *Evils*, and *Pleaſure* the *Summum Bonum.* There was one *Lucius Thorius Balbus*, of *Lanuvium.* (Probably you don't remember him) this Man was thoroughly devoted to Pleaſure, had ſo perfect a Knowledge of the whole Miſtery of it, and kept himſelf ſo well furniſh'd with all Accommodations for it, that he cou'd have challeng'd any Man to name him a Pleaſure, tho' it were never ſo Racy and Delicate, which his Ware-houſe did not afford in Plenty and Perfection; So little troubled with Superſtitious Grumblings, as to make a Jeſt of all the Sacrifices and Temples; and ſo unapprehenſive of the Terrors of Death, that he dy'd with his Sword in his Hand for the Service of his Country. He meaſur'd his Appetites and Deſires by his *Capacity* of *Fruition*, and had nothing to ſay to *Epicurus*'s *Diviſion* of them: Only he had an Eye to his *Health*, and us'd wholſom Exerciſe, to quicken the Inclinations of his Palat. His Diet was Rich and Picquant, but as eaſy of Digeſtion as he cou'd contrive it. His Wines Luſcious, but then he drank with Caution. In a Word, he left not out one of all thoſe

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ngredients, which if we deduct, *Epi-urus* has told us he knows not for his part, what we mean by any *Bonum* or *Human Good.* He labour'd under no ort of Pain, tho' if any had ſeiz'd him, e wou'd have undergone it like a Souldier, nd made more uſe, believe me, of the *Phyſicians* than of the *Philoſophers.* No Bo-ly had a more chearful Complexion, a etter State of Health, a livelier Air and Appearance, or a larger Portion of all he Delights and Pleaſures in which he cou'd oſſibly indulge himſelf. Here then we ave found ſuch a *Casket* of *Happineſs* as omes up to your own Deſcription. And et ſhall I? ——No; Vertue her ſelf akes the Aſſertion out of my Mouth, and peaks her *Marcus Regulus* to have been ten thouſand times a Happier Man, even at that Juncture, when of his own accord, and without any Compulſion but of Conſcience, in reſpect of his Faith which he had engag'd to the Enemy, he left his own Country, return'd to *Carthage*, and lay depriv'd of the Means of Sleep and Suſtenance; Even then, if Vertue may be heard and heeded, he was a happier Man than *Thorius* with his Bottles upon a Bed of Roſes. He had been a renown'd Commander in the Warrs, receiv'd the Honour of a Triumph, and born the Office of *Conſul*

ful more than once, but the Glory of all former Paſſages of his Life he thought by no means equal to that of the laſt Evidence he gave of his Integrity and Conſtancy. We that hear the Story may fancy his Condition was miſerable; but the Party that is the Subject of it, embrac'd that Condition as very Eligible. 'Tis not Wantonneſs, Merriment, Laughter, Jeſts, nor any other Symptoms of Levity that imply Happineſs, but Reſolution and Conſtancy of Mind, whatever outward Aſpect Perſons and Things may carry. When the King's Son had committed a Rape upon *Lucretia*, after ſhe had *abjur'd* in a ſolemn manner the whole Body of the Citizens, without more adoe ſhe ſtab'd herſelf to the Heart; and by the loſs of Her, at the Inſtigation of *Brutus* who led on the People, the Community at firſt made ſeizure of their *Democratical Liberties*; as in honour to her Memory her Father and Husband were created the firſt *Conſuls*. *Lucius Virginius*, a poor Plebeian, about ſixty Years after put an end to the Life of his own Daughter *Virginia*, rather than ſhe ſhould be debauch'd by *Appius Claudius*, then ſitting at the Helm. Now therefore, *Torquatus*, you have no other Choice but either to fall foul upon theſe Examples, or to drop your Pleas for Pleaſure,

ure. Very Pond'rous Pleas, no doubt, and a hopeful Cauſe that has not ſo much as a Teſtimonial or a Recommendation to countenance it from any one Illuſtrious Inſtance whatſoever! The way which we uſually take is to appeal to Hiſtorical Monuments for the Authority of ſuch extraordinary Perſons as have beſtow'd the whole Courſe of their Lives in conquering Difficulties, and would have ſtop'd their Ears at the Name of *Pleaſure*, while none of you, whenever you diſpute, dare pretend to fetch out a *Record* or a *Preſident*. You ſhall have all other Pretenders to Philoſophy telling you Stories ever and anon of *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Miltiades*, *Themiſtocles*, and *Epaminondas*; but the *Epicurean* Schoolsdare not ſo much as whiſper their Names. To give one Hint more upon the matter in hand; we have Reaſon to think our ſelves abundantly ſupply'd with the choiceſt Inſtances of Merit by my Friend *Atticus*'s Collections. Let any Man ſingle out e'er a one of the Lives he has written, and then tell us impartially his Opinion, whether it does not eclipſe the Splendour of all the voluminous Accounts about *Themiſtocles*. Not to diſparage the *Greeks* neither, becauſe it muſt be confeſs'd we deriv'd our Philoſophy and Politeneſs from them. But ſtill they took thoſe Liberties which in

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us 'twere a Fault to take. The *Stoic*
and *Peripateticks* are by no means agree
The former will not vouchsafe the Title
Good to any thing but *Virtue* and *Mor*
Worth; while the latter assign a very p
culiar Priority and Preeminence to *Virtu*
and *Moral Worth*, but say withal, that th
External Advantages of Body and Fortun
are *Good* in their Degree. This is a trul
Noble and Sublime Controversy, *Vertu*
being the Subject, and the Superiority of i
presuppos'd on both sides. Now wheneve
we come to engage with *Your* Men, w
must have our Ears, of course, offende
with *Clauses* relating to those sordid and ob
scene Pleasures which *Epicurus* rarely di
misses for a Period together. Do bu
meditate some time, *Torquatus*, upon you
own Counsels and Resolutions, and
am confident you'll presently grow sic
of your *Hypothesis*. *Cleanthes*'s *Emblen*
shames you out of it. 'Twas a perti
nent and a pretty Design as he set it forth
in his Discourses to the Imaginations of hi
Scholars. He bid them conceive *Pleasure*
in *Effigie*, a *Belle* very gaudily and royaly
attir'd, seated upon a Throne, and Figures
all about her symbolizing so many *Vir-*
tues for her *Majesty*'s *Maids of Honour*,
and suppos'd to have no other Employ-
ment or Office but to wait upon her and
serve

erve her, except now and then to adviſe ıer in her Ear, (that is, as much as one Party in a Picture can adviſe another) o behave her ſelf like a *Well-bred Gentlewoman*, and do nothing that might ſhock he Minds of Men, or prove fatal in the Conſequences; *Neither, may it pleaſe your Highneſs, are we ignorant that the End of ur Being, and the whole of our Buſineſs is o obey your Commands.* O! but ſtill *Epiurus* lays it down as an Impoſſibility that ıny Man ſhou'd be happy, unleſs he lives *Prudently* and *Vertuouſly*. This is the Propoſition which is to dazle us. But what is it to me whether *Epicurus* maintains the Affirmative or the Negative? I'm only concern'd to examine what the Man that makes Pleaſure the *Summum Bonum* muſt maintain, if he'll talk conſiſtently with himſelf. Urge any thing like a Reaſon, if you can, why the Pleaſures of *Thorius*, *Poſthumius*, *Chius*, and *Orata*, the moſt Accompliſh'd Voluptuary of 'em all, were not of the Firſt Rate? I have before obſerv'd how gently *Epicurus* deals by his Voluptuaries, only cautioning them againſt the Folly of indulging their Paſſions either of *Deſire* or *Fear*, and preſcribing ſuch a Remedy againſt both, as will not bear hard upon the Vices of *Luxury* and *Exceſs*; for truly the Philoſopher

pher has no Objections that he knows of, to point againſt Senſuality, when 'tis no longer encumber'd by theſe two Paſſions. It remains therefore, that while you go on to make Pleaſure the Standard of all Human Good, you cannot pretend to patronize or lay claim to *Virtue*, in as much as even he that takes care how he hurts his Neighbour purely for fear of incommoding himſelf, is far from being or deſerving to be call'd a *Good* or a *Juſt Man.* Don't you know, *Nemo pius eſt*, &c. *'Tis downright Irreligion to be Religious out of Fear*? Lay that to heart, I beſeech you, as an indiſputable Truth. No Man, believe me, is the Honeſter for lying under ſuch an Awe; and if that be all the Reſtraint that's upon him, whenever it goes off, he muſt be a *Rogue*; as his Fears will certainly vaniſh upon the firſt Opportunity of Solitude or Privacy that flatters him, or at leaſt, if he thrives and riſes, upon the Stock of his Power and Proſperity. In a word, we may very charitably preſume he wou'd much rather be thought a Good Man in order to his being a Rogue, than realy be a Good Man tho' he was ſure to have his Honeſty miſconſtrued. Upon the whole, you muſt acknowledge you have palm'd a ſpurious mimick Juſtice upon us, inſtead of that which is genuin and invariable,

and

nd favour'd us with two notable Pieces f Advice; firſt to make ſlight of all the ternal Rules of Conſcience, and ſecondly o court and move by the precarious Eſtinations of other People. And this that e alledge againſt you in Relation to the Virtue of Juſtice, affects you equaly as to he other Three Virtues, all which you uppoſe fix'd upon a Pedeſtal of Pleaſure, hat is to ſay, Stone Walls upon a Surface f Water. I wou'd gladly be inform'd oncerning that ſame *Torquatus* we were liſcourſing of juſt now, whether he had ny thing in him of *Fortitude* or not; or as little Hopes as you give me of e-er ſeducing Yourſelf, I cannot, if I wou'd, orce the dear and honour'd Examples of our Family out of my Head, but muſt njoy my ſelf in the Remembrance of them, eſpecialy of that incomparable Perſon *Aulus Torquatus*, as having been my particular Friend, and zealous Supporter in very dangerous Times. Both of you can witneſs it. And yet as much as I preſume to value my ſelf, and wiſh to be valu'd upon a ſincere Principle and Love of Gratitude, I cou'd not have any Reliſh of thoſe Obligations, if I ſuſpected that he was pleas'd to befriend me, not out of *Tenderneſs*, but for his own *Ends* and *Emolument*. 'Twill not ſave your Cauſe to reply upon me, that every

every good Action is it ſelf an Advan tage and a Gain for the Agent. Keep t that, and we have you to Our ſelves. Fo all that we affirm and ſtickle for, is this *that Virtue is its own Reward.* *Epicuru* will not hear of it; on t'other hand, h makes Pleaſure the Wages and Reward o all our Actions and Purpoſes. But not t forget your *Relation*; I tell you plainly if when he accepted of the Challenge o the *Gall*, fought him at the Battle of *Ani en*, deſpoil'd him of his Chain, and ac quir'd along with it an honourable Apella tion, and all this, as I conceive, upon the ſcore of the Congruity of ſuch an Actio to the Dignity of Human Nature; if he wou'd not have thus exerted himſelf but upon the Motive of *Pleaſure*, I cannot have any Opinion of his *Fortitude*. Agen; let only the Fear of *Puniſhment* or *Infamy* be Security for all our *Modeſty*, our *Chaſtity*, and our *Temperance*, inſtead of the real Sa credneſs of thoſe Tyes which ought to guard them: And what Lewdneſs and Bru tality is there ſo Vile and Abominable which a Man will demurr upon, when he can truſt to Secrecy, Impunity, or the Loftineſs of his Condition and Character? How foul and untoward an Imputation were it, Sir, to lie at your own door, ſhou'd we put the Caſe that, bright and admir'd as

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is your Sense, your Virtue, and the Magnificence of your Character: yet so dishonourable are your Intentions, Pursuits, and Endeavours, and so detestable is that very End into which you resolve the whole Conduct of your Life, that you cou'd not make a Discovery of them to the World but you must Colour and Tremble? E'er long you are to put on the Magistrate, and in that Occasion must make your Harangue to the People, and let them understand what Measures you design to follow in the Administration of Justice. I suppose you will think it proper also to go on in the old road, and to give your Auditory an Account both of your Ancestors and Yourself. How will it not be very Engaging and Polular, to declare that as you never did any one Action in your Life but Pleasure was your Aim in it, so you will regard none but Inducements of *Pleasure* throughout the Course of your *Consulat*? O but, say you, I hope I have a little more wit than so to Harspeak a Mob of ignorant *Mechanicks!* What think you then of one of the Courts of Justice to discover your Mind in, or, if that be too publick yet, of the *Senate-house* itself? Nor there neither will you try the Experiment, I dare answer for you. But why, if 'twere not scandalous to utter such a Period? And if so, methinks I and *Tria-*

rius, before whom you can talk at this rate have not had fair quarter from you. It ma be ſo, but the fault's our own. We impoſ an odious and an undeſerv'd Significatio upon a VVord of Mighty Merit, or ra ther we are no Judges of the Meaning c *Voluptas*, or *Pleaſure*. This is everlaſtingl your Evaſion. You can diſſect the dar *Orthography* when you pleaſe, and we to are allow'd to comprehend your Projec when you read us Leſſons about the In poſſibilities you are big with of *Atoms* ar *Spaces between World and World*, but a fataly uncapable of any Notion of *Pleaſur* which every *Sparrow* underſtands; tho whenever I think fit, I can force you confeſs that I comprehend not only wh is *Pleaſure*, a pleaſing *Tremor* upon t *Senſes*, but alſo what is the *Pleaſure* who Quarrel is eſpouſed by Yourſelf; and ſom times we have it in the ſhape of that *Tr mulous*, *Active Pleaſure* which I have no defin'd, and then it is capable of *Varia ons*; and ſometimes we have it in the Pha tom of that Incomparable Pleaſure of *I dolence*, and then 'tis a *Still*, *Fixt Pleaſu* and admitts of no *Variations*. And e' let it go for a Pleaſure, upon Conditi I may ask you the Queſtion, Wheth you'll ſet ſo ſtupid a Pleaſure before Y as the Scope of all your Actions; If you

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aſhamed to anſwer *Me* in the Affirmative, however take heart, be Plain with *the Peo-ple*, and make known your Reſolution, ne-ver to act, while you are in Office, and when you are not, upon any other Bottom than that of *Self-Intereſt*, never to play any other Game but what you're to be a Win-ner by; and gueſs how the Aſſembly will rend their Throats to return the Compli-ment, and what a *Golden Age* they'll pro-miſe themſelves upon your Advancement to the *Conſular Power*, which they are impa-tient at this time to put into your hands; And yet if *Propoſitions* of this nature be ſo ſcandalous, that you have neither Confi-dence nor Courage enough to make them part of a Publick Declamation; What pre-vails with you to riot in them to Yourſelf, and to your Friends? *With You*, that are habituated to the Language of the *Peri-pateticks* and the *Stoicks*, and talk loud, eſpecially in all Places of Publick Judica-ture, about Duty, Juſtice, Honour, Ho-neſty, Performance of Promiſes, What comports with the Dignity of the Go-vernment and Grandeur of the *Roman* Re-publick, and what Dangers, what Deaths are to be ruſh'd upon for the ſake of it. Now we poor eaſy *Citts*, little imagining how you laugh at us all the while in your Sleeve, glow agen with Admiration and

Extaſy. None but high Flights and *Cat*
nian Streins of Philoſophy 'ſcape your Li
upon ſuch Occaſions; not a ſingle Wo
of *Pleaſure*, neither of your *Active Pleaſu*
or *Voluptas*, (as that Word is underſtood
Town and Country by All who are a
quainted with our Language) nor yet
that *Still*, *Compos'd* Pleaſure, which
Body gives the Name of *Pleaſure* to b
Yourſelves. Recollect a little and ſhew
how you got a Diſpenſation to make uſe
our Words, and affix your own Meanin
to them. Shou'd a Humour take you
affecting in your Aſpect or Gate more th
ordinary Pretences to *Gravity*, you wou
not be the ſame Perſon you were befor
How then can you put upon us with n
thing but Out-ſide and Oſtentation? How c
you adulterate Words, ſay one thing, a
mean another, and do by your *Notions* as y
do by your *Garb*, put 'em on or off as Occaſi
calls you from your Houſe to the Chair of pu
lick Authority, or thence to your Houſ
Can you reckon this Latitude allowabl
Commend me much rather to ſuch fra
and ſound, ſuch candid, handſome, and bra
Aſſertions, as a Man without any baſe a
pitiful Reſervations would be glad to ha
either the *Senate*, the *People*, or any *Coun*
or *Concourſe* in the World hear him delive
ing. As to the matter of *Friendſhip*,
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cannot ſee where you have left any room for ſuch a Thing, or how one Man ſhou'd be another's Friend, unleſs it be for the ſake of his Friend that he loves him. For what does the Word *Amare*, (*to love*) from which *Amicitia*, (*Friendſhip*) import, but to wiſh all the Good we can to another, tho' we ſhall reap no Advantage by it Ourſelves? Doubtleſs, you'll tell me, I ſhall find my Account in't, if I'll take up with ſuch a Principle as this. 'Tis odds I might if I diſſembled it very artfully. But, I hope, you have no Thoughts of being *a Friend* according to true *Etymology*, till you are ſuch indeed; and that you can never be, till your Breaſt is lin'd with a Sincerity and Ardour of Affection, an Affection of *Spontaneous Growth*, and not propagated out of any precarious Purſuits of private Advantage. But what if I wou'd make my own Fortune? then juſt ſo long as you find you're a *Gainer*, you'll be a *Friend*, and when there's no More to be got, the *Fewel fails* and the *Friendſhip goes out*. For *Friendſhip* and *Intereſt* are not always inſeparable, and how will you contrive when they once come to interfere? Will you renounce the former? If ſo, it muſt have been of an Unaccountable Kind. Will you be true to't? Then you're no longer true to your own Principles, if I rightly repreſent them, as pro-

posing *Personal Utility* for the *Final Cause* of all *Friendship*. 'Tis possible, you'll desire not to be reproach'd with it, tho' some time or other you should abandon your Friend. But why reproach'd with it, if 'twere not a Matter well worthy of *Reproach*? Now here lies the Point; Tho' perhaps you'll not utterly desert a Friend to avoid an Inconvenience, yet you'll be wishing him out of the World when you cannot better your Circumstances in it by your Intimacy with him. At least, if instead of proving serviceable, it so falls out that he must cost you Trouble and Fateague, Estate, or perhaps Life it self; then 'twill be high time to look about you, and bethink Yourself of *Yourself*, and of those *Pleasures* which are the *End* of your Existence. Or will you rather, as the famous *Pythagorean* did, present your own Body in the room of your Friend's to the Fury of a *Sicilian* Tyrant? Will you, rather than not redeem his Life with your own, counterfeit him, and swear yourself *Orestes* when you are *Pylades*; or being *Orestes* confute *Pylades*, and demonstrate yourself *Orestes*? Or if you cou'd not demonstrate it, beg both of you might not die, but that your Friend might be spared? Yes, I know full well, *Torquatus*, you are not so ridden with Apprehensions of Pain or Death as to boggle

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at all This, or at any honourable Management whatever. But our Enquiry is not, which way your own Diſpoſition, but which way the Principles of your Philoſophy lead you. And notwithſtanding *Epicurus* rhodomontades in his Commendations of Friendſhip, yet his Inſtitutions and Precepts which you have imbib'd, and now vindicate, utterly overthrow all Duties of it. How can that be when *Epicurus* himſelf had ſo many Boſom-Friends? Did ever I queſtion *Epicurus*'s Probity, Candour, or Good Nature? 'Tis not his Conduct and Courſe of Life which I bring to the Shrift, but the Judgment he has paſs'd upon Things. To viliſie an Adverſary, that's for the Vanity of the *Greeks*. I own he never fail'd to diſcharge the Part of a Friend; but for all that, if what I have urg'd, is True, (and an *Academick*, you know, muſt not be *Over-poſitive*) 'twas a Practice of Supererogation in him. I ſhall be told that the Generality of the World have entertain'd Otherguess Notions of him, and thought they had very good Reaſons for't. They have ſo; but I am little influenc'd at any time by the Noiſe of *that Generality*. The choiceſt Excellencies of every Art, Profeſſion, or Science, nay, and of Virtue it ſelf, are the leaſt Common and Publiſh'd. Were it not that their Virtue

had overpower'd the Principle of *Pleaſure*, neither *Epicurus* himſelf nor ſo many of his Followers cou'd have prov'd ſuch ſincere, good *Friends*, or Men of ſuch an Exemplary Stability and Sobriety, ſo unconcern'd about Pleaſure, and to Duty ſo reſign'd. Their Lives and Converſations confute them. And whereas 'tis a Reproach upon the Majority of Mankind that they *ſay* greater things than they *do*, 'tis acknowledg'd in Favour of theſe Gentlemen, that they *do* better things than they *ſpeak*. Yet all this does not come quite home to the Point, as we ſhall ſee by looking over the Particulars you ſuggeſted relating to Friendſhip, among which one had ſo many of *Epicurus*'s *Features*, that I cou'd almoſt have ſworn I heard it from himſelf. 'Twas This, That it is our Buſineſs to ſet a'foot Amicable Correſpondences, in regard, there's no living ſecurely, nor enjoying Ourſelves, unleſs *Pleaſure* be well guarded with *Friendſhip*. However, this has had my Anſwer already. Of the Opinion which was next mention'd, and bears a Freſher Date as well as a better Conſtruction, *Epicurus*, as I remember, has never taken the leaſt notice; That when we firſt lay out for Friends we are wrought upon by *Self-Intereſt*, but that when our Friendſhips reach a Maturity, the *Outer-Coat* of *Pleaſure* peels away, and

we

e love our Friends for their own ſakes. his Account of Friendſhip has its Flaws o, but however, I'll not throw it back on their hands. Only be it obſerv'd, that o' I let it ſerve my turn, 'twill ſerve eirs very little that advance it, as being plain Confeſſion out of their own Mouths at ſometimes a good Man acts upon a tter Bottom than a Proſpect and Purſuit *Pleaſure*. The Third Notion you gave was a Suppoſal of a tacit Compact ob-ging the Wiſe to bear the ſame Favour and od Affection to their Friends as to them-lves, by which means they enhance their vn Happineſs; and you tell us further, at theſe Meaſures are not only practica-e, but have been actualy experimented. hen this League was in Agitation, they ight as well, methinks, have tack't ano-er to't, and agreed upon't among them-lves to admire and embrace *Juſtice*, *Mo-eſty*, and every other Virtue for their own oſolute and intrinſick Merit. And yet at ſt if our Friendſhips have no other Nerves an thoſe of Advantage and Lucre, if we o not think them worth the Seeking, for eir own ſakes, upon abſtracted Encou-gements, and purely as they are a Com-erce of Affections; What hinders but that e ſhou'd rid our Hands of them, when they ome in Competition with a *Rich Farm* or

a *Pleaſant Seat*? Here I expect you'll b putting in with *Epicurus*'s Courtly Saying in Commendation of Friendſhip. And fo me he may ſay what he will; my Provinc is only to examine whether what he ſays i agreable to Right Reaſon and his ow *Hypotheſis*. It ſeems, 'tis for the *Profi* ariſing out of it that we covet any Man Friendſhip. Say you ſo? Then Whether c the Two, think you, may it be moſt wort your while to have a Property in, ou Friend *Triarius* here, or the Granaries c *Puteoli*? Run over your *Common-place* and urge firſt of all, *that Friends are a M nition and Defence.* But if you want thef you need only have Recourſe to your ow Perſon, to the Laws, or to any commo Acquaintance. Secondly, *that by contra ing Friendſhips we keep clear of the H tred and Diſpleaſure of the World.* thought *Epicurus* had furniſhed you with h Preſervative Precepts againſt any of tho Blaſts, or however as long as you can affor Good and Lord-like Pay, a Ruſh for ou *Pyladean* Heartineſs; you need never b without your *Life-Guards* and your *Garr ſons. Well, but what muſt you do for Companion to exchange Notions, crack Jeſt with, and impart a Secret to.* E'e make a Companion of Yourſelf, or whe you're tir'd with Soliloquies, 'tis but callin

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an *Occaſional Acquaintance.* Beſides too, o' you ſhou'd be diſappointed as to Theſe, ie Inconvenience is a Trifle, and weighs othing againſt the Profits of a *Golden ſountain!* Now therefore to be ſerious, ou muſt be convinc'd, that as a Friendſhip ounded upon Sincerity of Affection is all ver Excellent and Noble; ſo the cloſeſt itimacy, if Self-Intereſt lies at the *bore*, is preſently forgotten when any ody elſe *outbids.* And therefore if you'd ave us Friends indeed, I beſeech you, t *Me* be the Object of your Love, nd not *my Poſſeſſions.* But I have al-eady expatiated too farr in ſo clear a aſe, and might at firſt have ſtopp'd ſhort : the Propoſition it ſelf, that if every hing muſt give way to *Pleaſure*, *Vertue* nd *Friendſhip* can have no footing in the Vorld. And now, to leave ſtanding none f your Arguments, I ſhall proceed to paſs few Reflexions on that part of your Diſ-ourſe, which as yet I have not ſpoke to. And Firſt, in regard 'tis our own Happineſs o which we direct and referr all our Phi-oſophy, and in queſt whereof we give our ſelves up to Speculations and Theories, while theſe Opiniators reſolve the Felicity f Life into This Thing, and thoſe into That, as particularly you of the *Epicurean* School faſten it all upon *Pleaſure*, on the other

other Hand making *Infelicity* and *Pain Syn*
nymous Terms; let us look into the Natu
of this Human Happineſs as underſtoo
by you *Epicureans*. That every Wiſe Ma
may be Maſter of his own Happineſ
wherever it lies, I ſuppoſe you will giv
me leave to lay it down as a *Poſtulat*. Fo
if he may be depriv'd of the Happine
of his Life, then is he not properly happy
ſince there is no depending upon the Steadi
neſs and Duration of that which we kno
to be Fickle and Variable; and yet it i
impoſſible but that, as long as Providenc
has not given us a Leaſe of its Favours
the Fear of thoſe Diſtreſſes which the lo
of 'em may, ſome time or other, bring upo
us, will be perpetualy affecting us, and a
impoſſible for us to be happy while poſſe
with Apprehenſions of ſuch ſevere Calami
ties. So that Happineſs at this rate i
never to be compaſs'd, becauſe 'tis not a
ny leſſer Parcels, but the full and uninter
rupted Current of our Time, which make
up the Meaſure of a Life of Happineſs.
And no Man's Life can be denominatec
Happy unleſs it continue ſo *throughout*.
The Poſſibility of being Happy at one time
is deſtroy'd by the Poſſibility of being
Miſerable at another, becauſe he that finds
himſelf obnoxious to Misfortunes, is in
that very reſpect Unhappy. For a true

Bleſſed-

Bleſſedneſs of Life, when it once commences, is as Laſting and as Undiſcontinu'd as Wiſdom, the Mother of it, and falls not under that Condition of Perfection, whereof, as we learn from *Herodotus*, *Solon* admoniſh'd *Cræſus* when he wiſh'd him to deferr his Judgment upon the Happineſs of any Man's Life 'till he had ſeen the Cloſe of it. *Epicurus* notwithſtanding, as explain'd by Yourſelf, is Poſitive that the length of its continuance adds nothing at all to the Happineſs of Life, and that an Eternal Circle of Delights wou'd be no more than juſt adequate to thoſe of a Momentary Opportunity. And here agen, the Man falls foul upon himſelf. He has made *Pleaſure* the *Summum Bonum*, and yet will ſtand to it, that a Determinate and Stinted Space of Time can gather under it as large a Compaſs of *Happineſs* as *Immortality* it ſelf. Thoſe Philoſophers, I confeſs, who referr all our Good to Vertue, have ſufficient Reaſon to deny that our *Summum Bonum* gains Bulk by the Prolongation of our Lives, becauſe they maintain that in a *Plenitude* of Vertue lies the Complement of our Happineſs. But for a Philoſopher to pin the Perfection of Human Happineſs upon *Pleaſure*, and afterwards aſſert that how *ſhort liv'd* ſoever *Pleaſure* be, we ſhou'd have no more of it, tho' it were ever ſo *Permanent*, this

this, or I'm miſtaken, is to contradict him ſelf with a Vengeance! Beſides if *Pleaſure* cannot receive any Increaſe from *Permanency*, neither can *Pain*. But the *Continuance* of *Pain* ſwells the *Evil* of it; And ſhall not the *Length* of its *Duration* amplifie the *Good* of *Pleaſure*? Or if it ſhall not, what then will become of that Bleſſed Condition and its Eternity, wherein *Epicurus* has with ſo much Devotion ſeated the Deity? For if *Eternity* be ſuch an *empty Circumſtance*, his Deity has not the leaſt Advantage of the Philoſopher, and the *Mortal* might vie *Pleaſures* and *Summum Bonum* with the *Eternal Being*. But the *Mortal* you'll ſay was ſubject to *Pain*. Not at all. He has declar'd he cou'd ſing, O *Delicious!* in the Belly of *Phalaris*'s Bull. And therefore in *Eternity* makes no odds, as it includes no more than an Infinite Perpetuity of Pleaſure not more perfect and plenary than *Epicurus* himſelf was capable of, *Epicurus*, 'tis plain ſtands upon the Level with the Deity it ſelf. Now if the Man and his Maxims fall out, all his Declamatory Flouriſhes and Rants will ſtand in him in very little ſtead. The Summ Total of a Happy Life is the Pleaſure of the Body, (and provided you will make no more of it than what you us'd to do) a Pleaſure not diſtinct from that of the Body) the Pleaſure too, an it ſhall pleaſe you,

you, of the Mind. But yet alas! Which way shall a Wise Man procure a Patent to hold this Pleasure *for Life?* The Materials of it being neither at his Command, nor in his Disposal, because they are not the Forces of his own Wisdom, but such Provisions and Furniture, as it ought to be the Province of his Wisdom to lay in for his Pleasures. And these consist altogether of *Externals*, and all *Externals* are liable to *Casualties*. The Consequence therefore is obvious, that notwithstanding *Epicurus*'s *Exiguam intervenire Sapienti*; *There are little or no Negotiations common to a Wise Man with Fortune*, all the Hagpiness of Human Life is in the Hands of *Fortune*. O but perhaps! I quote him by *Piece-meal*. *Sapientem locupletat ipsa natura* shou'd have come in, *Every, Wise Man has a fair Pension from Nature*, and those Perquisites *Epicurus* tells us are easily fetch'd home. There he's in the right, and about that matter I will never quarrel with him, but leave him to quarrel with himself. The Pleasure, he says, which a plain and cheap Diet ministers, comes not a whitt behind the Relishes and Flavours of the most palatable Dainties. And I readily agree with him herein, that the Choice of our Diet is a thing of an Indifferent Relation to the Happiness of our Lives. This is a real Truth,

and

and he shall have my good Word for *Socrates* himself, who shew'd Pleasure no the least Countenance or Mercy, allows so much, where he makes *a good Stomach th best Sauce to our Meat*, and *a dry Throa the best Improver of our Liquors*. But the when I catch a Man making over his *A* to Pleasure, squaring his Life by *Gallonius* Rules, and yet preaching against Luxur like a *Piso*, I can neither give that Ma the hearing, nor believe he speaks from hi Heart. That which facilitates the procure ment of Nature's Riches is, as he teache us, the Sufficiency of a little for the Suppl of her Occasions: But, under Favour, no for the Supply of *Epicurus*'s Pleasure. And tho' he is Express in it, *that the most Or dinary Accommodations yield as grateful a Pleasure as the most Chargeable*, yet here by he proves no more than that his Mouth was out of Tast as well as his Wits out of his Head. Had he been a Profes'd Foe to *Pleasure*, and told us he had rather make his Dinner of a *Red-Herring* than upon a *Sole* of *Sturgeon*, it had been something: But seeing he has pitch'd upon *Pleasure* for his *Summum Bonum*, 'tis no longer his *Rea son*, but his *Senses* that must determine him, and the Excellence of every Thing that's valuable arise in proportion to the Sweet nes of the *Gusto*. With all my Heart how-

ever

ever let him, if he can, poſſeſs himſelf of his Pleaſures at a ſmall Rate, or even *Gratis*, and let the Satisfaction the *Perſians* found in eating their *Naſturtium* Salads (which *Xenophon* ſpeaks of) come up to the Agreableneſs of thoſe profuſe Entertainments, which ſo highly incens'd *Plato* againſt the Citizens of *Syracuſe*. In a word, et it be as eaſy a Concern as you pleaſe o feed your Pleaſures; How ſhall we ſo rder it that notwithſtanding *Pain* is our *Vorſt Evil*, yet no Torment ſhall be able o make a Breach in the Happineſs of Life. *Metrodorus*, *aliàs Epicurus the Elder*, where e's giving a Deſcription of a Happy Man, ppoſes it neceſſary *that he ſhould have a ound, healthy Conſtitution of Body, and a ull Aſſurance that he ſhall never loſe it.* ow which way are we to obtain a Full Aſſurance of what ſhall be our State of Health ther a Year or an Hour hence? So hat although we ſhou'd eſcape the *reateſt of Evils*, *Pain*, yet becauſe 'tis oſſible it may ſeize us the next Minute, e muſt live continualy in fear of it; nd how can his Life be a Happy one who oks for the worſt of *Evils* to fall upon is Head every Moment? However *Epiurus* has put us in a way to give *Pain* Diverſion. A very Rational Undertaking! confeſs, to ſet about inſtructing us how

we may make ſlight of the worſt of *Evils*. Now the whole Art of it lies in recollecting that the *Sharpeſt* Pains are the *Shorteſt*. But what is it you mean by the *Shorteſt* and *Sharpeſt*? Think you the moſt acute Diſeaſes have never held a Man ſeveral Days nay Months together? Yet, who knows when you talk of *Sharpeſt Pains*, you may mean, perhaps, none but ſuch as are *immediately mortal*. Thoſe, 'tis granted, have not ſo much Terror in them; but the Pain I challenge you to aſſwage are ſuch as I beheld my very good Friend grappling with that worthy and obliging Perſon, *Cneius Octavius*, Son to *Marcus*, and that neither once nor twice, nor by *Twinges*, but by very frequent and tedious Returns. It makes me ſhrugg when I call to mind the Agonie which he ſuffer'd. Such an Inflammation had overſpread his whole Body, that you'd have thought the Flame was juſt ready to blaze out. All this while he felt not the *Worſt* of Evils; and altho' I cou'd perceive him ſenſible of the Anguiſh, yet was he by no means a Man in Miſery, as he muſt have been, if his Life had been all along taken up with Pleaſure and Wantonneſs. In good earneſt, you ſurprize me when you remark that the moſt pungent Pains are the ſooneſt Over, and the moſt laſting the lighteſt; becauſe Experience has taught me that ſome

time

imes the fierceſt Pains may be very Laſt-
ng; and if they cou'd never be ſo, that
ntill you are won to *Vertue* by her own
ſſential Charms, you cannot be duly qua-
fy'd to ſupport Yourſelf under thoſe
ains; for *Fortitude* has her *Directions*, I
ou'd ſay, her *Laws*, to embolden and con-
rm us againſt all Inſults of Pain, which
ou'd otherwiſe Unman us. And upon
is Account it is, that we contract a *Mo-
l Turpitude*, not by being ſenſible of Pain,
or that we cannot always avoid) but by
ur Impatience under it, when, like *Phi-
ctetes*,

*To the wild Waſt our Shrieks and Plaints
we vent,*
And teach the Rocks in Ecchoes to relent.

et *Epicurus* be transform'd for a little
hile into *Philoctetes*, and try how he can
have himſelf in the *Skin* of that *Greek*,
ui viperino morſu, &c.

*In whoſe diſtemper'd Veins the Foamings
flow*
Of Viper's Rage, and circulate his Woe.

hat tho' the Pain be moſt afflicting, it can-
ot hold long! So it ſeems, for *Philoctetes*,
s ſuppos'd, had not lain already above ten

Years under ground. Yet ſtill, *ſi longus, levis*, if it be Chronical, it cannot be Violent, but has its times of *Intermiſſion* and *Relaxation.* That's not always true neither, and when it comes, what are you the better for your Relaxation, the Image of your laſt Anguiſh ſitting lively upon your Memory, and that of the Return on't upon your Apprehenſion? But even then *Death* is a certain Remedy. And undoubtedly a very *Savoury* one! But what becomes then of your *Plus ſemper Voluptati.* that *every Man may at all times command Predominancy of Pleaſure?* For if he may 'tis Heinous Advice when you point him out that Remedy: And 'twere a great deal the better way to convince him what an unpardonable Dejection of Soul it argues to ſink into Impotence, and loſe our ſelves under the Diſcipline of Pain. All your *ſi gravis, brevis; ſi longus, levis*; *Short, if not light; if laſting, ſlight*; is but a *chiming rhyming* Cordial at the beſt. But if you wou'd effectually relieve and diſpell a Patient's Pain, it muſt be done by the *Lenitives* of true Fortitude, Magnanimity, and Patience. Let me repeat, what *Epicurus* himſelf (for I am ſtill ſticking as cloſe to his Skirts as I can) freely declar'd when he lay upon his Death-bed; and then judge whether his Deportment and his Rules were

of a Piece. Epicurus *to* Hermachus, *wiſhing all Health. I date theſe few Lines to you upon that day of my Life, which, tho' the laſt, I find not at all uncomfortable. The Miſeries I feel in my Bladder and Bowels are as exceſſive as poſſibly they can be.* No queſtion, *Exceſſive enough*, upon Suppoſition that *Pain* is the *Greateſt Evil*; not elſe. He goes on ——— *And yet I make all things eaſy to me by revolving in my Mind, of what a new Account, and of what ſingular Solutions of Things, I have had the Happineſs to be the Author. It remains, that, as all along from your tender Years you have valu'd either* Epicurus *or Philoſophy, you take* Metrodorus's *Children into your Care and Protection.* Now cannot I, for my Life, imagin that either *Epaminondas* or *Leonidas* made a better *Exit* than this Man! tho the former at the Battle of *Mantinea*, where he had given the *Lacedæmonians* a Defeat, having receiv'd a Mortal Wound, and finding himſelf draw near his End, firſt ask'd his Soldiers whether he had loſt his Shield, and when, with Tears running down their Cheeks, they told him he had not; then he enquir'd, *Does the Enemy fly?* And ſo ſoon as that Queſtion was anſwer'd to his good liking, he gave order to draw the Pike out of his Body, and ſo, Victorious and Triumphant, ſpouted forth his Life in

a Stream of Blood: The Latter, *Leonidas* King of the *Lacedæmonians*, when at *Thermopylæ* he had left his Soldiers no other Choice than that of an *Ignominious Retreat* or a *Glorious Exciſion*, deſperately charg'd the Enemy with his Three Hundred *Spartans*, Himſelf at the Head of 'em. Something there is very Noble and Great in the Fall of a brave General. But a Philoſophe grunts out his Laſt between the Blankets as for Inſtance; That ſame *Epicurus* who thought he ſhould purchaſe at leaſt Immortal Honours by leaving his Friend the Legacy of *Compenſabatur cum ſummis doloribus lætitia, I make all things eaſie to me when I revolve in my Mind* &c. This, 'tis confeſs'd ſounds *Philoſophicaly*, but ſtill *Epicurus* breaks his Shins over his own *Philoſophy*; for either Thoſe Writings and new Diſcoveries of his the Review whereof afforded him ſuch Matter of Comfort, have no Truth in them or if they have, they cou'd afford him no Comfort, as carrying in them no immediate Relation to the Body; it being an avow'd and conſtant Problem with *Epicurus* That nothing affords Matter of Joy or Vexation further than as it affects the Body. He ſays, *that he delighted himſelf with ruminating upon what was tranſacted formerly.* Was the Body the Principal in thoſe Tranſactions No, then it had been the Remembrance o

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Senſual Satisfaction; and not a Review of his own Syſtems that gave him Eaſe. Was the Mind then immediately concern'd? Neither is that poſſible, becauſe, according to himſelf, the Mind knows no other Joy than that which directly affects the Body. And then too, for what Reaſon, *Epicurus*, cou'd you think it worth your while to recommend *Metrodorus*'s Children to the Care of *Hermachus*? This was a Peculiar and a Noble Act of Friendſhip, or I know not what is ſo. But, I beſeech you, was your Body intereſted in it? So that whatever we meet with throughout this highly-celebrated Epiſtle of *Epicurus*, tilts and juſtles againſt his own Principles. Thus he perpetualy confutes himſelf, and leaves nothing beſides his own *Probity* and *Good Behaviour* to make his Writings bear a Price, it being a clear Indication of ſuch an Inbred and Unmercenary Goodneſs of Temper as is wrought upon by the Allurements neither of *Pleaſure* nor *Profit*, when a Man beſtows his *Concluding Moments* in Expreſſions and Offices of Reſpect and Friendſhip, and particularly in making one Friend Guardian to another's Children. When we ſee your own Philoſopher ſo very ſcrupulous at the Point of Death about fulfilling his Duty, can we deſire a more ſufficient Proof of what I aſſert, That Vertue and Probity are to be valued and courted for-

their own Sakes? However, bating the Incompatibleneſs of it all with its Author's own Tenets, this Epiſtle of *Epicurus*'s, render'd by me Word for Word from the Original, is a Piece which merits a much better Place in my Eſteem than his laſt VVill and Teſtament, where he does not only play Booty againſt himſelf, as before, but treſpaſſes too upon the Gravity that became his Beard. You muſt needs remember how pertinent and how large a ſhare of that Book of his, which I mention'd before, is beſtow'd to make out, *Mortem nihil ad nos pertinere, That Death touches not our Copy-hold*, becauſe abſolute Inſenſibility is the Conſequence of Diſſolution; and an abſolute Inſenſibility has no manner of Effect upon us. Here, by the way, he ſhou'd have deliver'd himſelf with a little more Art and Perſpicuity. He tells us, that *abſolute Inſenſibility is the Conſequence of Diſſolution*, but forgets to let us know what he means by *Diſſolution*. Let it ſuffice agen that I can gueſs at his Meaning: I'll only ask, why, if *Diſſolution* or *Death* puts an end to Senſe, and ſo nothing ſucceeds that can affect us, he was pleas'd to provide ſo quaintly and preciſely, *That his Heirs* Amynomachus *and* Timocrates *defray ſuch Expences as* Hermachus *in his Diſcretion ſhou'd appoint for the annual Celebration of* Epicurus's *Birth-day in the Month* Gamelion: Item, *That Monthly, upon*

pon the Twentieth Day of the Moon's Age, Honour of Himself and Metrodorus, *they ou'd find the Expences of a genteel Enter-inment for all such Persons as had been his ompanions, and concurr'd with him in his hilosophy.* Such a *Codicil*, if the Testator ad been a Country Gentleman of Gaiety nd Good Humour, might have pass'd well nough: But a Sage *Adept*, and one too nat peculiarly prides himself in his Natu-l Philosophy, might have understood etter things than to encourage the Vulgar rror of the *Return of Birth-days.* As if were conceivable how the same numeri-l Day, upon which a Man's born, shou'd ome over again: Or indeed, one exactly circumstantiated, 'till at least, after the evolution of many Thousands of Years, ll the Heavenly Bodies recover the very me Points and Positions which they had ttain'd upon that Day. *'Tis Nonsense, the onceit of the World about Birth-Days.* Well, ut the World thinks otherwise: As if I did ot know that! But whether it does, or oes not, wherefore, in the name of Wonder, hou'd *Epicurus* desire to be thus aggrandiz'd fter his Decease? Why shou'd he settle a Revenue for that Purpose in his Will, when he had stamp'd it upon your Minds or an Oracular Truth, that nothing after Death can have any Effect upon us? I'm afraid

afraid the Man improv'd himſelf very litt
by his Travels through his innumerab
Worlds and unmeaſurable Regions! H
own Tutor, *Democritus*, that ſet him u
(not to refer you to others) wou'd nev
have made ſo falſe a Step as this. But if I
muſt have a Day ſet apart and obſerv'd, t
Day whereon he came into the World w
hardly ſo proper as the Day whereon I
firſt became a Philoſopher: Saving (you'
ſay) that unleſs he had been born, he cou
never have become ſuch. No, nor unleſs h
Great Grandmother too had been born befo
him! Believe me, *Torquatus*, 'tis for the Illit
rate and Obſcure Part of Mankind to leave
Salary for the Commemoration of their N
tivities. I'll forbear making any Reflexion
for Quietneſs ſake, upon the Method yo
Epicureans have laid down to your ſelves c
paſſing the *Feſtival*, and how you expo
your ſelves to the Raillery of the Wits up
on that Score. But this I will maintai
that it was much more incumbent upon hi
Followers to have *Epicurus*'s *Birth-day* kep
among themſelves, than it was decent i
him Formaly to order the *Solemnization* i
his Will. To return to the Subject of *Pai*
which was that we digreſs'd from when w
began upon diſſecting the Epiſtle: I'll caſt al
that Part of the Controverſie upon this ſho
Concluſion, *That Man that is actualy involv*

i

n the Greateſt of Evils cannot be Happy, at eaſt ſo long as he's involv'd. But a Wiſe Man is always Happy, and yet ſometimes in Pain. Therefore Pain is not the Greateſt of Evils. Don't hope to turn the Edge of this Argument with your wonted Suggeſtion, That it's the Part of a Wiſe Man to chew upon paſt Felicities, and abdicate the Remembrance of paſt Afflictions. Teach me irſt how I ſhall retain or forget Things, juſt is I've a Mind to't. When *Simonides* (or whoever it was) proffer'd *Themiſtocles* to render him a Maſter in the Art of Memory: *The Art of Forgetfulneſs, Themiſtocles* old him, *he wou'd thank him for; that is, how he might forget all that he wiſh'd to forget, becauſe he remember'd already more than he deſir'd to remember.* This was a very pithy and ſharp Reply. To enjoyn us Forgetfulneſs at large is very *Deſpotical Philoſophy.* If you pleaſe to conſider, not *Manlius* himſelf cou'd have ſet us a harder Task than a down-right Impoſſibility. And what if after all it is realy a Pleaſure to recount thoſe Difficulties thro' which we've buſtled? What if the Proverb which ſays, *Jucundi acti labores, The ſweeteſt Calms are after Storms*; or the Tragedian (*Euripides*) if I can do him Reaſon in *Latin*, for the *Epicureans* have worn the *Greek* Thread-bare, *Suavis laborum eſt præteritorum memoria.*

How

How lively are the Joys we taſt
In recollecting Troubles paſt!

What if theſe have more of Truth and Sc
dity in them than all your pond'rous Inſti
ctions? On t'other Hand, as for your *Bo*
Præterita, your *Paſt Felicities*, were th
but of the right Kind, ſuch as, for Examp
Caius Marius's Victories (the Reaction
which Scenes in his Imagination might v
ry well ſupport him, tho' an Exile, a Be
gar, and laid up in a Moraſs) Then wou
we attend to you, and ſhake Hands wi
you; being ſenſible, that were a Wiſe M
to forgo the Remembrance of his own gre
Reſolves and Enterprizes, the Happineſs
his Life wou'd in ſome Meaſure be Defecti
and Unfiniſh'd. But it is a Recapitulatic
of Pleaſures formerly enjoy'd, and tho
proper to the Body, which refines the Hap
pineſs of Life in your Account, unleſs yo
will admit other Pleaſures, and then yo
muſt forego your Aſſertion, That all th
Pleaſures of the Mind are included in it
Communications with the Body. If th
Revival of a paſt Pleaſure of the Body up
on the Memory affects us with ſuch Delight
Ariſtotle was a *Blockhead* for making ſuc
ſport with that Epitaph of *Sardanapalus* up
on himſelf: *Here lies the Aſſyrian Monarch*
that, when he left the World, carry'd off all hi
Luſt.

Luſts and his Pleaſures with him; as if, quoth *Ariſtotle*, he had the Art of embalming them in the Grave for his own Uſe, tho' in his Life-time he cou'd never prolong the Senſe of them beyond thoſe few Moments the Fruition continu'd: For All Pleaſure of the Body is very ſwift, and, as he obſerves, Momentary from its earlieſt Commencement; beſides that the Tokens it generally leaves us to remember it by are *Smart* and *Pennance*. How much more ſincere the Happineſs of *Africanus*, while he addreſſes his Country in thoſe Incomparable Lines, *Deſine*, *Roma*, *vos hoſtes* &c. *No more*, *Imperial* Rome, *thy Rivals dread*——

Namq; tibi monumenta mei peperere labores.
With Trophies have my Toils thy Tow'rs adorn'd.

He hugs himſelf upon the Recollection of paſt Drudgery, not of any departed *Pleaſures*, as you adviſe. He will not exerciſe his Memory with any Matters of Meditation that reſpected the Delight of the *Carcaſs*; in which the *Epicurean* is ſo totaly and irrecoverably immers'd. Further; How will you convince us of that which you affirm ſo roundly, that all the Pleaſures and Pains of the Mind have an immediate Dependance upon the Pleaſures and Pains

Pains of the Body? I am now in Conference with *Torquatus*, and to him I appeal for an Anſwer to the Queſtion, Whether he never met with any Thing that purely by its own Impreſſions gave him a preſent Delight? I will not inſtance in Worth and Honeſty, nor the Idea of any Virtue, but in Matters which I've mention'd above of a much inferiour Significancy; every Oration or Poem you either compoſe or peruſe; every piece of Hiſtory or Geography you conſult; nay, or any good Statue or Piece of Painting; the Recreations of the Theaters and Fields, or a pleaſant Rural Retreat, as, ſuppoſe *Lucullus*'s: (perhaps if I had nam'd your own, you'd have took Shelter There, and I might have fallen under Correction for placing it in my Catalogue of Things remote from the Subſtance of the Body) But is e'er a one of theſe proper to the Eſſence of the Body? Or does it affect you with Pleaſure immediately from it ſelf? If you will ſtand to the former, much good may it do you with your Obſtinacy; but if you will allow the latter, then you muſt throw all *Epicurus*'s Pleaſure over-board. To come forward; The Pleaſures and Pains of the Mind, you are confident, muſt be greater than thoſe of the Body, which is only ſenſible of what's actualy preſent, whereas the Mind moreover col-

ollects into it self Things Past and Future. ut how will you make it out, I pray, that nother who rejoices upon my Account is ller of Joy than Myself? The Pleasure the Body conveys an Occasion of Plea- re to the Mind, and yet you will have it, at the Pleasure of the Mind exceeds the leasure of the Body, that is, He that con- ratulates his Friend is in happier Circum- ances than he that is congratulated. Then gen, without discerning the Consequence, ou crown the Happiness of your Man of Visdom with the Perception of the most xquisite *Intellectual Pleasures* infinitely sur- assing those of the Body. Which if true, e will be subject withal to the Perception f *Intellectual Pains* infinitely surpassing nose of the Body. So that sometime or ther, your Man of Uninterrupted Happi- ess becomes of necessity an Object of Commiseration. And This can't be pre- ented, if Pleasure and Pain are to go for he Two Last and *Final Causes*. And there- ore, *Torquatus*, if we wou'd get Intelli- ence of a *Summum Bonum* adequate to the Dignity of Human Nature, we must be ooking out further, and leave Pleasure for Property to the Vouchers you call about ou for the Verity of your *Summum Bonum*, he Brutes; tho even these under the Go- ernance of Instinct, very often set them-

selves

ſelves of their own good Purpoſe to toi
ſom Tasks and Enterprizes, and make it
vident that in the Care they take to pr
pagate their Kind, and nurture their Youn
they ſerve other Ends than thoſe of Pl
ſure. Many of 'em are addicted to th
Labour of Courſing and Wandring up an
down; and others rather chuſe to embod
themſelves into *their* ſort of *Civil Societ*
The Winged World make frequent Diſc
veries of their Apprehenſiveneſs and Me
mory; nay, of a certain kind of Diſciplin
and Piety among 'em. And if theſe An
mals practiſe ſuch Imitations of the Vertue
of the *Rational* as are foreign to *Pleaſure*; I
it not hard that *Man*, of a Nature ſo muc
ſuperiour to that of the Beaſts, ſhall b
ſuppos'd to want all his diſtinguiſhing Emi
nencies; and to reſpect *Vertue* only as th
Tool of Pleaſure? Beſides, if *Pleaſure* b
the *All* of Human Good, the Brutes have
infinitely the Advantage of Us, who
without giving themſelves the leaſt Trouble
crop a luxuriant Variety of the Fruits of the
Earth, as they are put into their Mouths
by the Bounty of Nature; while we very
often, with all the Pains we can take, find
it a difficult matter to glean a Competen-
cy. If 'twere conceivable that Men and
Brutes have the ſame *Summum Bonum* in
Common, how needleſs and ſuperfluous
muſt

muſt we reckon all thoſe Rules and Inſtruments of Art which we lay up and collect, all the Ingenuous and Liberal Studies upon which we employ Ourſelves, and all thoſe Vertues which ſtand within the Compaſs of our Capacities? Are they good for nothing but to ſtuff out *Pleaſure*? Had the Queſtion been put to *Xerxes*, for what end and purpoſe he rigg'd out and mann'd ſo many Sail of Ships, kept in Pay ſo many Troops of *Horſe*, and Companies of *Foot*, damm'd up the *Helleſpont*, cut his Paſſage thro' Mount *Athos*, march'd his Forces over Champion Tracts of the Sea, and render'd the Continent Navigable: Laſtly, why he made a Deſcent with all theſe Forces, and this incredible Violence, into *Greece*; and his Anſwer had been, that his Errand was only to rifle *Hymettus* of its *Honey-Combs*; Without all queſtion we ſhou'd look upon the Inducement to have been as weak as the Attempts were aſtoniſhing. And ſo in the Caſe of a Wiſe Man, well accompliſh'd with all the Particulars of a Generous Education and Vertue, to ſay, that as the other led his *Granadeers* a foot *over-ſea*, and ſteer'd his Fleets over Mountains, *He*, for his part, makes within himſelf the *Tour* of the *Univerſe* —— in order to ſuck a *Honey-Comb* —— No, no, *Torquatus*, our

Beings were beſtow'd for Deſigns and Purpoſes far more excellent and ſublime, as appears upon contemplating the ſeveral Perfections of the Mind, which in its Faculty of Remembrance, keeps a copious Journal of *Ideas* and *Events*; which by its Divining Power penetrates into the Courſe and Train of Things to come; which by a Natural Senſe of Shame bids us lay a Reſtraint upon our Appetites; which aſcertains the Immutable Laws of Juſtice, and the Rights of Human Society; and which arms and eſtabliſhes it ſelf by a Contempt of Pain and Death againſt all the moſt formidable Oppoſitions of Perplexity and Danger. Thus far extended lies the Field of the Mind's Abilities and Properties. Conſult at leiſure the Senſes and the Fabrick of your Body; You'll ſee that theſe too not only concurr with, but are Subſervient and Inſtrumental to the Intereſts of *Vertue*. For peculiar to the Body how many things are there preferable to Pleaſure; Vigour, Health, Activity, Symetry of Features and Proportions? And how many more peculiar to the Mind? which by the moſt Learned of the Ancients was eſteem'd a Celeſtial Ray of the Divinity it ſelf. In good truth were you to have your Will, and *Pleaſure* to be our *Summum Bonum*, there's nothing which we ſhou'd

have

have reaſon to covet with greater Earneſtneſs than to have all our Senſes, Night and Day, inceſſantly ſollicited by the ſprightlieſt Emotions and Extaſies of it. Now the Animal that cou'd be ſatisfy'd to lie thus *Diſſolv'd* from Sun-riſing to Sun-ſetting, with what Face does he aſſume to himſelf the Definition of a Man? And yet the *Cyrenaicks* are ſuch Animals *Profeſt*; and ſo, (which your Modeſty (poor Men!) will not allow you to be) are conſiſtent with Themſelves. Further; let me referr you, not to the more Important Exerciſes neither, which among our Forefathers were made neceſſary to preſerve a Man from the Imputation of *Idleneſs* and *Inſignificancy*, but to the leſſer and purely ornamental Improvements of *Genius*; Was it, ſuppoſe you, for Ends of *Pleaſure*, that *Phidias*, *Polycletus*, *Zeuxis* follow'd their Occupations; not to ſay that *Homer*, *Archilocus*, and *Pindar* ply'd the *Muſe*? Shall a *Mechanick* propoſe worthier Ends to himſelf when he's handling his *Chiſel* or his *Penſil*, than a Man of Character and Authority when he's forming honourable and great Deſigns? Now then, to what Origin ſhall we aſcribe this Error of yours, which has met with ſo general a Reception? That's as eaſily known as this Propoſition, *Whoever makes Pleaſure the Summum Bonum conſults the meaneſt of*

his Powers which are his Appetites, inſtead of attending to the Rational and Diſcurſive. And therefore it may be ſeaſonably demanded, how the Gods (for that there are ſuch Beings your ſelves confeſs) having not the Seat of Pleaſure, Fleſh and Bloud, can be capable of Happineſs? Or if they may be happy, tho' deſtitute of Corporal Pleaſure, why will you not grant alſo that a Wiſe Man may ſpin his own Happineſs out of his own Mind? Examine the Characters Recorded, not by *Homer*, of his *Heroes*, nor by others of *Cyrus*, *Ageſilaus*, *Ariſtides*, *Themiſtocles*, *Philip*, *Alexander* but of our Domeſtick Worthies, and in particular thoſe of your own Family. *There was no Man went beyond him in the Art of ſcrewing up his Pleaſures* you will find never makes a part of the *Encomium*. A little to the ſame Effect run the Inſcriptions of *Monuments*; Witneſs that over the Gate there ——*Uno ore cui plurimæ conſentiunt gentes Populi primarium fuiſſe Virum* ——*To whoſe Memory not a few whole Nations dedicate this Teſtimony, that he was inferiour no way to the beſt of his Fellow-Citizens.* And is it ſuppoſeable, that when ſo many Nations clubb'd this Teſtimony to *Calatinus*, they meant only, That no Body had a happier Hand and Skill at contriving and compounding his Pleaſures? Or what

if we ſhou'd ſtroak our Young People on the Head, and tell them we conceive a good Hope and Opinion of them, when they betray an Inclination and Reſolution to proſtitute themſelves and all their Actions to their own private Intereſts? Can any thing be more apparent than what Diſorder and Confuſion ſuch Encouragements muſt bring into the World? Seeing they wou'd effectualy put a ſtop to all Entercourſes of Benefits and Obligations, and ſo untie the Bands of Publick Unity and Agreement; it being ſo far from a Benefit, that it is down right Uſury and Stock-jobbing, when one Man takes Intereſt for what he accommodates another with, and conſequently he that ſupplies me upon thoſe Terms, brings me under no manner of Friendly Obligation. If *Pleaſure* is to rule the Roaſt, farewel, a long farewel to the very brighteſt of *Vertues*. Convertibly; When the Principle of Honour and Honeſty is ſhut out of Doors, I cannot underſtand what ſhou'd hinder even a Man of Wiſdom from letting into the room of it a thouſand Villanies and Vices. To draw to a Concluſion; (for 'twere tedious and endleſs to proſecute the Diſpute as far as 'twill run) That is the only true and meritorious *Vertue*, 'tis certain, which blocks up the very Avenues of *Pleaſure*: Whereof your own Senſe of Things will ſatisfie you much

better than I can. Turn your Thoughts into Your ſelf, and be determin'd by Your ſelf, whether you ſhou'd rather chuſe to paſs all the Stages of Life in a Stream of perpetual Pleaſures and that Tranquillity of Indolence which we hear of ſo often, not forgetting t'other Branch which (were it not impoſſible) you wou'd incorporate into your Happineſs, an abſolute Unapprehenſiveneſs of Future Pain; or (like your ſelf, the buſineſs of whoſe Life it has been to relieve and protect the Helpleſs, and to do Mankind all the Good that lay in your Power) to go in Queſt of *Herculean Labours* and *Hardſhips* (*Ærumnæ*) the Tragical Word, which (no Affront to the God that underwent 'em) our Progenitors made uſe of to ſignifie thoſe Labours, which at the ſame time they thought challeng'd every Man's Imitation. And therefore I ſhou'd next enſnare you with a very vexatious Queſtion, but I'm afraid leaſt, when provok'd you ſhou'd affirm, That by all the operoſe and mighty Services which *Hercules* himſelf did the World, his only intent was to force his way to *Pleaſure* —— Here I gave over Speaking, and *Torquatus* told me, If he pleas'd he cou'd repay me in my Kind, but firſt he wou'd take ſome Opportunity to diſcourſe an old Acquaintance or Two that

were

were greater Proficients and Maſters of the Argument than himſelf. You mean, ſaid I, the Deſerving and Learned Pair, *Syro* and *Philodemus*. You've hit upon them, ſaid he. But for the preſent, ſaid I, *Triarius* is to ſtand forth and be our Umpire. That were a good one indeed! reply'd *Torquatus*, and laugh'd. As for your ſelf, you treat us with Civility; but he's the verieſt *Vixin* of a *Stoick*——— And hereafter, ſaid *Triarius*, you'll find me much alter'd for the Worſe. I've hoarded up all that was urg'd againſt you, and ſo ſoon as ever your Complices have made you Tight agen, look to't, I ſhall try my ſtrength upon you. And ſo we broke up to reſt our ſelves.

TULLY

OF

Moral Ends.

BOOK III.

THE Buſineſs of the foregoing Book, my *Brutus*, has been to take down the Pretenſions of *Pleaſure*, and ake her Truckle to *Diguity* and *Greatneſs* *Mind*; and that I have done this effectu- y even *Pleaſure* muſt acknowledge, if left her ſelf, and not allow'd any (or at leaſt ot a very perverſe and incorrigible) *Coun- l.* For ſhame ſhe can perſiſt no longer in er Defiances to *Vertue*, no longer magni- e that which is only grateful to the Sen- s above that which is Honeſt and Honou- able, or thoſe Enjoyments which glitter upon

upon our Corporeal Organs above a so
and a ſteady, firm Diſpoſition of Soul. N
then 'tis time to take leave of the *Syren*,
queathing her this Caution, that ſhe ne
more let us catch her ſporting out of
own *Royalty*, and that ſo ſerious and ſole
an Argument as the preſent one, be
more ſet upon and detain'd by the w
ton Importunacy of her Blandiſhments.
ing therefore *Pleaſure* is ſo far from be
the *Summum Bonum*, and *Indolence* at
great a Diſtance, the ſame Objections
manner lying againſt both, we muſt lau
out agen in ſearch of our *Summum Bon*
taking this along with us, that there can
no ſuch Thing, unleſs *Vertue*, the great
cellency of All, makes up a good part
it. So that the Controverſie in which I
now going to engage the *Stoicks*, muſt
manag'd with greater Intention and a
ſer Addreſs than that which happen'd w
Torquatus; not as tho' I proceeded carel
then, but the Common-Places and Sug
ſtions of your Advocates for Pleaſure
at beſt, but very Shallow and Unartifici
as themſelves are by no means Quaint
Subtle Diſputants, nor qualify'd to cre
an Adverſary much Trouble. *Epicurus*,
One, has pronounc'd it unneceſſay to co
to any Ratiocinations in reference to *Pl*
ſure, becauſe the Senſes are the Pro

Jud

ges of it, and we need go no further Inſtructions concerning it than to their nuations. On which account it was, t as *Torquatus* went thro' his Part of the pute with an eaſie Plainneſs, avoiding all ricacies and Sophiſtical Fetches, ſo I've leavour'd to anſwer him with an equal arneſs and Facility: Whereas, I need tell you, the *Stoicks* affect ſuch Meds of Diſputing as may beſt hamper and poſe upon us, of which Method we ſtand re in danger than the *Greeks*, becauſe we ve a new Sett of Words to coin for the plication of a new Sett of Notions. Nor l any Man that is tolerably tinctur'd with arning make a Wonder of this, wellowing that the Profeſſours of every Diguiſhing and Uncommon Art aſſign eir Terms of Art according as the Inſtruents and Exigences proper to each Art quire the Uſe of thoſe Terms. Thus e *Logicians* and *Natural Philoſophers* have Language to themſelves made up of ords which are not in familiar Uſe among the *Greeks*. The *Geometricians*, *Muſicians*, and *Grammarians* obſerve their ſeveal Idioms and Dialects. Nay, the *Rhetoricians* themſelves, tho' the Subſtance of eir Art lies wholly in Judicial and Deamatory Pleadings, word their own Rules their own Forms, and in the Livery

of

of their own *Appellatives.* To ſte
ver theſe Polite and Liberal Arts,
Mechanicks cou'd never make any thin
their Manufacture, did they not invent
Names of Things for themſelves as
Body elſe underſtands. Even in an Em
ſo Unelegant and Ruſtick as that of *A*
culture, whatever has any Relation to it,
Province in it, has receiv'd its *Proper N*
And therefore 'twere ſtrange if *Philoſop*
might not make the ſame Bargain for th
ſelves, ſeeing *Philoſophy* is no leſs t
the *Art of Living*, and ordinary Modes
Expreſſion will not ſerve a Man's Purp
when he treats upon that Subject.
have none of 'em ſo much abounded
Terms, as the *Stoicks*. *Zeno*, the Foun
of the Sect, brought nothing new i
Play except Words. And if *Greece* has
far indulg'd her moſt eminent Scholar
that when they had ſprung a new Not
they ſhou'd dreſs it in new Words, n
withſtanding the ſuppos'd Fertility of th
Language; certainly a *Roman*, and the fi
that has made ſuch an Attempt in
Mother-Tongue, may very plauſibly cla
the ſame Privilege: And yet, having fi
repreſented it as a Grievance either th
the *Greeks* or Thoſe of our own People w
have revolted to them, ſhou'd ſcandali
the *Latin* Tongue as if 'twere Scanty a

Barr

Barren, and not indeed more Copious than theirs; I muſt confeſs it will coſt my Brain ſome Pangs before I can make as Authentick Latin of the Terms adapted to their *Acts* and *Hypotheſes*, (not to mention any of our own) as good Latin, I ſay, as the general Titles deliver'd down to us from our Fore-fathers, of *Philoſophy*, *Rhetorick*, *Logick*, *Grammar*, *Geometry*, *Muſick*. Not but Names might have been found for all theſe in the *Latin* Tongue; However ſince Use has made them ſo, we will accept of theſe Names for our own. Thus much may ſuffice with Relation to Words and Names. But as to the *Ideas* themſelves whereof they are the Signs, whether, my *Brutus*, I ſhou'd venture to ſend my Thoughts to ſuch an exquiſite Philoſopher (and in ſo excellent a *Road* of Philoſophy, as Your ſelf,) I've been a long time unreſolv'd, tho' well aſſur'd I were not to be forgiven if I preſum'd thus farr, as pretending to make you Wiſer and more Knowing. That never enter'd into my Thoughts, my Intention in the preſent Addreſs being not to inform you in thoſe Parts of Knowledge in which no Body is more converſant than *Brutus*, but to repoſe and ſhroud my ſelf under your Name and Authority, and becauſe I'm ſure to find you a fair Arbiter, as well as a great Proficient in theſe Phi-

Philoſophical Diſputes. Having premis thus much I ſhall now beſpeak your won ed Attention, and your impartial Judgme upon the Merits of an Argumentati Conteſt which was manag'd againſt Me t your Unkle, that Incomparable, that mo than Sublunary Man. Being, you mu know, at my Country-Seat and having o caſion to make Uſe of ſome Books th were in the Library of *Lucullus*, then Child, I went to his *Villa* my ſelf to fet them, as I ordinarily did; where who ſhou'd I caſt my Eye upon but *Ma cus Cato* ſeated in the Library with Volum of *Stoical* Authours pil'd up round hi And this was no more than ſuitable to h Love of Reading, ſo very vehement a conſtant, that never concerning himſe for the idle Reflexions the Populace mad upon him, he wou'd ſit conning-over h Leſſon in the Senate-Houſe, 'till ſuch tim as the Senatours were all come togethe but never ſo as to neglect the Publick Bu ſineſs and Proceedings. By which yo may gueſs what a *Gormandizer of Folio's* h was (forgive the Indecency of the Word when he had got the Opportunity of ſuc a *Vacation*, and the Conveniency of ſuc a Noble *Collection*. No ſooner had w ſpy'd one another but he quitted his Seat and according to cuſtomary *Prelim*

narie

ies upon a ſuddain Encounter, What ys he) brings you hither? I ſuppoſe from ur *Country-Home*, where I had certainly n with you before now if I had known your Arrival. Why Yeſterday (ſay'd I) City was all taken up and in Deſtracti- with the Theatrical Entertainments that re exhibited; So I took that Opportu- y of leaving it in the Evening, and am w come hither upon my own Errand, iich is to carry back with me a parcel Books for my preſent Uſe. By the y, methinks 'tis Pity, *Cato*, that our lit- *Lucullus* is not better acquainted yet th all this vaſt Treaſure he is Maſter of. you'd have him perſuaded to look upon s as the beſt-furniſh'd Apartment in his ouſe. For I have a hearty Love and enderneſs for him, and therefore hope you ll remember how much it is your Duty breed him up to the Pattern of his Fa- er, of our old Friend *Cæpio*, and of Your lf his near Relation. You'll perceive I ve reaſon for my Sollicitude, as you can- ot but be ſenſible how much I once ho- our'd the Perſon, and ſtill reverence the lemory of *Cæpio*, verily believing that ere he now alive we ſhou'd have him a- ong the Firſt-rate Supporters of the Com- on-Wealth; and by what an entire riendſhip and Concurrence of Sentiments

I was wedded to that Mirrour of Excelle
Lucullus, who ſtands at this time *in I*
before me. You are highly to be comme
ed (ſay'd *Cato*) for the Regard you ſh
to the Memory of thoſe Two Perſons, a
the Affection you bear to the you
Succeſſour of the Family that remains,
ſpecialy conſidering they both by *Will*
pointed you a ſhare in the Guardianſhip
their Children. Nor ſhall I be wanting
that Duty whereof you admoniſh n
neither muſt you in aſſiſting me to diſcha
it. And let me tell you, the Youth gi
us already very pregnant Intimations o
Sweet and Modeſt Diſpoſition and a la
Capacity of Soul. But then you may
member how little a while ſince he came
to the World. I do ſo, (ſay'd I) and y
account this a proper Seaſon for him to
trying at thoſe Introductory Studies a
Improvements, which the more haſte
makes to perfect himſelf in, the better a
the ſooner will he be qualify'd to ſtep i
to Greater Affairs. Of this Matter (ſay
Cato) we ſhall be oblig'd frequently and
Sett-purpoſe to conferr and deliberate.
preſent, if you pleaſe, let us chooſe Each h
Seat (which we did) and ſo far ſatisfie m
Curioſity as to tell me what Books they c
be which you, that have ſo good a Study
your own, are come hither for? Some *Ar*
ſtoteli

ſtotelian Treatiſes : I am ſure to meet with 'em here, and deſign to take 'em Home with me to beſtow that leiſure upon, which You and I (you know) can command but ſeldom. And are there (ſay'd he) no hopes of your Converſion to *Stoiciſm*? No, not of *Cicero's*, who had always all the Reaſon he poſſibly cou'd have to admit nothing for *Good* beſides *Vertue*? Not more Reaſon neither (ſay'd I) than there is for your not affixing new Names to Things when we are both agree'd upon the Things themſelves. For the Difference between us is not in the *Principle*, but wholly in the *Expreſſion*. Pardon me there: (ſay'd he) As often as you make any Thing *Deſireable* and a *Real Good* beſide that which is preciſely *Honeſtum* (*Honeſt Honourable* and *Vertuous*) you totaly eclipſe and for ever ſupplant what is Such. Loftily and Majeſticaly aſſerted! But then carry it along with you, *Cato*, (ſay'd I) that even *Pyrrho* and *Ariſto*, tho' they ſtand up for an exact *Parity* in the *Goodneſs* of Things, talk with as much Oſtentation as you can do for your Life. May a Body enquire what's your Opinion of 'em? What's *my Opinion!* (ſay'd he) 'Tis this, That all the Good, Great, Juſt, and Vertuous Members of our Common-Wealth, whether known to us by Fame or in Perſon, who excluſively of the Advantages

of Learning, and purely upon the Sincerity of their Intentions have acquitted themſelves like Gallant and Glorious Men, were much more happily inſtructed by the Dictates of Natural Reaſon than any *Philoſophy* in the World, which had taught them to reckon upon any Thing as *Good* or *Ill* beſide *Moral Honeſty* or *Turpitude*, cou'd have inſtructed them. All the other Schemes of Philoſophical Inſtitution are Some leſs, Others more valuable: But in ſhort, I am ſo far from allowing that any Diſcipline whatſoever extending the Denomination of *Good* or *Evil* to any thing remote from the Region of *Moral Vertue*, can conduce to the rectifying and advancing of Human Nature, that I am ſure it muſt debauch it, there being left us no Means of proving *Happineſs of Life* to be the Effect of *Vertue*, when once we have ſurrender'd this Propoſition, *Vertue is the only Good.* And if *Happineſs of Life* be not the Effect of *Vertue*, where's the Need to buſy our ſelves about any ſuch thing as Philoſophy? If *Unhappineſs* is Incident to a VViſe Man, as great as is the Glory and Reputation of *Vertue*, I do not ſee what it has for which we ſhou'd value it. All This, *Cato*, (ſay'd I) you might have urg'd had you been Pupil to *Pyrrho* or *Ariſto*, and as much to the purpoſe, for theſe

Two,

Two, you know well enough, determine *Vertue* to be not only the *Sovereign Good*, but the *Sole*, and that's what Your self wou'd have. And if it hold, the other Conſequence you are Zealous for is as Neceſſary, That every VViſe Man's Happineſs is Conſtant and Continual. So that it lies upon you to receive as your Favourites thoſe Philoſophers and their Opinion. Soft and Fair! (ſay'd he) To the Province of Vertue it belongs, the ſingling out and defining of what is moſt conformable to the Meaſures of Nature. And therefore, as the Parties aforeſaid have reduc'd all things to a level of Indifference, and ſo made them equaly Eligible, they have struck at the very Vitals of *Vertue*. Excellently obſerv'd, (ſay'd I) but while nothing paſſes with you for *Good* but meer *Vertue* and *Honeſty*, ſuppoſe you a *Stoick* has better Pretence to abrogate the diſcriminating Properties of other Things? I know not (ſay'd he) what you mean by *abrogating*. I think I leave them as I found them. Be *Vertue*, (ſay'd I) or *Honeſty*, or *Moral Rectitude*, *Goodneſs*, or *Decorum*, (the greater Variety of Names we give it, the better we ſhall ſet forth its Nature) be it our Sole and Single *Good*, and no other will remain worthy of our Regard; As agen, let *Moral Evil*, *Turpitude*, *Diſhoneſty*, *Diſhonourableneſs*

bleneſs, *Pravity*, *Flagitiouſneſs*, *Pollution* (to explain this *Idea* likewiſe to the beſt Advantage) let This be an Evil by it ſelf and the only one we are in danger of, and then 'tis the only one from which we ſhou'd be careful to preſerve our ſelves. You take me up (ſay'd he) before I'm down, fore ſeeing what more I was deſigning to add. And therefore not to try my Teeth upon your Scraps of Argument, I will rather with your Approbation ſpend a Portion of thoſe Hours we have now to ſpare, in giving a compleat Account of *Zeno*'s and the *Stoical* Philoſophy. 'Twill do might well, (ſay'd I) and go a great way towar expediting a due Concluſion of our Debate Now then to make an Experiment, (ſay'd he for the *Stoical* Hypotheſis is full of perplexing Difficulties aud Obſcurities! Th New Terms which They ſignify'd their New Notions by, tho' in proceſs of Time they'r become Familiar and Trite, appear'd Novel and Strange to the *Greeks* themſelves And therefore well may they look awkard and uncooth in *Latin*. Trouble not Yourſelf (ſay'd I) about that. *Zeno* took th Liberty of expreſſing thoſe new Thought which preſented themſelves by Words a Unknown; And ſhall *Cato* be deny'd th ſame Privilege? Not that it will be requiſite to do like a Pedantick Tranſlatour whe

when a Word either more or leſs in Uſe might be had exactly appoſite to the Senſe, to ſqueeze the Words in the Tranſlation, one by one, out of the Words of the Original. Whenever I am brought to ſuch a Pinch, my way is to render by a Circumlocution what the *Greeks* have thrown into a ſingle Word. Or if a Man cannot pick out a proper *Latin* Word, I will by no means debarr him from taking the *Greek*. 'Twere hard if we might call a *Horſes's Harneſs Ephippia*, and the *Drunkard's Jolly Full Bowls Acratophora*; and yet muſt not inſtead of *Præpoſita* and *Rejecta* (Words that ſignify *Things comparatively Eligible*, or *not at all Eligible*) ſubſtitute from the *Greek Proegmena* and *Apoproegmena*, notwithſtanding that *Præpoſita* and *Rejecta* will ſerve as well. I thank you (ſaid he) for the Succours you've lent, and ſhall adopt the Two *Latin* Words you recommend, requeſting you to ſet me forward when you find me at a ſtand for want of any other. The *Bold* (ſay'd I) are *Fortune's Darlings*: However I'll ſecond you with all my Strength. Only make haſte and begin, for 'tis a Divine one and the very Beſt we cou'd have chosen, That Exerciſe for which we are preparing. Then he ſet out: That every *Living Creature* is from its Nativity (whence begins the *Philoſophical Epoch*) inſtigated

compell'd by the Conſtitution of its *Being*, to love *it*, and endeavour its own Safety and Preſervation; to take a Pleaſure in every thing that may contribute thereunto; to keep as far off as it can from its own *Diſſolution*, and whatever may further it. is a Poſition eſtabliſh'd among the Men of my Party, and that upon the Evidence which *Infants* give in, before they've ye ſcarce taſted of *Pleaſure* or *Pain*, by reaching after what they think will be beneficial to them, and turning away from what they fear will incommode them. And this they wou'd never do, were they not well pleas'd with their own natural Condition, and afraid of a *Change*. Neither can it be accounted for, how they ſhou' be deſirous of any Thing at all, if they were not conſcious of their own Exiſtence and Perceptions, and endear'd to Themſelves and their own Intereſt by that Conſciouſneſs. And thus the Origin of Deſire riſes out of the Principle of *Self-Love*. Among the natural Springs and Sources whereof there are very few *Stoicks* who reckon Pleaſure. The Reaſon is, becauſe *Pleaſure* be liſted in the Number of thoſe Things which Nature has made *Primarily Deſireable*, we ſhou'd be thereby powerfully induc'd to purſue very lewd and unjuſtifyable Courſes; and to me this is a mo

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ſatisfactory Reaſon. Then for a ſufficient one, why, in courſe, we are ſo kindly affection'd toward thoſe Things which Nature has inſcrib'd of *Prime Account*, we have it here, that as for *the Parts of the Body*, there is no one but if left to his Choice, wou'd rather his own ſhou'd be entire, perfect, and well-limb'd, than defective, unſerviceable, diſtorted. And as for *Ideas* and *right Conceptions* of Things, (perhaps you had rather have me ſay καταλήψεις and may underſtand that better) theſe, as being ſo many Vehicles and Subjects of Truth, we ſuppoſe to be very acceptable to our Minds upon their own Account. And of this we receive a convincing Proof from the Behaviour of young Children, who, as little as they gain by it, rejoice and exult, if at any time without the help of others they've compaſs'd a new Invention or Diſcovery. Furthermore, Arts and Sciences are in our Eſteem worthy for their own ſakes to be propagated amongſt us, not only becauſe conſider'd at large they have ſomething in them that deſerves Cultivation, but alſo, becauſe as well the *Deductions* as the *Principles* upon which they proceed are Rational and Methodical: And with us it goes for an undoubted Truth, that there is nothing ſo contrary and deteſtable to Hu-

man Nature as to yield our Assent to an ap parent Falsity. The *Limbs* or *Parts* o the Body are of *Two Sorts*; either such a Nature has adapted to proper Uses an Functions, as the Hands, the Legs, th Feet, and the *Internal Organs*; and abou the various Offices and Operations of Thes the Physicians themselves cannot agree a mong themselves; Or such as have no ma nifest Use, but serve only to beautifie, a the Peacock's Tail, the Variegating Plume upon the *Neck of a Dove*, and the *Tuf* and *Beard* of a Man. I am sorrry that my present Matter will not admit of more Dif fusive and Lively Periods. We are got a mong the first general Branches of Divi sion in Nature, and to them all Exuberan cy and Fluency of Expression is foreign, not that otherwise I should be very stu dious of it. Tho 'tis impossible but that when we are discoursing upon Subjects of main Importance, *Expression* will force its way, and bring along with it both *Weight* and *Lustre*. I deny not (said I) but you are so far in the right; and yet if what is attempted upon a Material Subject, runs easy and clear, the Manager, in my Opi nion, has perform'd his part to Admirati on. 'Tis for every School-boy to spread his Treasure of *Rhetorical Foliages* upon a Thesis of this kind. A Man of Learning

and

ıd Senſe will ſtudy and endeavour all he ın to diſcourſe of it with Plainneſs and erſpicuity. Having then (continu'd he) remis'd as much as is ſufficient concern- ıg the aforeſaid *Principles*, we ſhall now dvance to certain Conſequences which un- voidably reſult from them. The Divi- on that comes next in my way is of *hings* into *Æſtimabilia* and *Ineſtimabilia*, *hoſe that are truly Valuable* and *thoſe that re not*. That which is truly Valuable is ıe ſame, as I conceive, with that which is onſonant to Nature, or by means of hich ſuch Valuable Properties accrue to ɔmething elſe as render it very well worthy f our Choice. This *Valuableneſs Zeno* calls ξία. And that which is not truly Valuable juſt the Contrary to that which is Valua- le. Now this Foundation being laid, That noſe things which are exactly agreable nd calculated to the Rules of Nature, re to be clos'd with and accepted for hemſelves, and the contrary to be reject- d; The firſt Office or Duty (for ſo I in- erpret the Word καθῆκον) is to look to, nd ſecure our ſelves in the Condition and Conſtitution that is proper to our Species; The Second, That we faſten upon thoſe Things which hold an exact Conformity vith the Methods and Order of Nature, nd that we guard againſt the Contrary.

And

And after we have pass'd this *Choice* an *Refusal*, then follows thirdly, *Cum offic selectio*, *Choice in Conjunction and Union wi Duty*, and this *Choice* a standing and pe petual one, ever fixt and constant and pe fectly accommodated to the Nature Things. And here we have the first Eme gency and Notice of something real Good, and our first Obligation to engag Ourselves to those Things which are cor sonant to the Measures of Nature. B when we have run a longer Thread *Knowledge*, (ἔννοια in the Original) and b held the Relation of Duties to one anothe and the Harmony of all in Consort, w rate them far above those things whic we had reckon'd upon before, and th are we brought by Knowledge and Reaso to conclude that the great *Summum Bonu* of Man, which deserves to be the chi Subject of our Praises, and the chief Ob ject of our Desires, stands upon the Groun work of that ὁμολογία, as the *Stoicks* ca it, or if you please, in our Language, *Co venientia* (*Coincidence* and *Harmony*) sinc in this lies that *Bonum* or *Good*, to whic all Vertuous and Worthy Actions must b referr'd, and the *Good* of *Vertue* itself, whic tho' a *subsequent Good*, is nevertheless re commended purely upon its own Authorit and Excellency; whereas the *Prima Natura*

th

e Things which offer themſelves firſt in or-
r of Nature are none of them *Irreſpe-*
ively and *For themſelves* to be priz'd. And
ecauſe upon the *Initia Naturæ*, *the firſt*
neral Proviſions in Nature, the Duties we
ere mentioning, ſubſiſt, they are to be
ook'd upon as Subordinate to them and
ependent of them; ſo that in the Upſhot,
ne Center to which all Duties tend, is that
f the *Principia Naturæ* (*The firſt general*
rinciples in Nature.) Not that theſe con-
itute the *Laſt Good of all*, the Firſt Ana-
ogies and Coherences in Nature not in-
luding Vertuous Actions or Practices,
which, according to what I obſerv'd be-
ore, are the Fruits and Conſequences of
hem. Still theſe Actions are among thoſe
Things which hold an exact Conformity
with the Meaſures of Nature, and engage
us to bid higher for them than for any of
the reſt. Now here to foreſtall a Miſtake
which ſome People may be apt to run up-
on, as if we introduc'd a Couple of *Ul-*
tima Bona, (*Ut'moſt Goods*) let it be remem-
ber'd that when a Man is to dart a Spear,
or ſhoot an Arrow at a *White*, which in
the Parallel anſwers to our *Ultimum in*
bonis, (*Laſt and Furtheſt Good*) he muſt
neglect no Motion or Condition which
may bring his Weapon to the Mark, and
thus the ſame Perſon does whatever is ne-
ceſ-

ceſſary to be done, to the end that h may hit within the *White*, and likewiſe t the end that no means may be omitted t render him ſucceſsful, with this differenc ſtill between the Two Ends, that the for mer is, as the *Summum Bonum* in Life, th *Laſt* and *Outermoſt*, but the latter, name ly, that no means may be omitted t make the *Flight* Proſperous, does not im port a *Good* to be priz'd and deſir'd for it ſelf, but only to be choſen and us'd as *Conducive* one. And in regard all *Office* and *Duties* whatſoever, ariſe out of th *firſt general Principles in Nature*, it muſ needs be that *Human Wiſdom* reſults alſ from thoſe *Principles*. Neither is it more wonderful that theſe *General Principle* ſhould conduct us to *Wiſdom*, and that we ſhou'd ſet more by *Wiſdom* afterwards, than before by theſe *General Principles* tha brought Her and Us together, than what is known every day, that he who is hand-ed by another into the Acquaintance of a Third Perſon, comes to eſteem the Third Perſon above him to whom he owes the Knowledge of him. The Members and Organs of our Body are evidently fram'd and diſpos'd for a ſtated and uniform Diſcharge of the Offices and Operations proper to the Animal Life. In like manner the Inclinations and Propenſities of the

Mind

lind (ſignify'd in *Greek* by ὁρμαὶ) and ſo eaſon too, be it never ſo perfect and im-rov'd in us, are allotted us not for every ſe we can make of them, but only for ertain Uſes reſpecting the due Govern-ient of our Lives. For Life ought to be ; little left to it ſelf, and as much ty'd) Rules as a *Stage-player* in his *Action*, r a *Dancing-Maſter* in his *Steps*. And a ife ſhap'd by theſe Rules we call a *Well-rder'd* or *a Rational Courſe of Life*. The rt of *Governing*, or the Science of *Medi-ine* has not, I conceive, ſo near an Affi-ity to *Wiſdom* as what I compar'd it to be-ore, the *Geſtures* of a *Player*, or the *Mo-ions* of a *Dancing-Maſter*, becauſe it imme-iately conſiſts in the Exerciſe of itſelf, and ; not to be reduc'd into Act before 'tis con-ummate. Altho the Compariſon will not old throughout between *Wiſdom* and theſe *Two Attainments*, becauſe let the Perfor-nances of a *Player* or a *Dancing-Maſter* be ever ſo Juſt and Excellent, yet they do ot ſingly take in the whole Oeconomy nd Complement of the reſpective Arts. Whereas the entire Subſtance of *Vertue* comes under our particular κατορθώματα, *rectè facta, good and rational Acts*. For it's peculiar to *Wiſdom* in contradiſtinction to all other Arts and Accompliſhments what-ſoever, that it is to itſelf *all in all, and all in*

every

every Part. It were also a meer Madness to pitch a Parallel between the *End* of the Art of Governing or of the Science of Medicine, and the *End* of *Wisdom*; inasmuch as it is the business of *Wisdom* to fortifie and rectifie the Mind, and raise it above the Impressions and Reach of External Accidents, to effect which exceeds the Province of all other Arts and Sciences: As no Body can be thus happily dispos'd, till he has pass'd it into an infallible Dictate, that whatever touches not upon the Confines of *Vertue* or *Vice* is in its own Nature *Uncomparatively Indifferent.* And now let me entertain you with a Tast of those choice Inferences which flow from the Premisses. That it is the last and Final *Good* of Man to take such Measures of Life as quadrate with the Order and the Constitutions of Nature, is prov'd; and that the Life of every Wise Man must be Fortunate and Happy, Independent, never entangled, and always Free and Furnished, unavoidably follows from that Position. By the way you may have taken notice, I presume, that when I speak of the *Last*, or *Final*, or *Principal Good*, (or *End* instead of the *Two former*, *Last*, or *Final Good*) I mean the same by it as the *Greeks* by the Word τέλος. Then as to that grand Article that we shou'd esteem *Vertue*, and no-

)thing elſe to be our *Good*, (a Direction at reaches as far into the Condition of ir Lives, and into Life it ſelf, as into that nd of Philoſophy which we are now)nſidering) I might fetch a large Compaſs *Rhetorick*, and ſet out the Praiſes of it length in the choiceſt Turns of Speech, id the moſt commanding Periods, but at I poſtpone them all to the quick and rding *Concluſions* of the *Stoicks*; as thus, 'hatever is good is Praiſe-worthy; Whatver is Praiſe-worthy is Matter of Vertue id Honour; Therefore whatever is Good, Matter of Vertue and Honour. Can any ing be more cloſely and fairly inferr'd? here's nothing to be found in the Sequel ut what is the genuin Product of the Preiſſes. The *Major* or *Firſt Propoſition*, I now, is uſualy deny'd; as if 'twere not ue, that Whatever is Good is Praiſe-wory (For no Body queſtions but that whatver is Matter of Vertue and Honour is .) But then how extravagant is it to ſupoſe that any Thing which is Good is not eſireable, or that that which is Deſireble is not Pleaſing, or that that which is leaſing is not worthy of our Love, or at that which is worthy of our Love is ot worthy of our Eſteem and Praiſes, and onſequently Matter of Vertue and Hour? Agen, 'tis not a Life of Miſery or with-

without Felicity, but a Life of real Hap-
neſs that a Man may boaſt of, and in ſu
a Life he's allow'd to glory, which y
were not to be ſuffer'd if his Life of Hap
neſs were not a Life of Vertue, and ther
fore Both are the ſame. Neither is a
one worthy of Eſteem and Commendatio
but upon the ſcore of ſome ſignifica
Claim which gives him Poſſeſſion of Cr
dit, Honour, or Happineſs; and what hol
as to the *Man*, holds as to the *Life of t*
Man. Conſequently, if Vertue and H
neſty are the Characteriſticks of a Ha
py Life, nothing but what is Matter
Vertue or Honeſty may paſs for *Go*
To make ſure Work; Let it once be grar
ed, that *Pain* is an *Evil*; and then find n
out a way, if you can, to ſettle, invigora
and confirm the Mind. As 'tis not in t
Power of any Man, that accounts of *Death*
an Evil, not to be afraid on't, nor, in gen
ral, to ſlight or be unconcerned at any M
chief or Evil, be it what it will. And whe
this is once admitted, which was never
this World conteſted, the next is a very n
tural Superinduction, that a Man of tr
Greatneſs and Bravery will afford Conti
gencies and Accidents of Life no othe
Conſideration than that of Scorn and Co
tempt. Upon the Whole therefore nothin
we ſee, can be an Evil but what has in it a

Allo

Alloy of Moral Turpitude. Accordingly, 'tis the Part of that great *Sampler* of Magnanimity, Fortitude and Contempt of the World (which if we cannot actualy produce, we ſhou'd at leaſt be glad if we cou'd) to rely upon Himſelf: To be undiſmay'd about any Part of his Life, and to have a good Opinion of his own Strength and Condition, holding to This, with Aſſurance, *That a Wiſe Man can come to no Harm.* Which Conſideration alone makes it appear plainly, *That nothing beſide Vertue and Honour is Good*, and that a Happy and a Vertuous Life are one and the ſame. I know very well what a Variety and Difference of Opinions there was among thoſe Philoſophers that ſeated the *Summum Bonum*, or the *Laſt Great Good*, in the Mind, and how many Abettors of their Miſtakes they've had. But, for my part, I that follow the Maſters who ſettle it all upon the *Vertues* of the *Mind*, in compariſon of that Opinion, as little attend to the Doctrines of any of thoſe Three Sects which repreſenting Vertue as Unentire and Abortive, pretend to patch it up either with *Pleaſure* or *Indolence*, or the *Prima Naturæ* (*the Firſt General Conſtituents of Human Nature*,) as to Theirs that ſaluting either *Pleaſure* for a *Summum Bonum*, or *Indolence*, or the *Prima Naturæ*, make a Separation between *Vertue*

and *Summum Bonum.* Beyond them all for Paradoxes of Abſurdity, is that Clan of your *Academicks*, who, notwithſtanding they have determin'd the laſt *Empyreal Good* to conſiſt in a Life of Speculation and Science, that there's no real Difference between one Thing and another, and that a Wiſe Man cannot but be Happy, becauſe he ſtrings all his Circumſtances upon the ſame Thread; yet bind it upon their *Wiſe Man* as the Preſiding and moſt Fundamental of his Duties to bilk his own Eyeſight and forſwear all manner of *Aſſent.* The Replies which are made to this Account of the Matter are, for the moſt part, much more prolix than ſo plain a Caſe requires. For is it not clear, that unleſs we underſtand how to skimm and drain off whatever is repugnant to the Meaſures of Nature from whatever agrees to them, 'tis a Jeſt to look longer after any ſuch thing as *Prudence*, or ſo much as to talk of it *Reſpectfully?* So that having diſpatch'd the aforeſaid *Hypotheſes*, and in them all others of the ſame Complexion, we have now no other *Summum Bonum* left behind, unleſs it reſts here, That we live under a Judicious Regard to the Motions and Emergences in Nature, that we ſtand to her Propoſition and abjure what croſſes upon her; in ſhort, That we live up and according to

he

her Directions. The ἐπιγενηματικὸν (as 'tis call'd by the Men of Skill) or *Advance and Progress* that is made in any Specimen of any other Art is Subsequent and Expected. But *Wisdom* is always born *Full-grown*, and every Effect of it so compleat and adequate in itself, as not to be capable of Improvement, amounting to no less than that which we take to be truly *Valuable* and *Desireable*; it being no less a Misdemeanour to be sensible of any Fear, or Sorrow, or Fleshly Inclinations, tho' they are not comply'd with in Practise, as to sell our Country, injure our Parents, or disfurnish the Temples, which are *Crimes of Commission.* And as These do not gather and grow into *Sins* by Little and Little, but so soon as they are, are as great as they will be: So the Exercise of any *Vertue* implies an *Actual* Perfection of Practice, not an *Ascending* one. And now to explain what I mean by *Bonum* or *Good*, a Word which makes such a Figure in our present Debate; Somewhat variously the Philosophers have express'd themselves about it, tho' all their Definitions run at last into an Equivalency. I am for that of *Diogenes*, with whom *Bonum* or *Good* is, That *whose Essence is consummate*, and the ὠφέλημα or Advantage deriv'd by it, he has defin'd to be either those Influences, or Circumstances, which that *Perfection of*

Eſſence conveys. And foraſmuch as the Mind is the Fountain and Reſidence of all our Notions, whether collected from Experience, Relative Connexions, Similitude, or by comparing Reaſon with Reaſon; the laſt of theſe Operations produces the Knowledge of our *Good*, the Mind after having diſtinguiſh'd thoſe Things which are according to the Meaſures of Nature, mounting in a Road of Rational *Collections*, 'till it arrives at the Comprehenſion of its own *Good*, which is of that Nature that it neither admitts of Acceſſion, nor Intenſion, nor Compariſon, but is Abſolute, and Singular, and makes us know that it is ſuch. As *Honey* the Principal of all Sweets, does not reliſh by vertue of any Comparative, but of its own Proper and Specifick *Sweetneſs*. In like manner the Excellencies, which make our *Bonum* or *Good* ſo Valuable, are to be eſtimated not by *Quantity* but by *Kind*. Nor does our Valuation, (ἀξία) tho' it ſhou'd run ever ſo high, take it out of its proper *Kind*, becauſe it carries in it nothing of Good or Evil. Whence it fully appears that the Eſtimate we paſs upon Vertue muſt not follow Rules of Proportion, but the Definition of its Eſſence. Next for the *Perturbations* or *Paſſions* of the Mind, the Unwiſe the Burthen and Bane of their Being, call'd in the *Greek* Πάθη, which

as much as to ſay, *Diſtempers* and *Indiſpoſitions*, and ſo, perhaps, I might have tranſlated it, were it not Unuſual to call *Compaſſion* or *Anger* a *Diſeaſe*, or had I not thought the Senſe of the Word *Perturbation* ſufficiently Diſadvantageous. Theſe Perturbations, which are digeſted under Four general Heads, *Trouble of Mind*, *Fear*, *Luſt*, and Ἡδονή, according to the Signification the *Stoicks* have impos'd upon it, equaly applicable to the Body and Mind. *Lætitia* we may render it, a Lively and Emphatical Senſe of Pleaſure Within. Theſe are ſo many *Unnatural Fermentations* to be accounted for from falſe Opinion, and the Levity of Human Nature, and lie out of a Wiſe Man's way. 'Tis advanc'd by a great many other Philoſophers beſide the *Stoicks*, that whatever comes under the Notion of *Vertue* is valuable and deſireable upon its own Account. This all Philoſophers are bound to aſſert, however they ſtand affected, except the Three Factions that leave Vertue out of the *Summum Bonum*; but the *Stoicks* eſpecialy, that leave all things out of the Character of *Good* beſide *Vertue*. And the Reaſon why they do ſo, is obvious and evident, if it were no more than this, that tho' as to Inconveniences and Puniſhments he were ſure to be excus'd,

there neither is, nor ever was any Man, let, ſuppoſe his Avarice, and other Deſires and Inclinations have govern'd him as uncontroulably as you pleaſe, but who wou'd much rather have brought about his Deſigns without than by the Perpetration of a Crime. So when we take Pains to inform our ſelves rightly of the Conceal'd Diſtributions, Motions, and Efficiencies in the Natural World, as for Inſtance in the Heavenly Bodies; What Advantage or Lucre do we propoſe to make of our Curioſity? Or what *Wild Man of the Mountains or the Foreſts* cou'd ever yet ſo damp the Force of Nature's Impulſes within him, as not to reckon it worth his while to converſe with ſignificant Matters of Science, but on the contrary to nauſeate them, unleſs they yielded either his *Purſe* a *Stipend*, or his *Senſes* a *Gratification*? Who that ſo ſoon as he hears of the Actions, the Sayings, and the Reſolutions of thoſe aſtoniſhing Examples of true *Fortitude* and every other Vertue, our Predeceſſours, whether the *Africani*, or (the Man that takes up ſo much room in your Thoughts and Words) my *Great Grandfather*, or any of the reſt, perceives not a mighty Satisfaction diffus'd over his Faculties? Who that ever had an Ingenuous Education and among People of Worth and Honour, but wou'd abominate whatever is

Foul

Foul and Unwarrantable as ſuch, tho' the Conſequences of it were not diſagreable? conceive a ſecret Reſentment at the Sight of a Libertine? and be always out of Conceit with little Souls, Temporizers, Fopps, and Triflers? If the Diſhoneſty of an Action is not in itſelf Execrable and Frightful; What is there to tye us up from committing the moſt heinous Facts, when countenanc'd by Darkneſs and Solitude? All this amounts not to the Thouſandth Part of what I might offer upon this Point, if there were occaſion. I know of nothing more Indiſputable, than that as *Vertue* or *Moral Excellency* is for it ſelf to be valu'd and deſir'd, ſo *Vice* or *Moral Turpitude* is to be hated and avoided. Further; If I have now evinc'd it ſufficiently that there is no other *Human Good* beſide *Vertue* and *Moral Excellency*, it neceſſarily follows that this *Moral Excellency* is to be preferr'd before the Means which are made uſe of to acquire it. And therefore as often as we affirm againſt Folly, Temerity, Injuſtice, Intemperance, that we ought to beware of them becauſe of the Ill Effects they bring; This muſt not be taken as contradictory to that other Poſition of ours, that there is no other Evil beſide *Moral Turpitude*, the Malignity of thoſe Effects not lying in the Detriment which the Body ſuſtains from

them, but in the Immorality and Viciousness of the *Action*; For so the Word κακία is better turn'd than by the Word *Malitia* (properly signifying *Malice.*) You are very happy, *Cato*, (say'd I) in the Elegance and Expressiveness of your Terms. Philosophy has been long accounted at *Rome* an *Exotick*, and such is the Subtilty and Delicacy both of its Matter and Language, that we have hitherto despair'd of weaving it into our Mother-Tongue; and yet you find no Trouble to *Latinize* it, and make it a compleat *Roman*. 'Tis true, we have Those that will discourse in *Latin* upon Philosophical Subjects, but then they never proceed in the way of *Divisions* and *Definitions*, and only insist upon such Particulars as stand explicitely ratify'd by Nature. The Questions upon which they try their Skill are not at all involv'd; and so wrought off with Ease. Permitt me therefore to observe narrowly what you say, and to fix in my Mind such new Terms as you supply us with to help out our present Controversy, because they will be serviceable to me in my Turn. You suggested rightly, and like a Master of *Latin Etymology*, in the Opposition you were stating between *Vertue* and *Vice*, the latter, as I apprehend, taking its Name from *Vituperabile*, because *Reproach* and *Accusation* stick to its very Essence, unless

s *Vituperabile* may rather come from *Vi-*
um (*Vice*;) And if you had made *Mali-*
a (*Malice*) of κακία, it wou'd have deno-
d according to our Acceptation but one
rticular ſort of *Vice*; whereas *Vertue* and
ice, as you have *indefinitely* oppoſed them,
mprehend the ſeveral *Species* of Either.
e are now (continued he) upon the Verge
a Diſquiſition that has been proſecuted
th mighty Heats. The *Peripateticks*, who
ing deſtitute of *Logick* ſeldom argue
ſely, have thought it their beſt way to
anage it with Moderation and Tender-
ſs. But your belov'd *Carneades*, a ſin-
lar good *Logician* and *Oratour*, had well-
gh put us to our Shifts. He was ever confi-
nt that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks*, upon
ie Queſtion *De Bonis & Malis*, (*Of Good*
d Evil) diſagree'd not in their *Principles*,
t only in their *Terms*. Now for my part
think it notorious that there is more than
Verbal Difference between the Two *Hy-*
otheſes. The *Stoicks*, I ſay, and the *Peri-*
ateticks vary not half ſo much in *Terms*
s in *Principles*. Thus the *Peripateticks*
ake every Thing which they call *Good* an
gredient in their Compoſition of *Hu-*
an Happineſs: Whereas We maintain that
Happy Life is conſtituted only of That
hich *properly and by Vertue of it ſelf* chal-
enges our Eſteem. Agen; If *Pain* is an

Evil

Evil, what can be clearer than that a Wi
Man, when he lies in Torture upon th
Wheel, is no longer Happy? Now we
that have no Notion of the *Evil* of *Pai*
have found a ſurer way to hold a Wi
Man's Happineſs together in ſpight of th
Rack itſelf. And 'tis plain that, were it no
for *Opinion* and the *Vapours*, in the Natur
of the Thing we ſhou'd never find Th
Pain Greater and That Lighter. Elſe wha
makes that Pain a *Scratch*, when we com
by it in the Defence of our Country, whic
is an *Anguiſh* when the Occaſion's leſs Ho
nourable and Important? Another Artic
wherein the *Peripateticks* diſſent from u
is This. The *Peripateticks* allow Thre
Kinds of Things realy Good, and the R
cher Allotment of Advantages either o
Body or Fortune falls to a Man's Shar
the Wider, they ſay, is his Felicity, th
Acceſſion of all ſuch External Privilege
making out the whole Extent of Huma
Happineſs with Them; ſo that if we wer
to come up to their Terms, we muſt ad
mitt that the larger the Inventory of his *Ex*
ternals, the Happier the Man; which w
cannot by any means digeſt. For certain
ly if we deny altogether, that any ſuppos'
Affluence or Abundance even of the *Bo*
na Naturæ (*Thoſe Things which Nature ſig*
nifies to be Good) add any thing to th
Ble

eſſedneſs or Value of Life; We can ne-
r perſwade ourſelves that our Happineſs
ceives any thing from Externals, be their
enty and Perfection as great as you pleaſe.
Wiſdom and *Health* be, both of them,
hings Deſireable, then muſt both in Con-
nction be more deſireable than *Wiſdom*
one; and yet, notwithſtanding Both de-
rve to be valued, in conjunction they are
o more than equivalent to the firſt alone.
or tho' we grant that *Health* is a Thing to
e *made much* of, but not to be made Free
f the Claſſis of *Bona*, or *Things abſolutely*
ood; yet in Competition and Compari-
on with *Vertue* we value it no more than a
hadow. The *Peripateticks* teach us ano-
ner Leſſon, and affirm that a *Vertuous*
ction which will not expoſe us to a pre-
ent Pain or Loſs, takes place of one that
vill. This now ſounds very harſh in our
ars, and why it does, you ſhall underſtand
n the Sequel. Mean while what think you
of the Parallel between the *Peripateticks*
and the *Stoicks!* In reſpect of the *Final*
Good we ſtand up for, all thoſe foreign Ac-
commodations that relate to the Body are
like the Glimmering of a Lamp before the
Sun in the Meridian, immediately vaniſh'd
and abſorpt; a Drop of *Brine* loſt in the
Ægean Sea; a Stiver laid up among *Crœſus*'s
Golden Magazines; or the Length of a *Flea*'s
Leap

Leap deducted out of the number
Leagues that lie between this Place and th
Indies. The Splendor of *Vertue* extin
guiſhes them, and the Bulk, Exuberanc
and Extent of it overbears and annihilate
them. An Opportunity (εὐκαιρία) is no
more itſelf tho' the Allowance of Time b
never ſo Liberal, becauſe it cannot trangre
its own Duration. And ſo a right *Practi*
(κατόρθωσις, as for κατόρθωμα I wou'd pu
Rectum Factum, a *Regular Action*) and th
Concurrence of Moral Principles, and th
Good of Conformity to the Meaſures of Natu
are uncapable of being augmented. Th
Caſe of theſe, and that Former of an *Op*
portunity are perfectly alike. And hence
is that the *Stoicks* have drawn off this Do
ctrine, That a Happy Life of the Lengt
of Half a Span is as good, and ought t
be as ſatisfactory, as one of a longer Clu
The prime Excellency of a *Slipper* is t
ſit eaſy and handſom upon the Foot, (
give you the old *Simile*) which if it does
'tis nothing to the purpoſe what Size 'tis o
nor how many *Pair* of the ſame Size there
are in the World. And thus if *Symetry* an
Opportunity make out the Nature of an
Good, tis not to be multiply'd into a Plura
lity, nor advanc'd by being ſtretch'd. An
yet ſome People are ſo Weak as to inferr
that becauſe a good State of Health when
i

ſtays with us long, is better than if it ſted but a little while; therefore a long llowance of Time for the Cultivation and xerciſe of Wiſdom is rather to be wiſh'd r than a ſhort one. Now they are to nderſtand that our Eſtimate upon *Health* determin'd from the Circumſtance of *Con-nuation*, but our Eſtimate upon *Vertue* om the Circumſtance of *Opportunity*. And ney might as gravely inculcate that 'tis etter to die or be born, in a *long Inſtant* f Time than in a *ſhort one*. Some Things ho' very Tranſient are as much Worth as o-thers tho' very Permanent; But 'tis not every ody that knows the Diſtinction. To come orward; They who attribute unto the Laſt nd Final *Good* a Poſſibility of Increaſing, f they will be conſiſtent with themſelves, nuſt alſo maintain *Degrees in Wiſdom*, and n *Inequality in the Goodneſs or Badneſs of ny of our Actions*. We that conceive the inal Good to be incapable of Additions, leny This. He that's over Head and Ears n a *Pool*, tho' he ſhould not be further than Three Inches below the Surface, is as lit-tle in a Condition to fetch his Breath as if he were at the Bottom. A Young Puppy that's to have the Uſe of his Eyes within a Day or Two is as blind as another that was whelp'd an Hour ago. In like manner, he that makes but a Partial and an Imperfect

Pro-

Progreſs in Vertue is as Wretched and Forlorn as he that has made none. You may call theſe Propoſitions Myſteries, or Paradoxes; or what you pleaſe but; ſure I am if my Firſt Principles are True and Compact and what I have now ſuperinduc'd altogether comports with them, there's no Pretence for queſtioning the Truth of them When I ſay that any Degrees of *Greater* or *Leſs* are foreign to the Nature of *Vertue* and *Vice*, do not miſtake me, as if I deny'd that either the One or the Other might be, as I may ſay, Expanded and *Rarefy'd*. Riches our *Diogenes* conceives, may help us to *Pleaſure* and a good Conſtitution, and be the Vehicle of Both; but for the Art of Living well, or any other Art, Riches convey nothing of it to us, tho' they may convey us to it: That therefore Wealth is as much a *Good* as *Pleaſure* or a *Favourable Conſtitution*; That it is yet far from a Conſequence, becauſe Wiſdom is a real Good, therefore *Current Coin* muſt be ſo too: That whatever is not it ſelf a real Good cannot include that which is; That our Conceptions of Things, which are the Groundwork and Materials of all Art, naturaly operate upon our Inclinations; and That for as much as Riches are no real *Good*, they cannot conſequently include whatever may be call'd an *Art*. And tho' this is

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ghtly obſerv'd as to Arts in general, yet ıere is this one Thing peculiar to *Vertue*, ıat it muſt be perpetualy Refreſh'd and xercis'd; Which is not abſolutely requir'd ı Arts and Sciences; As alſo that un- er Vertue is comprehended an Uniform onſtancy and Steadineſs in the Tenour f a Man's whole Life; But This is not of ıe Subſtance of any Liberal Art or Science. o go on with our Diſtinctions, becauſe ere we to do, as *Ariſto* has done, not iſtinguiſh between the Nature of This nd That, we cou'd never metho- ize the Conduct of Life, nor underſtand ıe proper Functions and Adminiſtrations f Wiſdom; in regard the Severals, which eſpect or come into the Management f Life, wou'd lie undiſtributed, and ap- ear all equaly Eligible: Paſſing therefore rom the Diſtinction between that which is bſolutely Good, or Matter of Vertue, and hat which is abſolutely Evil or Matter of ice, the *Stoicks* have ſettled another Di- iſion of Things, which, tho' they neither nake for nor againſt the Happineſs of Life, et are Diſſimilar and Subordinate; and Theſe ıre either Such as are of *Some Account*, of *ll Account*, or *Intermediate*. Thoſe which ıre of Some Account have ſomething in hem Recommending and *Preferable*, as *Health*, *Senſes Perfect*, *Indolence*, *a great*

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Character, *Money*, and the like; or e
they are not properly Preferable, and
ſtand *Intermediate*; and thoſe which a
of Ill Account, having ſomething in the
Diſcommending and Unacceptable, as *Pa*
Sickneſs, *the want of any of our Senſes*,
digence, *Ignominy*, and the like; or elſe th
are not properly Unacceptable, and ſo ma
the other Branch of the *Intermediate*. Her
upon *Zeno* rather than he would forgoe
Diſtinction of προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμέ
took the Liberty to diſgrace his own c
pious Language by bringing up thoſe Ne
Terms, tho' *We* muſt be prohibited to e
rich our ſcanty one, if you'll give me lea
to call it ſo. That I may make the mea
ing of theſe Terms a little better underſtoo
'twill not be Impertinent to tell you wh
Zeno had in his Eye when he made t
Word προηγμένον. As 'twere abſurd, ſa
he, to talk of a Sovereign Prince's bein
promoted to a Dignity; and Places at Cou
are not for him, but for the Great Mer
his immediate Inferiours: Even ſo the
are not the Supreme but the Secondar
Prerogatives of Life, which I term προη
μένα, *Producta*, (*Literaly*) *Things that obtai*
Favour and Promotion, as ἀποπροηγμένα, *Re*
jecta, *Things wherewith we are diſpleas'a*
unleſs we render Both as before, *Præpo*
ſita or *Præcipua*, *Preferables*; and *Rejecta*
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Things Disagreable. So we do but understand one another, we ought not to be Superstitious about VVords. Now then, for as much as That which is realy our *Good* is Absolute and Superlative, the Nature of that which is no more than a *Preferable* can be neither Good nor Bad, but is ἀδιάφορον, what we may call *Indifferent*, or something as well on this side *Insignificancy*, as on this side the *Greatest Significancy*. That such Midling *Species* of Things either Agreable or Disagreable to Nature shou'd not be left out of his Distinctions was most necessary; and no less, that what cou'd not be left out shou'd be reckon'd upon as of *Some Account*; and agen, as necessary, if we affirm such and such Things to be of *Some Account*, that our Species of *Præpositа* or *Preferables* be allow'd. So that this Distinction is a very just one, and the Advancers of it, because they wou'd have it sufficiently intelligible, illustrate it by a *Simile*. Suppose a *Die* to be thrown, upon a VVager that such a Number shall rise, if such a Number does indeed come up, that Position of it (consider'd *Abstractedly*) approaches very near to the End for which it was thrown, as another Position wou'd utterly defeat that End; and yet that particular Position does not partake of the Nature of the End. Thus

the *Preferables* I am ſpeaking of have a Relation and Affinity to the *End* it ſelf, tho neither contain'd in it, nor influencing it Conjunction with it. Next comes on th Diviſion of Good Things into τελικὰ, Thoſ that are of the very Eſſence of the Fina Good (to make uſe, for once, of the Be nefit of that Conceſſion, That we ſhou' have recourſe to a *Periphraſis*, when th Import of the VVord in the Original ma be thereby better explain'd) and ποιητικα Thoſe that are Inſtrumental towards our at taining of it, and laſtly, Thoſe that ar *Mixt*. *Vertuous Actions* are ſolely thoſe th are purely of the Eſſence of it. *Friend* are alone the purely *Inſtrumental*. An *Wiſdom* is both *of the Eſſence* and *Inſtrumen tal*; *of the Eſſence*, becauſe Nature is con curr'd with in every Act of it; and *Inſtru mental*, becauſe it directs us to and pu us upon the Practice of *Vertue*. The *Pr ferables* are alſo either *Eſſential Ones*, *I ſtrumental*, or *Mixt*: *Eſſential*, as our *Fe tures*, our *Poſtures*, our *Motions*, which a ſome of them *Agreable*, ſome *Diſagreabl Inſtrumantal*, as *Money*; *Mixt*, as *Soun Senſories*, or a *good State of Health*. Th Opinion of *Chryſippus* and *Diogenes* as t the Value of *Reputation* (for the preſer Occaſion requires that εὐδοξία be conſtru *Reputation* and not *Glory*) was, that, whe

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ve have deduced its *Subserviency*, 'tis not Worthy to cost us the Trouble of extending n Arm; and I am all in their Interest. Altho' Others overpower'd by *Carneades* ave since confess'd, that Reputation is a Thing to be valu'd and sought for it self, nd that altho' it could no way turn to dvantage, every Man of an Ingenuous Disposition and Improv'd Intellectuals wou'd e glad to sit fair in the Thoughts of his Parents, his Kindred, and all good People; That tho' 'twill stand us in very little tead, we shou'd endeavour to leave behind is a Lasting and an Honourable Mention of ur Name, in like manner as we make Provision for our Children, tho born after ur Decease, barely for their Convenience. Now That being prov'd to be our only *Good* which is *Matter of Vertue*, it follows hat we ought to do whatever is our Duty, tho' the Nature of *Duty* falls not within the Account of those Things which are properly *Good* or *Evil*; for between These lies the Ballance of its *Reasonableness*, and he Measures we are to take from the Reasons which preponderate. It's certain we re to be determin'd to the doing of our Duty by such Reasons as we can shew to be the *more Satisfactory*. Whence it appears hat *Duty* is none of those Things which are either *Good* or *Evil* in themselves, but

hovers in the Middle; and ſince thoſe Things which are neither *Vertues* nor *Vices abſolutely*, are nevertheleſs of Conſequence and Advantage, we are not to make the leaſt abatement of them. Now ſome of our Actions we are determin'd to by the *Reaſons* that reſult from the Poſture and Aſpect of thoſe Things; As whatever is tranſacted upon *Reaſons* is that which we term *Duty*. And therefore *Duty* has no part in the Liſt of thoſe Things which are either *Good* or *Evil* properly ſo call'd. And yet is it Unqueſtionable that Theſe Things are Matter for a Wiſe Man to work upon; who, when he puts a Duty in Practice firſt ſatisfies himſelf that it is a *Duty*, and ſtands infallibly aſſur'd at the ſame time that That *Duty* moves in a *Middle Sphere*. For a further Proof, obſerve that whatever Action bears the Name of a *Compleat Good one* is a Duty Perform'd, as there is alſo *Duty Unconſummate*. So to deliver up honeſtly what was depoſited in my Hands is a *Compleat Good Action*; To deliver up what is none of my own is a *Duty*. The Word *Honeſtly* imports a *Good Act Compleat*, and to give every Man his own, is a *Particular Duty Defin'd*. And becauſe the *Middle Order* of Things comprehends the Matter of our Choice, whatever we Do or Say with reſpect thereunto, will be a

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Point of Duty. And ſo the Unwiſe as well as the Wiſe Man, upon the ſcore of that natural Affection which Either bears to himſelf, will purſue thoſe Meaſures which he thinks moſt agreable to Nature, and avoid the contrary. Thus *Duty* lies in Common between the *Wiſe* and the *Unwiſe*, and diſcovers the *Middle Order* of Things to be the Region of its Reſidence. And as all *Duties* whatſoever ariſe out of this Element, ſo all our Conſiderations and Counſels tend to it, even thoſe about going out of or ſtaying in the World; as to which, when the Majority is on the ſide of thoſe Things which *ſympathize* with Nature, 'tis a Man's Duty to live on; but when the Majority either is, or is likely to hang on the other ſide, 'tis his Duty to make his *Exit*. Whence it ſometimes comes to paſs that a Wiſe Man, tho' his Condition be very happy, is oblig'd to remove out of Life; and a Fool, as bad as his Circumſtances are, to keep to his old Quarters. For the *Firſt* and *Beſt Generals* in the Deſtribution of Nature, the *Secondary* or *Middle*, and the *Laſt* or *Worſt* are all offer'd and expos'd to the Judgment and Choice of a *Wiſe Man*, as his Materials; and the *Real* and *Chief Good* and *Evil*, which we have made ſuch frequent Mention of, reſide beyond theſe; But theſe are to deter-

mine his Resolutions, one way or t'other, as to the Advisableness of quitting or not quitting Life. 'Tis not my being Vertuous or not Vertuous that shou'd induce me to run upon *Destruction.* But it is a *Duty* incumbent upon a *Wise Man*, when the Face of Affairs requires it, notwithstanding he is actualy in possession of the most exalted Happiness, to dispatch himself, as soon as he can; as he means to conform precisely and scrupulously to the Measures of Nature it being taken for granted by the *Stoicks* that the Circumstance of *Seasonableness* or *Opportunity* is the Distinguishing Note and Measure of a Happy Life. Accordingly *Wisdom* lays her Commands upon her *Votarie to abdicate herself too, when he cannot play a better Game.* On t'other hand, seeing our *Moral Defects* are in themselves no sufficient Grounds for us to become our own Executioners, it follows as certainly that a *Fool*, tho' as such he's fated to be Miserable, is bound-over to live on till he looses a *Majority* of those Advantages which are *according to Nature.* And another good Reason why the Man, that's instated in such a *Majority*, shou'd be ty'd to keep his Hold of Life, is because he is never the more Unhappy if he keeps it than if he leaves it, its Continuance not at all aggravating any Disobliging Conditions of it which may

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tempt him to throw it up. Moreover, the *Stoicks* advertize, that it nearly concerns us to obſerve how effectually 'tis contriv'd and adjuſted in the Nature of Things, that thoſe Creatures which propagate ſhou'd love what they beget; and from this Natural Principle we fetch and account for the Fundamentals of Society and Commerce among Men. The very Figure and Fabrick of our Bodies demonſtrate Procreation to be among thoſe Ends to which they were form'd; and that Procreation was intended upon the Forming of our Bodies, and not withal a Love and Tuition of what ſhou'd ſpring from us, were moſt Unaccountable. The Brutes have a Propenſity to theſe Offices implanted in them, and by the Care and Trouble which they undergo, as well in the part of Nurſing as of Bringing forth, Providence has expreſsly Promulg'd and Countenanc'd the Principle; inſomuch that we have not a fuller Aſſurance of our Natural Averſion to *Pain*, than of the Importunity and Impulſes which we feel within us enforcing the Parent's Affection toward the Child. And this Eſtabliſhment in Nature lies at the Bottom of Civil and Perſonal Entercourſes and Correſpondences, and obliges every Man to a Concern and Regard for his Neighbour, becauſe his Neighbour is a Man as well as

Himself. 'Tis true, some of the Parts of the Body serve only for their own Purposes, as the Eyes and Ears; but then others are Ministerial to their Fellow-Members, as the Legs and Hands. Thus agen, there are Beasts of Prey, the Ends of whose Being seem to terminate in Themselves. But then there is the *Pinna* or *Nacre-Fish* (That in the Open Shell) and the *Pinnoteres*, as 'tis call'd, because tho' it makes a Custom of Swimming out, yet it never deserts its Tenement, but immediately closes it upon its Return, as who shou'd say, Caution is an Excellent Thing (beside the *Pismires*, the *Bees*, and the *Storks*) which pursue a Publick and Common Interest in the Affairs they carry on. And these Combinations and Partnerships are much more Effectual and Perfect in the Societies of Mankind. You see then how natural it is for us to form ourselves into Communities and Corporations. The *Stoicks* further teach you, that the Providence of the Gods governs the Universe, and that as well the College of the Heavenly Powers as the whole Multitude of Mankind, and every Individual in it are of the Substance of that *Universe*. And thence inferr, that the more *Publick Good* is to supersede the more *Private*. For that whoever pretends to any Probity, Wisdom, a Dutiful and a Governable Temper,

er, or a Tolerable Notion of Civil Duties, ill, in imitation of the Laws, more ſtu-iouſly ſollicit the Intereſt of the Publick, ıan any Private one whatſoever, tho' it ere his own; And that he who is a Tray-or to his Country, is neither better nor orſe than a Mercenary, Corrupted *Rene-ado* from the *Common Cauſe* of Mankind: onſequently that Whoſoever makes a Pre-nt of his Life to his Country, merits ery particular Commendations, for cor-oborating in ſo ſignal a manner this Do-trine, That we ought to be more zealous or our Country's Preſervation than for our wn; and this in reference to ſome Bar-arous and Hardy Wretches, who declare *hey'll readily give their Vote for a Bonfire be made of the whole World the day after hey are ſtepp'd out of it*; (There is a thread-are *Greek* Verſe to this Purpoſe in which might have expreſs'd my ſelf) Now with eſpect to Theſe, the *Stoicks* urge that it our Duty to take care for the Well-be-ng of our Survivours and Poſterity, pro-erly and abſolutely for their Sakes. And heſe Cordial, Affectionate Intentions are reſuppos'd upon the Dictating of a *laſt Will*, or a Dying Man's recommending heir reſpective *Charges* to his Friends. Fur-hermore; That it is natural for us to u-ite in Confederations and Alliances, is as

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apparent as the Irreconcileablneſs of an Man's *Genius* to perpetual Solitude, tho' h were promis'd it ſhou'd be qualify'd wit all imaginable Amuſements of Recreatio and Pleaſure. Beſides, there is implante in our Conſtitution a good-natur'd Eage neſs to be as ſerviceable, and to as many c our Kind, as we can, particularly by rect fying their Judgments, and furniſhing thei Faculties. We are naturaly as forward t communicate as to accept of Notions, an he muſt be very ſingular indeed, that im parts to no Body the leaſt Portion of h own Obſervations and Acquiſitions. A gen; 'Tis a Rule of Nature to thoſe Pec ple who enjoy ſingular Privileges of Fo tune, and may command in the Worl that, after the Examples of *Hercules* an *Bacchus*, they ſhou'd exert themſelves a the Champions and Protectors of Mar kind. So Inſtinct animates the *Bulls* to en counter the *Lions* with Collected Force an Fury in Defence of the *Heifers* and th *Ca'ves*. When we conſecrate to *Jove* him ſelf his Epithets of *Greateſt* and *Beſt*; whe we appeal to him under his Titles of *Be neficial and Benign*, *the Preſerver of ou Families and Government*, (*Stator*) we ſig nifie how glorious a Province it is whic we aſcribe to him, namely, that of *guard ing us againſt Violence*, *and delivering u*

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ut of Danger. And therefore, if Below we re unſollicitous for, and wanting to the dvance of our own mutual Intereſts, 'twere Jnreaſonable and Preſumptuous to make our Petition to the Gods, that they vou'd be pleas'd to receive us into their avour and Patronage. In Brief; We ſlide s directly into Civil Society and Commerce, as we come to the Uſe and Exerciſe f our Limbs, before we can give a Philoophical Account of 'em. And unleſs we lid ſo, Juſtice and Generoſity muſt be ve-y precarious and Chimerical Things. *They* dd, that altho' the Laws and Bonds of ociety hold Men and Men together, yet etween Men and Brutes no ſuch Enterourſes take place; agreable to that excelent Remark of *Chryſippus*, *That Man is orn to Incorporation and Society, and that every thing elſe receiv'd its Exiſtence for the Uſe and Service of the Gods and Him; and conſequently, that Man may diſpoſe of the Inferiour Animals as he pleaſes, to his own Advantage, without doing them any Injury:* That becauſe the Eſtabliſhment of Civil Rights is thus Natural and Neceſſary, the *Juſt Man* is he that is careful to have 'em preſerv'd; the *Unjuſt* he that invades and infringes them. And yet that there is nothing in any Common or Civil Rights, which interferes with the Rights of Individuals

viduals; as the Seats in the Play-houſe ar all for Common Uſe, and yet every Man' Place is his own when he has taken it That ſince it appears to have been the In tent of the *Efficient Cauſe* that Men ſhou' ſuccour and ſupport one another, a Wiſ Man is not at all forbidden by his Characte to take upon him and adminiſter a Publicl Poſt, nor to marry and have Children; fo that Wiſdom and *Love*, if it be chaſte an pure, are compatible with one anothe As for the Meaſures and Courſe of Life pe culiar to the *Cynicks*, the *Stoicks* are divided ſome admitting that when, as it may hap pen, the Exigencies of a Man's Conditio call for it, he ſhould have recourſe to thoſ Meaſures; but others will not hear of ſuc a *Diſpenſation*. And the better to ſtrengthe this Oeconomy of Commerce and Natura Affection, what they call ὠφελήματα an βλάμματα (*Subſtantial Emoluments*, an *Subſtantial Detriments*) they hold to be o Common Concernment; the Former to th Advantage, the Latter to the Diſadvantag of the Community. And as they affirm them to be of Common Concernment, ſo to lie in a *Parity*, which they will not allow us to what they call εὐχρηςήματα and δυσχρηςή-ματα (*Conveniences* and *Inconvenences*) tho they muſt make theſe two to be of Common Concernment: Becauſe That which brings

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real Advantage muſt be Simply and Properly Good, and that which brings a real Disadvantage muſt be Simply and Properly Evil, and to the Inſtances of Either of Theſe *Kinds Diſparity* is foreign. Now *Conveniences* and *Inconveniences* are to be reduc'd to the *Species* before mention'd of *Preferables* and their *Oppoſites*; and to Thoſe *Diſparity* is Eſſential. Any Particular Juſtifiable or Unjuſtifiable Actions *(in reſpect of the Agents)* are not of Common Concernment, as the *Subſtantial Emoluments* are declar'd to be. Of this laſt Advantageous Kind is *Friendſhip*; and hence the *Stoicks* recommend the Cultivation of it. There are ſome among them who maintain, that 'tis the Part of a *Wiſe* Man to love his Friend and Himſelf alike, and Others that ſay, He ought to love himſelf beſt, reſerving it ſtill as a Caution in behalf of the Obligations to Juſtice which are faſten'd upon our Nature, that there muſt be no *ſnipping my own Gains out of another Man's Cloath.* But not One of them will endure any ſuch Suppoſition as that Conſiderations of Profit ſhou'd ingratiate or enforce the Duties of Friendſhip or Equity, becauſe the ſame Conſiderations will ſerve as effectualy to undermine and ſupplant them, it being unconceivable how there ſhou'd be any ſuch Thing as Juſtice or Friendſhip in the World, unleſs Both

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ſubſiſt upon their own intrinſick Merit and Dignity. They teach us likewiſe, that the Notion of *Right* is truly and properly That the Definition whereof we find legible in the Nature of Things; That a Wiſe Man will abhorr all Thoughts not only of Injurious Practices, but of Practices any way Prejudicial to Another; as alſo of *aſſociating* with his Friends, or his Benefactors and Patrons, in any Villanous Devices or the Execution of them. *They* contend for't with all the Nerves of Truth and Argument that *Equity* and *Profit* are Inſeparable; That whatever is Juſt and Fair is truly Honourable and Becoming; and (convertibly) that whatever is truly Honourable and Becoming muſt be Juſt and Fair. In the next place, to the aforeſaid Variety of Moral Vertues they annex their Corollaries of *Logick* and *Natural Philoſophy*; the Former of which they denominate a *Vertue*, becauſe by it we are enabled to make our Party good againſt all the little Skirmiſhes of Falſhood and Fallacy, and to confirm and aſcertain the Doctrines which we lay down in relation to Moral Good and Evil. For the *Stoicks* apprehend, that if a Man is not Something of a *Logician*, he muſt needs be very liable to be miſled and impos'd upon. So that unleſs Inconſideration and Ignorance in general are no *Faults*, when they reckon upon That which

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medies Both as a *Vertue*, they have Rea-
n. And when they aſcribe as much to
Natural Philoſophy, they juſtifie themſelves
well; for, ſay they, when a Man pro-
poſes to come up as near to the Model of
ature as he can, if he goes to work re-
ularly, he ſets out with the Contempla-
on of the Productions and Methods of
rovidence. Not to mention at what Un-
ertainties we muſt be left about the Nature
f Moral Good and Evil, 'till ſuch time as
e have competently ſatisfy'd Ourſelves a-
out the *Phænomena* of the World, how farr
he Gods are concern'd with it, in what
egrees of *Symmetry* Man, the Little Uni-
erſe, anſwers to the Great One, and how
uch he is indebted to the Sages of old
or thoſe excellent Precepts of theirs; *That*
e ſhou'd never bear againſt the Byaſs of an
Exigency; *That we ſhou'd reſign our ſelves to*
he Conduct of the Deity; *That every Man ſhou'd*
now his own Perſon, thoroughly, and no
Man exceed Bounds. Now the juſt Impor-
ance of all Theſe, and 'tis very conſidera-
ble, he that's a Stranger to Natural Philo-
ophy cannot reach. Then too this Sci-
ence will carry us a great way in ſtating the
Motives and Encouragements diſcernible in
the Face of Nature, to a ſtrict Obſervation
of Juſtice, and of all the Duties of Friend-
ſhip and Humanity. Nay, 'till we have
made

made a due Progreſs in our Phyſical E
quiries, we can hardly have a comple
Rationale of our Duties and Obligations
the Divine Powers themſelves. But, I fe
by this time, I have out-run my Line, a
expatiated beyond the proper Limits of t
Queſtion propos'd. However the charmi
Contexture of all the Parts of the *Stoic*
Diſcipline, and the Surprizing Dependan
of its *Inſtitutions*, one upon another, w
bear me out. O Heavens! are you n
Raviſh'd at the Review of 'em? What do
Nature herſelf, as unimitably Elegant a
Exquiſite as are her Perfections and Bea
ties; What does Art and Invention affo
ſo delicately Proportion'd, and ſo firm
Compacted? How curious the Agreeme
between our Antecedents and Conſequent
Does not every one of the Latter *grow out*
the Former? And are not all the Parts of th
Hypotheſis ty'd together with ſuch a *Continu*
ty, that if you crop off a Syllable, you ruin
the Whole? and yet we challenge you t
wound the leaſt *Fibre*. O! what an Aw
ful! what an Heroical! what a ſteady Ex
ample is our *Man of Wiſdom!* He ſtand
Convinc'd and Aſſur'd, that Vertue is alon
the *Good* of Man, and ſo cannot but b
always Happy, and in an actual Poſſeſſio
of thoſe Privileges and Eminences, which
when attributed to him, are a Subject fo
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the Pedantick World to rally and joke upon. For why is *Tarquin* so much a Monarch as He; *Tarquin*, who knew not how to govern either his Subjects or Himself? Why is not he more truly the *People's Master* (I mean a *Dictatour*) than *Scylla*, whose *Province*, when all's said, lay only between his Three accursed Qualities, Luxury, Avarice, and Barbarity? Why not Richer than *Crassus* too, seeing *Crassus*, if it had not been for his *Wants*, wou'd never have pass'd the *Frat*, and engag'd in a groundless War? Alass! All Things we may fairly say, are in his Possession, and in *his alone*, who knows what Use to make of Every Thing. A Wise Man is the most Charming of all *Beauties*, because Regularity of Features is much more Captivating in the Soul than in the Body. A Wise Man only is in a State of Freedom, as never lying at any One's Mercy, or submitting to the Motions of his own Appetites. A Wise Man only is *Invulnerable* and *Unconquer'd*, because his Mind cannot be made a Prisoner, tho' his Body shou'd be cover'd with Chains. Lastly, a Wise Man cuts off all Occasion for suspending your Judgment about the Condition of his Happiness 'till You have seen the Conclusion of his Life, and so proves that One of the Seven *Wise* Men gave *Cræsus* very Foolish Advice.

For if *Crœsus* had ever been a *Happy Man* 'twas impossible that his Happiness should leave him even at the Funeral Pile which *Cyrus* had provided him. Well then! If of necessity all Good Men must be Happy and only They: What can deserve to be more cultivated by us than *Philosophy*, or to be more sacred with us and dear to us than VERTUE?

TULLY

TULLY

OF

Moral Ends.

BOOK IV.

THus he concluded his Diſcourſe; and when he had done ſo, ſuffer me *Cato*, ſaid I, to admire your Strength of Memory, and Clearneſs of Expreſſion after the Proofs you have been giving of Both: and withal, either to deſpair of ever anſwering you, or at leaſt 'till I have had ſome time to recollect my ſelf. The *Stoical* Hypotheſis, tho' perhaps not very ſolid, (for I will not be bold in my Cenſures too ſoon) is ſo cloſely laid together, and ſo artificialy work'd up, that it's no eaſie Matter to look through the ſtructure of it. Are you thereabouts? (re-

ply'd he) What? have not I heard you since the new Statute was in Force, pleading for Three Hours together againſt a Proſecutor's Allegations upon the ſame day whereon they were exhibited? And do you think you ſhall have leave to adjourn this Cauſe? No: tho' on your ſide 'tis as indefenſible as a great many others, which nevertheleſs you have carry'd. The Controverſy is no Strange or New One either to Your ſelf or Others; It has been often already in your Hands; Make up to it once more, and you'll find both Matter and Words as ready to advance. I am never in haſte (ſay'd I) when I have the *Stoicks* to deal with, not ſo much for any Opinion I have of their Principles, as becauſe I cannot rightly underſtand them, and when I am forc'd to tell them ſo, it puts me out of Countenance. I grant, (ſay'd *Cato*) we talk ſometimes a little out of the Way, but we know not how to help it, becauſe our Subject-Matter is dark and perplexing. That's remarkable indeed, (ſay'd I) and yet when the *Peripateticks* hold forth upon the ſame Subject, and to the ſame Effect, I underſtand every Word. Upon the ſame Subject to the ſame Effect? (ſay'd he) Then have I been proving all the while to no purpoſe, that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* come not near one another

their

ther, not only as to Terms, but by the whole Diſtance and Length of Either Inſtitution? Make that ſufficiently Clear, (ſay'd I) and I'll capitulate immediately. I verily believ'd I had done ſo (ſay'd he;) but if you think not, be pleas'd to fall upon that Particular before you have engag'd Your ſelf in any other. With all my Heart, (ſay'd I) and if I may reaſonably oblige you to't, ſpeak up as well as you can for your ſelf in your Turn. Be it ſo, (ſay'd he) tho' the faireſt and the beſt Way wou'd have been, to give every Man his Due, whether *Stoick* or *Peripatetick*, *without making any Compariſons.* I am well ſatisfy'd, *Cato*, (ſay'd I) that the Principles which had been current with *Speuſippus*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Xenocrates*, all Diſciples of *Plato*; and with their Two Pupils afterwards *Polemo* and *Theophraſtus*; are ſo Extenſive in their Compaſs, and ſo handſomly laid together, that *Zeno* cou'd have no Pretence for ſeparating from *Polemo* who had been his Inſtructour, and from the other *Leaders* of that Inſtitution. Here I muſt deſire you not to expect a Reply from me to every Particular you have offer'd; Rather, if you pleaſe, let the main Body of our Forces be drawn out on either ſide. And be you careful to let me know what it is which you think may be reform'd or

improv'd. Now the Philoſophers aforeſaid obſerving that Men are born with a Common Aptitude and Tendency to the Exerciſe of the more noted and conſpicuous Vertues, Juſtice, Temperance, and the like, which in their Nature are analogous to other Arts and Sciences, tho' in the Matter and Exerciſe of them Superior; and that we make after theſe Vertues with all the Ardour and Ambition imaginable. That our Souls are, as it were, *Inlaid* with a Love of Knowledge; Moreover that one great End of our coming into the World is to fall into Societies and Confederations and that the greater a Man's *Genius* is, he ſtrives to make himſelf a more conſiderable Inſtance hereof: Obſerving theſe things to be ſo; they diſtributed the whole of Philoſophy into Three Parts, the Diviſion which *Zeno* has adopted for his own. The firſt Limb of the Diviſion is *Moral Philoſophy*, and our Queſtion about the End of Moral Good lying deep in the Subſtance of it, I ſhall forbear to conſider it yet a while, and at preſent only remark, that the old *Peripateticks* and *Academicks*, that held the ſame Opinions under different Names, have handled at large, and very judiciouſly, the Subject of *Politicks* or *Civil Government*. What a mighty number of Treatiſes have we extant of their re

relating to *Publick Eſtabliſhment*? And then how many Inſtances may we thank them for of true Oratory, in their *Exerciſes*, as well as Rules of Art, in their *Syſtems*. Every nice, Metaphyſical Definition or Diſtinction they have been able to ſet out in very Modiſh and Agreable Language! So, I grant, have ſome of your Brethren ſometimes; But then 'twas, in the main, *Cimmerian Darkneſs*, whereas every Sentence of theirs is Clear and Pellucid. Then as often as they are concern'd with thoſe Arguments which challenge at once both Elegance of Stile and Weight of Reaſoning; can any Thing be more Lofty and Splendid than their Diſcourſes? as particularly when they write upon the Subjects of Juſtice, Fortitude, Friendſhip, Conduct, Philoſophy, Publick Adminiſtration, Temperance, the Bravery of ſome Men †

* * * * * They are not for Harrowing and Scarifying like the *Stoicks*, but when the Matter they are to work upon is of grand Importance, they garniſh it with a proportionable Grace of Expreſſion; and when 'tis more Slight and Humble, they never let it loſe any Thing by the Comments they make upon't. How Happy are they in their Conſolatory and Monitory Eſſays addreſs'd to Perſons

† *What is here loſt, I will not pretend to retrieve, even with the Aſſiſtance of* Lambin, *whoſe Gueſſes* Gruter *very juſtly rejects.*

of the higheſt Rank and Repute? They had Two Roads or Channels of Diſputation to anſwer to the double Face of Circumſtances in the Nature of the Things conſider'd by them; for either the Diſpute muſt proceed in general Terms without being reduc'd to any certain Perſons or Spaces of Time; or if theſe are conſider'd, then upon ſome Particulars either of *Fact*, or *Right*, or *Parties*, or *Significations of Terms*. Accordingly, they trac'd Things both VVays, and had they not done ſo, cou'd never have ſally'd out with ſuch a Fluency upon every Subject of either Kind. Now *Zeno* and his Partiſans have troubled their Heads with nothing of This; whether becauſe they wou'd not, or cou'd not look ſo far, I cannot tell. *Cleanthes*, 'tis true, and *Chryſippus* have publiſhed their Methods of *Rhetorick*: And what's the beſt we can ſay of them? Why truly that there are no *Grammars* like them in the World, to teach a Man Silence. In ſhort, I know no other Uſe of them but to trepan us into a new Language, and wean us from our old one; And yet there is nothing too hard for them! No: they can ſqueeze the whole World into a ſingle Burrough! And this I ſuppoſe is one of *Zeno*'s ways to ſet it on Fire! Amazing indeed! that every Freeholder of *Civita*

Vec-

cchia ſhou'd ſtart up an Univerſal Mo-
rch. And does he think the World
ll be ſet on Fire thus? Alaſs! Had he
flam'd Mankind ever ſo much, This
ere enough to damp the Conflagration.
confeſs, 'twas Quick and Smart, your
warfiſh Proof of your Wiſe Man's being
King, a Dictatour, and a *Craſſus*; Thanks
the Rhetoricians that furniſh'd you!
were well for the *Stoicks* if they cou'd
eak a little more up to the Merits of
ertue: Nay, tho' they extend its Juriſ-
ction to the full Complement of Human
appineſs. For what are all their little
terrogations but ſo many *Flea-Bites*. We
ay be glad to admit of them, but can
ver be convinc'd by 'em, and they leave
the ſame as they found us. They are
ndoubtedly of 'Special Concernment, and
rhaps there's Truth underneath 'em too,
t then, as I take it, they are treated be-
w their Quality. Next come on *Logick*
nd *Phyſicks*. Remember, 'twas my Bar-
ain that the *Summum Bonum* ſhou'd bring
p the Rear of the whole Diſpute. Now
eno cou'd never find in his Heart to ſet
out a Reformation of One or T'other of
heſe, having not the leaſt Fault to find
ith the Model of Either. In relation to
ne Firſt; Is there any Omiſſion or Over-
ght, I beſeech you, with which the An-

cients

cients may be charg'd? Have they not be queath'd us as many Definitions, and a good Rules of Defining as can be desir'd Have they not, as the Reason of the Thin prescrib'd, settled their Divisions as we as their Definitions, and likewise the whol Process of Dividing? Not to speak c their Rules concerning *Contraries*, upo which their Doctrines of *Kinds* and *Speci* are erected. For the Ground of the Argumentations they laid down Sel Evident Propositions, observing a due M thod of Connexion, and weighing th Truth of every Proposition till they arriv at the Conclusion. Where d'you meet wit such a *Mart* of *Ratiocinations* as amon them? Not like Your little, fallacious Qu res. Then too it must be remember'd ho frequently they press us as well to con firm the Credit of our Senses by our Rea son as of our Reason by our Senses, an that so, as not to confound the one with th other? Were not These the Men that firs launch'd all the Rules and Directions whic the *Logicians* keep such a Clutter with a this Day? *Chrysippus*, I grant, was a con siderable Pains-taker in that Part, but *Ze no* made nothing of it, in comparison o the Ancients. And if as to some Thing he succeeded as well as They, yet for o thers he never so much as took Know

ledg

edge of 'em. Toward the perfecting of n Argument, whether in the Mind or in Words, there concurr the Two Arts of *Invention* and *Reasoning*. The latter of these as been improv'd both by *Stoicks* and *Peipateticks*; the former to Advantage by the *Peripateticks*, for the *Stoicks* never meddled with it at all. No, they little imagin'd where ny *Mines* of Argument lay, which the *Peripateticks* discover'd Methodicaly and skilfully. And by this means they have eas'd us of the Incumb'rance of Repetitions, Amplifications, and *Glosses*; Matters remote nd involv'd being easily manag'd and come at, when once we know whereabouts hey lie, and which is the way that will bring us to them. You'll tell me, that here have been great *Wits*, who by the Strength of pure natural Parts have advanc'd thus far: But all this while 'tis the safer way to steer by Art than Nature alone. To sprinkle Expressions Poeticaly is one thing; *Judiciously* and *Logicaly* to distribute and distinguish them is another. And thus the Case runs too between the *Peripateticks* and the *Stoicks*, with regard to your Natural Philosophy, the Ends whereof, beside those Two of *Epicurus*, to rid us of the Terrors of *Death*, and the Plague of *Superstition*, are made to be the teaching ourselves Temperance and Modesty from those Circum-

cumſcriptions and that *Decorum* which th Gods themſelves have obſerv'd; *Magnan mity* by contemplating their Operations an Atchievements; and *Juſtice* by a ſufficien Enquiry into the Attributes, Intentions, an Determinations of the great Sovereign c the Univerſe. For it is a Conformity c *Ideas* and *Purpoſes* within us to *Ideas* an *Purpoſes* in him, which Philoſophers mea when they talk of a *Genuin* and *Imperi* Law of Nature. Moreover theſe *Phyſica* Speculations are accompany'd with an end leſs Delight ariſing from our Progreſs i Knowledge, the only Pleaſure upon which after we have diſpatch'd our Affairs of Ur gent Conſequence, we may beſtow our va cant Hours with Credit. In a Word, th *Stoicks* have copy'd from the *Peripateticks* as in all other principal Parts of Philoſo phy, ſo particularly in their Two Aſſer tions of the Exiſtence of the Gods and the Four Elements of the Materia World. Not but *Zeno* upon that untow ard Queſtion which had come abroad Whether there is any ſuch Thing as a *Fifth Sort of Subſtance*, conſtituting the reaſona ble and Intellectual Part of the Univerſe. (and here came in the Enquiry they made about the Nature of the Soul) affirm'd, that it conſiſts of *Fire*; In this, and in ſome few Inſtances beſide, he will not agree with 'em.

m. Notwithſtanding as to the main Point
f All, that a *Divine Spirit* or *Nature* has
ıe Management of the Univerſe, and
ırns all the greater Wheels of it, he deter-
ıines juſt as they have done. And then
ıſtead of that narrow Compaſs both of
Matter and Things, which the *Stoicks* ſup-
oſe, the *Peripateticks* make the Whole ve-
y Ample and Extenſive; not to ſay what
nighty Advances and Collections they
ıave made, in ſtating the ſeveral Kinds of
Animals, and illuſtrating their Originals,
he Structure of their Bodies, and the
Length of their Lives. How fully have
hey acquitted themſelves in relation to the
Vegetative World? How well have they ex-
olain'd and laid open the ſeveral Cauſes of
Things, both Final and Efficient? And here
we have the *Conduit* which ſupplies us with
an inexhauſtible Plenty of ſound Argument
to clear up our Phyſical Account of Things.
Upon the whole then, I am to ſeek for a
Reaſon why the Name of the Sect ſhould
be chang'd. For 'tis no matter, whether
Zeno trod upon the Heels of the *Peripate-
ticks* in every Circumſtance and Particu-
lar, or not, ſo long as, 'tis certain, they
led him the way. Juſt as *Epicurus* in his
Natural Philoſophy is no more than the
ſecond Edition of *Democritus*, tho' he has
made Alterations, and perhaps not a Few;
but

but ſtill the greater and the more materi-al Part of the Hypotheſis is old: And as un-graciouſly have you *Stoicks* dealt by the Men that gave you what you enjoy. So much for that Head. Next as to the mat-ter of *Summum Bonum*, the very Root and Trunk of all Philoſophy, let us a little ex-amine, whether *Zeno*'s Refinings will juſti-fie his Separation from thoſe Philoſophical Inſtructors of his, that firſt brought that ſame *Summum Bonum* to Light. Upon this Occaſion, *Cato*, I ſhall make bold in my Turn, to ſet out the Senſe of the *Final* Good, as it comprizes all the Buſineſs of Philoſophy; and what is by the *Stoicks* look'd upon to be ſuch: Not to diſparage that *Idea* of it which you have been at the Pains to give me, but only to diſcover as far as we are able, how much *Zeno* has added to't. His *Predeceſſours* the *Peripateticks*, and in that number *Polemo* moſt expreſsly, wou'd have *Secundum naturam vivere*, *a Life after Nature's Model*, to be the *Summum Bonum*; and to this the *Stoicks* affix a Threefold Expoſition, as firſt, that it is a *Life*, *the Meaſures whereof reſult from a Judgment rightly paſs'd upon the Meaſures of Nature*; And this, they ſay, was *Zeno*'s Senſe of his Fi-nal Good where he pronounces it to be that which you were mentioning, *Convenienter naturæ vivere*, *To conform to the Meaſures of Nature*;

ure; Secondly, thro' the whole Course of our ives to discharge all, or however the best art of the *Media Officia (Middle Duties.)* ut then this Exposition clashes with the ormer; for the *Rectum* or κατόρθωμα you ere speaking of (*that which is altogether ust and Good*) is appropriate to the Man of *Visdom*, whereas the discharging of Unfi-ish'd or Imperfect Duties is no more than nany an *Unwise Man* is capable of. Third-y, so to live as to make the best, if not of ll, yet of the largest Portion of those Circumstances which are agreable to Na-ure. Now This is plainly trespassing be-ond matters of Practice; the *Summum Bonum* thus explain'd comprehending, be-ide a *Vertuous Life*, all such Things as are greable to Nature, and not at our Com-nand. And to this Third *Summum Bonum*, is also that Character of Life which it re-quires as including *Vertue*, 'tis for none ut a *Wise* Man to make any Pretensions. What is this at last, by the Confession of the *Stoicks* themselves, but the very same *Sum-mum Bonum* for which *Xenocrates* and *Ari-totle* had declar'd? Accordingly they have recogniz'd that same First Principle of Na-ure which you begun with, in Words to his Effect: *Every Being in Nature affects its own Conservation, and endeavours to retain itself in the Properties of its Kind.* And hence

hence it is, they tell us, that we apply o
ſelves to learn Arts and Sciences, becau
of their Uſefulneſs and Subſerviency to o
Nature, and conſequently the main one
'em all muſt be the *Art of Living*, that
in ſuch a manner as to loſe nothing of wh
Nature has beſtow'd upon us, and to f
up the Defects remaining. Further; th
divided the whole *Compoſitum* of Man in
Soul and Body, determin'd both to
Things Valuable in themſelves, and th
therefore the Virtues and Excellencies
Both are Valuable too, making the Ve
tues of the Mind as incomparably Sup
riour to all Advantages of the Body,
the Mind itſelf to the Body. *Wiſdom* th
recommended for the Guardian and *Gove
nant*, the Companion and Helpmate of H
man Nature, and alledg'd that it was i
Buſineſs to protect our *Compoſition*, ar
hold Body and Mind together in a con
modious Union. Then after they hav
offer'd you the *Groſs* of their Notion, the
come to manage more artfully. The
ſtimate and Uſe we are to make of th
Goods of the Body, they conceiv'd wer
obvious enough. But took a nearer and
nicer View of the Goods of the Mind, amon
the Principal whereof *Juſtice*, and as it were i
Embryo, firſt preſented itſelf. Theſe, of a
the Philoſophers, were the firſt that urg'

th

the Obligations of Nature incumbent upon that which procreates to love its own Iſſue, and the natural Validity of Conjugal Ties and Matrimonial Union antecedent thereunto; and that the Friendſhips and Intimacies of *Relations* all reſulted from this Origin. When they had thus prepar'd the way, in the next place they ſet themſelves to contemplate the ſeveral Species of *Vertue*, their Derivations and Progreſſions; and aſcended by theſe Steps to that Greatneſs of Mind which makes a Man a Match for Fortune, let her do her worſt, upon this Conſideration, that a Man of true Wiſdom *has the World in a String*. Indeed, whoſoever follow'd the Directions of the Old Philoſophy, diſappointed the Treachery and Malice of Fortune, with all the eaſe imaginable. Thus they ſet out with the firſt Fixt Principles in Nature, and then ſuperinduc'd the *Amplitudines Bonorum*, or *Conſummative Goods*, whether they be ſuch as are Conſequent of cloſer Inſpection into Matters more Difficult and Dark, purſuant to that Deſire of Knowledge and Information which is radicated in the Mind, and ſpurs it on to Exerciſes of Ratiocination, and the Improvement of the Apprehenſive and Diſcurſive Faculties; or whether they be ſuch as comfort with Human Nature, in regard that Man is the only Animal that's born with a

Principle of Modeſty and Senſe of Shame
that courts *Allyances* and *Society* with thoſ
of his own Kind, and finds himſelf ty'd u
to a ſtrict Obſervation of Honeſty and De
cency in all his Actions and Words. An
thus the Seminary of Natural Principles a
bovemention'd gives Birth to all the Dutie
of Temperance, Modeſty, Juſtice, and
very other Vertue. I have now, *Cat*
ſumm'd up the Scheme of that Philoſoph
for which I am concern'd, and having don
ſo, would willingly underſtand upon wh
account *Zeno* and this Primitive *Sett*
Notions, cou'd not agree together.
there any of them which he has ev
diſapprov'd? Does he diſpute whether Se
Preſervation be a Natural Principle? Wh
ther every Living Creature is ſo much
Favour with itſelf as to promote, as far
it can, the continuance of its Exiſtence
its proper Kind? Whether, ſeeing the E
of every Art is reſolv'd into that whi
Nature principaly purſues by it, the *Art*
Living has the ſame End as the reſt? Wh
ther the Mind and Body we are compoun
ed of, with their Excellences and Privi
ges, are worth our Choice and *good Lo*
ing-to for their own Sakes? Whether t
Excellences of the Mind deſervedly ta
the Upper Hand? Whether the *Peripateti*
are in the right as to what they aſſert co
cer

cerning Prudence, Love of Knowledge, Human Commerce and Society, Temperance, Modesty, Magnanimity, and all other Kinds of Vertue? No, the *Stoicks* frankly acknowledge, that the *Peripateticks* have succeeded admirably well upon all these Heads, but that *Zeno* stands excus'd, upon other Grounds, for erecting a separate Interest. Undoubtedly! *Zeno* was for setting all things in a true Light! and the Errors of the Ancients were intolerable! O the hideous Perverseness and Stupidity of the Men, to call a Flourishing Constitution, an Ignorance of Pain, a clear, good Eye-sight, and all the other Senses in Perfection; to call these Things *Good*, as if any Distinction were to be made between Them and their Contraries! One wou'd think they might have easily perciv'd, that these *Good Things* of theirs are no more than *Præposita (Preferables!)* Agen; How Wise were the old Gentlemen, I warrant you, when, instead of making *Advantages* of the Body to be such as we shou'd rather choose to have than be without, they have represented them as Desireable for themselves! So for Life, there ought to be nothing in't but Vertue! What an Escape! to say, that a Condition of Life, garnish'd with all other Accommodations agreable to Nature, is the more *Desireable* rather than the more

Eligible! Vertue, it seems, is Self-sufficient to render us as Happy as 'tis possible for us to be; and when a *Wise Man* is at the *Tip-top* of all Felicity, can he wish Things were better with him? Yes truly, he will endeavour to keep out of the way of Pains, Diseases, and Infirmity! Now was it not shrewdly done of *Zeno*, to innovate upon such Pretences and Provocations! Neither must we overlook some other Hints which you touch'd upon, as became a Man of Art and Discretion, that all Vicious Habits and Actions, whether of Imprudence, Injustice, or any other, are of an *Equal Obliquity*; and that tho' a Man climb to as high a Pitch of *Vertue*, as the Nerves of his Natural Faculties and Learning will carry him, yet his Case is as much to be pity'd as that of the Wickedest Wretch upon Earth, 'till he arrives at a *Sinless Perfection*. For Example, *Plato* was an Extraordinary Man, but because he was not the *Stoick's Wise one*, he was as Ill a Liver, and as Unfortunate a poor Soul, as if he had been the most desperate Villain in Flesh. What must the Old Philosophy do if 'twere not for these *Corrections and Amendments!* But still there's no Admission for them into Cities, Market-Places, or Courts of Justice; for if any Body shou'd talk at this rate in Publick, who cou'd have the Patience to hear him

set

ſet up for a Profeſſor in Wiſdom and Morality? To perſwade us there's no Body can teach the Conduct of Life like himſelf, and yet has the very ſame Conceptions with other People, the very ſame Principles, only he changes the Significations of Words, caſhiers the Old Names of Things, and fills up their Places with New ones of his own! What wou'd you ſay if a *Priſoner's Council*, in the Concluſion of his *Plea*, ſhou'd flatly deny the Inconveniences of Baniſhment or Confiſcation, for that they are not *Fugienda*, *What we ſhou'd be glad to eſcape*, but *Rejicienda*, *What we have no Reaſon to make our Choice*, and ſignifie to the Judge, that Clemency will be thrown away upon his Client? Or if *Hannibal* were advanc'd to the City Gates, and had begun a Breach, and a *Stoick* ſhou'd ſtart up, and prove with Might and Main, that there's no Harm at all in Captivity, Slavery, Deſtruction and Devaſtation? If the *Stoick's* Man of Wiſdom be ſolely entit'led to Vertue and Happineſs, how came it to paſs that our Senate inſerted the Words, QUOD EJUS VIRTUTE, AUT FELICITATE (*To whoſe Vertue and Succeſs we owe*) in the Order they paſs'd for *Africanus's* Triumph? In earneſt, 'tis a very unaccountable Philoſophy which expreſſes itſelf *abroad* in the Vulgar Forms, but, when it comes from the *Preſs*, in *its own!* and all

the while the Things to which new Names are Assign'd, receive no manner of Alteration but what's purely *Modal* and *Abstracted.* Whether we account of Riches, Power, and Health, as Things properly *Good*, or only *Preferable*; as long as he that affirms them to be *Good* reckons upon them no more than he that will have them call'd *Preferable*, What does it signifie? And therefore 'twas no wonder that *Panætius*, a Man of such remarkable Sincerity and Seriousness, and a Fit *Privy-Counselour* for *Scipio* and *Lælius*, being to send *Quintus Tubero* some Advice relating to *Patience*, has not a Word to say against Pain's being an *Evil*, which, if it had not been one, shou'd have been his Grand Argument: but shews the Nature and Qualities of it, in what Degree 'tis Foreign, and may be thrown off, and by what Methods we may support ourselves under it. Now this Man was a *Stoick*, which makes it more probable that he design'd by such a Management to discountenance that *Abuse* of Words, of which I have complain'd. To return, and make a nearer Advance to your self, *Cato*; Give me leave to press hard upon you, and attempt the Comparison between yours and other Assertions, which I preferr before yours. And as to all Points, wherein you and the Ancients are Both of a Mind, let's al-

allow them without more ado, and ſo, if you think Good, fall directly upon thoſe Articles which are controverted. The Propoſal, ſaid he, looks well: Come as cloſe to the Buſineſs, and thruſt as home as you pleaſe. Hitherto your Objections have been Vulgar and *of Courſe*; and therefore I promiſe myſelf you have a higher Strein in Reſerve. Meaning me? (ſaid I) Yet, ſo far as I am able, I'll anſwer your Expectations, and when I am at a Stand for want of Something Better, take up with Coarſer Conveniences. In the firſt place then be it eſtabliſh'd as a *Poſtulate*, that we are inſtigated by Nature to deſire and conſult for our own Safety and Well-Being. The Subject of our next Meditations ought to be our own Nature; for how ſhou'd we look to the *Main Chance* till we know what it is? We are *Men*, or Beings compounded of Mind and Body, whatever Principles they conſiſt of. The Mind and Body therefore challenge our good Affections upon the Title of a *Natural Impulſe*, and from them it is that we muſt meaſure and make out the Condition of the Final and Ultimate Good. And This, if the Premiſſes may be depended on, appears to be the Acquiſition of the largeſt and the choiceſt Portion of Circumſtances agreable to Nature. This was the *Moral End* of the *Peri-*

pateticks; only they defin'd it more compendiously, *Secundum Naturam vivere*, *To follow Nature's Rule of Life*; This was their *Summum Bonum*. And let your Brethren, or yourself, with all your Abilities, satisfie us, if 'tis possible, how upon the Footing of the precedent Propositions, you'll fetch a *Summum Bonum* out of *Honesty* or *Vertue*, or the *Congruity* (in your Sense) *of our Lives to Nature?* Or whereabouts, or which way you have dropp'd your Bodies together with all those other *Advantages* which lie out of *Human Jurisdiction*; not excepting *Duty* it self? How Nature shou'd recommend, and Wisdom at the same time reject all These, I am to learn. But what if instead of Man's *Chief Good*, we were employ'd to look out for that of some Imaginary *Living-Creature*, (to make use of a Fiction for the lightning-up of Truth) with no more than *Mind* or *Spirit* in its Substance? Even such a *Living-Creature* wou'd have nothing to say to your *Moral End*. No, it wou'd ask, Where are the Blessings of Health and Repose? And as it wou'd be intent upon its own Preservation, so it cou'd not but be hankering after these. What other *End* therefore of its Existence or Action shou'd it regard, but that of *Living according to Nature?* or in other Words, as I've explain'd it above, that it shou'd be Hap-

lappy in, if not all, yet the moſt and the eſt of thoſe Circumſtances which are a-reable to Nature? 'Tis no matter what ort of Animal I inſtance in, for tho' it ou'd be my new faſhion'd one without leſh and Bones, 'tis the ſame thing: The ind is not without its *Tone* and *Affections* nalogous to thoſe of the Body. And erefore it wou'd certainly apprehend its *inal Good* to be as I have deſcrib'd it. *hryſippus*, where he makes a Diviſion of nimals, obſerves that in ſome the Bo-y is the Sovereign and Excelling Part, Others the Mind, and that others agen ave This Proportionable to That; and en he comes to ſtate the Laſt and Final ood which is proper to every *Species*. *Man* he had diſpos'd of under that *Species* which the Mind is Principal: And yet e allots him ſuch a Final Good, as if nſtead of being principaly *Mind*, he had hought him nothing elſe. So that before ou have lighted on ſome Animal or o-her that's all over Incorporeal, and ut-erly unacquainted with any of thoſe things vhich are *Secundum Naturam*, *agreable to Nature*, as Health, or the like, there's no oundation for a *Summum Bonum* of pure, bſtracted Vertue. And how ſuch an Ani-nal ſhou'd exiſt without contradicting its wn Nature, is Unconceivable. You tell

us

us of *Advantages*, which upon the Com
pariſon are found ſo ſlight and ſlender, a
to diſappear and be loſt. And we gran
you that ſuch there are, as *Epicurus* ſay
of ſome ſorts of *Pleaſure*, ſo inconſidera
ble that in a manner they come to no
thing. But are all the Advantages of th
Body, at leaſt when in due Proceſs of Tim
arriv'd at Perfection, of no better a *Cla*
than this? As to thoſe Advantages whic
are ſo mean that they are preſently eclips'
by others, 'tis very often Indifferent to u
whether we have them or not, as (to uſe you
own Similitudes) 'twere to no purpoſe t
light up a Candle to the Sun, or mak
over a *Counter* to the Treaſury of *Cræſu*
And thoſe which are not ſo eaſily obſcur'
may ſometimes too be of little Accoun
As the Acceſſion of a Month to a Ten
Years Life of Pleaſure has ſomething *Goo*
in it, becauſe it lengthens the Pleaſure of i
and yet if we cannot obtain it, the Ten
Years Life of Pleaſure hath been a Life c
Pleaſure ſtill. The Acceſſion of a Mont
is what I reckon Parallel to the *Goods o*
the Body. Now 'tis worth our while t
dive after theſe *Acceſſionals*: And there
fore when the *Stoicks* give us to learn tha
a Wiſe Man will rather chuſe that the Ver
tuous Life he leads ſhall have, than want
the Conveniences of a *Jugg* and a *Pitcher*
an

d yet that these Utensils conduce nothing
his Happiness, they make me smile.
all we dispute, or rather laugh such an
ustration out of Doors? Cou'd any thing
Nature be more Comical and Ridiculous
an a Man in Concern about the having
not having of a *Jugg*? 'Tis one of the
eatest Services for which I can be indebt-
l to another, the Rescuing my Body out
Indispositions and Torments. And I am
t to believe, if *the Wise Man* were, at
e Command of a Tyrant, to be broke
on the Wheel, he wou'd put on another-
ness Countenance than if he had let his
gg drop; and muster up all his Fortitude
nd Patience, as well knowing how despe-
te an Expedition he is sent upon, and
hat a Dead-doing Enemy he has, of *Tor-
ent*, to encounter, and that therefore he
nust make the most of his Vertue. To
eturn; 'Tis none of those Diminutive Ad-
antages which perish in Comparison, but
he Total of those which goes to the Com-
letion of our *Summum Bonum*, after which
t concerns me to enquire. In the Life of
a Voluptuarie any one Pleasure is as none
among so many, and yet it makes a Part of
a Voluptuous Life, as little as there is of it.
A Groat would have lain undistinguish'd a-
mong *Crœsus*'s Heaps, and yet he wou'd
have been the Richer for't. And thus, tho'

our

our *Advantages according to Nature* ſhou
not be very ſignificant in the *Compoſiti*
of a Happy Life, nevertheleſs they con
into it; and ſince we are agreed in Thi
that a *Natural Inclination* thruſts us upon th
Purſuit of thoſe things which are accordin
to Nature, 'twere proper to have an I
ventory drawn of them, and when that
done, we may pick and chuſe our Oppo
tunities of inſpecting *Particulars*, their E
tent and *Diameter*, the Eminence of the
Properties, and in what Degree they promo
the Happineſs of Life; and the Nature
all thoſe Advantages which are ſo ſma
as to be in a manner Undiſcernable. I
ſhort, What Occaſion is there for makin
many Words about a Matter decided? For n
Body queſtions but the *Summum Bonum* is A
nalogous and Proportion'd to the Capacit
and Nature of the Thing to which it is
Summum Bonum; and that, becauſe every Be
ing loves it ſelf. Did ever any one yet de
ſignedly abandon either All of itſelf, or Par
of itſelf, or ſo much as the Functions an
Faculties of any Part of itſelf, or ſtand of
from any of thoſe Circumſtances which
are according to Nature, or any *Influence*
or *Poſture* of them? Or did it ever grow
utterly inſenſible of its Original Conſti-
tution? No, there is not a Being in Nature
but makes much of all Advantages, Little

or

Great. Upon what Account therefore Man ſo ſingular as to relinquiſh him-, to diſcount his Body, and take up h a *Summum Bonum* Uncommenſurate the Whole of his Perſon? 'Tis deter-n'd and confeſs'd not only among the *icks*, but all Parties whatever, that there ſt be an Analogy between the *Summum num* and the Nature of *Man*: But how ? if, conſiſtently with that Analogy, the *incipal Good* of every Thing muſt lie thin the more Eminent and Diſtinguiſh-Part of its Nature: For in that Senſe *Stoicks* underſtand our *Summum Bo-n.* So that you have no more to do but make a Change in the Firſt Principles Nature! and, quitting what you have erted, that every Animal is no ſooner rn than engag'd to the Love, and ta-n up with the Tuition and Defence of elf, to maintain henceforward, that the ſt Affections of every Living Creature e only laid out upon its Diſtinguiſhing Ex-llences and Privileges, and all its Care d Attendance engroſs'd by them! and at every other Being ſollicits the Wel-re of no more than the Worthieſt and obleſt Part of Itſelf! Tho' which way at Nobleſt Part ſhou'd be ſuch, unleſs reſpect of ſome other Noble and Wor-y Part, is Unintelligible enough! And

if

if that Part claims a Share too in our f
vourable Intentions, why ſhou'd not t
Summum Bonum or *the full Meaſure of*
That's Deſireable, be thought Equivalent
an Aggregate of All, or at leaſt, the gre
ter and choiceſt Part of thoſe Things whi
we are capacited to deſire? 'Tis equa
Phidias's Buſineſs to work a Piece of Ca
ving, all himſelf; or to undertake the F
niſhing of what another Hand has left in
perfect. And in this Caſe he's an Emble
of *Wiſdom*, which does not create Me
but gives the Finiſhing Stroaks. Not b
that She muſt well weigh the Steps whi
Nature has made, if She deſigns there ſha
be no Defects in her Work. Very wel
In what Condition do we come out of t
Hands of Nature? And what is the Pr
per Office and Province of Wiſdom? Wh
is there wanting for her to make up?
there nothing elſe to be conſummated b
the Operations of the Intellectual Facu
ties, which is but a *Periphraſis* for our Re
ſon? Why then indeed a Vertuous Li
muſt neceſſarily be the Sole and Utmo
Good of Man, becauſe *Vertue* is the Perf
ction and Accompliſhment of Reaſon. C
if the Body *alone* is to be put into t
beſt Condition, then let our *Summum Bonu*
be patch'd up out of Health, Eaſe, Bea
ty, &c. But becauſe we are ſeeking aft
t

ne *Summum Bonum* of Human Nature En-
re, what ſhould hinder us from taking a
'iew of the Reſult of the Queſtion ſo ſtated?
'hat all the Offices and Efforts of *Wiſdom*
re directed to the Improvement and Ele-
'ation of Human Nature, is univerſaly
onfeſs'd. And yet nothing will ſerve ſome
'eople's Turn (to let you ſee that the *Sto-*
cks are not the only Men in the World
rom whom I differ) but *Summum-Bonums*
vhich are not ſubject to our Diſcretion and
Choice; as if we were no more than *Ani-*
nated Mechaniſm: while others of the con-
:rary Extream, take not the leaſt Notice of
any thing but the Mind, as if a Man's Bo-
dy were no more than a *Chimæra*, and as
if the Mind itſelf had not its own Copore-
al Seat and Vehicle, but were a ſort of *Ab-*
ſtracted Being diſengaged from all *Matter*,
(which is ſuch a Being as I know not what
to make of) and ſo were to be ſatiated with
Vertue alone, and had no Inclination to
Repoſe and Freedom from Pain. Now eve-
ry Individual of theſe Two Factions might
with as good Reaſon entertain a Partiality
for the Left Side of his Body, in Oppo-
ſition to the Right; or ſhake Hands with
Herillus, ſtop at the Operations of the
Judgment, and ſet aſide the Practical Con-
currence of the Will. For ſo far they are all
alike, that every Man's *Hypotheſis* is not a

Whole

Whole one, while he takes in as much
Human Nature as he pleaſes, and leav
us the reſt. So that only they can ha
effectualy and fully notify'd the *Summ*
Bonum of Man, who have depreciated
one Part of his Body, or Power of
Soul. But becauſe, *Cato*, no Philoſoph
will put you upon proving that *Vertue*
the Main Excellency and Beſt Accompliſ
ment of Human Nature, and becauſe Wi
and Good Men are look'd upon as Inſtanc
of an Adequate Perfection, you are alwa
flaſhing this Conceſſion upon our Unde
ſtandings. Whereas every Animal h
ſome good Quality Predominant in hi
as for Example, a Horſe or a Dog : An
yet his Health and Eaſe are Things whic
turn to Account. Accordingly Vertu
being the Firſt and Moſt Tranſcende
Qualification of Human Nature, Ma
takes the Denomination of Perfect fro
that Sovereign Ingredient of his Perfection
Seriouſly the different Methods and Pro
ceſſes of Nature ought to have been bette
conſider'd by you. When ſhe has ripen'
Men into Philoſophers, 'tis not neceſſar
that ſhe ſhou'd do by their Bodies as i
they were ſo many Stalks of Corn at ful
Age, leave them behind for *Stubble*, or *looſe*
Straws. No; ſhe accepts of the due Sha-
dings and Maſterly Touches without ex-
pung-

punging the *Out-Lines* herſelf had adjuſted. *Reaſon* is an Addition and Superſtructure upon *Senſe*, and when it comes to take its Place, cannot be ſuppos'd to exterminate t'other. The Cultivation of a Vine conſiſts in taking ſuch a juſt Care of it, as that all its Parts may thrive: Now ſuppoſe (as for Explication and Inſtruction-ſake you *Stoicks* never make any Scruple of putting Imaginary Caſes) ſuppoſe, I ſay, this Faculty of Cultivation lay within the Vine, no doubt it wou'd ſet a higher Value upon itſelf than upon all the Subſtance of the Vine, and determine for itſelf that nothing n the Vine beſide is comparable to it; and ret it wou'd not willingly be deſtitute of vhatever elſe in the *Vine* concurrs towards he Support and Improvement of it. In ike manner when *Reaſon* comes into Play, ınd exerciſes the Supream Authority; the *Prima Naturæ*, *the antecedent Proviſions of Nature*, become Subjects and Vaſſals to it: And yet the Senſitive Part is as ſerviceable s ever, both to Nature and itſelf. In the nean time *Reaſon* is to execute that Regal Office which ſhe holds, in all the Parts of it, and regulate the whole *Series* of Life. Now theſe things lay'd together, who can :hooſe but be ſurpriz'd at the Inconſiſten-:y of the *Stoicks*? They attribute it to the ὁρμή, or *Natural Appetite*, to Duty and

to Vertue itſelf, the Cuſtody of thoſe Things which are according to Nature; but when they take a Flight to their *Summum Bonum*, theſe are all left behind, and rather than they ſhall be ſhut up together into one and the ſame *End*, one and the ſame Energy of the Will is ſubdivided, and theſe Things we are to *make our Choice*, and thoſe we are to *purſue*. You aſſure us notwithſtanding that if any Thing beſide Vertue has any Relation to the Happineſs of Life, there can be no ſuch Thing as *Vertue*. Whereas, on the contrary 'tis impoſſible for Vertue to commence, unleſs her *Acceptances* and *Refuſals* be allow'd to go along with the Account of the *Summum Bonum*. For if theſe are taken away, immediately we ſlide into *Ariſto's* Abſurdities, forgetting thoſe very Principles out of which we extracted Vertue; or if they are diſpens'd with, but not ſo as to retain their Relation to the *Summum Bonum*, then we're in a direct Road to the Extravagances of *Herillus* make Life to be Twofold, and inſtitute a Double Rule of it anſwerable to his *Brace* of diſtinct *Summum Bonums*, which, if they had been any, muſt have been united; where as now a'days they're ſet at Diſtances wide enough. To ſee the ungainlineſs of ſome People! 'Tis plain you're got o'the wrong ſide

ſide of the Hedge, for that unleſs the *antecedent Proviſions of Nature* be reckon'd among with Vertue into the Total of the *Summum Bonum*, we turn Vertue into an Impoſſibility. For *genuin* Vertue, which we have now been in queſt of, never neglects any Part of Human Nature, but conſults for the Whole, whereas the Vertue which the *Stoicks* patronize, takes one Part of Human Nature into its Protection, and leaves the reſt to ſhift for itſelf. The earlieſt Eſſays of Appetite tend toward the ſecuring of that Condition of Nature wherein we are born, and cou'd our Conſtitution ſpeak, 'twoud ſecond me. Well but, ſay you, that's before it appears what it is to which Nature has a Principal Regard. And let that be aſſign'd as ſoon as you pleaſe; will this Propoſition fare the worſe, *No Part of our Nature is to be overlook'd*? Now if we are made up of nothing more than pure *Reaſon*, then can our Ultimate Good be made up of nothing but pure *Vertue*. But if we have Bodies too, then is this the Conſequence of reſting in any ſuch Suppoſition, that ſo much of our Nature as antecedently to that Suppoſition we adher'd to, in the reſult we are oblig'd to forgoe; that is to ſay, if we will live according to Nature, the only way is to deſert her. As we have known ſome Philoſophers that when they

have come within ſight of Objects of a more Eminent and Glorious Kind, have bid adieu to the Senſes from which their Firſt Meaſures were taken; Even ſo the Speculatours of your Order, when they had been viewing the Graces and Charms of *Vertue* thro' the Inclinations of Human Nature, flung away the *Teleſcope*, and remembring imperfectly that all Deſireable or Valuable Beings are ſuch *throughout*, and from one end to t'other, they have ſapp'd the very Foundations, before they were aware, of that which they ſo much eſteem and admire. For which reaſon, I conceive, all the ſeveral Parties that have eſtabliſh'd *Honeſte vivere* (*a Good and Vertuous Life*) for their *Summum Bonum*, have been overſeen in that Reſpect. Tho' ſome have had better Luck than Others. *Pyrrho* came by the worſt of all, while he magnify'd Vertue at ſuch a rate as to make every Thing elſe abſolutely Worthleſs and Inſipid. *Ariſto* was not altogether ſo Unmerciful; but as an Occaſion and Motive for the Inclinations of a Wiſe Man to work upon, has afforded him any Subject of Thought or Object of Imagination that at any time falls in his way. And foraſmuch as he was pleas'd to vouchſafe *Natural Inclination* ſomething to truſt to, he got the Start of *Pyrrho*; but came behind o

ther

thers of the ſame Kidney upon this Account, that he has quitted the *Firſt Proviſions of Nature*. The *Stoicks* are ſo far *Cater-Couſins* to theſe Philoſophers, that they confine the *Summum Bonum* to Vertue, but then, as in reference to their fixing a *Principle* of *Duty* they are better adviſ'd than *Pyrrho*, ſo they have ſucceeded much beyond *Ariſto* by ſhunning his *Occaſional Subjects and Objects*. But then agen, in paring away the Advantages from the Subſtance of the *Summum Bonum* which they confeſs are Natural, and Simply Eligible, they play Faſt and Looſe with *Nature*, and border upon *Ariſto*; ſeeing as he conjur'd up his *Riddle* of *Occaſional Subjects and Objects*, ſo they taking up the *Firſt Proviſions of Nature* divide them from the Subſtance of Human Good, and allow them no Place in the Conſideration of *Moral Ends*. Now in repreſenting them under the Notion of Things Eligible, they ſeem to aſſent to the Suggeſtions of Nature, 'till they come to deny the Subſerviency of thoſe Things to the Happineſs of Life, and then they have done with her. Thus far I have proſecuted the Proof of that Allegation that *Zeno* had no real Inducement to found a Faction contradiſtinct to the *Order* of the Old Philoſophers. Let us now bethink ourſelves of proceeding to new Matter——— But perhaps, *Cato*

you may have ſome *Animadverſions* to interpoſe, or however I ſhall tire you. No Remarks 'till you have made an end, (ſay'd he) and the longer you diſcourſe, the better. 'Tis a Felicity I am proud of, (ſay'd I) the Liberty of conferring Notes about the Nature of Vertue with ſo great a Patron and Example of it in every *Species*, as *Cato*. Firſt then obſerve that the *Stoicks* are but Sharers with all other Philoſophers who make Vertue the Full and Ultimate Good of Man, in their Characteriſtical Poſition, *their Axiom of Axioms*, that Vertue is our only Good, and an Honeſt Life the Perfection and Conſummation of our Nature and our Happineſs. And as for what you urge, that if we reckon upon any Thing beſide Vertue, we deſtroy the Being of it, the Parties aforemention'd can object as much. Tho' I have been rather diſpos'd to make a Judgment of *Zeno*'s Exceptions againſt *Polemo*, eſpecialy becauſe they ſtart fair from the ſame Firſt Principles, the former having borrow'd them from the latter; and to take Notice where *Zeno* makes his firſt halt, and how he picks a Quarrel, than of his Character in reſpect of Thoſe who, notwithſtanding that they held the ſame Opinions with *Zeno* and *Polemo*, and ſupported them by the ſame Arguments, declar'd that their *Summum Bonums* were no

ſubſe-

ſubſequent *Emergences* of Nature. Another Thing which ſcandalizes me is this, that after you have been broaching your Doctrine of Vertue's being our only Good, you require as a Thing neceſſary, that certain *Principles* or *Materials* congruous and well adapted to Nature come under our *Choice*, in order to the being of *Vertue*. Is it a *Choice* fit for Vertue to be built upon, when the Chief and Ultimate Good embrac'd is capable of, and imperfect without *Additions*? Certainly the *Summum Bonum*, or *Total of Human Good*, ought to encloſe every Thing that's Deſireable or Eligible, and he that has made Prize of it, has already all that he can have or wiſh to have. Further; Let us with the *Epicurean* ſingle out Pleaſure for the Total of Human Good, and do we not preſently come to a plain Rule and Road of Practice? Is it not apparent and notorious, the End which the Men of that Denomination propoſe to themſelves in diſcharging Offices or Duties, and how far they are concern'd to act or not to act; and what they are to purſue and what to decline? This is ſomething-like! here you have no ſooner a *Summum Bonum* but you underſtand, of your own accord, what are the Duties and Practices which match with it. But for your *Summum Bonum* of *Vertue* and *Honeſty*, it takes up ſo much Room,

as you have extended it, that there's not a Corner left for any ſuch Thing as a Principle of Duty and Action. And this is that for which Yourſelves no leſs than the Friends of *Occaſional Subjects and Objects* are ſo much at a loſs. You, for your Parts, are driven back again to Nature, and the beſt Anſwer ſhe returns you is a Reproof, becauſe you did not fetch from her as well your *Ultimate Good* of *Life*, as your *Principles of Practice*, there being a near Connexion and Entercourſe between all *Principles of Action* and the *Final Good.* She'll tell you that as *Ariſto* has been utterly diſcountenanc'd, and with very good Reaſon, for ſuppoſing a Parity between and ſetting an equal Value upon all Things which are not of the Nature of Vertue and Vice; ſo *Zeno* is under a great Miſtake, ſince with him nothing but what is Matter of Vertue and Vice is in the way to the *Summum Bonum*, and other Things make nothing for the Happineſs of Life, tho' they have That in them which is ſufficient to ſway the Will; as if any Thing out of the *Summum Bonum* cou'd command ſuch a *Choice* ot *Propenſity.* What can be more abſurd and preposterous than this Method of yours, firſt to find out the *Summum Bonum*, and then to retire back to the *Conſtitution* of Nature for your Principle of *Practice* or *Duty*? Do not

not miſtake your ſelves. We are not firſt call'd upon by Principles of Practice or Duty to purſue thoſe Things which are *according to Nature*, but theſe are the Things which ſet our Inclinations on work, and invite us to *Practice*. Next we are to try what we can make of your conciſe Concluſions or *Conſectaries*, as you call them. And firſt of all for the wonder of *Laconiſm! Whatever is Good, is Praiſe-worthy; Whatever is Praiſe-worthy, is Matter of Vertue and Honour; Therefore whatever is Good is Matter of Vertue and Honour.* This 'tis to be run through with a *Bulruſh!* But who, d'you think, will connive at the *Major* or *Firſt Propoſition*? Or in caſe it ſhou'd be receiv'd, where's the need of the ſecond? For if whatſoever is Good is Praiſe-worthy, whatſoever is Good muſt be Matter of Vertue and Honour. Who (I ſay) will ſurrender the Premiſſes to you, *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and their Complices excepted? Now with all theſe Profeſſours you are out of Conceit. As for *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, and the reſt of that Party, they'll not let you run away with it. Health, Strength, Riches, Fame, and ſo forth, are Good, (ſay they) tho' they are not Praiſe-worthy; and what if Vertue far ſurpaſſes every other Human Good or Excellency, muſt therefore Vertue alone comprehend the whole Subſtance of our

Good?

Good? Then agen, what expect you fron *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, and as many as hav eſpous'd *Carneades's Summum Bonum?* Wi Theſe, can you imagine, after they hav deducted Vertue out of that Total, com ply with your Demands? or from *Calliph* or *Diodorus*, who have ſuperinduc'd up on Vertue that which is *Heterogeneou* and Diſtinct from it? Or is it *Cato's* Cu ſtom to lay down diſputed Premiſſes and then make his own Concluſions There's your *Sorites* alſo condemn'd by us *Whatever is Good, is worthy of our goo Wiſhes; Whatever is worthy of our goo Wiſhes, is Deſireable; Whatever is Deſirea ble is Praiſe-worthy*; and ſo on, for I ſha trace it no further. 'Tis enough to de ny you what we deny'd you before, tha whatever is Deſireable is Praiſe-worthy As wretchedly ſhallow is that other *Con ſectary*, that a Man may boaſt of th Conſtituents of a-Happy Life, where in he were not Excuſable if any Thing beſide Vertue were of the Eſſence of it For that Matter *Polemo* will never ſtand out with *Zeno*; no, nor *Polemo's* Preceptor nor any one of that or of the other *Fra ternities* that compound their *Summum Bo nam* of *Vertue and other Things*, tho' *Ver tue* they account the *Sovereign Simple.* And 'tis granted, that Vertue has incomparably

ne Advantage, that This, and This alone, ffords Matter of Boasting, and that whoever has This within him, may be happy, nder the want of all the rest. But to y, that nothing must be counted *Good* ut *Vertue! Polemo* will ne'r be brought to . Neither will so much as this Aphorism, *hat there's any thing in a Happy Life which ffords Matter of Boasting* be yielded by hose who receive not *Vertue* into their *ummum Bonum*; tho' by fits they'll maintain, that *Pleasure* may be fairly a Subject f Ostentation. At last you must be convinc'd then, either that you have assum'd hat will never be granted you; or, that it shou'd be granted you, 'twill do you o manner of Service. The Truth on't is, henever we are meditating Conclusions of his Nature, it ought to be the Business and Aim of Philosophy and Philosophers, especialy when they are enquiring after the *Summum Bonum*, to rectifie and settle the Counsels and Conduct of Life much rather than he Construction of Words. Your Short nd Poinant Demonstrations, with which you confess you are so much taken, will they rescue a Man from his Prejudices? How Pain comes to be an Evil, is a Point debated, and we would be rightly inform'd bout it. That it is Hateful, Vexatious, Disagreable to Man's Nature, and Hard to

be

be borne, the *Stoicks* will tell you as well
other People; but then having nothing
it of Diſhoneſty, Lewdneſs, Immoralit
Obliquity, or Turpitude, it cannot be poſ
bly an Evil. Now when you have la
this Conſideration before a Timorous Ma
tho' he may keep his Countenance, an
not think it worth his while to Laugh, ye
I warrant him, he returns every jot as Sul
ſtantial a Coward as he came to his Inſtr
ctours. 'Tis very ſtrenuouſly aſſerted b
you, that ſo long as any Man conceiv
Pain to be an Evil, he cannot but want th
true Spirit of Fortitude. And will he n
therefore become ſtrangely Strengthen'd an
Animated when he apprehends it to be,
Yourſelves deſcribe it, *a Sore Affliction, an
hardly to be endur'd!* Verbal Diſtinctio
and Quibbles are but a very poor Antido
againſt a real Conſternation. Will you ſtan
by it ſtill, that if we can make the lea
Fiſſure in your Philoſophy, there's an en
of the Whole? What's your Opinion?
it only a Syllable, or ſo, that I have ba
ter'd down? Or have I lay'd all open fo
a conſiderable Length together? Or wha
if the Method, Coherence, and Articulati
ons of the *Stoical* Hypotheſis are ſo Jul
and Exact as you ſay they are? Have w
any reaſon to befriend Conſequence
grounded upon Falſe Principles, becauſ
the

ıey are conſiſtent with themſelves, and ıſwer the End for which they were adınc'd? *Zeno* loſt his way, and made off om Nature as ſoon as he ſally'd forth. nd having reſolv'd the *Summum Bonum* in- that Excellency of Soul which we call *ertue*, and deny'd that any Thing can be ruly *Good* beſide *Vertue* and *Honeſty*, and hat if other Things are allow'd the Diſriminations of *Better* and *Worſe*, *Verue* cann't ſtand upon its Legs; having egg'd *All this*, he rightly purſu'd his Inerences. 'Tis true; he did ſo, and I dare ay nothing to the Contrary. But then hoſe Inferences are ſuch manifeſt Falſities, hat we can no longer doubt of Error in he Principles from which they are deduc'd, according to the known *Logical Rule*, *If the Concluſion be Falſe, then the Premiſſes from which that Concluſion fairly follows can never be True.* And that ſame Syllogiſtical Proceſs, *If That be ſo, then This is ſo; but This is not ſo, Therefore That is not ſo*, is, in the Opinion of the *Logicians*, not only Certain, but ſo Clear and Apparent as not to want a Reaſon to back it. And therefore your Inferences failing, your Principles come to nothing. And this is the Fate of your Conſequential Doctrines too, *That all Parties who fall ſhort of your Standard of Wiſdom are equaly Unhappy*; *That the Wiſe are*

as

as Happy as 'tis possible for them to be; That no One Good Action is Better than another; No one Ill Action Worse; which at first Appearance make a *Fine Shew*, but will not bear the Test of Second Thoughts. Indeed there is so little Bottom for the *Parities* which *Zeno* has suppos'd, that Nature, Truth, and Common Sense cry out upon him for the Wildness of the Supposition. And to mend the matter, the little *Carthaginian*, (your *Citiæan* Friends, I need not tell you, are a *Phœnician Colony*) when he cou'd not carry his Cause, and the Nature of Things got the better of him; What does he, like a *Cunning Gamester*, but pervert the Signification of Words? And the Things which before pass'd under the Character of *Good*, are now to retain no better Epithets than those of *Convenient*, *Commodious*, and *Suitable to Nature!* Nor was it long before he confess'd thus much, that a *Wise Man*, or a *Man compleatly Happy*, is yet Happier in the Possession of those Things, which we must not upon any Terms call Good, than he can be without them. For he grants that they have their Significancy in the Nature of Things, and that altho' *Plato* be not a Giant in Wisdom, yet He is not quite so Bad as *Dionysius* the Tyrant; there being no Hopes that the latter will ever become a Wise Man, tho' 'tis not impossible

ıpoſſible but the former may. So 'tis adſeable for *Plato* to live on; but the ſoon- t'other hangs himſelf the better. And ıat foraſmuch as ſome Sins are Wider Deations from Duty than others, Some Sins e Venial, Others not; And that ſome ſen are born and bred up to that Degree f Folly, as to be utterly Incapacitated for ıe attaining of *Wiſdom*; but others might cquire it, if they'd mind their Buſineſs. nd thus he expreſſes himſelf in a Lanuage different from that of all other Phiɔſophers, tho' he holds their Opinions; nd notwithſtanding all his Fury againſt any ıcknowledgment of the *Goodneſs* of thoſe Things which Others dignify'd with the Title of *Good*, he ſets as high a Price upon hem as They. What Projects then and Proclamations might he have in his Head when he reform'd the Terms! Had it been ɔut to ſet up a Diverſity as well in Sentiments as in VVords from the Doctrine of he *Peripateticks*, he ought to have reduc'd the VVeight and VVorth of thoſe inferiour Advantages ſomewhat below *Their* Calculation. And then, with regard to that which is of the laſt and largeſt Importance, a Happy Life, you are poſitive 'tis the Sole Effect of *Vertue*, and no ſuch Thing as a *Congeries* of whatſoever Subſtances or Circumſtances are ſufficient for the Occaſions

of

of Human Nature. Either Things c Words are the Subject-matter of all Disp tations; and whether you do not unde ſtand the Thing, or miſunderſtand th Name of it, you're betray'd into a dou ble Conteſt about Both. But if we hav not fallen beforehand under ſuch an Igno rance or Miſconſtruction, then are we t take as much Care as we can that the Word we make uſe of be well known and re ceiv'd, and expreſſive of what they ar apply'd to. Will any Body, if once mad ſenſible how right the Ancients were i their Judgment upon the State of Things call in queſtion the Aptneſs and Propriet of their Words? But to digreſs a little fron the Vindication of their *Terms*, let us tak a ſlight View of their Tenets. They ſug geſt, that ſo ſoon as the Mind of Man ap prehends *This* or *That* to be Conſonan and ſuitable to Nature, it is awaken'd into a Good-liking and Deſire of it: That what ever is according to Nature challenges a Place in our Eſteem, and is to be valu'd up to the Proportion of its Significancy: That of the Things which are according to Na ture there are Two Sorts, either thoſe that carry no ſuch Principle in their Conſtituti on as that of the Deſire aforeſaid; and to Theſe the Denomination of Meritorious and Laudable cannot belong: Or elſe thoſe which

which take in ſuch Satisfactory and Delightful Senſations as are proper to Animals, together with thoſe Operations and Exerciſes of the Rational Faculties which are peculiar to Man: That the latter of theſe, when they are Reaſonable and Regular, are ſtil'd *Honeſt*, *Vertuous*, *Becoming*, and *Commendable*; the Former *Natural Advantages*, which in Conjunction with what is *Honeſt* and *Vertuous* conſtitute the full Meaſure of a Happy Life: That *Honeſty* and *Vertue* are infinitely Superiour to all thoſe other Advantages, which *Zeno* will not ſuffer us to call *Good*, tho' They who give them that Name, aſcribe no more Excellency to them than *Zeno*: That whenever we are left, ſuppoſe, to the Choice of *Vertue with Health of Body*, or *without it*, we are immediately determin'd by the Voice of Nature, which to preferr: That ſtill Probity and Vertue are Things of ſuch an over-ruling Obligation and Conſequence, and of ſo much higher Account than whatever can come in Competition with them, that when once we are come to a Certainty as to the *Matter* of *Truth* or *Falſehood*, *Right* or *Wrong*, we muſt neither be influenc'd by any Dread of Puniſhment or Hopes of Reward: That thoſe Powers and Perfections which adorn our Nature are an Over-match for the greateſt Difficulties

Hardſhips, and Adverſities; not that we are to make a meer Jeſting Matter of Theſe, no Diſparagement (ſay they) to the force of *Vertue*; but this we are to conclude upon, that Things of this Rank concurr but Subordinately and Secondarily toward the making of our Lives Happy or Unhappy. In a Word, *Zeno* ſets forth the Inferiour Advantages of Life under the Titles of *Valuable*, *Eligible*, and *Suitable to Nature*; and *They* think fit to give them the Appellation of *Good*, and the largeſt and beſt Share of them, they throw into the Definition of a Happy Life. With *Zeno* that alone paſſes for *Good* which is Deſireable in its Kind: and his Happineſs is a Good and Vertuous one. So that, *Cato*, when we come to argue about the Thing itſelf, 'tis plain we are cordialy agreed, and to all Intents and Purpoſes of the ſame Side and Sentiments, provided our *Terms* be once Exchang'd. *Zeno*, I am confident, could not but perceive as much, tho' he was borne away by an *Enthuſiaſm* of Big and Bouncing Words. For either he deſign'd that the Words he us'd ſhou'd be underſtood according to the genuin and common Signification of them; and then *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and Himſelf are all of a Piece. Or if he will not come in a Partner with them; For what reaſon does he diſtinguiſh himſel

imſelf in Expreſſion from ſome others, hoſe Principles he cannot diſtinguiſh from is own? Let the old *Platoniſts* and their cholars come out of their Graves, and ius undeceive you, "We have heard a great deal, *Cato*, of your Honeſty and Love of Philoſophy; how ſincere you are in the Adminiſtration of Juſtice; how Conſcientious in atteſting Matter of Fact; And therefore 'tis a mighty Surprize to us, that the *Stoicks* have heav'd us out of your *Better Thoughts*, tho' they comprehend neither more nor leſs about the Nature of *Good* and *Evil*, than what our Brother *Polemo* here had thrown in *Zeno*'s way. 'Tis true, the Terms and Forms of Speech wherein they deliver themſelves, kindle at the firſt Hearing a ſudden Veneration; but when the Subſtance of the Matter has been well examin'd, they'll give a Man a Fit of Laughing. If therefore you reſolve to ſtand by the Opinions they advance, why will you not aſſert them in proper Words? Or if you were prevail'd upon by the Argument of *Authority*, how is it that an Upſtart has got the Aſcendant, to the Excluſion of All Us and of *Plato* himſelf? 'Tis your Ambition to be ſerviceable at the Head of Affairs; and who ſo fit as We to qualifie and accompliſh you for

" the Service and Support of the Common-
" wealth, in that high Character which
" you ſuſtain? *Political Precepts* it ha
" been one of our Chief Concerns to look
" after and lay down: And there is no
" thing that relates to Civil Government
" whether as to its Kinds and Conditions
" Revolutions, Laws, Proviſions, Cuſtoms
" or the Tempers and Behaviour of th
" People, but what our Directions ex
" tend to. Further; Eloquence, you know
" is a *Stateſman's Beauty*, and your part
" cular Talent. O! what prodigious Ad
" vantages might you reap if you wou
" look into thoſe Volumes which we hav
" wrote relating to it? Suppoſe the gre
Sages harangu'd you thus, what have yo
to ſay for yourſelf? Why after you ha
taught them their Leſſon, (ſaid he) th
Defendant wou'd retain you to ſpeak f
him too! In the mean time I ſhou'd cra
the Liberty of Replying in my place, b
that at preſent I ſhall be better pleas'd
hear you out, and promiſe e'er long a fi
Anſwer to the *Platoniſts* and their *Lawy*
together! Which undoubtedly, *Cato*, w
have nothing but Truth in it, and the
fore muſt run to this Effect: " Gentl
" men, I have always had a profound
" ſteem for you; You are Perſons of
" Vulgar Capacities, and your Author
"

" is very conſiderable, but excuſe me if I
" think the *Stoicks upon your Shoulders* have
" ſeen further than you cou'd, and both
" concocted and clear'd the Argument with
" more Spirit and Force of Reaſoning.
" Theſe were the Men who firſt found it
" out, that a good State of Health is not
" a Thing *Deſireable*, but purely *Eligible*,
" as being improperly accounted *Good*, tho'
" 'tis *Valuable* too in ſome meaſure; not
" that they aſcribe a Tittle more or leſs to
" it, than you that never ſcruple to give it
" the Name of *Good*. Beſides, there's ano-
" ther Thing which is highly Provoking,
" that You Ancients, as if you had been
" *Barbarous Born and Bred*, (as we *Romans*
" tell one another ſometimes) are perſwa-
" ded that a *Good* and *Vertuous* Man had
" much better live in Health, Reputation,
" and Plenty, than, as *Ennius*'s *Alcmæon*,
" *Circumventus morbo*, &c. *With Sickneſs*
" *curſt*, *an Exile*, *and a Beggar*. 'Tis cer-
" tain, you were ſtrangely overtaken, in
" ſuppoſing that the Former leads the Hap-
" pier, the Better, and the more Deſireable
" Life of the Two. The *Stoicks* are ſo
" Wiſe as to aſſign ſuch a Life no more
" than the *Preference upon Choice*, becauſe
" tho' it does not ſurpaſs the other in any
" Degree of *Felicity*, yet it is better *accom-*
" *modated to Nature*; but elſe All Men

" whatſoever, that are not *abſolutely Wiſe*,
" are ſhut up in one and the ſame Circle of
" Unhappineſs. This you were little aware
" of, but the *Stoicks* have ſince diſcover'd
" it, and *Reſolv'd*, that Libertines and Par-
" ricides are upon an Equality of Happi-
" neſs with the ſobereſt and ſincereſt of us
" all, if he ſtep ſhort of a *Conſummated*
" *Wiſdom*. And then you muſt bring in
ſome of your *Unreſembling Similitudes!* As
if any Body were ignorant that if a *Clubb*
of Swimmers are to riſe up out of the Wa-
ter, they that are almoſt return'd to the
Top, are nearer advanc'd to the Region of
Reſpiration, than they that are left at the
Bottom, and yet are as little able to breath?
But will it follow that we muſt be as mi-
ſerable as 'tis poſſible for us to be, if we
do not come up to the very utmoſt Verge of
Vertue, let us make never ſo ſucceſful Pro-
greſſes, never ſo near Approaches to it?
By all means! For we muſt be either Eagles,
or ſtark Blind! And therefore *Plato*'s Proſ-
pect into Senſe and Wiſdom, was no bet-
ter than that of *Phalaris*. And wherefore,
I beſeech you? the Reaſon's plain. A Pup-
py-Dog, that's within a few Hours of the
Age of *Seeing*, is as blind as another that's
newly whelp'd. Theſe Alluſions, *Cato*, are
far from being Parallel to the State of the
Matter in Queſtion, foraſmuch as they im-

ply,

ɔly, that tho' you remove and depart as far as you can from that which you avoid, yet is it all one as if you had never avoided it, till you ſtand at the wideſt Diſtance from it conceivable: For a *Swimmer* does not fetch his Breath till his Head's above Water, and a Whelp ſees no more before he ſees, than if he were never to ſee. If you're for Compariſons, what think you of a Man with Dimm Eyes, and another with a Diſtemper'd Body? Theſe under the Regimen of a skilful Hand gradualy recover, the one his *Seeing*, the other his *Health*. Which is the very Caſe of thoſe who are laying out for *Vertue*, they are cur'd of their Ill Habits, and their Falſe Opinions by Degrees. Otherwiſe you muſt acknowledge that *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son was ev'ry whit as Happy a Man as his Father, tho' the latter made it his Buſineſs to ſupport the Common-Wealth, and the Former to ruin it. For tho' the Father was not *Abſolutely* a Wiſe Man, (as Whence, Where, or When cou'd you ever produce one?) yet being ſenſible of what became him, and what wou'd recommend him, he made a good Proficiency in the Practice of *Vertue*. Or let us ſet your Grand-Father *Druſus*, and *Caius Gracchus* his Contemporary, over againſt one another. As ſoon as the Latter had given the Government a Wound,

ſtill the Former clos'd it. Well but Impiety and Wickedneſs are the Origin of Infelicity. I grant it; Unhappineſs is the Portion of the Unwiſe; but for all that, He who promotes the Good of his Countrymen, is not in the ſame *Latitude* of Unhappineſs with him who wiſhes and endeavours the Deſtruction of them. For as faſt as we correct the Indiſpoſitions of the Mind, we refine it up nearer and nearer to the *Standard* of *Vertue*. Now you do not quarrel with us for ſuppoſing *Degrees of Improvement*, but will by no means hear of *Degrees of Reformation*. And 'twere Pity to let the Argument paſs Unexamin'd, which the *Stoicks* bring for the Negative: *Thoſe Arts and Sciences which admit of a Poſſibility of further Advances and Improvement, do not exclude the Poſſibility of Gradual Advances in that which is oppoſite unto them; But Vertue abſolutely conſider'd admits of no Advances or Improvements; Therefore Vice, which is Contrary to it, admits of no Gradations.* Now the Queſtion is, whether Uncertainties are to be determin'd from Certainties, or Certainties be over-rul'd by Uncertainties. That ſome Vices are greater than others, is not to be deny'd. But whether *Your Summum Bonum* will admit of *Additions* or not, is hardly ſo Clear. And yet you reſolve, that that which is Uncertain

ſhall

hall hold good againſt that which is Cer-
ain, inſtead of proceeding from that which
s Certain, to ſatisfie yourſelves about that
vhich is Uncertain. At this Lock we
nuſt hold you. For if one Vice cannot be
vorſe than another, becauſe nothing can
e ſupperadded to that which you have ta-
ken up with for your Ultimate Good, and
et it is notorious that all Vices are not
qual, it follows that you muſt turn away
our old Ultimate Good, and provide
ourſelves another. For this is a never-fail-
ng Rule, *That when the Conſequence is Falſe,*
he Premiſſes, upon which that Conſequence
epends, can never be True. And how comes
t about that you're ſo unhappily wedg'd?
Becauſe nothing contents you but a High-
lown *Summum Bonum* to make your Brags
of. Nay, rather than *Vertue* ſhou'd not
be the *only Good* of Man, we are let looſe
from all Obligations, either to take care
of our Health, or to look after our Eſtates,
to execute Publick Offices, to proſecute a-
ny Concerns, or to diſcharge any Duties of
Life. Even your great *Catholick* Good,
your Principle of Honeſty and Vertue is
given up. And this is the very Objection,
which with ſo much Earneſtneſs *Chryſippus*
urges againſt *Ariſto.* Now 'twas the fore-
going Difficulty which gave birth to theſe
Malitiæ Fallaciloquentiæ (in the Words of
Accius)

Accius) *theſe wicked Effects of Sophiſtry.* When you have ſet all the Duties of Life afloat, Wiſdom has nothing left to ſupport her; and When you confounded all things together at ſuch a rate as to leave no Diſtinctions between them, nor Matter of Option among them, you vacated the Duties of Life; and thus you betray'd yourſelf into Inconveniences of a much more heinous Tendency than *Ariſto*; beſide that he went through-ſtitch with Simplicity and Plainneſs, whereas your People are full of Prevarication. Put the Queſtion to *Ariſto*, whether he accounts as *Good*, either Freedom from Pain, or Riches, or Health, and he will anſwer you, *No.* Or whether he looks upon their Contraries as *Evil*; *No* agen. Let the ſame Queſtions be propos'd to *Zeno*, and he'll return you the very ſame Anſwers. Hereupon we begin to ſtare, and of Both demand, how 'tis poſſible to carry on the Purpoſes of Life, if 'tis all alike to us, whether we are Sick or Well, in Pain or at Eaſe, Starving with Cold and Hunger, or in good Caſe and Cloathing. Now *Ariſto* will tell us roundly; You may live better than ſo many Princes if you pleaſe, and do juſt as you pleaſe, and never know what it is *to ſuffer*, *to deſire*, *or to fear.* And what ſays *Zeno?* That this is all Madneſs, and ſuch Doctrine as fruſtrates the very

Ends

Ends of Living; That *Vertue* and *Turpitude* are as distant from one another as the *Poles*.; That as for other Things, no Difference lies between them; That these *Intermediate Things*, which are upon a perfect Parity in respect of one another (keep your Countenance if you can, for there's something very pleasant a coming) are Threefold, either such as are *Eligible*, such as are to be *Refus'd*, or such as are *Indifferent*. Say you so? How came they then to be perfectly alike before? They are so still, say you, in the relation which they bear to *Vertue* and *Vice*. A great Piece of News indeed! However let us hear you out. Your Instances, quoth *Zeno*, of Health, Riches, Freedom from Pain, I cannot dignifie with the Title of *Good*, but, if you please, I will call them προηγμένα in the *Greek*, which has been translated *Producta*, *Præposita*, *Præcipua*, (The Two last Words are the best, the other sounds Harsh) *Preferables*. As I dare not call Want, Diseases, and Pain, *Evils*, but I make them *Rejectanea*, *What we have reason to avoid*. Accordingly, we must not say that we desire or wish for, but that we chuse and preferr the former; nor that, on t'other hand, we Avoid, but that we Set aside the latter. Now for *Aristotle* and the rest of *Plato*'s Retinue; What say they?

Why

Why that that which is *according to Nature*, is to be call'd *Good*, and that which is otherwiſe, *Evil*. What think you now of this Maſter of yours? Does he not ſay the ſame thing with *Ariſto*, while he means otherwiſe? and does he not mean the ſame thing as *Ariſtotle* and his Brethren, tho' he will not ſay the ſame? and ſince he means the ſame, why can he not expreſs himſelf as other People wou'd? At leaſt let him convince me that my ſuppoſing *Money* to be *ſomething Preferable*, rather than *ſomething Good*, and *Pain* to be *rather ſomething that moleſts a Man, trys his Patience, and is contrary to his Nature*, than *ſomething Evil*, weans me e'er the more from too great a Love of the Firſt, or makes me e'er the leſs reſigning to the Impreſſions of the Laſt. Our old Friend and Acquaintance, *Marcus Piſo*, us'd to make very good Sport with the Maxims of the *Stoicks*, particularly upon the Topick before us. Be it ſo, ſaid he, *Riches* are not *Bonum*, *Good*, but *Præpoſitum*, *Eligible*. And what are we the Better now? Is our Avarice check'd upon't? *Præpoſitum*, indeed, for a Word, has as many Syllables again as *Bonum*: And what of that? But it has more in it yet. How the Word *Bonum* comes to be applicable to *Riches*, I cannot inform you; but I conceive the Name of *Præpoſitum* is conferr'd upon them,

them, becauſe of *their having the Preference in general.* Upon which Account they cannot but be ſomething Extraordinary! And this was his way of proving that *Zeno* ſeem'd to ſignifie, when he diſpos'd of *Riches* among his *Præpoſitâ* or *Preferables*, that they are of greater Conſideration and Value than *Ariſtotle* had ſuppos'd them when he allow'd them to be ſomething *Good*, but yet no very *Deſireable Good* neither, nor of ſuch a ſignificancy as to weigh any thing in oppoſition to *Vertue* and *Honeſty.* And ſo he went thro' all the Terms with which *Zeno* equivocated, and made it out, that he had appropriated higher Titles to thoſe Things which he deny'd to have any *Goodneſs* in them, and that he had branded thoſe Things which he wou'd not endure to be call'd *Evil*, with more ghaſtly Apellations, than E'er a one of *Us.* After this manner the great *Piſo*, that entertain'd ſuch a ſingular Eſteem for You, (and you know full well how great it was) came over the *Stoicks.* Two or Three Words more to cloſe with, and I have done: For 'twou'd take up too much time to confute your Aſſertions in the Detail. 'Tis the ſame *Necromantick* Language that has rear'd the Scene of every *Wiſe Man*'s Univerſal Monarchy, encircled him with Mountains of Crowns and Scepters, and created him Proprietor of Heaven and Earth. 'Tis by ver-

vertue of this that he monopolizes all the Charms of Beauty, and all the Privileges and Character of a *Denizen:* But as for your Fools, (that is, the reſt of the World) they are no better than Madmen, and in Circumſtances quite contrary to thoſe above mention'd. Theſe are your παράδοξα, in our Language *Admirabilia*, *Paradoxes.* But let us come forward, and look through them, and we ſhall find little Cauſe for Wonder. 'Tis but comparing your Words and the true Meaning of them together, and the Diſpute's at an end. You affirm that all Sins are Equal. Now I do not deſign to attack this Principle in the ſame manner as I have formerly done in defence of *Lucius Murena* againſt your Indictment. Then I had a great many Unphiloſophical Auditours, and condeſcended to the Capacities of the Croud. But this time I ſhall handle the Matter a little more diſtinctly. I ask then how it comes about that all Sins are Equal? Becauſe no one *Vertue* is ſuch any more than another, nor any one *Vice* more a *Vice* than another. This, let me tell you, has been vigorouſly controverted; But let us proceed and diſcuſs thoſe direct Arguments by which you prove all Sins to be Equal. If among the Strings of a Lute there is ne'er a one in Tune, they are all alike out of Tune; Therefore the Inharmonioufneſs of Sins

in

n general is the ſame, and conſequently they ıre *Equal*. Thus you think to impoſe upon ıs with Ambiguities. What if one String is ɔut of Tune *as well as* another? Does it fol-ow too that it is *as much* out of Tune *as* ınother? If not, you'll get no Ground by your *Similitude*. For what if one ſort of *Avarice* is as *properly Avarice* as another? Shall we thence inferr that one ſort is *Avarice in as great a degree* as the other? And e'en as *Pat* and *Parallel* is your Simile of the *Pilot*, who, as 'tis hinted, is equaly in Fault if the Ship happens to be loſt thro' his means, whether the *Cargo* be *Chaff* or *Gold*. And ſo 'tis all one, if I do violence to another Man, whether that other be my Father or my Servant. This is as much as to ſay, never any of you knew that the Pilot, as ſuch, is not to concern himſelf about the Lading of the Veſſel. Be it fraited with *Gold* or *Chaff*, his Knowledge of *Steering* is neither the *Greater* nor the *Leſs*: Whereas every Body is or ought to be ſenſible how widely the Relations of *Parent* and *Servant* differ from one another; ſo that notwithſtanding 'tis of no Moment in the Buſineſs of Steering a Ship, what the Character is of that which comes to a Miſcarriage, yet a great deal depends upon't in the Buſineſs of *Duty*. Agen; if the Ship were laden with Gold, and caſt away thro' the Care-

Careleſneſs of the Pilot, he's more in Faul than if it had been fill'd with Chaff; becauſ there is no Art or Vocation in the Worl but what requires a Foundation of *Commo Prudence*, as 'tis call'd; Certainly no Mai pretending to Skill or Science ough to be without it. Still then we are a much to ſeek for this Equality of Sins a ever. 'Tis all one for that; The *Stoick* will leave no Stone unturn'd, and thus they go on: Every Sin is an Effect of Weakneſs and Levity; Now for that all *Unwiſe* Peo ple labour, one Man as much as another under theſe two Imperfections, it inevita bly follows that no one Sin can be greate than another. But who told them tha all *Unwiſe* Men have theſe Imperfections in an equal Degree? Was *Lucius Tubulus* nc more Chargeable with Weakneſs and In conſtancy than *Publius Scævola* his *Proſecu tour*? Or does there not a Diſparity ariſe out of the Nature and Circumſtances of the *Subject-Matter* of the Fault? So that in proportion to the Dignity, the Bulk, and the Number of Theſe, an Abuſe is either more or leſs Aggravated or Pardonable? Here then, after all, (to draw to a Conclu ſion) lies the ſole, but fatal Miſtake of the *Stoicks*. They flatter themſelves that they can claſp-together Two contrary Suppoſi tions. As what can be more Irreconcile-

able

able than, for the ſame Perſon, to affirm that nothing beſide *Vertue* has any *Goodneſs* in it, and yet that Nature has recommended to our Inclinations whatever ſhe has accommodated to the Uſes and Purpoſes of Life? And ſometimes they are for keeping the *Track* of the firſt Hypotheſis, and then they run Riot with *Ariſto*; ſometimes they'll ſcamper away from it, and then, tho' they are Superſtitiouſly tenacious of their own *Terms*, yet in the Subſtance and Senſe of their Philoſophy they are *Peripateticks True-blue*; over and above that thro' their obſtinate Adherence to their Singularity of Expreſſion they contract that Moroſeneſs, Auſterity, and Vehemence of Temper, which they diſcover both in their Words and Actions, and to which *Panætius* had ſo great an Averſion, that he diſclaim'd as well the Rigour of their Maxims, as their Intricate Methods of Argumentation. He remitted of the Former, and was very ſhy of the Latter. No Body made more Uſe, as you find in his Writings, of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, *Theopraſtus*, and *Dicæarchus*, Authours upon which I cou'd heartily wiſh *You* too wou'd beſtow due Attention and Application. It grows late, and 'tis time for me to think of going Homeward, and therefore I ſhall ſhut up All with this Propoſal, That our Conferences may go

on. O, ſay'd *Cato*, by all means! We cannot better employ our Leiſure, and at our next Meeting I expect you will be patient till I have diſarm'd you at all points. Let it ſuffice, that whereas there is no Notion of Yours in which I can acquieſce, there is nothing that diſpleaſes you in *Stoiciſm* beſide the Uncommon Significations of our Terms: Remember that. We'll conſider of it, ſay'd I, but to ſpring a Doubt at Parting is Unfair. And ſo we withdrew

☞ Inſtead of *And yet there is nothing too hard for them* &c. (page 216) to *Conflagration* (page 217) read *And this his way to warm the Spirits of his Audience and to ſet them on Fire? You ſee what a mighty Buſineſs he drives at 'Tis to perſuade an honeſt Bourgher that* Civita Vecchia *and the* Univerſe *are the ſame Corporation, and that he that is Free of the firſt has the ſame Relation and Privilege in the other. Is ſuch Diſcourſe as this like to put the Blood into a fever ment of Satisfaction? No, 'twould much ſooner check the Paſſions in their Career, than ſet 'em a going!*

TULLY

OF

Moral Ends.

BOOK V.

HAving been a By-ſtander, my *Brutus*, at an Engagement which happen'd (and 'twas no new Thing) between *Antiochus* and *Marcus Piſo* in the *Ptolemæium*, (the *School* ſo call'd) and with me, my Brother *Quintus*, *Titus Pomponius*, and my Brother *Lucius*; Brother I mean, in reſpect of the Love that is betwixt us, tho' no more than my Couſin-German in reality; we agreed, by common Conſent, that the *Academy* ſhou'd be our *Walking-Place* for the Afternoon, where we knew we ſhou'd meet, all that Part of the Day, with no Diſtur-

bance. Accordingly, at the Hour appoint
ed, we rendezvous'd at *Piſo*'s Houſe, chat
ted-over the ſhort Mile we had to wal
from *Diphylus*'s Quarters, and ſo made ou
Entrance into the *Academy*, a Receſs ve
ry deſervedly Celebrated; and, accordin
to our Wiſhes, we had it all to ourſelve
VVell! ſaid *Piſo*, whether it be the Effe
of any Innate Principle, or no more than
Prejudice, I cannot ſay; but ſure I am,
makes a ſtronger Impreſſion upon us, if w
behold a Place where any Sons of *Fa*
have reſorted heretofore, than either to l
told the Hiſtory of their Lives, or to l
Converſant with their VVritings. I know
by my ſelf at this time. Theſe VValls p
me in mind of *Plato*, who (ſays Tradi
on) held his Diſputations within ther
There lay his little Garden, which affec
more than my Memory, for, methinks,
ſee him walking in it juſt before me. The
ſat *Speuſippus*, here *Xenocrates*, there h
Pupil *Polemo*; That very Seat was h
which we are now looking on. So wh
our *Hoſtilia* at home ſalutes my Eye-ſig
(not the new *Hall* of that Name, whi
tho' it be the Larger in Compaſs, is Le
than the other to me) preſently my He
is full of *Scipio*, *Cato*, *Lælius*, but eſpe
aly of my Grandfather. And for this Re
ſon ſo great uſe is made of the Circur
ſtan

ſtance of *Place* in the Art of Memory, becauſe the *Idea* of *Place* naturaly excites us to *Recollection.* 'Tis as you ſay, *Piſo*, (ſaid *Quintus*) In my Paſſage hither the *Colonean Tenement* preſented itſelf; and I ſaw as Plainly *Sophocles* in it, as I Zealouſly admire and love him. Giving my Memory the Rein, at laſt I ſpy'd out *Oedipus* too, or the Shape of him at leaſt, advancing this way, and heard him ask in flowing Numbers, *Where am I?* ——For my Part, ſays *Pomponius*, I am an *Epicurean*, tho' you'll never let me be one in Quiet; and as we came along by *Epicurus*'s Gardens, *Phædrus*, my particular Favourite, you know, afforded me a great Deal of his Converſation, 'till the old Proverb at laſt came into my Thoughts, and then I turn'd them and myſelf from the Dead to the Living. Tho 'twou'd be Impoſſible for me, were it ever ſo much my Deſire, to baniſh *Epicurus* out of my Imagination; for we that are of that Family are not contented with having the *Picture* of him preſerv'd in an ordinary way, but his Face muſt be be grav'n too upon the *Outſide* of our *Plate* and the *Seals* of our *Rings*. *Pomponius* is Merry: (ſaid I) He has loſt no time at *Athens*, it ſeems, and is reſolv'd to make out his Title to his Name. But I am ſeriouſly perſuaded, *Piſo*, of the Truth of

your Obſervation, That the *Places* which they us'd, have a Vertue in them to excite, enliven, and feed our Conceptions about great and eminent Men. When you and I made a Tour to *Metapontus*, you may remember, inſtead of going directly to my Inn, nothing wou'd ſerve my Turn but I muſt pay a Viſit to the Place where *Pythagoras* dy'd, and to the Seat that had been under him. I muſt confeſs there is no Part of *Athens* which is not beſet with theſe Monuments and Relicks, but you cann't imagin how much that *Portico* there ſtrikes my Fancy. Not long ſince *Carneades* had it, and there, to my thinking, he is at this time. I have often ſcann'd his Features and am apt to believe the very Seat yonder miſſes that Burthen of Good Senſe which reſted there, and the Satisfaction of that Voice which came from it. Every Man in the Company, ſaid *Piſo*, has had his own Amuſement, except your Kinſman *Lucius*. How does he ſtand Engag'd? For a Wager in the Apartment of *Demoſthenes* and *Æſchines*, liſt'ning, as his *Genius* and his Courſe of Study oblige him, to their Oratorical Rencounters. You might have ſav'd Yourſelf the Trouble of asking, (ſaid *Lucius* and bluſh'd) if you had obſerv'd my Deſcent to the *Phalericum*, where, as the Report goes, 'twas a Cuſtom with *Demoſthe-*

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nes ro harangue the Tide, with a Proſpect of ſpeaking louder one Day than the Sea cou'd roar. And juſt now I made a Digreſſion a little upon the Right and took *Pericles*'s Tomb in my way. But I perceive there's no end on't. From one Skirt of the City to t'other a Stranger cann't ſet his Foot upon the Ground but he treads upon a Jewel of Antiquity. The Uſe which a Man of Underſtanding and Learning ought to make of theſe Remains, is to Spirit himſelf on (ſaid *Piſo*) in his Imitation of Illuſtrious Examples. A Man of Curioſity indeed regards them only as the Pledges of Earlier Generations. Give us leave therefore, Forward as you are of Yourſelf, to quicken your Emulation, and encourage you to copy, as near to the Life as you can, after thoſe Originals, whom you ſo much deſire to be better acquainted with. I am to thank you, *Piſo*, (ſaid I) for your Advice to my *Relation.* At the ſame time you may be aſſur'd by what you ſee of him, that he practices up to your Inſtructions. Whereupon, ſaid he, in a Strein of his wonted Friendlineſs, 'Tis reaſonable that we join Forces, and help, all hands, toward the Young Gentleman's Improvement; more eſpecialy that we initiate him in his Philoſophical Studies, for Two Reaſons, Firſt, becauſe he has the Advantage of ſo good an Example,

and one so Dear as Yourself to lead him the Way; Secondly, because they will be a Noble Adorning and Superstructure upon the Study which he pursues at present. Not that I believe there's great Occasion for suggesting this Counsel, to One of himself predispos'd to take this Course; and who minds his Business to so good Purpose under *Antiochus's* Tuition. I do my best, reply'd *Lucius* with a modest Confusion; By the way my Uncle was making mention of *Carneades*. That's the Man for my Money; but my Infallible Guide *Antiochus* forbids me his Company. 'Tis easy to foresee, say'd *Piso*, what opposition the Attempt will meet with in the presence of a certain Friend of ours, (looking at me) but, for all that, I'll venture to dissuade you from following the new *Academicks*, and bespeak you in behalf of the Old ones, in which number, as *Antiochus* must needs have inform'd you, beside the *Academicks*, properly so call'd, *Speusippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemo*, *Crantor*, and so forth, are the Old *Peripateticks* too, and among them *Aristotle*, their *Foreman*, perhaps, excepting *Plato*, not to be match'd among all the Philosophers. Let me prevail with you to set your self to the Reading of them; You'll find they'll furnish you with Helps and Directions for all Sorts and Parts of *Learning*, *Humanity*, *History*,

ſtory, *Rhetorick*, and every other Art and Science; In a word, a Man can never be fit for any Matters Extraordinary, 'till Theſe have made him ſo; as They have been the making of many an Oratour, General, and Stateſman; beſides Multitudes of Artiſans of an inferiour Character, as in Mathematicks, Poetry, Muſick, and Medicine, which this Seminary of Univerſal Knowledge has bred. I am very ſenſible (ſay'd I) of the Truth of all This; You know I am; and well pleas'd that you've fallen upon ſo ſeaſonable a Subject of Diſcourſe, my Couſin being ambitious of a right Notion of that *Hypotheſis* which the *Old Academicks* and *Peripateticks* you ſpeak of, propagated about *Moral Ends*. And in regard *Staſeas* the *Neapolitan* was your Companion for many Years together, and for ſeveral Months laſt paſt you have laid it out for your Buſineſs, as we know very well, by the Help of *Antiochus* here at *Athens*, to make your ſelf Maſter of the whole *Hypotheſis*; Who ſo fit to explain it as yourſelf? At which Smiling, Well, (ſay'd he) I find then I am to run the firſt Heat, and ſince it muſt be ſo, I'll give the Young Gentleman as good a Light into the Matter as I can, the Silence and Commodiouſneſs of this Retirement inviting me to do what ne'er an Oracle in the World cou'd have perſuaded

ſuaded me I ever ſhou'd, and that is, to exerciſe the Function of a Philoſophy-Lecturer in the *Academy*. This Quere firſt however; In endeavouring to be ſerviceable to one of you, ſhall I not be troubleſome to the reſt? Yes, to me, no doubt, ſaid I, that have been requeſting the Favour! At the ſame time *Pomponius* and my Brother *Quintus* entreated, they might be ſo happy as to hear him; whereupon *Piſo* began. Now, *Brutus*, you are a Judge of his Expoſition of *Antiochus*'s Notions, whether it was right or not, becauſe you've receiv'd ample Inſtructions from his Brother *Ariſtus*. Beſides, or I'm under a Miſtake, you are an Admirer of his Principles: Let me pray you therefore to take good Notice of what *Piſo* told us to the following Effect. I have already ſpecify'd, ſaid he, the peculiar Excellences, and the Advantageous Oeconomy of the *Peripatetical* Scheme. The Whole of it, as of all the other Hypotheſes, lies diſtributed into Three Parts: The Firſt, *Phyſicks*; the Second, *Logick*; and the Third, *Morality*. So narrowly have theſe Philoſophers inſpected the Fabrick and Conſtitution of the Univerſe that perhaps there's ne'r a Region or Extent, ne'r a Combination of Particles in Heaven, Earth, or Ocean, (to ſpeak Poeticaly) but their Diſquiſitions have reach'd

reach'd it. In the firſt place they took under Conſideration the Origin and Elements of the World, and came to Reſolutions concerning them, not meerly Plauſible and Specious, but Mathematical and Demonſtrative. They laid together all ſuch Aſſertions or *Effata* as appear'd to have the greateſt Evidence, and upon the Sufficiency of that *Stock* they ſtill traded on to the more Occult and Remote Diſpoſitions and Affections of Nature. *Ariſtotle* has deſcrib'd and accounted for the Generation, Nutrition, and Organical Structure of all Kinds of *Animals*. *Theophraſtus* has done as much for *Plants* and *Vegetables* of every *Species*. By the help of theſe Collections the hidden Forms and Properties of Things are diſcover'd more eaſily. The ſame Inſtructors have left a Body of Directions both for *Logick* and *Rhetorick*; and *Ariſtotle*, their *Generaliſſimo*, brought into Play the Method of maintaining both Sides of the Queſtion, to the end that whatever can be ſaid *Pro* or *Con* upon every Argument may have its full Force; and not in order to contradict and overthrow whatever ſhall be alledg'd, as *Arceſilas* propos'd. In managing the Third Part of Philoſophy relating to the Conduct of Life, they concern'd themſelves with more than the Condition of private Perſons, and preſcrib'd for the

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Modelling and Regulation of a *Body Politick.* To *Ariſtotle* are we Debtors for the Deſcriptions he has tranſmitted of the Manners, Cuſtoms, and Conſtitutions, as well of the *Barbarous Nations* as of *Greece*; and to *Theophraſtus* for that Knowledge which is come to us, of their Laws. Both have likewiſe offer'd their Sentiments and Directions about the Forms of Publick Government, and the Qualifications of the Governours, and have ſhewn at large wherein conſiſts the Perfection of Political Eſtabliſhment; *Theophraſtus* has favour'd us over and above with his Obſervations and Maxims about Publick Revolutions, Nice Junctures, and the Critical Seaſons for *Rigour*, and *Indulgence.* A retir'd, contemplative, and ſtudious Life they apprehended to be the Beſt, and that it moſt becomes a Man of Wiſdom, as being of the ſame Kind with the Life of the Deities. Upon all theſe Heads they have treated Gracefully and Majeſticaly. With regard to the *Summum Bonum* they have deliver'd themſelves in Two different Stiles and Methods, the one ſuited to Vulgar Capacities, and this they call ἐξωτερικὸν; (*Proper for the Uſe of Thoſe that are Strangers to Learning and Philoſophy*) the other, that which is to be found in their *Commentaries*, or *Diſſertations*; Correct and Elaborate. Not that there is any Thing

Thing Material wherein they vary or disagree, tho' ſeemingly they may teach us Inconſiſtent Leſſons. As for Inſtance, when they are enquiring into, and ſtating the Conditions of a Happy Life, the grand Purpoſe, I confeſs, and the *Dernier Reſort* of all Philoſophy, they are ſometimes unreſolv'd upon the Queſtion, whether a Wiſe Man may command it if he pleaſes, or whether adverſe Accidents may ruffle and marr it; Some are for This, and ſome for That. *Theophraſtus* in his Treatiſe of a *Happy Life* makes large Conceſſions, and ſcrews up the Power of Fortune too high: For if he has Truth on his Side, then is it realy more than Wiſdom can do to make us Happy: And indeed his Account of Things is ſo enervating and unmanly, that it derogates not a little from the Authority and Pretenſions of Vertue. Wherefore it will be adviſeable for us to keep cloſe to *Ariſtotle* and his Son *Nichomachus*, I mean the Books of Moral Philoſophy which bear his Name, tho' we are told that *Ariſtotle* penn'd them; as if it had been impoſſible for the Son to come up ſo near to the Excellences of the Father. And yet there will be no harm in't, if we ſometimes call *Theophraſtus* to our Aſſiſtance, provided we don't under-rate the Strength and Forces of Vertue as he has done. To

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theſe Profeſſours let us confine ourſelves, it having been the Misfortune of their Succeſſours, that notwithſtanding in their own way they have anſwer'd their Character much beyond the Deſcendants of the other Schools, yet they ſlid into ſuch a Degeneracy, that One wou'd almoſt take them for another Sect, *by themſelves*, and *from themſelves*. *Strato*, *Theophraſtus*'s Pupil and immediate Succeſſour addicted himſelf wholly to Natural Philoſophy, and ſucceeded in it very well; but New and Singular were all the Notions he ſtarted, and hardly any of them had a relation to *Moral Subjects*. *Lyſias* was the Scholar of *Strato*, a Man of a large Compaſs of Expreſſion, but his Matter Mean and Steril. *Ariſto*, his Diſciple, excell'd in Politeneſs and Elegance, but wanted the main Perfection, Serioufneſs and Solidity of Reaſoning. He has wrote many Volumes very neatly and handſomely; 'Twere to be wiſh'd his Performances carry'd in them a greater Sway and Cogency. Many others I might mention, as particularly the Learned and Eloquent *Hieronymus*, tho' in regard *Indolence* is his *Summum Bonum*, 'tis ſomewhat abſurd to make a *Peripatetick* of him; for a different *Summum Bonum* ever implies a different *Philoſophy*. *Critolaus*'s Arguing is almoſt as pond'rous and commanding as that of the Ancients whom he

ne propos'd to imitate; and this muſt be ſaid for him, he no where departs from the Good Old Way; but then he ſurfeits you with a Superfluity and Luxuriancy of Words. *Diodorus*, a Pupil of his, tacks *Vertue* and *Indolence* together, and ſo is as Singular in his *Summum Bonum*, and as Diſtinct from the *Peripateticks* as *Hieronymus*. But as for the Doctrine of the *Ancients*, my Friend *Antiochus* has been at the Pains to repreſent it fairly in all its Parts, and proves that it was the ſame with that which *Ariſtotle* and *Polemo* have ſince aſſerted. Nor has *Lucius* unadviſedly pick'd out the Queſtion of *Summum Bonum* at this time to be read upon, ſeeing, when we have once determin'd that, we have as good as paſs'd a Judgment upon all the reſt. Matters leſs conſiderable may perchance be over-look'd, or not thoroughly underſtood, and then the ill Conſequences of our Careleſneſs or Ignorance can but bear Proportion at moſt to the Value or Importance of the Advantage neglected: Whereas, 'till we are duly inform'd of the Nature of the *Summum Bonum*, we muſt live in the Dark, and manage at all Ventures; Float upon the wide Ocean without Fear or Wit, without apprehending where we are, or what Port we are to ſteer for. But when the Ultimate Ends of Good and Evil are made out, we know what

what Courſe to take, and what Duties we have to diſcharge; For there muſt be ſome End or other which our Intentions or Actions are aim'd at, and this ought to be the *Land-mark* in our purſuit after the Meaſures and Means of making ourſelves Happy. But *What This is at laſt*, has been the Subject of many a notable Diſpute. I conceive it our beſt way to take that Method which proceeds upon the Diviſion of *Carneades*, and is Current with *Antiochus*. Now *Carneades*, beſides the ſeveral Concluſions which the *Philoſophers* had come to before him about *Summum Bonum*, conſider'd and comprehended how many Notions 'tis poſſible to frame of it. No Science or Art, ſaid he, has properly the Occaſion and Deſign of itſelf within itſelf; theſe are Things Diſtinct and Peculiar. 'Twere needleſs and tireſome to run out into Inſtances. Nothing can be clearer than that *Art* conſiſting of no more than its own Rules and Methods is one Thing; the End and Purpoſe of *Art* another. Medicine is the *Art* of Preſerving Health and Reſtoring it: The Directing the Motions of a Ship is the Art of Navigation; And Wiſdom or Prudence is the Art of Living: Why then ſhou'd not this Art have a Final Cauſe dependent upon ſomething out of itſelf as well as any of the other? That *Prudence affects* only and altogether

ther what ſhe finds conſonant and analogous to the Meaſures of Nature, and Eſſentialy ſufficient to excite and engage the ὁρμὴ (as the *Greeks* term it) or *Appetite of the Soul*, is moſt generaly Preſuppos'd. The only Queſtion is, What thus excites and engages by Vertue of itſelf, and emerges the Firſt Object of our earlieſt Inclinations? And this is the great Bone of Diſſenſion among the Philoſophers, in their Searches after the *Summum Bonum*: For the Diſpute about Moral Ends and the Nature of the Final and Ultimate Good hangs and turns upon the *Prima Invitamenta Naturæ*, *Whatever in Nature firſt challenges our Inclinations*; for when we have made a Diſcovery of this, 'twill be a Key to us, and the whole Length of the Diſquiſition about the *Summum Bonum* and its Contrary lies open and plain. With ſome People 'tis a clear Caſe, that Pleaſure is the Thing we catch at from the Beginning; and Pain that which we firſt avoid, and endeavour to divert: With others, that Indolence is our Darling, and Pain a Nuiſance as ſoon as we are born: Others agen are pleas'd to preferr what they call the *Prima ſecundum Naturam*, *The firſt general Proviſions and Privileges of Nature*, ſuch as Sound, Entire Limbs and Organs, neither More nor Fewer than a Man ought to have, Health, Eaſe, Strength,

Comelineſs, and ſo forth; anſwerable to which the Mind has alſo her firſt general Proviſions, and Privileges, and the Kindlings and *Fœtus*, as it were, of *Vertue*. Under one or other of theſe three *Titles* muſt come whatever affects us, either in order to our obtaining or eſcaping it, for 'tis impoſſible that there ſhou'd be any Fourth, and therefore the whole Concern and Obligation of Purſuing This, and Eſchewing That, is to be accounted to, and ſtated by one or other of theſe Three; whence it follows, that *Prudence*, or *the Art of Living*, muſt have one of theſe Three to lay hold on for a Handle, and for Matter to work upon; and when it appears which of them it is that adminiſters the Firſt Sollicitations or Impreſſions, we cannot well miſs of a right Conception of Vertue and Honeſty. For in conformity to one of theſe Three *Generals* the Eſſence of Vertue will lie, either in practicing upon a Principle and Proſpect of *Pleaſure*, tho' it ſhou'd be unſucceſsfully; or of *Indolence*, tho' as Unſuccesfully; or of ſecuring to our ſelves the *firſt General Privileges of Nature*. Obſerve by the way, that as manifold as the Principles in Nature are ſuppos'd to be, ſo many and ſo various are the Accounts of *Moral Ends*. There's another ſort of People, who take all theſe *Principles* together, and aſſign for the *Scope* of *Duty*, *Pleaſure*,

ſure, *Indolence*, and the *firſt General Privileges of Nature*, in Common, and at Large. By this time I have reckon'd up ſix ſeveral Opinions concerning the *Summum Bonum*. The Firſt of the Three laſt, that of Pleaſure was *Ariſtippus*'s; the Second that of Indolence, *Hieronymus*'s; and the Third, that of *being furniſh'd with the firſt General Proviſions and Privileges of Nature*, came from *Carneades*; for tho' he did not eſtabliſh it in good earneſt as his own, yet by way of Argumentation and Exerciſe he undertook to defend it. Theſe Three Hypotheſes have taken their Chance; the laſt of them has been eagerly and warmly ſupported. Indeed 'tis not to be imagin'd, how the Intent and Reſolution of practiſing upon a Purſuit of Pleaſure, and that without Certainty of Succeſs, can imply ſo much of Vertue, or of any Thing ſimply and ſolely Good, as that upon the Conſideration of its being ſuch, we ſhou'd drive at Pleaſure as the End of all our Actions. As no Body ever yet imagin'd, that the Eſcaping of Pain and Incovenience, even when we have the *Refuſal* of it, is a Thing *ſimply* Advantageous, but only ſo upon the *Compariſon*. This we cannot ſay with regard to the Principle of taking thoſe Meaſures, which may beſt put or keep us in Poſſeſſion of What is agreable to Nature. In the Judg-

ment of the *Stoicks* there can be no other Principle of Vertue, no other Notion of Good Simply and for itſelf Deſireable, but This. The Six *Uncomplex Acceptations* of *Summum Bonum* I have now laid before you: Of which, Two had the Ill Luck to be thrown up and come to nothing, but the other Four have ſtood their Ground. There are, beſides, Three ſeveral Compound or Blended Notions of *Summum Bonum*, Three and no more, as, if you ſearch to the Bottom of the Matter, you will perceive there cannot be; becauſe 'tis neceſſary either that *Pleaſure* ſhould be coupled with *Vertue*, according to the Project of *Callipho* and *Dinomachus*; or elſe *Indolence*, as *Diodorus* wou'd have it; or the *Prima Naturæ*, *the firſt General Proviſions and Privileges of Nature*, as the Ancients, or the old *Academicks* and the *Peripateticks* conceiv'd. 'Tis not to be expected I ſhou'd enlarge upon all theſe now; thus much however I may ſpare time to advertize, That the Principle of Pleaſure merits not ſo much as the Favour of Connivence, the Ends, for which our Being was given us, being abundantly more Honourable and Exalted; Whereof more anon. *Indolence* has the ſame Objections in a manner, lying againſt it, as *Pleaſure*. You have ſeen already, *Brutus*, what was inſiſted upon by *Torquatus* and Me, as to the Hypotheſis

theſis of Pleaſure; and upon that of *Vertue*, conſider'd as the *Sole Good of Man*, how I manag'd the Diſpute with *Cato*; ſo that I need only ſuggeſt as before, that almoſt all the ſame Arguments which bear hard againſt *Pleaſure*, will do the Doctrine of Indolence a like Diſſervice. As little occaſion is there that we ſhou'd caſt about for any other to confute *Carneades*. Fix upon what you will for a *Summum Bonum*, if Vertue has no part in't, it will be inconſiſtent with all Obligations of Duty, Conſcience, and Friendſhip. Agen; if you graft *Vertue either* upon *Pleaſure* or *Indolence*, the Specifick Excellency of it will turn into *Venom*. What can be a readier way to overcaſt, to ſully and tarniſh the Brightneſs of Vertue, than to aſſign it a joint Influence over us in our Counſels and Actions, either with a Principle according to which a Man is as happy as he can be, if he is not under the Senſe of any preſent *Evil*, or elſe with another which is wholly concern'd for the gratification of the Capricious and Deſpicable Part of us? The *Maſters of the Porch* are ſtill in the way, and Theſe have plum'd themſelves from the *Peripateticks* and *Academicks*, that is, they have taken their Senſe of Things to themſelves, and impos'd new Terms of their own Deviſing. Were we to take all Theſe to task in their Order, we ſhou'd find

our Account in it. But the *Stoicks* challenge the Opportunity before us, and the reſt of them ſhall hear from us at a more convenient Seaſon. Take notice, if you pleaſe, that *Democritus*'s εὐθυμία, or *State of Inward Serenity and Good Aſſurance*, cannot enter into the Subſtance of the Debate propos'd, it being not demanded *Wherein the Happineſs of Life conſiſts*, but *Out of what it reſults*: Now *Democritus*'s Inward Satisfaction and Complacency is neither more nor leſs than *Happineſs of Life* itſelf. Neither are the Conceits of *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and *Herillus*, to be fetch'd into the Compaſs of our Diſquiſition as now limited; ſo that had they not loſt all Credit and Regard, they wou'd be foreign to our Subject and Deſign. If we will make out any thing upon the Queſtion in hand, concerning the *Final Cauſes and laſt Conſequences of Good and Evil*, we muſt turn to what has been taken notice of already, to That, whatever it be, *which is agreable to Nature, and primarily and ſimply to be deſir'd*. Now this were pure Nonſence and Folly, if every Thing whoſe Eſſence is not wholly made up either of Moral Goodneſs or Turpitude, had not in it That, upon the ſcore of which it is more than meerly indifferent and inſignificant; and all Things that come under this Denomination are e'en one as Good

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and as Bad as another, which is what *Pyrrho* and *Ariſto* ſuppoſe; And as for *Herillus*, by reſolving the Whole of our Good into *Knowledge* or *Science*, he has remov'd the Obligations of Duty out of Sight, and abſolutely vacated the Expediency of *Admonition* and *Deliberation*. Upon the Whole; ſince we can ſhew no Favour to e'er a one of all the other *Hypotheſes*, and 'tis impoſſible any beſide ſhou'd ariſe, That of the Ancients will have its Courſe, and carry its Point in ſpight of Fate. This is it which the *Stoicks* are pleas'd to make ſo Free with; and with this we ſhall now begin to wade into the main Enquiry. Every *Living Creature* is poſſeſt by a Love of itſelf, and is no ſooner Such than Buſy about its own Conſervation. This Zeal and Sollicitouſneſs for its own Safety and Well-being is implanted in it, for that it may be the Guardian of itſelf, diſpos'd and in a condition to take thoſe Impreſſions and Meaſures which Nature recommends. Now this Fundamental Principle of *Self-preſervation* is at the firſt Implicit, Confus'd, and Undiſtinguiſh'd, and 'tis more than the *Subject* of it comprehends, what is the Nature either of itſelf, or of that very Propenſity, or the Force of its own Powers; 'till it gets Ground, and begins to entertain ſome Imaginations and Suſpicions of Things, how

far This and That and T'other hath any relation to it, or can have any Effect or Influence upon it, and so, by little and little, it picks up a Consciousness and Knowledge of its own *Compositum*. And then the next Thing it sets about is to make Prize of those Circumstances which are found agreable to Nature, and to give the Contrary a Diversion; and for this very Purpose the Instinct and Prejudice aforesaid was originaly wrought into the Soul. The Consequence is, that every Animal's Proper Object of Desire must be That *in Kind* which accords to the Measures of Nature. And so its Final Good appears to be This, That it shou'd live according to Nature, and stand rightly dispos'd for taking her Bent and for closing with her Counsels. To go on; Every Animal has it own *Species* and *Properties*, and its Final Cause is to be commensurate to the Capacity of its Nature. 'Tis true, They all concurr in the more *General Essentials*, and as Men and Brutes hold many Qualities in Common, so do the Brutes of one Predicament with those of another. Nevertheless every *Species* vindicates its *Distinguishing* and *Characteristical* Properties, which are those we are now concern'd for, Peculiar, and accommodated to the Purposes and Tendencies of its own Nature. Let it therefore be observ'd, that while we make it the End of every Animal's

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Exiſtence that it ſhou'd live according to Nature, we neither ſay nor mean that all Animals whatſoever have the very ſame End of Exiſtence. No *Art* can be without ſome Principles of *Science:* And ſo far all *Arts* are equaly under a Common Neceſſity; And yet every *Art* has its Principles of *Science* proper to itſelf. Thus all Animals are alike concern'd to live according to Nature, as Different and Diſſimular as their Natures are from one another; (for the Purpoſe, a Horſe's, an Oxe's, a Man's) becauſe all of them have their common Qualities and Affections wherein they agree. Nor is this only true as to *Animals*. Every Sort and Order of Things in the World that ſubſiſt in the way of Nutrition, Growth, and Encreaſe, as we ſee of the Product and Fruits of the Earth, purſue their own *Proceſs* of preſerving Life, acquiring Subſtance, and attaining the reſpective Ends of their Being. In a word, we may apply the ſame Obſervation to all the Parts of the Univerſe, and I will be bold to ſtand by this Aſſertion, That every Kind of Thing is Studious of its own Safety, and ſtrives, as after its *Ultimate End*, to fix and enſure it ſelf in the very beſt Condition its Nature admits of. And therefore tho' all Things that have a Place in the Univerſe do not exiſt unto one and the ſame End, yet the

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Ends to which they ſtand directed, have a near Affinity and Likeneſs. And thus is it fairly prov'd that Living according to Nature is the Chief and Ultimate Good of Man, that is to ſay, Living ſo, as to make the Moſt of our Nature, and to leave no Defects in't. What I have hitherto ſuggeſted I ſhall make ſomewhat Clearer yet, beſpeaking your Favour, if I over-act my Part. Reaſonable Allowances are to be made for my *young Scholar*; who ſtands fairly excus'd, conſidering his Age, tho' he ſhou'd ne'r have known any Thing 'till now of what I have told him. You ſay well; ſay'd I, let me add only This, That there's no Part of your Diſcourſe but what Young and Old too may their find Advantage in. Having ſhewn (continued he) the Standard whereby we are to judge of the Deſireableneſs of any Thing, we muſt now ſet forth and confirm the Reaſons upon which this Rule of Valuation is grounded. And that we may do this effectualy, we will return to the Poſition which lies at the Bottom of All, not only in our Method, but in the order of Nature too, namely, *That every Animated Being loves itſelf.* This, 'tis certain, is a Principle ſtruck deep, and every *Senſitive* Creature is ſo neceſſarily Conſcious of it, that the Man wou'd be hiſs'd out of all Converſation who ſhou'd ven-

venture to deny it. However, that the leaſt want of Evidence may not be pretended, I am willing to deſcend to a more Curious Demonſtration of the Truth of it. Let us take for granted then, tho' I know not how we can in Modeſty ſo much as put the Caſe, that ſome one Animal is to be found in the World which bears a Mortal Hatred againſt itſelf. That which follows from the Suppoſal is a Direct and Immediate Contradiction; As thus. In compliance to that Inclination or Impulſe by which it is prompted to commit Hoſtilities upon itſelf, it will earneſtly endeavour to give itſelf the Satisfaction of compaſſing that which will be Prejudicial and Injurious to it. Now this it will do to indulge and gratifie itſelf; And ſo *in the very ſame Act* it will both hate and love itſelf, which is Impracticable and Impoſſible. Before any Man can truly become his own Enemy, he muſt learn to turn Good into Evil, and Evil into Good; avoid what he has all the Reaſon in the World to purſue, and purſue what he has all the Reaſon in the World to avoid. And if he can do that, 'tis to no purpoſe to make more words about Life or the Ends of it. But how then are we to account for the Practice of Self-Murder? for one Fellow's hanging himſelf, another's drowning himſelf, *&c.* for that Reſolution of the old Man in *Terence*,

rence, to make his own Life miserable in Remembrance of his Child and by way of *Tribute* to him? Alas! These are not designedly and properly their own Enemies. For what if 'tis the Unhappiness of some People that they give way too much to their Grief, of others that they cannot moderate their Passions, either of Desire or Anger, and so leap into Ruin and Destruction with a hearty good Will? They are verily persuaded all the while that they cannot do themselves a greater piece of Service. They have This to say, and with very good Pretence, as they conceive, *Mihi sic usus est*, &c. *'Tis my Pleasure so to do; I leave you to yours; pray leave me to mine.* Else, when they had resolv'd upon a *Heart-Breaking*, and were Night and Day carrying on the comfortable Work of Maceration, the Malecontents wou'd never charge themselves, as they do, with Mismanagement, and confess, in the very Practice, that some time or other, in some Respect or other, they have brought Mischief and Inconveniences upon themselves; for by such a Complaint they make it appear, that they mean well, after all, to their own Persons. And therefore when we say at any time, *Such a Man has done himself a Diskindness, that he's his own Foe, and stands in his own way, and Life is such a Burthen to him*

him that he canot endure it, the very Supposition implies, that the Person is possess'd with an antecedent Concern for and Regard to himself. But this is not the *Whole Truth* yet; for beside that no Body entertains an Hatred against himself, every Body, as it must be acknowledg'd, is sollicitous to have his Condition and Circumstances sit right and easie upon him. For if it shou'd be all one to us, whether Matters go well or ill with us, (as in Things of an Indifferent and Trivial Nature we are Neuters and Careless) then must the Soul be utterly uncapable of any Act of *Desire*. Agen; To imagin that this Principle of Love does not terminate in a Man's own Person, but in something else, were absurd to the highest Degree. 'Tis true, when we come to talk of its Efficacy with Relation to Friendship, Good Offices, and the Exercise of particular Vertues, it may be said in one Sense to do so, but then the meaning is Obvious and well Known, and hinders not at all, but that when we consider it with respect to our own Persons, it shou'd center in them. Thus, for example, we love not Ourselves for the sake of any *Pleasure*, no; we love *That* for the sake of Ourselves. But to what purpose all This? Is it not certain that we love, and which is more, that we passionately love Ourselves?

Where

Where is the Man, or, at leaſt, how great a Rarity, who *keeps his Colour and an even Pulſe* when Death ſurprizes him? not but 'tis a very culpable Weakneſs, When our Time's come, to be ſcar'd out of our Wits. The ſame Remark and Rule hold proportionably as to Grief or Pain. Tho' 'tis enough for my Purpoſe, if, by theſe *Apprehenſions* in us, it plainly appears, as it does, that Human Nature cannot be reconcil'd to its own Diſſolution. And if ſome People let the Dread of it run away with their Diſcretion; from hence we may the more ſtrongly conclude, that theſe exceſſive Fears would never appear in ſome People, unleſs Nature allow'd 'em in a moderate Degree. Nor are thoſe Perſons the only Inſtances of this Averſion who fling away from Death, either becauſe it carries them from the Enjoyments of Life, or becauſe they have reaſon to fear they ſhall fare amiſs in a Future State, or becauſe of the Conflict and Agonies under which they ſhall probably labour at the time of Expiring. Infants, we ſee, before they have conceiv'd the leaſt Suſpicions of any ſuch Ill Conſequences, are preſently under a Conſternation if we tell them, with a Deſign to ſcare them, that a *Bullbeggar's* a coming. The Brute-Beaſts themſelves

——— *un-*

——— *unfurniſh'd with a force of Senſe*
And Policy, to plot their own Defence,

(*Pacuvius* is my Authour) even Theſe have no ſooner Death in View but they are ſtruck with Amazement and Horrour. Nay further; Cannot the Preſence of it diſcompoſe a Man of Wiſdom? No Body will have the Confidence to ſay ſo. It muſt run againſt the Grain to take his laſt leave of his Friends and the World. Tho' the Vigour and Vehemence of this Principle never ſhews itſelf more to advantage than when Indigent People are ready, as Thouſands have been, to ſuffer any Thing rather than die to Rights; and old decrepit Creatures are dragg'd off ſo ſorely againſt their Will, deſiring with *Philoctetes* to protract a miſerable Life rather that not live at all, as he made out a Subſiſtence upon the Birds which he ſhot. So *Atticus* tells us, *Configebat tardus celeres*, &c.

The Shafts he ſent return'd well-fledg'd with
Prey
To their diſabled Owner as he lay;
The Plumes his Mantle made,———

We have trac'd the Principle down from Rational to Irrational Animals, and, whether the

the *Vegitative* World came fortuitously by it, or, as the Men of the best Learning and Understanding alledge, the Sovereign Cause of the Universe entail'd it upon the *Kind*, we may follow it into our very Orchards and Gardens. 'Tis wonderful to observe how every Vegetable keeps it self Sound and Fix'd, either by the Munition of its *Bark*, or the Distribution of its *Root*; as *Animals* are held to their Being and their Kind, by a right Disposition of their Organs and the Continuity of their Parts. There are, who assert *Nature* has the sole ordering of all these things, and I subscribe to their Opinion; but yet if others will have different Sentiments I cannot help it; they must enjoy their own Constructions; Only let them know, if they please, that by *Human Nature* I mean nothing else but *Man*. They are both one and the same; and 'till a Man has got a way of *Disperſonating* himself, he cannot avoid hankering after those Things which will turn to Advantage and good account. And therefore it was not inconsiderately done of all the greatest Philosophers, to choose for the *Starting-Place* of their Enquiries about *Summum Bonum*, the first Affections and Principles of Nature; for they presum'd that whatever Beings feel themselves inwardly sollicited to love themselves, are under the Power of

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an *Ingenerated Principle* obliging them to purſue whatever is accommodated and agreable to their Natures. This therefore being evinc'd, that every Man has naturaly a near Affection for himſelf, in the next place we are to ſettle our Notions about the Nature of Man, for the whole Controverſy will turn upon that. Man, 'tis notorious, conſiſts of Body and Mind; the laſt is the Superiour Half of him; the firſt the Inferiour. The Structure of his Body is very Remarkable; and how far it excells that of other Living Creatures, as well as the noble Oeconomy of his Soul, attended with all the Senſitive Faculties, and conſtituted of thoſe Intellectual Powers which preſide in his Compoſition, being the ſtupendious Inſtrument and Source of his Counſels, his Reaſon, his Knowledge, and his Vertues; for the Parts and Functions of his Body lie a great deal more open and obnoxious to Diſcovery than the Nature of his Soul, and are by a long diſproportion leſs Eminent and Valuable. To begin nevertheleſs with theſe; It is Univerſaly known into what an exact Regularity the Parts, Proportions, the Shape and Stature of the Body are Wrought and Adjuſted. No one can be ignorant of the Situation, and external Form of the Forehead, Eyes, Ears, *&c.* that are proper to an Human Body. 'Tis moreover well enough underſtood how much it imports us,

their being in a good Condition, and duly disposʼd to exercise their respective Offices; and that none of them be Distemperʼd or Damagʼd. Nature desires it, and there is a certain *Tone* or *Co-operation* of the Parts of the Body wherein all such Motions and Conditions of them conspire as agree best to Nature: Insomuch that if they suffer any Distortion or Injury, or are twisted into any Awkard or Untoward Motion or Posture; as when a Man is for walking upon *All Four*, or backward instead of forward, it looks as if he had a mind to run away from himself, and throw off his Nature in a Pique. And therefore 'tis not at all strange that the Ways which Posture-Masters, Buffoons and Libertines have of bestowing their Limbs, their Wriglings and their broken Motions, shouʼd seem a Force upon Nature. The Depravity gets to a Head in the *Soul* first, and afterwards to compleat the *Metamorphosis*, it disjoints the Body. And 'tis therefore much less a Wonder that Orderly and Graceful Actions and Gestures appear so *Natural*. To go on; the bare Existence of the Mind ought by no means to content us; The Perfections of it we are not to leave out or neglect, but care must be taken that its Faculties be no way impairʼd or unaccomplishʼd in any of those Vertues which they are capable of attain-

attaining. Each External Senſe has its proper *Capacity*, by Vertue of which it exerts itſelf effectualy, and very readily and nimbly catches the Ideal Communications of Senſible Objects. The Powers or Vertues of the Soul, or rather of the Excelling and Tranſcendent Half, that is, of the *Mind* properly ſo call'd, tho' not a Few, ſtand reducible to theſe Two *Kinds*, Thoſe that are Inbred or Innate, and known by the Name of *Involuntary*; and Thoſe out of which it derives an Acceſſional Luſtre of Merit, and theſe are call'd *Voluntary* or *Acquir'd*. Of the Former Sort are *Docility* or *Aptneſs of Underſtanding*, *Memory*, and in a word, all that goes to the making up an *Ingenious Man*, or a *Man of Parts*, and is call'd *Sagacity*, and *Reach* or *Richneſs of Senſe*. But the Latter Sort is of the True and Sublimeſt Vertues, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*, and the reſt of them. This Summary Account of the Mind and Body it was neceſſary to ſet before you that we may come the better to underſtand what are the *Occaſions* of Nature, and what ſhe expects from us. Now 'tis evident in the reſult, that we cou'd not poſſibly love ourſelves, nor ſo heartily wiſh and ſollicit the Perfection of all the Parts and Powers of our Minds and Bodies, did they not challenge our Favour and Affection upon their own

account, and carry in them almoſt All that's Fundamental to a Happy Life, becauſe as he, that makes the Preſervation of himſelf his Buſineſs, cannot but ſtand well-affected to every Part of Himſelf, ſo the greater the Perfection is, and the more Meritorious and Improv'd the Significancy of any Part, the more of our Eſteem and Love it commands, that Perfection of Life to which we aſpire being all one with a compleat *Collection* of Vertues and Excellencies Intellectual and Bodily. And this is the *Complement* of *Summum Bonum*, in other Words, of that *Final Human Good* which has no other Good lying out of it. Now then, we ſee, and very clearly too, that foraſmuch as every Man is a Lover of Himſelf, immediately and for his own proper Sake, he can do no leſs than be Kind to whatever bears a Part in the Eſſence of his Body or his Soul, or is Inſtrumental or Serviceable in any Action or Diſpoſition of Either, and that for the proper Sakes of the Severals. A direct and obvious Conſequence of all which is this, that the greater the Worth and Excellency is of any Parts or Properties that belong to our Being, the larger is the ſhare they are entitl'd to of our Love and Eſteem. And ſo the more This or That is to be valued of thoſe Conſtituent Parts, which are ſingly to be valued upon their own

own Accounts, the higher ought its *Force* or *Vertue* to be rated. Thus, for Inſtance, the Vertues of the Mind take place of the Abilities of the Body, and the Voluntary Vertues, of the Involuntary. Indeed properly we ought not to give the Title of *Vertues* to any other but the *Voluntary*, to which as being the Effects of *Reaſon*, the moſt Exalted of our Faculties, the Involuntary are not Comparable. The *Summum Bonum* of all thoſe Unintelligent Movers which, among her other Species, Nature provides and has in Charge, is reſtrain'd to the *Body*. 'Tis ſhrewdly and plauſibly ſuppos'd by the *Vertuoſi*, *That the Soul or Mechanical Principle of Motion in a Hog is conſtituted of Saline Particles or Acids to preſerve it from Putrifying.* Not but in ſome Kinds of *Brutes*, as *Lions*, *Dogs*, *Horſes*, we diſcover a 'Semblence or Imitation of This or That Vertue. And the Caſe ſtands otherwiſe with any of Theſe than with a *Hog*, becauſe beſide the ordinary Motions of their Bodies One wou'd almoſt conclude from their Behaviour ſometimes that they had Rational Souls to *ſet them at Work*. The Soul of Man is Conſummate in his Rational Faculties; as *Vertue*, which owes itſelf to them, and affords the Philoſopher ſo much Matter to work upon, is the *Conſummation of thoſe Faculties.*

Agen; the ſeveral *Claſſes* of *Vegetables* reſemble Animals, in their *Proficiency* and *Perfection.* Thus, for Exemple, we ſay of a *Vine*, that *it lives* or *is dying*, and ſo of any *Tree*, that it is *Young* or *Old*, in a *Thriving* or *a Decaying Condition.* We take the ſame Methods with 'em as we do with *Animals*; What their Conſtitutions require and reliſh we adminiſter, and ſeparate what is noxious. 'Tis one part of the Buſineſs of *Agriculture* to breed them, and keep them Alive and Flouriſhing, to make Inciſions, to Prune, to Raiſe, Carry up, and Fix the Branches upon *Stock*; in a word, ſo propitiouſly to aſſiſt and encourage Nature in her Courſe as that the Vine itſelf, had it a Voice, wou'd return Thanks for the Dreſſing and Care beſtow'd on it. Now the means of this Tuition and Cultivation of the Vine, (to keep to that Inſtance) are *External*, it being unable, if left deſtitute of all Succour and Tendance from without, by itſelf to work on its own Perfection. Furthermore; Suppoſe this *Vine* ſhou'd come to have *Senſe*, and *Appetite*, and *Spontaneous Motion*; How, moſt probably, wou'd it manage Matters then? Over and above continuing and promoting thoſe Advantages which it formerly receiv'd from the Hand of Him who dreſs'd it, wou'd it not befriend and guard its *Acceſſional Senſes*, *Appetites*

petites, and *Members* too, ſuppoſing it had any? And if its Care will be thus extended beyond the Subſtance and Properties which it has had all along to thoſe which afterwards came into it; its *Final Cauſe* will not continue the ſame as when the *Gardiner* look'd after it; for it will now endeavour to be as Juſt as it can to its Nature with all its new Additions and Improvements about it. And ſo its laſt *Final Cauſe* is Analogous to the Firſt, but yet not the ſame: The *Summum Bonum* of a *Vegetable* is quitted, and now 'tis concern'd for that of an *Animal*. Once more; Let Rationality be ſuperinduc'd upon Senſation; Will it no longer make Proviſion for the Parts and Powers which it had before? Yes: But yet will it not chiefly favour and conſult for the Intereſts of the laſt *Addition*? Will it not be moſt wedded to thoſe Properties and Affections of the Soul which are the Worthieſt and the Beſt? And theſe being the Intellectual, muſt not the *Complement* of its *Summum Bonum* be their Perfection? Thus then riſes the Aſcent or Scale of *Advantages*, as trac'd from Beings of a more *General Character* to ſuch as have an Intereſt in that *Summum Bonum* which is made out of the beſt Condition and Circumſtances that the Body can deſire, together with the Conſummation of the Rational or Intelligent Faculties. And This

being the State of the Caſe, I can't have err'd in what I further off intimated before, that, cou'd every Man be acquainted with Himſelf, and frame a right Eſtimate of the Value and Significancy of his Nature and of every Part of it, as ſoon as he is Born, that Conſummate and Supream Good of his which we are now enquiring for, cou'd not poſſibly 'ſcape his Knowledge even then, and conſequently he cou'd never be overſeen or miſled. But alaſs! the Misfortune is, our Conſtitution lies out of the way, and is not to be underſtood 'till a great many Years of Ignorance are gone over our Heads, and we come by a Slow, and Inſenſible Progreſs a little better to apprehend Ourſelves. By an Original Inſtinct, and before we can give an Account of it, we are recommended and endear'd to our own Perſons; and forc'd upon *Self-Defence* and *Protection* by the *Elaſticity* of that Principle of Self-Love which is Begot and Born with us. And afterwards when we can look deeper into ourſelves, we find out our own Beings, and wherein we and other Animals are unally'd, and thence-forward, perhaps, we try to make up to the proper End of our Exiſtence. Thus it is alſo with *Brutes*; For ſome time together they are faſten'd to the very Place where they drew their firſt Breath, and e'r long they ſet forward to

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ſeek their Fortunes as their Inclinations carry them: The young Snakes crawl away; the Ducklings paddle; the Blackbirds leave the Neſt; the Calves butt and run atilt; and the *Scorpions* play their Stings; Each in the way of their reſpective Natures. So for *Human Kind*; Infants we ſee, when once *within the Threſhold* of Life, lie ſtill as contentedly as if their Souls were to come after them; till they have gather'd a little Strength and Courage, and then the firſt Experiment they make with their Souls and Senſes, is, to get upon their Legs, and do Feats with their Hands, and take Knowledge of their Nurſes; By and By there's nothing to be done without their Play-fellows, and no Quiet but when the Knot of Sportſmen is met, and Buſineſs going forward; Little Romances muſt be told them; and when they have any thing to ſpare, their Favourites partake of their Bounty; nothing ſhall paſs in the Family, but they'll be making their Enquiries and Obſervations; and ſo they go on to form and compoſe their own Notions, and treaſure up other People's; no Body can come in their way, but they'll be asking his Name; when they outwit or get the better of their Companions, they exult and triumph; and when they come by the worſt on't, they're dejected and mortify'd: The Cauſe and Reaſon

Reaſon of all which may be very eaſily aſſign'd. There is wrought into our Nature an Aptitude admoniſhing us to acquire good Habits and Improvements; and Children, before they have laid any Foundation of Learning, while there's no more Vertue in them than the *Seminal Miniature*, are for the eſſaying at the Imitation of it. Things are ſo order'd and contriv'd within us, that of courſe we're led on to *Action* and Offices of Benevolence, Liberality, and Gratitude, and our Souls are qualify'd for and diſpos'd to the Earning of Knowledge, and the Exerciſes of Prudence and Fortitude; and their Contraries are a *Nuiſance*; No wonder then that, when *Little*, we ſhou'd ſtrike out theſe firſt Glimmerings and Sparklings of Vertue, which at Long-Run kindle up Philoſophy into a Luminary that conducts us, as commiſſion'd from *God*, till it brings us to the Ultimate *Good* of *Human Nature*: The Prevalency of the *Principle* aforeſaid, as I have already often obſerv'd, betraying itſelf in the State of the Soul's Infancy and Impotence. At length, when it has attain'd Maturity and Vigour, it comprehends the full Force and Significancy of Human Nature, that is, it firſt of all acquaints itſelf with its own Domeſtick Affairs, not but it may, if it pleaſes, examine and learn what lies beyond. And therefore

fore if we design to know what we are, we must retire into Nature, consult seriously her Occasions, and embrace her Directions. This Advice was too Remarkable and Weighty to come from a meer Mortal, and therefore 'tis ascrib'd to a Deity, it being no less than the Oracular Instruction of *Apollo Pythius*, *That we shou'd beware of not knowing Ourselves*; which is as much as to say, that we shou'd not be ignorant of the Nature and Powers of the Body and the Mind, and that we shou'd propose to ourselves that Condition of Life which takes in the largest Circuit of Advantages. Now it being prov'd, that there is in the Mind of Man an Inbred and Original Inclination to the Perfection of Condition and Plenitude of Circumstances above-mention'd, 'tis very certain that Nature can have no After-game, when once we are in Possession of the Objects Desir'd, and so the *Summum Bonum* must be an *Aggregate* of those Things which we are inclin'd to desire and affect upon their own proper Account, unless, after all, we have not yet demonstrated that every *Particular* included in that *Aggregate*, is by it self, and for it self, a Desireable Good. Perhaps it may look like an Omission, my not bestowing Pleasure among those Goods of the Body I have lately mention'd. If it does, I shall take

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ſome other time to give my Reaſons. For in the preſent Enquiry it makes no Difference, whether *Pleaſure* be any of thoſe Things which are *Primarily deſireable in the Account of Nature*, or not. If it has nothing to do among them, and for my own part I think it none of the Number, 'tis well I have not made it ſo. If it has, and the other Opinion is better grounded, it can give no Diſturbance to our *Idea* of the *Summum Bonum*. Let *Pleaſure* immediately take its Place among our *Prima Naturæ*, *our firſt General Advantages and Deſireables*, and all that can be ſaid, is, that the Body is Capable of another Good which we did not think of. What does our Definition of the *Summum Bonum* get or loſe by this? Hitherto have we been proſecuting the Argument taken from the Natural Principle of Self-love and Self-preſervation. We ſhall now proceed upon another, and prove, that not only becauſe we love ourſelves, but alſo becauſe every Portion and Property, whether of Body or Soul, has its peculiar Office and Significancy, therefore the Summ of all our Intereſts and Concernments lies adequate to *Theſe Collectively*. To begin with the Body; If any of its Parts are mis-ſhap'd, Enfeebled or Maimed, do we not endeavour to cover it from the Eye? If we cannot hide it quite, don't we make

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a mighty Pother to keep it at leaſt as Conceal'd as we can? And what painful Treatment and Diſcipline do we chearfully undergo to have all ſet right agen, and the Part reſtor'd to its natural Form and Appearance, tho' perhaps inſtead of recovering the perfect Uſe of it, we ſhall render it more Unſerviceable than it was before? The Reaſon's apparent. For every Man being under Indiſpenſable Obligations to love and value himſelf *Throughout*, and that purely and immediately for the ſake of himſelf, he is neceſſitated too to love and value for their own ſakes all the *Parts* of himſelf, as conſtituting that *Whole* which he loves for itſelf. And ſo agen, as for the Motions and Figurations of the Parts of the Body, has not Nature ordain'd a certain Rule of *Decorum* and *Uniformity* in Theſe? Does it not lie upon a *Cavalier* to avoid Unſeemlineſs and Abſurdities in his Gate, his manner of Sitting, and the Adjuſtment of his Mouth and Countenance? Is it not *Shocking*, when we ſee a Man's Nature Tortur'd and Diſtreſs'd, either by the Awkwardneſs of his Action, or his placing himſelf out of Figure? And ſeeing our Limbs are under ſuch a Regulation as this, can it be deny'd of the Body's Comlineſs and Symetry, that it is for itſelf Deſireable and Valuable? We are ſatisfy'd that by the

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Body's being Disfigur'd or Dismember'd, we are realy and immediately incommoded; Is it not all Reason then, that a Graceful Personage shou'd be reckon'd so much the more a Valuable and Desireable Advantage? If we are ty'd to Laws in our Motions and Postures, can *Beauty* be a thing undeserving our Regard? So for Health, Strength, Ease, are they not Precious and to be Coveted, for the Intrinsick Good of them as well as for the Consequent Benefits and Opportunities? For as certainly as our Nature is desirous of Consummation and Undefectiveness, so certainly it prizes and affects irrespectively and for the Essential Importance of it, that Condition of the Body which includes all These, as being the most Natural; for the Measures of Nature are utterly broke by Sickness, Pain, or Loss of Strength. Come we forward to the Powers and Affections of the Soul, an Object of Contemplation every way more Bright and Excellent, and wherein the Drift and Purpose of Nature is much more Discernible and Conspicuous, than in the Frame of the Body. And first: Our very Constitution is season'd with so passionate a Desire and Love of Knowledge and Information, that it will not bear the least Dispute, whether we shou'd trouble ourselves about attaining them, were it not for the

the Encouragements they meet with in the World: For what ſhall we think of the Genius of thoſe Youngſters, that will not be Brow-beaten or Whipp'd out of their Contemplations and Searches? but are obſtinately inquiſitive under the Terrors of the Rod, and tranſported with Improvement at any Price? that take a Pride and Pleaſure in being Communicative, and pay their Attendance to pompous Solemnities, Plays, and the like Publick Entertainments, and ſo heartily admire them, as at any time to loſe *Breakfaſt*, *Dinner*, *and Supper* for them? Has not every Body beheld, how furiouſly ſome People are addicted, and how entirely devoted to *Study* and *Science*? What Pennances, what Hardſhips they'll embrace, what Riſques they'll run of deſtroying their Health, and how little they value their Money and Land, when Learning and Books have ſeiz'd their Affections? How ſeverely they'll work and rack the Brain, and think themſelves richly rewarded in the Pleaſure of being *Edify'd*? *Homer*, I preſume, alluded to This, in the Fable of the *Sirens* and their Singing. 'Twas not ſo much the Melody of their Notes, nor the Variety of their *Diviſions*, nor the Novelty and Singularity of their Streins that had Power enough to interrupt a Voyage, as their Pretences to Penetration, and their Promiſes of Inſtru-

ſtruction. 'Twas an Effect of this Artifice, that ſo many Veſſels were lodg'd upon the Rocks thereabouts, and to this very tune they call upon *Ulyſſes* in thoſe Lines of *Homer*, which, with other Parts of him, I have tranſlated upon occaſion, *O decus Argolicum, quin puppim flectis Ulyſſes*, &c.

Hero, this way gently ſteer,
Hither the Pride of Hellas *bring,*
Bring Ulyſſes, *bring him near,*
And let the Knowing Warriour *hear*
The Wonders which we ſing.

We ſalute in myſtick Lays,
Each Veſſel as it ploughs the Sea,
In vain upon the Canvas plays
A wanton Gale: The Machin ſtays
Becalm'd with Harmony.

Secrets of Nature and of Art
We to the Paſſenger impart;
With Learning Univerſal ſate his Mind;
And leave no Miſt of Ignorance behind;
But ſend him home, the Wiſeſt of his Kind.

Hark! thy Vict'ries we relate,
The Vengeance of the Gods, and Troy's *deſerved Fate;*
The Kings, the Fights, the Fleet, the Tents,
The Cauſe, the Conduct, and Events,——

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By the way, the Poet was aware, that if he had made his *Hero* ſurrender to the Magick of the *Performance*, he muſt have ſunk the Credit of his *Poem*. They promiſe him, if he'll attend, his Underſtanding ſhall be enlarg'd; And who that's a true Friend and Admirer of Wiſdom, as was *Ulyſſes*, had not ſuſpended the Remembrance of his Native Soil upon thoſe Terms? No; 'tis a fruitleſs and freakiſh Curioſity to aim at an Indefinite Expanſe of Knowledge; but yet when a Man falls in love with Letters and Speculations, upon a View of, and with regard to the more Noble Objects and Uſes of them, 'tis a certain Sign of an Exalted Soul. To what a Streſs of Intenſion were *Archimedes*'s Thoughts engag'd; who when the Enemy made themſelves Maſters of his Country, was ſo hard at work with his Compaſſes upon his *Slat*, as not to perceive or know any thing of the Matter? How was all the Soul of *Ariſtoxenus* raviſh'd and *overflow'd* with Muſick? What a Bleſſing did *Ariſtophanes* account it, that he cou'd ſpend the full Period of his Life in a Courſe of *Learning*? *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, did they think much, to travel to and over the remoteſt parts of the World in queſt of Improvement and Information? 'Tis impoſſible any Man, that was ever deſirous of or pleas'd with the Knowledge of

any thing worth Knowing, can be a Stranger to the truth of all This. Some People, I grant, will tell you, that it is the Pleaſure accompanying Concerns of this nature which induces us to mind them: But then either They do not obſerve, or elſe forget how frequently, when we have no manner of Advantage in Proſpect, nay and when 'tis more likely we ſhall be Loſers and Sufferers by it, we perceive a moſt Exquiſite and Lively Satisfaction in furniſhing and filling our Intellectuals; and therefore, it muſt needs be, that all ſuch Operations and Exerciſes are Valuable and in Eſteem with us upon their own Account. Indeed the Caſe is ſo plain that I'm aſham'd to ſay more of it. Let every Man put the Queſtion to himſelf, how he finds him influenc'd and affected when he's forming a Judgment either upon the Motions of the Stars and Heavenly Bodies, or the occult *Diſpenſations* in the Natural World; and what it is which makes *Hiſtory* ſo very agreable to him, that he cannot forbear following the *Series* as far as 'twill lead him; that he turns back to conſult afreſh thoſe Paſſages which he does not perfectly retain; and cann't find in his Heart to give over till he's come to the Cloſe of the Narration. I'm ſenſible too that *Hiſtory* is a profitable and Uſeful Study as well

well as a Diverting one; But how ſhall we account for the Pleaſure and Entertainment of reading *Romances* and *Comedies*, which we can make no Advantage of? and for our Forwardneſs to learn the Names of Men famous in their Generations, of what Families they came, the Places of their Births, and a Thouſand other the like *Superficial Circumſtances*? Agen; what is the promiſing Motive with *Plebeians* and *Mechanicks*, and Fellows that cann't have the Confidence to ſuppoſe they ſhall ever enterprize any thing conſiderable; that Theſe too ſhou'd be ſetting up for *Hiſtorians?* And old wither'd *Stagers*, with one Foot in the Grave, when paſt the poſſibility of exerting themſelves, do they not, at that time of Day more eſpecialy, pleaſe themſelves with reading and hearkening to Relations of any great Exploits or Publick Tranſactions? There's therefore no doubt to be made, but that we are ſpirited on to fructifie our Underſtandings by thoſe Encouragements and Recommendations, which the Means and Matter of Improvement have in them. Agreably hereunto the old Philoſophers repreſent their Wiſe Man as one of the Inhabitants in the *Fortunate Iſlands*, Maſter at large of his own Time and Actions, ſupply'd thro' other Hands with all the Neceſſaries of Life,

and his only and perpetual Buſineſs, to Search and Examine into the Nature of Things. That Contemplations of this kind are not only *Eſſentials* of *Poſitive* Happineſs, but a Sovereign Antidote againſt Affliction and Sorrow, is certain. The Expedient has been commonly made uſe of by the Unfortunate, when in a State of Captivity or Thraldom, under Confinement, or in Exile, to relieve and amuſe their Melancholy. Thus *Phalereus Demetrius*, once at the Head of Affairs in this very City, when he was driven out of his Country againſt all Right and Reaſon, retir'd to *Alexandria*, put himſelf under the Protection of King *Ptolomy*, and became a mighty Proficient in this ſame *Philoſophy* which I now recommend. *Theophraſtus* was his Director; and he compos'd many admirable Pieces during that Leiſure which his Troubles gave him. Nor can we imagine he would have thus employ'd himſelf, under thoſe Circumſtances, for any other end, than purely to cultivate his Faculties, and nouriſh his Reaſon. *Cneius Auſidius*, of the *Prætorian* Order, an Excellent Scholar, tho' he wanted the Benefit of his Eyes, has declar'd in my hearing, he wou'd not care what External Advantages he renounc'd, if he cou'd but have his *Sight*. Even Sleep we ſhou'd look upon as

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a Grievance and Inconſiſtency in Nature, were it not ſuch a Refreſhment as our Bodies require, and the Sovereign Reſtaurative when we are Spent and Weary'd. Otherwiſe, the beſt Effects of it are an abſolute Inſenſibility and Inactivity. So that we ſhou'd be very well pleas'd, if things might be order'd in ſuch a manner, as that either we cou'd diſpenſe with this Repoſe, or take it out in a more commodious way. For when we're ſet upon *Buſineſs* or *Studying*, we put a Force upon Nature, and make a Practice of breaking our Reſt. There is no one Man, no nor Animal, but what gives very ſufficient, and, in truth, moſt convincing Proofs of the Soul's *Operating perpetualy, and of its utter Abhorrence to an Eternal Stagnation.* This we may gather from what we find in little Children; for to them I muſt referr my ſelf agen, tho' you may tell me, too much of one Thing's good for nothing; and yet all the Philoſophers of old, and the Sect I ſpeak up for eſpecialy, were of the mind, that Infants are beſt able to teach us what it is our Nature wou'd be at, and therefore they are ever and anon looking back to the *Cradle*, and the *Go-Cart*. Now we may obſerve, that tho' at firſt the little ones lie Helpleſs and Unactive, yet ſo ſoon as they're in a Condition, they become ſuch

eager *Sportſmen*, that tho' you chaſtize them, they will not forſake their beloved Recreations, be they never ſo Toilſome and Slaviſh: And this Mudling, Mercurial Humour grows up with them. 'Twou'd be a Heart-breaking to be condemn'd to ſuch a *Nap* as *Endymion*'s, tho' beforehand we were ſure of a Succeſſion of the moſt glorious and obliging Dreams. *Opium* can do no more than lay us *finaly* aſleep. 'Tis matter of Fact, tho' very Unaccountable, that the Souls and Bodies even of the greateſt Miracles of Idleneſs and Negligence are always in Motion, and when no longer held in hand by ſome Obſtacle that will not be manag'd, they are either for Cramming, Gaming, or Tattling; and if they have not had Education good enough, to be able to paſs away the time with *Smatterings* of *Scholarſhip*, then they'll employ themſelves any how to no purpoſe, tho' 'twere in ſcratching Lines and Figures upon Walls and Tables. Nay, and the very Brute-Animals, which, for a Fancy, we keep up and confine, are diſturb'd and uneaſy under the Reſtraint, and impatient to recover that full Range and Freedom, into which they were born, tho' they have more and better Feeding than if they were to live Wild. The Nobler Birth we have had, and the more Generous Inſtitutions we have im-

imbib'd, the more we diſdain a total Exemption from Employment, and a Life of Luxury and Pleaſure. The People of a Private Station and Fortune find themſelves Work at home. Thoſe of a more Sanguin, Aſpiring Temper, thruſt up to a Share in the Publick Miniſtry, and the Tuition of the Common-wealth; while others are as much bigotted to the Buſineſs of Studying and Literature. Now ſo little of Enjoyment and *Guſto* in it has the Sort of Life laſt-mention'd, to flatter thoſe who follow it, that they muſt and do make familiar to them the moſt earneſt Intenſion of *Thought*, and the harſheſt *Acts* of Self-denial; and ſo they may but turn the *Imperial*, or rather the Divine Part of themſelves, their *Underſtanding* and *Reaſon*, to the beſt Account, 'tis all one to them what Pleaſures they quit, or what Drudgery they do. With Reverence they conſult the Collections of thoſe who have gone before them, and contribute their own. This is their Occupation, and they are never to be ſated. No; the meaner Concerns of the World are ſet aſide and forgotten, and they mount after a *Quarry* worth a Thouſand on't. So engaging and ſatisfactory a thing is *Converſing with Books*, that thoſe very Men who have ſet up their *Reſt* in the Purſuit of External Profit and Pleaſure,

have yet made it the Buſineſs of their Lives to ſearch into the Nature of Things, and account for their Dependances and Operations. From all which 'tis demonſtrated, that *Man is born to Action*, of one kind or other: For *Action* is either *firſt-rate* or *ſecond*; the former a Worthier Kind a great deal than the latter. The principal Exerciſe of all, if you'll take my Word for't, and theirs whoſe *Hypotheſis* we are now upon, is to contemplate and learn the Nature and Courſes of the Heavenly Bodies, and, by Dint of Reaſon, to diſſect and unriddle the ſecret Complications and Communications of the Parts of the Univerſe one with another. The ſecond Beſt is to do the Publick what Services we can, and to learn and practiſe all thoſe Duties of Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, Juſtice, and every other Vertue and Habit ſuitable to Vertue, which are compriz'd under the Title and Character of *Honeſtum*, and for the Knowledge and Practice of which we are beholden to Nature, who ſhews us the way, and trains us to them. For all Things are Diminutive and Slight in the State of their Imperfection and Nonage, and as they come forward they gather Bulk and Vigour; nor can it be otherwiſe, becauſe during the firſt Scene of Life we are Spiritleſs, and Tender, and uncapable either of

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Judging or Enterprizing for the Beſt. *Vertue* and a *Happy Life*, like the *Poles*, are not to be come at preſently, and a longer time it requires to give ourſelves a through-knowledge about them. 'Tis a Saying of *Plato*'s, and a *Golden* one, *He that can overtake Wiſdom, and reach a right Sence of Things, tho' extream old Age overtakes him firſt, is a Happy Man.* By this time enough has been ſaid of the Primitive Advantages and Services of our Nature. Next, let the Subſequent and more ſignificant be conſider'd. In the firſt Formation of an Human Body, Things are ſo contriv'd, as that it ſhould be capable of ſome leſſer Energies and Performances immediately upon its Birth, and afterwards, by degrees, of other Operations and Atchievments, till at laſt it becomes able, in a great meaſure, to act without the Inſtrumentality of External and Adventitious *Aids*. And Nature has taken much the ſame Courſe with the Mind; for ſhe has allow'd it the Privilege of *Senſories*, whereby it is ſo well accommodated with Perceptions, as to be in a condition for working up itſelf to the Uſe of its Powers, with little or no *foreign* Aſſiſtance. But yet ſhe has ſubmitted it to the Diſcretion of Man, whether his *Greateſt Excellency* ſhall be in him or not, having qualify'd his Rational Faculties for the Enter-

tertainment and Exercise of every Vertue, and antecedently to any Acquisitions of Learning imprinted imperfect Ideas of the greatest and most transcendent Objects and Things, and brought us so far on our way, as just to initiate us in some faint Imitations and Airy Essays of Vertue, only to give us a Taste, and put us in a Road. Thence-forward it is our Province, which cannot extend farther than *Art* or *Industry*, to look about us, and compleat the Work which Nature has begun, and never to think we have gone far enough with it 'till it is as Consummate as it can be. And when it is so, it will deserve to be deem'd infinitely more Valuable in itself and of higher Account than our Senses or any of the other foremention'd Perfections or Accomplishments of the Body; Infinitely, I say, for the distance of Perfection between the one and the other is so wide that our *Apprehension* cannot measure it. Thus *Vertue*, we see, and the *Practice* which she moves in, demands from us, with a manifest Right, our ut'most Veneration and Application; And whatever of that Nature resides within or is exerted by the Soul, comes under the Title of *Honestum*; Of which more particularly yet in the Sequel, where we shall observe, what Ideas belong to the Severals of that Denomination,

mination, by what Names they are denoted and diſtinguiſh'd, and what is the Force and Importance of them. At preſent let me rather carry our Conſequence forward, and ſhew you that theſe *Honeſta* (*Vertuous and Honourable Principles and Practices*) excluſively of their Merit and Value reſulting from the Principle of *Self-Love*, are *Eſſentialy and for Themſelves Deſireable and Excellent*. And here agen the little Children muſt be Summon'd, as being the Mirrours which reflect the faireſt Image of Nature. How Eager and Emulating are they at their Tryals of Skill? And how Hazardous and Difficult are thoſe Tryals? How do they hugg themſelves if they come off Winners? And how ſimply they look, if Defeated? How highly they reſent it when any Thing's lay'd to their Charge? How well pleas'd are they with Commendation and Applauſe? How furiouſly will they beſtirr themſelves to ſupplant and over-top their Fellows? How perfect and laſting a Remembrance do they retain of their Benefactours? How ready do they ſhew themſelves to make the moſt Grateful Acknowledgements? And the better Diſpoſition and Temper they are of, the plainer and deeper Characters of theſe *Honeſta* they have about them. Thus our Childhood itſelf is not without Rudiments and Repre-

Repreſentations of Vertue. But when arriv'd to an Age of Maturity and Diſcretion, what Man is there to be found ſo Malevolent and Irreconcileable to Human Nature, as not to be ſcandaliz'd at Moral Turpitude, nor to take a good liking to Moral Honeſty? The Lewdneſs of ſome young *Libertines*, can any One forbear being vext at it? The Modeſty and Staidneſs of others who, tho' a Diſintereſted Party, is not delighted and charm'd with? What's more Deteſtable than the Name of the Traitour *Pullus Numitor* of *Fregellæ*, tho' the Common-wealth of *Rome* was the better for him? On t'other Hand, Is not the Memory of *Codrus* reverenc'd for the dear-bought Reſcue of *Athens*? And are not the Daughters of *Erictheus* at this Day in great Eſteem and Favour with every Body? Who ſpeaks a good Word for *Tubulus*? or a ſlight one of *Ariſtides*? As often as we read or hear of Inſtances of Piety, Fidelity, and Generoſity, can we avoid being ſtrangely *won upon* and *Affected*? I do not ſay *We* only that are Honourably Deſcended, and have been ſuitably Bred. How will the *Baſe-born Blunderers* in the *Upper-Gallery*, clap at thoſe Words of *Pylades* in the *Play*, *I am the Man*, *I am Oreſtes*, and at the Anſwer of *Oreſtes*, *Believe him not*, *I am Oreſtes*, *I*? And when both of 'em offer'd to diſcover him-

himſelf the guilty Perſon, and to help out the King at a loſs, we heartily wiſh they might both come off, and have the Satisfaction of Living always together. Whenever this *Drama* comes upon the *Stage*; To what Extaſies are we rais'd of Concern and Admiration? Which makes it a clear Caſe, that to be ready and reſolv'd to acquit ourſelves like Men of Honour, eſpecialy when there's nothing to be got by it, and a great Deal to be loſt, is ſuch a Diſpoſition of Soul as every Body is realy conſtrain'd to encourage and applaud. Neither are the Examples of this kind recorded among the *Poets* and *Mythologiſts* only; The *Hiſtorians* have them in Plenty too, and none ſo many as our own. When there was occaſion for a Perſon of moſt Exemplary Piety and Integrity to conduct into *Rome* the Image of the *Idæan Goddeſs*, we found ſuch a one in *Publius Scipio*; From us Monarchs have receiv'd their Deliverers and Protectors; We have had *Generals* that, to divert the Ruin of their Country, have thrown themſelves without Reluctance into the Jaws of Death; and *Conſuls* that precaution'd a King, One of the Worſt Enemies *Rome* ever conteſted with, when they might have had him poiſon'd, and expected him with his Army, every Hour, before the Walls of the City. We can

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pride our ſelves in the Example of a *Woman* that having been Forc'd, ſtruck a Dagger to her Heart, to expiate the Pollution, and a *Father* that did as much for his *Daughter*, to prevent it. Now 'tis notorious in theſe and a thouſand other *Tranſactions* of the ſame Nature Unſpecify'd, that the *Agents* had ſo juſt a Senſe of the Merit of the *Action*, as rather than they wou'd not go *through ſtitch*, to throw up the greateſt Advantages and Satisfactions; and that when we celebrate them for what they did, the *Worthineſs* of the *Practice* is the ſole Reaſon inducing us to recognize it. Theſe *Hiſtorical Premiſſes* take up little room, and a much greater Number of Inſtances I might appeal to, but theſe, tho' there were no more, will make good our *Concluſion*, That every *Species* of *Vertue*, and that *Honeſtum* which reſults from it and is Eſſential to it, is *Deſireable and Valuable upon its own Account.* Further; this *Honeſtum* has not, in the Latitude of it, any thing of a more Glorious and General Importance than the Obligations and Laws of Human Society, and the mutual Entercourſes of Commerce and Kindneſs between Man and Man. Theſe commence from that Natural Affection which the *Parents* bear to their *Iſſue*, and *to one another in the Relation to Husband and Wife*, extending pro-

proportionably to all the Individuals of the ſame Family; and ſpread in order to *Relations* and *Kinsfolk*, whether by *Bloud* or *Marriage*; to *Friends*, *Neighbours*, *Fellow-Citizens*, *Political Collegues* and *Confederates*, and ultimately to all Mankind. The Purpoſe and Effect of this Principle is, that every Man gives every Man his Due, and, as much as in him lies, keeps up the Spirit of Concord and Humanity in the World; and this is the meaning of *Juſtice*, and thoſe other Vertues which concurr with *Juſtice*, *Natural Affection*, *Good-nature*, *Liberality*, *Beneficence*, *Courteouſneſs*, and the like. All which have their Dependance upon *Juſtice*; not but they conſpire and co-operate with every other *Vertue*. For that *Principle* being wedg'd into *Human Nature* which the *Greeks* call πολιτικὸν, the Principle of *Correſpondence* and *Uniting our Intereſts*, every Sort of *Vertue* muſt have a Communication with thoſe of *Agreement*, *Unity*, and *Benevolence in Societies*, as *Juſtice* reciprocaly influences, enforces, and ſeeks to every other *Vertue*. From whence it follows that *Honeſty* muſt be *Impracticable* without *Courage* and *Wiſdom*. So that this *Honeſtum*, it ſeems, is equivalent to the aforeſaid *Concurrence* and *Combination* of *Vertues*, and compounded of *Vertue in the Habit*, and *Vertue in the Practice*. Conſequently a Courſe of Life which

which anſwers to ſuch a Conjunction and Courſe of Vertues is entitl'd to the Appellations of *Regular*, *Honeſt*, *Conſiſtent*, *Steady*, and *Agreable to Nature*. By the way; Tho' the *Philoſophers* confeſs that all the Vertues are thus United and Blended with one another, yet at the ſame time they find no Difficulty to diſtinguiſh and ſort them. 'Tis true, they are in ſuch a manner connected and complicated as that they enter into the Eſſence of each other, and cannot be diſpers'd. However, each *Vertue* keeps its peculiar Province. *Fortitude* carries us thro' Labours, Diſaſters, and Dangers; *Temperance* curbs us in the Fruition of Pleaſure; *Prudence* diſcerns between *Good* and *Evil*; *Juſtice* diſtributes to every Man his Due. And foraſmuch as each *Vertue* has its Concern for and Regard unto Perſons and Things *abroad*, and is deſirous and effective of the Good of Others, it is moreover evident that *our Friends*, *our Brethren*, *Relations*, *Countrymen*, and the great Univerſal *Society*, *all Mankind in Conſort*, are *propter ſe expetendi*, *to be valu'd and lov'd upon their own Account*, *and for their own proper Sakes*. Nevertheleſs they conſtitute no Part of the Eſſence of our *Ultimate* and *Final Good*. So then here are Two different Kinds of the *propter ſe expetenda*, *Things to be valu'd and lov'd upon their own Account*, the

the first, of *Those which make out the Summum Bonum, and referr to the Mind and Body*; the other, of those *External* and *Remote ones, in which the Mind and Body have not an immediate Interest*, as *Friends, Parents, Children, Relations, Native Country*, which are all *Dear and Valuable for their own Sakes too*, but *not in the same Nature and Respect* as the former. Indeed if all such *Valuable Externals* were a Part of the *Summum Bonum*, 'twere plainly impossible that we shou'd any way make ourselves Masters of it. You will ask me, How it is that they come into the Definition of the *Summum Bonum*, *the Relations of Friendship, Consanguinity, Affinity*, &c. and yet make no part of it? I answer that the Business of every Vertue in its own way and kind is to vindicate and support these *Externals* by the Discharge of its respective *Duties*. 'Tis in itself of singular Advantage and good Consequence to love and honour our Friends and our Parents, because the Discharge of those Duties goes among the *Recte Facta*, the just and good Practices which are the Results of *Vertue*. These good Practices the Men of an accomplish'd Wisdom are addicted to at the meer Motion and Direction of Nature; whereas the less Perfect and Improv'd, tho' they may be Persons very gallantly dispos'd and re-

ſolv'd, proceed upon the Motives of *Glory* and *Repute*, which mimick *Vertue* and *Honour* ſo to the Life, as to be frequently miſtaken for them. How then wou'd it feaſt the Souls of ſome People with Delight and Satisfaction, cou'd they but once let go the Shadow that inchants them, and gain a juſt Apprehenſion and an adequate Knowledge of the moſt Laudable and Illuſtrious Excellency of all, a Finiſh'd Vertue? Did ever any Man, tho' the moſt wretched Slave to *Pleaſure*, or delirious with his Feaver of Appetite and Paſſion, taſte half that Rapture in the Enjoyment of his Wiſhes, as the Elder *Africanus* in the Rout of *Hannibal*, or the Younger in the Demoliſhing of *Carthage*? Who of all the Company that regal'd themſelves upon that Feſtivity *in their Barges on the Tyber*, was fluſh'd with as exquiſite an Elevation and Joy as the Conquerour *Lucius Paulus* himſelf, when he brought his Priſoner King *Perſes* up the River? Now then, my *Lucius* make good uſe of your Time, and let all the Vertues in Conſtellation ſhine in your Soul. For by what has been urg'd you underſtand, that whoever is ſufficiently Practic'd in them, has his Mind ſo Ennobled and Fortify'd, that he cannot help being *Happy*, and *when Vertue and Principles are at Stake, is Indifferent to the Beſt and Worſt Viciſſi-*

Viciſſitudes of Fortune, and will be the ſame Steady, Chearful Man in ſpight of all Changes and Revolutions. For tho', 'tis true, *the Goods of the Body*, as aforeſaid, ſerve to fill up the Largeſt and Compleateſt Meaſure poſſible of Human Happineſs, yet a Man may be very Happy without them: And ſo mean and inconſiderable is their *Quota* that like *Starrs* before the *Meridian Sun*, they are loſt and bury'd in the *Radiancy* of *Vertue*. But yet as little room as, we know, they take up among the Conſtituents of our Happineſs, to deny they have any at all wou'd be a Bold and a Partial Award, and they that have paſs'd it, may do well to conſider whether or no they remember what *Firſt Natural Principles* they ſtand to. No harm can come of doing Juſtice to *theſe Inferiour Advantages*, provided the Extent of their Significancy be rightly ſtated. A Philoſopher that ſtudies *Truth*, not *Oſtentation*, will be equaly inclin'd not to overrate thoſe Conveniences which even the Vaineſt Boaſters of the High-flown Sect allow to be *Secundùm Naturam*, *Agreeable to Nature*; and to magnify the *Power* and *Supremacy*, as I may ſay, of *Vertue* and *Honeſty* to ſo high a Pitch, that the other Diminutive Advantages, tho' *Real*, ſhall hardly ſtand for any in Compariſon of *Vertue*. This is doing what's fair o'both

ſides, when we give *Vertue all her Line*, and yet value other Things according to the Worth of them. To be ſhort; The Dimenſions and Latitude of *Summum Bonum* muſt reach ſo far as we now ſuppoſe, and can reach no further. And all that the other *Schools* have done, has been only to take, each for itſelf, a *Limb* of this *Hypotheſis*, and make a Whole One out of it. *Ariſtotle* and *Theophraſtus* frequently run high in the Commendations of *Science*, and its *Intrinſick Excellency*. What does *Herillus* in his *Zeal* but ſet up Science for the *Summum Bonum*, and ſwear that nothing in the World beſide is *Valuable and Deſireable for itſelf*? The Ancients are very Full upon the Topick of ſlighting and deſpiſing Externals. *Ariſto* flies away with it all, and aſſures you that 'tis not worth while to avoid any Thing but *Vice*, nor to purſue any Thing but *Vertue*. The *Ancients* have made Indolence one of thoſe Things which are agreable to Nature; And This has been ſince *Hieronymus*'s *Summum Bonum*. *Callipho* had an Aching Tooth to *Pleaſure*, and, after him, *Diodorus* conceiv'd as high an Opinion of *Indolence*; but they thought it their beſt way to fetch in *Vertue* too; the *Good* which we had principaly recommended to them. And let the *Patrons of Pleaſure* leap from one little E-

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ſion to another as long as they pleaſe; let them talk big all the day about *Vertue*, and at laſt averr that *Pleaſure* is the *Only Firſt Deſireable*; and agen, that *Uſe* or *Cuſtom* is a *Second Nature*, and yet by reaſon of that *Second Nature* they do a great many Things without propoſing *Pleaſure* for the End of their *Acting* —— *I ſay no more of them*, but come in the laſt Place to the *Stoicks*. Now theſe Gentlemen have not retail'd, but robb'd us of all our Philoſophy at once. And as 'tis the Trick of *Common Felons*, when they have ſtole a Parcel of Goods, to deface and change the *Mark* of the *Owner*; ſo when the *Stoicks* had carried off our *Principles*, they diſguis'd the Propriety by altering the *Terms* of Expreſſion. And therefore the remaining Syſtem which is ours, is the only one well worthy all Men of Underſtanding, Ingenuity, Letters, Character; up to Magiſtrates and Monarchs. Here *Piſo* ſtopp'd, and after a ſhort Silence, Well, ſays he, What d'you think? Have I ſpoke to purpoſe in Vindication of my Cauſe? This is not the firſt time by a great many, Sir, (ſaid I) of your giving us ſo right a Notion of theſe Things, as to make us wiſh we cou'd have your help at every Turn, and then there wou'd be little Occaſion for the Aſſiſtance of the *Greeks*. Beſides, I ſhou'd be ſo much the more pleas'd with *Yours*, be-

cauſe I remember, *Staſeas* the *Neapolitan*, a *Peripatetick* of the *Firſt Form*, and your *Preceptor*, when he wou'd ſet out the Senſe of this Inſtitution, went another way to work, as being one of thoſe who maintain, that *Proſperous* or *Adverſe Fortune*, *External* or *Circumſtantial Good* and *Ill*, carry a conſiderable Sway with them. True, ſaid he, And this Expoſition, which is that of my Friend *Antiochus*, is Better and more Generous a great deal than that of *Staſeas*. But what Buſineſs is it of mine, whether my Diſcourſe has made Impreſſions upon you or not? If you can but kidnap your Kinſman, I deſire no more. For my part, ſaid *Lucius*, I think you have given us *Demonſtration*, and ſo, I do verily believe, does my Brother. What ſay you? ſaid *Piſo* to me, Shall he be mine? Or is he deſtin'd to grow famous in the Science of *Scepticiſm*, that is, of *Knowing nothing*? He's left to his Liberty, ſaid I, but withal recollect, if you pleaſe, that I have my Liberty too, to prove and approve what, I muſt be convinc'd, is very Probable and Reaſonable. No, no, ſaid he, poor Man, you cannot conceive, comprehend, or know any thing! not you! Soft and Fair, *Piſo*, ſaid I, there's no ſuch great Miſunderſtanding betwixt us as you imagine. Had you been a *Stoick*, I ſhou'd have dealt plainly with you, and told you that

that, for my Life, I cou'd have no clear Perception of things, becauſe according to that Definition of *Perception*, which has obtain'd in the *Porch*, 'tis impoſſible to be ſatisfi'd of any but thoſe *Truths* which are *Self-Evident* and cannot be Falſe. This is the Ground of the Quarrel between them and us, but as for the *Peripateticks*, we are their hearty Friends. However we'll let alone this Ball of Eternal Strife.—— One Affirmation, it ſhou'd ſeem, you dropt a little in haſt, which was, *that a Wiſe Man is always happy.* You ſlip'd it over cunningly, I don't know how. And yet if it will not hold, I am afraid *Theophraſtus*'s Doctrine muſt, *That Misfortune, Trouble, and Bodily Pain, have Power to ruin the Happineſs of Life.* Methinks it implys a *Staring* Repugnancy, that the ſame Perſon ſhou'd at the ſame time be Happy and Encompaſs'd with Evils and Calamities. I cannot tell what to make on't. Shall Vertue, ſaid he, ſuffice in her own name, and by her own Strength, to make a Man Happy? Will you allow that? or if you do, will you deny the poſſibility of a Vertuous and Good Man's being Happy under the Senſe of ſome leſſer Evils? I am perſwaded, ſaid I, that the Efficacy and Power of Vertue reaches a great way; how far exactly I ſhall take ſome other time to detetmine.

At preſent I wou'd learn, which way it can extend ſo far, if any thing beſides *Vertue* has *a real Goodneſs* in it. Strange! ſaid he, that when the *Stoicks* affirm *Vertue* to be ſufficient in its *puris naturalibus* to render us Happy, you ſhou'd ſo eaſily acquieſce, and not when the *Peripateticks* tell you ſo! What they ſcruple to call *Mala*, *Evils*, at the ſame time ſtiling them *Severities*, *Inconveniencies*, *Uneligible*, and *Croſs to Nature*, we call *Evils*, with the Limitation of *Little* or *Diminutive*. So that if a Man may be Happy in the midſt of *Rugged* and *Uneligible Circumſtances*, he may certainly be ſo in the midſt of our *Diminutive Evils*. Experience has taught me, *Piſo*, ſaid I, that no Body better diſcerns what comes up to the Point upon all Controverſial Occaſions, than yourſelf: Which obliges me to think the Fault mine, if you do not conceive what it is I make a Queſtion of, and therefore, pray attend. I'll do you reaſon, ſaid he, but then you muſt anſwer my Queſtion too. I do, ſaid I, in acquainting you, that I propoſe not at this time to compute the Forces of *Vertue*, but to examine whether *Poſitions* be conſiſtent with *Poſitions*. In what *Proceſs*? ſaid he. *Zeno*, ſaid I, has utter'd it with the Majeſty of an *Oracle*, *Vertue is alone ſufficient to render us Happy*. But Wherefore? He lets you know; *Becauſe there is*

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no other Human Good beſide Vertue. No matter whether this be True or Falſe; Thus much I am ſure of, that he talks as conſiſtently with himſelf as can be deſir'd. On the contrary, *Epicurus* has blurted it out more than once or twice, that *a Wiſe Man is always Happy*, yes and, if you'll believe him, wou'd expreſs his abſolute Unconcernedneſs, nay and his Satisfaction too, while he ſuffer'd the Extremities of a *Torture*. Now, in this place, I am not angry with him for aſcribing ſuch a Predominancy to his *Summum Bonum*; but this gives me Offence, that having before concluded *Pain* to be *the worſt of Evils*, he ſhou'd run into ſuch a Contradiction Blind-fold. Much the ſame Objection lies at your door. *Health*, *Strength*, *Stature*, *Shape*, and all the Perfections of a *Compleat Human Body*, even to the very Nails upon the Fingers, you dignifie with the Name of *Good*, and the contrary, *Deformity*, *Diſeaſe*, *Infirmity*, you call *Evil*, as do thoſe who ne'er knew whether a *Philoſopher* were a Man or a Monſter. And of theſe Externals you make very little Account. Tho' nevertheleſs on the ſcore of the *Body* they are *Good*, and therefore you juſtly look upon whatever is Effective of them, or may be a means of procuring them, to be *Good*, as *Friends*, *Children*, *Relations*, *Riches*, *Honours*, *Power*. Take notice

tice I object nothing againſt all This. But if, as you ſay, *ſuch and ſuch Things* are *Evils*, and yet may be the *Lot* of the *Wiſeſt*, how is it in the Power of *Wiſdom* alone to render us Happy? Why not? anſwer'd *Piſo*, to render us Happy, tho' not as Happy as 'tis poſſible for us to be? I have not forgot, ſaid I, how little a while ſince you ſuggeſted this Diſtinction, and that our Friend *Antiochus* is never without it. But then the Suppoſition is Harſher ſtill, that a Man can be *properly Happy*, and not *ſufficiently ſo*. The Addition of *More* to *Enough* ends in *Too Much*, *whereas no Man can be too Happy, nor Happier than Happy.* So that by your Rule *Quintus Metellus*, ſaid he, a Man of as great Wiſdom probably as *Regulus*, and who liv'd to ſee Three of his Sons *Conſuls*, one of thoſe Three created *Cenſor*, and honour'd with a *Triumph*; a Fourth a *Prætor*; and afterwards left them all in a Flouriſhing Condition, and his Daughter well marry'd, having been *Conſul*, *Cenſor*, *Augur*, himſelf, and honour'd with a *Triumph* too: had no more Happineſs to his Share than *Regulus*, (a Man of as great Wiſdom as *Metellus*) tho' *Regulus* fell into the Enemies Clutches, and was *Starv'd* and *Watch'd* to Death! Why that to me? ſaid I, You take me for a *Stoick* ſure. How wou'd the *Stoicks* confront me? ſaid he. They'd be poſitive with you,

you, *Metellus was no Happier than Regulus.* Abide by that, ſaid he, and let's hear you go on. We ſtraggle, ſaid I: 'Tis not my Deſign to examine what's true or Falſe, but who talks conſiſtently. With all my Heart, the *Stoicks*, if they pleaſe, may affirm that one of them was Happier than t'other, but let them look to't, and when they have wholly reſolv'd our *Good* into *Vertue*, and *Honeſt Principles and Practices*, and declar'd theſe to be uncapable of *Intenſion* or *Improvement*, and that the Man who has attain'd this *Single Good*, *this ſame Single Good* which is not a growing one, muſt be Happy in ſpight of his Heart, let them ſhew me afterwards, if they can, how one Man may be Happier than another. Their Sentences have more of a mutual Congruity than this comes to. The Coincidence of the ſeveral Parts of their Philoſophy, to give them their due, is admirable. All their Poſitions cloſe exactly with one another; The *Initial* match with the *Concluding*, and the *Intermediate* with Both. In a word; They have the whole Knack of ſeparating *Conſequences* from *Repugnances*. By granting a *Geometrician* his *Firſt Principles*, you give up all. So if you let it paſs, that nothing but Vertue is Good, you're oblig'd to admit Virtue for the ſole Conſtituent of a Happy Life. Try it t'other way, and

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if the latter is, the former muſt be allow'd. Now your Philoſophy cann't pretend to this. *Of the Things entit'led Good there are Three Kinds:* And ſo your *Hypotheſis* trundles down-hill till it comes to the Botom, and there it *lodges.* For, if you cou'd have your Wiſh, the Upſhot of the Whole ſhou'd be, *That a Man of Wiſdom ſtands in need of nothing elſe for the Eſtabliſhment of his Happineſs.* This is a Venerable Dictate, and worthy of *Socrates* and *Plato.* I'll ſtand to it, ſaid he. Do ſo, ſaid I, but then you are to diſprove this *Reaſoning*, *If Poverty is an Evil, a wiſe Beggar cannot be a Happy Man.* 'Tis true, *Zeno* cou'd preſume to ſtand to't, not only that he muſt be a *Happy Man*, but a *Rich* one too. *Pain* is an *Evil*; If ſo, then he cannot be happy that's under the Hands of the *Executioner.* *Children* are a *Bleſſing*; To loſe them, a *Misfortune.* *The Liberty of living at home* is an *Advantage*; *Baniſhment*, an *Evil: Health* an *Advantage*; *Sickneſs* an *Evil: A Carcaſs Whole and Sound* an *Advantage*; *To be Diſabled or Diſmember'd* an *Evil: Good Eyes* an *Advantage*; *Blindneſs* an *Evil:* Now tho' a wiſe Man can find a way to be Eaſy, perhaps, under one or more of theſe Calamities, what will he do with them all together? Suppoſe him Blind, Bedrid, Viſited with the worſt of Diſtempers, Baniſh'd, Childleſs,

leſs, Indigent, broke upon the Wheel; What will *Zeno* think now of his Condition? Is he ſtill Happy? Yes. Moſt Happy? Yes, for it has been *Zeno*'s Opinion all along, that Happineſs is as Abſolute and Unimprovable as *Vertue*, becauſe Both are the ſame. Moſt Happy? ſay you, that's Unconceivable. And is your Notion a more likely one I beſeech you? Seeing if we will be concluded by the Vulgar, there's nothing to be ſaid for the Happineſs of a Man thus loaded with Afflictions; if by the People of better Underſtanding, they may queſtion indeed, whether *Human Nature* by Dint of Vertue might enjoy itſelf in the Bull of *Phalaris*, but can never make it a *Doubt*, whether This is Reconcileable with other Things, in *Stoiciſm*, or Irreconcileable, in your Philoſophy. I perceive, ſaid he, *Theophraſtus*'s *Book of a Happy Life* has prejudic'd you. We are turning out of the Road agen, ſaid I, but however, to be free with you, if the Circumſtances *above* are truly *Evils*, I declare for the *Book*. Don't you take them to be Evils? ſaid he. That's an unlucky Demand, ſaid I. For let me anſwer which way I will, I ſhall force you to ſhuffle and dodge. Why ſo? ſaid he. Either they are Evils or not Evils: If the firſt, No Man can be Happy that's involv'd in them; If the laſt, then farewel,

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all at once, to the Scheme of the *Peripateticks*. I ſmell a *Rat*, ſaid he laughing; which is, that you ſmell another. There's Danger of your Pupil's Revolt. If he's inclin'd, ſaid I, to go over to you, he may with my free Conſent. When he's in your Intereſt he muſt be in mine. Whereupon, ſaid he to *Lucius*, *Prepare for freſh Inſtructions, for to you* (as *Theophraſtus* has it) *I ſhall direct my Diſcourſe*. Philoſophy pretends to no Merit or Dignity further than as it is the means of accompliſhing our Happineſs; after which all our Faculties and Inclinations crou'd. Herein your Brother and I are agreed. The next Enquiry is, whether the Philoſophers with all their Skill can help us to't. 'Tis certain we have a *very fair Chance*. To what Purpoſe elſe did *Plato* travel to and over *Ægypt*, collecting *Arithmetical*, *Aſtronomical*, and *Aſtrological* Obſervations among the *Barbarian Prieſts*? What Errand carried him afterwards to *Archytas* of *Tarentum*, and to thoſe other *Pythagoreans* at *Locris*, *Echecrates*, *Timæus*, *Acrion*, unleſs it were to crown the *Socratick* Philoſophy, in which its Author had made him a perfect Maſter, with the *Pythagorean*, and contract an Acquaintance with all thoſe Parts of Knowledge which *Socrates* diſregarded? What led *Pythagoras* himſelf over *Ægypt* and to the *Perſian Magi*? What made

made him ſail over ſo many Seas, and foot it over ſuch Extended Lengths of *Barbarous* Ground? Why did *Democritus* put himſelf to the like Inconveniences? Of whom 'tis at leaſt reported that, to have his Thoughts leſs Deſultory and Diſtracted, he put out his Eyes; That he let his Eſtate run to rack, is Certain. And why did he take no more Care of it, but becauſe he thought his only Buſineſs was to make his Life Happy? And therefore he devoted himſelf wholly to contemplating and examining the Oeconomy of Things, upon a proſpect that he ſhou'd at laſt by that means obtain his εὐθυμία, *Serenity and Chearfulneſs of Soul*, or as he frequently calls it, his ἀθαμβία, *Security*, which was his Notion of *Summum Bonum*; and an Excellent one, but, for all that, *Democritus* was far from bringing *Philoſophy* to Perfection. What he has contributed touching the Principles of Morality and Vertue is Inconſiderable, and Illdigeſted. This Province was left for *Socrates* who begun with it privately in this City, and afterwards exercis'd it publickly in the Place where we are met. 'Twas taken for granted at that time of Day that a Happy Life as well as a Good one is wrapt up in *Vertue*. The Men of our School made *Zeno* ſenſible of This, and what does he preſently but *move in another Form*, as the *Lawyers* word

word it? For his Senſe is the ſame with ours; and yet you make no Exceptions againſt him! We are charg'd with *Repugnancies*, and I know not what, while he ſlips his Neck out of the Collar by abſurdly changing the Terms! *Metullus*, quoth, *Zeno*, was no Happier than *Regulus*, not but he had the better Fortune of the Two, that is, the more *Eligible*, tho' not the more *Deſireable*, and were a Man left to his own Diſcretion, he'd rather be *Metellus* than *Regulus*. Here's the Difference in ſhort; I ſtile that the *Happier* Condition which he calls the *Preferable* and *more Eligible*, tho' at the ſame time I ſet no more by it than the *Stoicks*. I ſignify Things by their ordinary Names, and they trump up their own! So that whenever they begin to ſpeak, we muſt have an Interpreter, as when *Embaſſadors* or *Foreigners* are to concert Affairs with the *Senate*. Whatever is *according to Nature*, that I term *Good*; and whatever is contrary, *Evil*. So does *Chryſippus* in the Streets or at Home, as well as I, tho' the Man's *Definition-Bound* in the *School*. And is there then any ſuch great Neceſſity that the Philoſophers and the Learned ſhou'd expreſs the Value of Things in a different Strein from Unlearn'd and Ordinary People? For after all, had not theſe *Adepti* thought their very Beings of

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a Superiour Kind, when they had ſettl'd their *Valuations*, they might as well have ſpoke in the Language of their *Fellow-Mortals!* But let them coin their own Words till they're weary, they cannot alter the Nature of Things. Now then, leaſt you correct me a third time for *Expatiating*, let's return to the Charge of *Inconſiſtency*. You are pleas'd to fix it upon the *Terms*, whereas it rather ſeems to lie in the *Thing*, as you'll ſee if you take it all together. Firſt, the moſt eminent *Stoicks* contend as much as we for the Truth of this Doctrine, that ſo great is the Conſequence and Importance of *Vertue*, as infinitely to exceed all leſſer Conſiderations: Secondly, thoſe Advantages which the *Stoicks* repreſent in ſuch a manner, as tho' they had a Mind they ſhou'd make the beſt Figure poſſible, and which they recommend for *Acceptable*, *Eligible*, *Preferable*, and mention either in Terms Unheard-of and Invented by themſelves, *Producta*, for Inſtance, and *Reducta* (*as if one ſhou'd ſay Promotables and Rejectibles*) or in Terms *Equivalent* to thoſe they're diſpleas'd at; for where's the Difference between having an Inclination to a Thing and being ready to chuſe it? If there's any, that which is in *Election*, and *Choſen*, has in my Apprehenſion the better on't:

Theſe *Advantages*, I ſay, paſs with me for *Good:* Thirdly, the Queſtion is, *how Good* and *Valuable* I pretend them to be. And if theſe *Bona*, *Good Things*, as I call them, are no more *Deſireable* and *Valuable* in my Account than the *Producta* of the *Stoicks* are *Eligible* in theirs, 'tis ſure that upon being compar'd with and plac'd near the *Beams* of *Vertue*, they muſt neceſſarily diſappear, and ſhrink off. Still, that can't be properly a Happy Life, which has the leaſt Alloy of *Evil* in't. And ſo by the ſame Logick a *Yielding*, *Full-ear'd Crop*, if it harbours a *Weed*, wo'n't make amends for the Reaping! Nor a *Ship-full* of *Jewels* be worth Unlading, if a *Cable* has ſuffer'd in the *Voyage!* For is not each of theſe every way parallel to the Caſe of a Happy Life? And will you not make a Judgment of the Whole from what's known of the moſt Material Part? I hope I may with better Aſſurance call *whatever is according to Nature*, *Good*, and refuſe to cancel an Immemorial Title than affect Innovations, and diſgrace *Vertue* ſo as to put other Things in the *Scale* againſt it, for this *the Stoicks themſelves do by their Diſtinctions*, whereas *Vertue* turns the Ballance againſt the *Globe*. 'Tis a receiv'd *Uſage* to give a Thing its Denomination from that which it principaly conſiſts of. As

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we ſay, ſuppoſe, of This or That Man that he's always Merry or Pleaſant. And will it juſtifie our Inverting the Character, if once in his Life he ſhou'd have a Fit of the *Spleen*; *Lucilius* obſerves that *Marcus Craſſus* was ſeen one ſingle time to laugh, and yet, ſays the ſame Authour, he reſtrain'd his Badge of ἀγέλαστος or *Irriſible* to his dying Day. *Polycrates*, the *Samian*, is a Known Inſtance of Felicity, who never had ſuſtain'd any *Loſs* or *Inconvenience* 'till he threw a *Ring*, which was highly priz'd by him, into the Sea with his own Hand. So he wilfully created himſelf one Miſcarriage, which nevertheleſs was afterwards retriev'd when the Fiſh that had ſwallow'd the *Ring*, was taken, and cut up. And yet either this Man was never truly Happy, as being a *Tyrant*, and conſequently wanting in Wiſdom: Or if he had been a *Wiſe Man*, even then he cou'd not have been unhappy, when *Darius*'s *Præfect*, *Oroetes*, drove him to his Execution. But was he not very cruelly dealt with? He was; and for all that, *Vertue* might have made a *Moot-point* of his Calamities. Are the *Peripateticks* permitted to maintain that the Proportion of *Good* in the Life of a *Good Man*, that is to ſay, of a Man *Wiſe and Vertuous*, throughout preponderates the Proportion of his *Evil*? And, pray by the way, whoſe

Assertion is This? The *Stoicks?* Not so! 'Tis the Doctrine of that *Party* that make *Pleasure* and *Pain* the *Test* of all *Good* and *Evil*; They declare loudly that the Condition of a *Wise Man* is never without more of the former than of the latter! Now if those People who profess they wou'd not, but for the sake of a consequent *Pleasure*, so much as rise off their Couches for *Vertue*, ascribe so much to it; How are we to express ourselves, We who vouch e'r a one of the Lowest Perfections of the Mind to transcend so incomparably all the Advantages, taken together, which belong to the Body, as in a manner to null and erase their very Being? Had ever any of us the Impudence to imagine that a Wise Man tho' never so embarrass'd wou'd, if 'twere in his Power, depart from his Vertue to purchase his Ease? Or *that it may possibly be more adviseable, and the better Way, to act Basely, and Thrive, than Honestly, and Suffer*; notwithstanding we make no Scruple of calling those Things *Evils* which the *Stoicks* call *Adversities?* We can as little pardon the Defection of *Dionysius Heracleotes*, who for a Pain in his Eyes deserted his Sect, as the *Stoicks* themselves. *Zeno* had done his Best to persuade him that *Pain is no Pain*, and yet for his Life cou'd he not be convinc'd (as, in Truth

Truth, how ſhou'd any one?) that, becauſe it implies no *Moral Turpitude*, and may be manag'd, therefore there is nothing of *Evil* in't. Had he been one of us, he wou'd infallibly have ſtood his Ground, becauſe we muſt have acknowledg'd it an *Evil*. The Rules we inculcate for a Man's bearing up with Courage againſt it, are the ſame as the *Stoicks* preſs, nay, and your own *Arceſilas* too, who in his Heart was as good a *Peripatetick* as *Polemo* his Maſter, only he muſt have leave to ſplutter and wrangle in his way. For when he was tormented with the *Gout*, *Carneades*, *Epicurus*'s great *Crony*, pay'd him a Viſit, and perceiving that *Carneades* mov'd in *Dudgeon* towards the Door. *Hark you, my Friend*, ſays he, *Not ſo faſt*, (and lay'd his Hand upon his Feet and his Breaſt) *'Tis not aſcended hither yet*. Still, I warrant him, he'd have been glad to be rid on't. Thus it appears what a Bundle of *Inconſiſtencies* you meet with in my *Philoſophy!* To be ſhort, ſince under *Vertue* are comprehended ſuch Divine and Cœleſtial Excellencies, that wherever it reſides, and exerts itſelf in laudable Practices and Memorable Actions, thither *Miſery* and *Wretchedneſs* cannot approach, tho' *Pain* and *Moleſtation* may; It goes with me for Unqueſtionable, *that all Wiſe Men are always Happy, and yet one*

Wiſe Man may be Happier than another. Drive the Nail Home, Piſo, ſay'd I, and arm that Aſſertion at all points, for if you can maintain that Poſt, we ſhall be Both your Proſelytes, my dear *Cicero* and myſelf. Seriouſly, I think, ſay'd *Quintus*, there wants no farther Corroboration: And I'm exceſſively pleas'd to find true what has been ſo generaly deny'd, that that *Philoſophy* is the beſt laid together, the *Furniture* and *Equipage* of which I always preferr'd to the whole Eſtate and Subſtance of any other; having by Experience found it ſo Pregnant and Fruitful as to ſupply me with whatever Materials or Utenſils my ſort of Study requir'd. No, ſay'd *Pomponius* ban-t'ring, My *Philoſophy* for *Solidity* and *Subtilty*, againſt a Thouſand! Well but in good earneſt, you have oblig'd me, *Piſo*, by rendering what I was confident cou'd never be render'd, into *Latin*, and as pure and proper too as the *Greek* of the reſpective *Originals*. But our time is up, Gentlemen; Let us, if you pleaſe, adjourn to my Quarters. Accordingly it being conceiv'd we had done enough for once, we went along with *Pomponius* to his end of the Town.

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AN APPENDIX, BY THE TRANSLATOR.

OUR Philoſopher having in a direct and methodical Way of Confutation, firſt overthrown the Syſtem of *Epicurus* by that of the *Stoicks*, and the *Stoical* by that of the *Old Academy*, and the *Peripateticks*; or in other Words, having effectualy and demonſtratively prov'd that in Senſual or Corporeal Pleaſure cannot lie the Perfection of Human Happineſs, becauſe there are in Vertue Satisfactions better accommodated and more truly grateful to Human Nature; and agen, that Vertue alone without all the External Goods of Body and Fortune cannot accompliſh our Happineſs, becauſe we are born with a Capacity of enjoying alſo thoſe leſſer Advantages: It yet remains to be conſider'd, whether Vertue in concert with ſuch Externals, reaches the Meaſure, and makes out the whole Extent of that Felicity which falls within the Condition of our Nature. And the rather, becauſe *Piſo* himſelf has been oblig'd in the laſt Period of his Diſcourſe to make this Conceſſion, that let a Man, after all, be never ſo Wiſe, Vertuous, Fortunate, and Happy, yet Diſappointment, and Trouble, and Vexation, may gaul him ever and anon, which, even upon the Footing of his own Principles, is as much as to ſay that no Man in this World can be Happy; for

if our Happineſs muſt be deficient when any of thoſe things are wanting to it which are agreable to Nature, as certainly as Eaſe, Proſperity, and Quiet, are agreable to Nature, ſo certainly when our Affairs are diſcouraging, the Comforts and Conveniences of Life deny'd or detain'd, or any of our Purſuits or Stratagems defeated, we muſt be at leaſt proportionably Unhappy, and *out of Sorts*. Wherefore, conſidering the General Uncertainty and Variety of Intereſts and Events, and that immediate Union and Communication between the ſeveral Parts and Powers of our Nature, by vertue of which not a Fibre in our Bodies can be affected with any diſagreable Senſation, but our whole Being is in an Inſtant diſorder'd and upon the *Frett*, it is impoſſible that theſe untoward Circumſtances ſhould not frequently betide us, and conſequently our Happineſs will be Precarious, Incoherent, Incompetent, inſtead of that to which the Goodneſs of Heaven has moſt evidently created us, according to that Capacity of being Happy which it has made peculiar to Human Nature. Since therefore ſo compleat a Bleſſedneſs is Unattainable in this Life, or rather, ſince even a tolerable Degree of Happineſs is more than comes to the Share of the *Majority* of Human Kind, we may and muſt as aſſuredly depend upon its *Completion* in a Future State, provided we don't wilfully run the Riſque of Forfeiting our Title, as upon the Divine Benevolence or Veracity itſelf.

This Argument has, from three Known and Experimental Proofs, that of the Fickleneſs and Mutability of a Comfortable or a Proſperous Eſtate; that of its neceſſary Brevity; that of its Unfrequency and Imperfectneſs, been Enforc'd and Illuſtrated, as by many others, ſo particularly by a near *Relation* of mine, now among the Bleſs'd, in his Book *Of the Demonſtration of the Law of Nature*, from *Sect* 16th *to the End*; ſo that it wou'd be as ſuperfluous as unbecoming to review thoſe Evidences of a Future State, which theſe obvious and inevitable Conditions of Sublunary Happineſs afford. But beſide theſe there's another lamentable Imperfection Eſſential to it and which, tho' *Fortune* were as much at our Command as Entire, Steady, and conſtant as *Vertue*, can neither be remedy'd nor ſupply'd, but by a State of more Perfect and Plenary Happineſs in Reverſion; and that is the Inadequacy of the fulleſt and the moſt conſummat-

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Happineſs imaginable on Earth, to that *Capacity* of being Happy which belongs to Human Nature; for upon ſuppoſition, that after any Man has obtain'd, which no Man ever cou'd, a Confluence of all the Bleſſings and Enjoyments which are compatible to his Mortality, his Faculties and Powers are ſtill capable of other and greater and more durable Satisfactions, as undoubtedly as Nature always acts for Ends, and every End muſt be adequate and anſwerable to the Capacity of that Being whoſe End it is, which has been all along, and muſt ever be preſuppos'd in this Queſtion, there is reſerv'd for us after the Period of this preſent Life another Condition of Happineſs, to fill up the Meaſure and reach the full Breadth of that Capacity of being Happy, which is proper to the Nature of Man. So that if this Suppoſition be demonſtrated, the *Peripatetick Model* ſtands equaly ſelf-condemn'd with all the reſt, or rather more than any of them, becauſe that eſpecialy inſiſts upon an exact Proportion and Parity between the *End* and the *Capacity* of the *Purſuant*.

I ſhall not examine whether our Corporeal Organs and Senſories are in their preſent Condition capable of more Exquiſite and Tranſcendent Satisfactions, than thoſe General and Ordinary ones which are Common to Mankind. I do not doubt but the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Holy Men, in thoſe Viſions and Repreſentations which God exhibited to them, found the Impreſſions which were then made upon their Senſes more exhilarating and delightful, than any of the moſt Innocent and Delicious Gratifications, natural to the Conſtitution of an Human Body; And hence, I conceive, it was that St. *Peter* upon Mount *Tabor* propos'd the erecting of three Tabernacles or Reſidences, for he was there an Eye-witneſs of the μεγαλειότης of *Chriſt, his Majeſty and Regal Splendour*, and of the Honour and πρεπώδης δόξης *the Imperial Glory and Grandeur* which he receiv'd of the Father; and for this Reaſon, I conceive, as well as for the Benefit of thoſe Oracular and Important Diſcourſes which paſs'd between *Chriſt* and his two Prophets, the Apoſtle took for granted that it was *Good* for him and his Fellow-Diſciples to abide there. But then from Caſes ſo extraordinary as theſe, we can hardly infer, that our Organs are in themſelves qualify'd for the Perception and Enjoyment of any Satisfactions more Lively and Copious, than

than those which Vulgar Objects and Methods excite. And tho' perhaps by a long Series of Arguments, and a more Careful and Curious Inspection into the Structure of the Parts of the *Body* this might be shewn, or at least made probable; yet in regard the Proof requires more Time and Paper than can be conveniently allotted to this *Appendix*, and because by a shorter *Medium*, and the *more sure Word of Prophesy* we are certify'd, that hereafter the Son of God *will change our vile Body that it may be like unto his Glorious Body*, and that then we shall be admitted to a Sight and Sense of those good Things *which neither Eye has seen, nor Ear heard, neither has it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive.* I shall decline all farther Enquiries upon this Head.

The Soul of Man takes in the Three Faculties of *Apprehension, Judgment*, and *Will*, so that if by vertue of its *Apprehensive* Power it is able to entertain purer and larger Ideas, and a greater Variety, than it can procure and collect in the Station to which it is here confin'd; and so the *Judgment* being more Improv'd and better Furnish'd, might compare, distinguish, and determine more clearly, comprehensively, directly, and swiftly than now; and the *Will*, by the Advantage of such easier and more authentick Directions, take right Measures, and follow the best Byass; Then it is in a Condition to pursue and attain higher Ends, and a more perfect Felicity, than that of the *Peripatetical Summum Bonum, the Known and Ordinary Goods of the Mind and Body.* And if it is in the Power of our *Apprehensions* to receive Ideas of greater and more delectable Objects, or at least more genuin, expressive, and fair Ideas of them, than any of these Familiar ones which we meet with in this Life, it will follow that our Judgment, and Will, and those Benefits and Advantages which flow from a right Use of them, are proportionably Improvable, seeing all the wrong Motions and Errors of the Judgment and Will are occasion'd by our apprehending either imperfectly or falsly, what we seem to apprehend entirely and realy; and were our Simple Conceptions Clear and Adequate, the Principle of *Self-love* and *Self-preservation* wou'd necessitate us not to confound or misunderstand their mutual *Relations Designedly*, and if this never happen'd, the *Elective* Faculty, under the Influence of the same Principle, cou'd not but pursue and chuse as it ought, and consequently with good Success. That

That the Apprehenſive Faculty is capable of receiving and entertaining Clearer and more perfect Ideas, and of more perfect Objects than thoſe of this Life, every Man, as he is conſcious of his own Nature, cannot but know; for that by Obſervation and Application we daily multiply, rectify, and improve our Ideas of ſuch Objects as occur, and yet we find ourſelves as capable of enlarging and improving our Stock at the End of Life as at the Beginning; and the Happier we have been in our Acquiſitions of this Kind, and the more time we have ſpent in heaping up Notices and Conceptions, the more ſenſible we are as well of the Paucity of them, as the Obſcurity and the Inadequacy, and of the Sufficiency of our Apprehenſive Faculty to admit a great many more, and thoſe, as well as others collected and receiv'd, abundantly more clear and perfect. Indeed there are no *Ideas* (except the *Abſtracted*) ſo entire and conſummate, however genuin according to the meaſure and proportion of their Significancy, but what might be more Full, Conſpicuous, and Entire, than as they are exhibited. Thus for Inſtance, our *Idea* of *Light*, tho' genuin and true as we conceive it *That which affects our Organs of Seeing after ſuch a peculiar manner*, yet is Defective and General, and takes not in a diſtinct and adequate Notion of the Matter, Modifications, and Affections, out of which *Light* reſults. And we are convinc'd that our *Apprehenſion* is capable of much clearer and more perfect Ideas of that *Matter* and thoſe *Modifications* and *Affections*, if clearer and more perfect Ideas were offer'd.

And as it is not for want of Sufficiency in our Faculties that we have no clearer and more expreſſive Ideas and Impreſſions of Objects in general, ſo in particular of thoſe Objects, from the Contemplation of which our moſt natural Happineſs and Sovereign Satisfaction ariſes; for as it is the Effect of Ideas and Impreſſions communicated from without, that we feel any Symptoms or Degrees either of Pleaſure or Pain, ſo the more ample and perfect thoſe Ideas and Impreſſions are which affect with Pleaſure or Pain, the greater and more Exquiſite muſt be the Pleaſure or Pain. Of *Amiable* and *Beatifick Objects* the moſt Excellent is that Eternal Being which is Infinitely Good and Perfect, Infinitely, Powerful, Wiſe, Gracious, Juſt, and Holy; for if no Ideas but of good and excellent Objects can poſſibly affect

affect us with Comfort and Delight, then the better, and clearer Idea we have of the best and most Excellent of all Objects, the more a great deal we must perceive ourselves Delighted and Blest. And therefore as this BEING, Infinitely Wise, Benevolent and Faithful, has created Man with Intuitive and Apprehensive Faculties, of Force, tho' by no means to comprehend an adequate *Idea* of his Perfections, for then his Perfections were not Infinite, yet to receive and entertain a fuller and a more distinct Conception of his Glorious Attributes than that which he vouchsafes us in this Life; so will he, being Infinitely Wise, Benevolent and Faithful, and therefore never Erring, never Acting in Vain or Fallaciously, fill up the Measure and satisfie the Capacity of those Faculties; that is, he will most graciously vouchsafe us a fuller and a more distinct Conception of his Glorious Attributes in another Life.

Nor can it be disputed whether our Intuitive and Apprehensive Faculties are in themselves capable of entertaining a more full and distinct Idea of the Divine Attributes, than what is afforded in this Life, because, notwithstanding those Attributes are *Infinite*, and consequently *Incomprehensible*, yet we are conscious to ourselves, that were it not for the Distance of the Object, we are capable of *apprehending yet* more of that Excellency (and that more *Clearly* and *Distinctly*) which is *Infinite* and *Incomprehensible*. When I say *Distance*, let me not be mistaken, as if I meant that Word to the Derogation of God's *Ubiquity* and *Omnipresence*, (God forbid I shou'd) *for he is not far from every one of us, and in him we live, move, and have our Being*; but that which I wou'd signifie by it, is the *Remoteness of his Essential Glories and Excellencies from our Apprehensive Faculty in this Life, in Respect of that clearer Idea which we are capacitated to have of them in another.* We know that we can receive and entertain Ideas or Conceptions of the Excellencies of a *Transcendent Being* more Distinct and Lively than those we have already, if they might be communicated; tho' we cannot comprehend *adequate Ideas* of them, for that we cannot of those *Finite Beings* whose *Natures* are *more immediately* perceiv'd by us, and more *intimately* known to us. And altho' there is no *Gradation* in the *Essential Perfections of God's Attributes*, yet since our Faculties are

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Finite, there may, and muſt be in our manner of apprehending them. Thus in the firſt place we acknowledge it moſt certain that a Being Infinitely Perfect and Excellent exiſts, and then, to make out as much of the Idea of his Perfections and Excellencies as we can, we gather into One all the Ideas of Perfection and Excellence which in this Life we can collect; and as we find our Apprehenſive Faculty capable of receiving and entertaining more diſtinct and full Ideas of Perfection and Excellence than all theſe, we are ſure, as I ſaid before, that God will in another State fill up and ſatisfie that Capacity (leſt the End of its exiſting ſhould in any Meaſure be vacated) with thoſe more diſtinct and full Ideas of Perfection and Excellence, which will conſtitute a more diſtinct and perfect Idea of the Divine Attributes.

Foraſmuch therefore as the Ideas and Impreſſions of Good and Excellent Objects, ſo far as they are Good and Excellent, are the Efficient Cauſe of all our Happineſs; and as the End of our having a Capacity to entertain ſuch Ideas is, that we ſhou'd entertain them; and ſeeing that we cannot entertain them till they are communicated; and ſince we are capable of receiving and entertaining a more diſtinct and perfect Idea of the moſt Excellent, and conſequently the moſt Beatifick Object, than that which is in this Life communicated; It is as certain as that an Infinitely Wiſe and Benevolent BEING acts not in vain or fallaciouſly, that that more perfect and diſtinct Idea of Himſelf will be vouchſafed to us hereafter in another Life, if on our Parts we make that Uſe of our Faculties and Powers which he requires and expects we ſhou'd; for ſince along with our very Beings he has given us a Law and Rule of Practice adapted to the Strength and Dignity of our Nature, if we obſtinately refuſe *Performance*, we violate very fair Conditions, and have Reaſon to look for a Treatment directly oppoſite to that which our Obedience would have been rewarded with; for if we abuſe the Mercies and provoke the Juſtice of the Almighty, we are as capable and as worthy of more Terrible und Vindictive Ideas and Perceptions in another State than any known to us in this, as we are of more Glorious, Rich, and Satisfactory Ideas than thoſe of this Life, if we ſubmit and conform ourſelves to his Good Pleaſure and Commands.

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Now then at last we have carry'd up their own Argument to what the Philosophers of old cou'd neither agree about nor find, the true and proper *Summum Bonum* of *Man, the End of our Faith, even the Salvation of our Souls*, the *Beatifick Vision* itself; *for* now *we know* but *in part, but when that which is perfect is come, than that which is in part shall be done away, for now we see through a Glass darkly, but then face to face; now we know in part, but then shall we know even as also we are known*, and being *Equal unto the Angels shall in Heaven always behold the Face of our Father which is in Heaven.* To what Clearer Accounts and Fuller Discoveries we shall be admitted of the Natures of created Beings, whether Superiour or Inferiour to ourselves, is as little Material as Certain; for altho' we are also capable of *much more* distinct and comprehensive Ideas of these, yet they cannot be, as those *Future Ideas* of the *Divine Attributes, Finaly, Simply*, and *Supreamly Good*, but barely *in dependence upon*, and consideration of the *Ideas* of the *Divine Attributes*, our Knowledge of the Creatures being only Directive and Introductory to the Knowledge of the Creatour, the most Glorious and Beatifick Object of Contemplation, and therefore most evidently the *Summum Bonum*, to the contemplating of which, the Capacity of our Faculties is principaly design'd.

And be it observ'd that the Proof now advanc'd of a Future State, wherein the full Measure of our *Summum Bonum* shall be fill'd up, which in this Life we cannot have compleat and commensurate to our Faculties, is a Reasoning that holds equaly Just, whether the Soul be an Immaterial or Material Substance, because tho' it were the last, (which, I have elsewhere in *Famil. Letters* shewn it is not) the Capacity of its Apprehension will be nevertheless as large as, by the Consciousness and Experience which we have of it, we find and know it to be.

What now can more surprize a Man than that the *Philosophers* of old, after all their tedious Enquiries and close Disputes should miss of the true *Summum Bonum* by stopping short of so plain a Consequence as this? That they should employ their whole Lives in Searches after the Final Good of Human Nature, and at last take up with a partial and imperfect one, (as did the *Peripateticks* themselves, tho' theirs was the most Extensive of them all) for want of examining a little whether the Com-

Completion of it is reserv'd for another State? Especialy considering the Proof I have offer'd, obviously and directly proceeds upon that very first *Principle*, which all the *Schools* (not *Epicurus*'s excepted) presuppos'd as a *Postulatum*, that the *Summum Bonum* of Man and of every Thing else ought to be commensurate to the Capacity of their respective Natures; and *Piso* himself has already confess'd that the largest Combination of Vertues and the Goods both of Body and Fortune cannot be so. Neither is it possible to account for the strange Blindness of all those Wise and Penetrating Persons, though so long a Succession of Generations, in this as well as other Instances, but by confessing that God in an extraordinary and miraculous way darken'd and bridled their Apprehensions, having ordain'd that the *Messiah* should First convince the Gentiles of the Certainty of another Life, and enforce an universal Submission to that more Austere, and Spiritual Scheme of Morality, which he was to introduce and establish, *by bringing that Life and Immortality to Light thro' the Gospel*, which the *Profoundest Doctours* of the Heathen World only talk'd of in Conjectures and Dreams, tho' a Demonstrative Proof of it from the Nature and Constitution of Things lay just before them.

Let us all therefore, as many as profess the Faith of *Christ*, and have been by his *Gospel* confirm'd in the Belief and Hope of the Consummation of our *Summum Bonum* in a Future State, bless and magnifie the Name of *God*, who by a peculiar Favour and Mercy has reserv'd us for the times of the *Evangelical Dispensation*; Let us not only express our Thankfulness with our Lips, but our Gratitude in our Actions and Behaviour, especialy those Children of God and Heirs of Eternal Life, whom he has been pleas'd to appoint unto Sufferings in this World for the Testimony of his Truth and the Observation of his Laws. O what a ravishing Prospect! and how sure an Expectation are they fixt upon of approaching Glory and Blessedness! The Cruelties and Furies of Oppressours and Tyrants can neither terrifie nor shock them; the Impiety and Cowardize of Apostates and Hypocrites never discourage nor surprize them; no scandalous, Atheistical Renunciations of Moral Duties for the sake of Religion, tho' never so general and popular, can confound their *Understandings* or

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infect their *Conſciences*: no little fooliſh Vanities, not all thoſe Kingdoms nor the Glory of them which the Tempter ſhew'd our Bleſſed Saviour in a moment of time, can prevail with him to fall down and worſhip the Devil in their Principles and Practice. *They know that they have in Heaven a Better and a more Enduring Subſtance, and that their light Afflictions which are but for a Moment, work for them a far more exceeding and Eternal Weight of Glory.* And therefore they cannot help being Eaſy and Chearful in the midſt of thoſe Circumſtances which had utterly dejected a *Zeno* or a *Chryſippus*; When the chaſtizing Hand is over them, they joyfully receive that Severity which comes as the Earneſt of *an Hundredfolds and Everlaſting Life.* In the Bull of *Phalaris* they would celebrate the Loving-kindneſs of their Heavenly Father, encourag'd by his immutable Promiſes, and ſupported by his Holy Spirit. No wonder then if indeed they are found to *take Pleaſure in Infirmities, in Reproaches, in Neceſſities, in Perſecutions, in Diſtreſſes for Chriſt's Sake.* Theſe are not ſo much as the *Stoical Rejicienda, what One would rather refuſe than wiſh to have,* in proportion to thoſe innumerable, ſuperlative, eternal Pleaſures and Advantages which will infinitely more than compenſate for them in another State, *where Thieves cannot break through and ſteal.* In vain therefore do thoſe Principalities and Powers, whether of the Air or of the Earth, againſt which the *good Soldiers of Jeſus Chriſt* maintain a Spiritual Warfare, pretend to compel, affright or inveigle them; for *they are perſuaded that neither Death nor Life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor Things preſent, nor Things to come, nor height, or depth, or any other Creature ſhall be able to ſeperate them from the Love of God which is in Chriſt Jeſus our Lord.*

To whom be Glory for ever and ever.

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

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